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I. Introduction 
 
 A search for responsibility is unleashed, when a potentially fatal or serious event 
happens, such as a car crash or an explosion due to gas. Political actors, in need of public 
support, often choose to exploit such issues, because they can affect most citizens in their 
everyday life. The question of “who is responsible” and the need to denounce publicly 
bad and harmful actions often dominate political and media discourse. Moreover, when 
confronted with a trial, the public and, in particular, the victims concerned by the 
incriminated act often find that the sentence imposed to perpetrators is not harsh enough, 
and more specifically, not commensurate with the consequences of their acts. People find 
themselves frustrated in their search for accountability in cases where legal responsibility 
and culpability is tenuous to determine, difficult to prove or simply very low. A rift may 
thus exist between what the legal system can actually do to regulate and sanction 
behaviours and society’s expectations concerning its role. This research aims, thus, at 
understanding better how responsibility is represented and perceived in commonsense 
reasoning, when judging a person’s harmful actions.  
 
 Given the fact that this research concerns the legal system and ordinary reasoning 
about criminal responsibility, a criminological and a social psychological analysis is 
warranted in order to explore these issues. The interdisciplinary approach used in this 
research allows us to examine ordinary judgments about criminal responsibility against 
the backdrop of the legal regulation processes that organize the social context in which 
these judgments are made. The contextualization of such responsibility ascriptions is 
essential in order to understand the social underpinnings of ordinary perceptions of legal 
violations. The theoretical introduction will focus on three main issues.  
 First, the legal and criminological issues surrounding criminal responsibility and 
punishment that are important to understand the evolution and the status of criminal law 
and penal sentencing in Europe, and in Switzerland, in particular, will be described in the 
two first sections. Section 1 will consider how societal heightened concern for risk, as 
well as for crime, has shaped criminal policies and law in the past decades. A particular 
attention will be afforded to policymakers’ stance towards the increased 
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“responsibilization” of individuals and the punitive control of deviant behaviours, as well 
as the political and media exploitation of victimhood and emotion. In section 2, a 
thorough examination of the evolution of penal legislation and criminal policies in 
Switzerland will be carried out in order to demonstrate the current trend towards 
increased punitivity. 
 Second, we will review the findings of studies that focused on gaining a better 
understanding of the manner in which people in everyday life think, perceive, and 
understand the criminal justice system and the law in the two following chapters. The 
issue of public attitudes towards punishment and the criminal justice system, in terms of a 
general research overview, as well as findings that are more specific to the Swiss 
population, will be tackled in section 3. Research related to commonsense notions of law 
and responsibility, as well as to the role of social representations in ordinary reasoning 
about responsibility will be described in section 4.   
 Thirdly, this analysis will be followed by a detailed review in section 5 of relevant 
social psychological research on attribution of responsibility and blame, as well as related 
factors, such as normative, attitudinal and emotional determinants of these attributions. A 
detailed examination of research concerning the attribution of responsibility, intention 
and blame, and the relationships highlighted between these evaluations will be carried 
out. The existence of a moral and a legal dimension to responsibility and the relevant 
research supporting the assumption of a bi-dimensional model to responsibility will then 
be discussed. Finally, the role of attitudinal, normative and emotional factors in relation 
to responsibility attributions will be considered. More specifically, we will examine 
previous research findings on responsibility evaluations concerning the role of attitudinal 
factors related to punishment and locus of control, normative factors related to social 
norms and expectations, as well as negative emotions.  
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1. Socio-political determinants of criminal policies and 
legislation in Europe and in Switzerland  
  
 The study of an issue such as the attribution of criminal responsibility for fatal road 
traffic offenses, when taking into account the legal and the psychological perspective, can 
only be apprehended through the lens of an analysis of the society in which the law and 
the criminal justice system evolve in today’s world. This analysis also involves an 
understanding of the socio-economic and historical factors underlying the post-WWII 
development of criminal law and policies in western societies, and particularly, in Europe 
and Switzerland1.  
 
 Post WWII western societies were characterised by the development of a social 
welfare perspective in social policies evolving in parallel with a liberal conception of the 
criminal law which emphasized personal freedom and individual responsibility and which 
was particularly dominant in the United Kingdom (Norrie, 2009). After WWII, most 
European societies had to deal with major economic and social instability. Moreover, 
crime rates in most European countries rose from the 60s until the mid-90s. These 
increases in crime were most probably due to a post-war phenomenon of legitimation of 
violence (Archer & Gartner, 1984), From the mid-90s, depending on the countries, crime 
rates stabilized, fluctuated or fell (Aebi et al., 2006 ; van Djik, Manchin, van Kesteren & 
Gegerly, 2007). Crime control became an increasingly debated issue in political discourse 
and became a subject of worry and anxiety, but also fascination for the public. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The development of criminal law and policy in the United States will not be considered here, since it involves very distinct and 
characteristic patterns that cannot be generalized to evolution of criminal policy and penal systems in European countries (for more 
information on these differences, see Tonry, 2007). Switzerland, even though it is not a member of the European Union, is considered 
here as a European country in the geographical and socio-political sense. 
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1.1. Context of heightened concern for risk: individual responsibilization 
and punitive control for harmful acts  
 
 Western societies have seen major economic, social and cultural changes after WWII 
which affected such domains of life as consumerism patterns, familial structures and ties, 
religious practices, a reorganisation of time and space linked to the use of cars and road 
infrastructures, as well as the development of the media and general societal values 
(Garland, 2007). These changes bear witness to the advent of late modernity. Such late 
modern societies are also characterised by a focus on risk and its control (Hudson, 2003), 
whereby heightened concerns for risk are a distinguishing feature. Such social contexts, 
also known as “risk societies” (Beck, 1992), tend to favour security over liberty. This 
preoccupation for risk is generalised and widespread throughout all domains of 
contemporary society and thinking. Modernity and related technological or scientific 
evolutions are, in this context, considered more as involving risks than as a source of 
benefits and opportunities. According to this perspective, such risk-oriented way of 
reasoning is an integral and routine part of our thinking and social regulation processes 
(Rose, 2000).  
 
 This orientation has several consequences according to social theorists such as Beck 
(1992) and Giddens (1990). Expectations concerning the mastery of the social and natural 
environment, which are typical of our modern societies, involve the need for all risk to be 
defined and controlled. The realisation that these expectations can never be totally 
satisfied results in a growing distrust for expert knowledge. This mistrust concerns of 
course also the criminal justice system and its “experts” and results in perceptions of 
leniency in sentencing practices, of miscarriages of justice, of the inefficiency to control 
and deter crime, as well as low confidence in the administration of justice. This lack of 
trust is also apparent in social interactions. Modern societies are indeed characterised by 
growing individualism, as well as the loss of traditional values and the loosening of social 
bonds, which create the ideal breeding ground for people to feel threatened by each other. 
 The emphasis on risk and safety has also had consequences on criminal justice theory 
and policy. This influence is embedded in the emergence of a “new penology” (Feeley & 
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Simon, 1994), where offenders are more identified according to the degree of risk they 
pose to society and less as individuals whose criminal and culpable behaviours troubled 
the social order. This “new penology” implies the use of actuarial-based penal 
techniques, such as statistically-based risk assessment methods, or risk avoidance 
measures, such as closed circuit television. Governance is focused on provision of 
security or risk management: citizens accept to trade-off some of their freedom in return 
for a greater level of security provided by the government (Foucault, 1991). This 
phenomena, although less prevalent in European countries (except for the United 
Kingdom), than in the US, have an increasing influence on crime control policies 
throughout the western world. Actuarial judgments are used in courts to determine the 
likelihood of an offender to reoffend and the danger he/she poses to society, which in turn 
have an influence of the sentencing type and quantum (Gendreau, Little & Goggin, 
1996). Thus, the evaluation concerns whether the offender possesses or not the 
characteristics associated with reoffending, that is, the risk factors, whether social or 
personal, that increase the probability of recidivism (Hannah-Moffat, 1999). However, as 
Hudson (2003) warns: “with the new, actuarial justice, the “truth” of an assessment lies in 
correctly identifying the factors, not whether an individual really would or would not 
reoffend”. The increasing focus on risk control might erode principles that are essential 
for penal systems such as due process and proportionality.  
 Let us add that this new concern for risk has also consequences for the attribution of 
responsibility and blame. As Douglas (1992) suggests, risks can be attributed to different 
sources depending on the society and individualistic cultures could be more likely to 
attribute these risks to the members of the “weak” categories (the poor, the foreigners, the 
deviants). Members of marginalized categories, acting as scape-goats chosen by society 
to symbolize their fears, are pinpointed as representing the source of all evil that has to be 
eradicated to live in a secure world (Dollard et al., 1974; Robert, 1986). Thus, western 
societies tend to blame the criminal, but not social and structural factors, such as social 
inequalities or unemployment as causes of crime. This also has an incidence on the way 
in which the criminal justice system attributes blame for risks: risks of all kinds will be 
primarily related to the wrongdoing of individuals and not to providence or ignorance of 
rules. The search for responsibility and its unequivocal focus on individuals has become a 
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central aim in our society and in the legal system (Giddens, 1999; Lacey, 2001). 
Probabilistic and moral perspectives of crime control are thus now combined in the 
“blaming the individual” discourse concerning risk. However, this individualisation of 
responsibility for harm is coupled with a focus on making the collective accountable for 
risk management (Hier, 2008). This is, for example, the case when authorities initiate 
campaigns promoting preventative measures each citizen must take to avoid a burglary or 
reminding parents to keep their children under supervision.  
 Proponents of the risk-society thesis suggest also that this blame-orientation results 
also in punitive populism (Bottoms, 1995; Garland, 2000). They argue that politicians 
and the public in such risk-control cultures are likely to express the need for unrealistic 
levels of safety, which could lead to an increasing repression and criminalisation of those 
behaviours that are pinpointed as posing a risk for the society. Politicians are also often 
accused of using the sensationalistic media to stimulate public acceptance of such harsh 
policies, by highlighting the many risks that can plague their everyday life and by 
exploiting the suffering of the victims who have encountered such dangers. These media 
representations have of course the intended effect of giving a distorted and 
disproportionate perspective of these risks and will thus contribute to the creation of 
unfounded anxieties and support for a harsher stance in crime policy in the population. 
Let us however bring a nuance to the risk-society thesis and its relationship to punitive 
populism, in particular. Although this relationship is clearly applicable to the English 
context, it may less be the case for other countries in Europe and Switzerland, in 
particular (Tonry, 1999, 2007).  
 
 Still, one cannot deny that current criminal policies are guided by an actuarial logic of 
prevention of the risk of criminal actions (Languin, Kellerhals & Robert, 2006; Zedner, 
2009). Punishment, which aimed mostly at “normalizing the deviant individual”, is now, 
considered primarily as a means to promote and maintain security (Garland, 2007). This 
“punitive fervour” has led to the multiplication of criminal laws in many European 
countries and harsher sentences for certain deviant acts (Muchielli, 2008). There is no 
doubt that our post-modern societies are characterized by an increasing 
“disciplinarization” and criminalization (Bauman, 1992; Muchielli, 2010; Wagner, 1993). 
 16 
 
Moreover, a trend towards increased accountability seems to legitimize this emphasis on 
punitiveness as a morally proper response to individual criminal acts (Norrie, 2009). 
Thus, one can notice the emergence of new forms of regulation in Europe, such as those 
pertaining to anti-social behaviour (Ramsay, 2004), corporal punishment (Sebba, 2009) 
or driving offenses (Cunningham, 2008). Behaviours that amount to incivilities, such as 
begging or loitering, are now the object of a greater social control that takes on various 
forms such as surveillance, repression or exclusion (Lianos, 2000). Our society has 
become intolerant: any form of violence and behaviours that were once tolerated, even 
though considered as exaggerated or deviant, have now become intolerable (Mucchielli, 
2010). A behaviour that was widely practiced a few decades ago, such as spanking one’s 
child, is now considered as an act that should be prohibited by many specialists 
(Bitensky, 2006). Many European countries (Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Latvia and Sweden) have adopted policies or laws in that direction. This 
prohibition movement has been followed by a General Comment formulated by the 
Children’s Rights Committee asserting an unequivocal right for children to be protected 
from corporal punishment2. Given such normative declarations, it is reasonable to think 
that criminalization of such conduct will be generally applied in other countries in the 
near future. As for Switzerland, calls for a ban of corporal punishment are increasing in 
the political3 and the associative field4. However, many people, including specialists, are 
divided on the potential harmfulness on children of corporal punishment as a means to 
discipline (Gershoff, 2002). The boundaries between unpleasant and criminal behaviours 
or between crime and nuisance have thus become significantly blurred. This could be 
explained by Hunt’s analysis (2003) of an increasing fuzziness in the limits separating 
morality from immorality in the past century. Everyday activities are increasingly 
analysed in terms of their goodness or badness, of their wrongness or rightness, or of 
their healthiness or unhealthy nature. Society tends to confer a moral status to certain 
behaviours, especially when they are found to have harmful effects, and, thus, powerfully 
                                                 
2
 Committee on the Rights of the Child to Protection from Corporal Punishment and Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment. 
General Comment No 8 (42nd Sess.), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/8, 15 May-2 June 2006.  
3
 See Motion CAJ-CN 96.3176 on the legal prohibition of corporal punishment and degrading treatment of children. Postulate CAJ-
CN 96.3177 on dispositions concerning the protection of childhood in the Federal Constitution. See also the parliamentary initiative 
Vermont-Mangold 06.419 of March 24th 2006 to protect better children again violence.  
4
 The Swiss foundation for the protection of childhood has been campaigning against corporal punishment and has instated since 2003 
a day for non-violent education (No hitting day). For more information, see www.kinderschutz.ch. Parliamentary debates on the issue 
of banning corporal punishment have recently also taken place in Switzerland.  
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change their moral significance. This process of moralization, as Rozin (1999) termed it, 
means that a behaviour, which was once accepted in a society, can be progressively 
perceived as violation of societal values. For example, in the space of a few decades, 
harmful addictive behaviours, such as cigarette smoking or alcoholism, that were once 
tolerated and considered as an action that was the product of free will, are increasingly 
the object of intense moral disapproval and feelings of disgust. 
  Finally, let us add that the idea of an increasing consideration for controlling risk is 
also applicable to the Swiss context, as demonstrated by the emergence of new 
legislations such as those pertaining to the incapacitation of dangerous offenders or the 
imprescriptibility of sexual acts committed on children. These issues will be the subject 
of a more detailed discussion further. Moreover, the political exploitation of certain risk-
related issues, such as sexual abuse of children, the increasing occurrence of violent 
crimes or fatal road traffic offenses due to dangerous drivers, has been clearly relayed or 
reflected by sensationalistic and disproportionate media representations of crime and 
victims in Switzerland. The criminal justice system in Switzerland is also affected to a 
certain extent by this risk and control orientation as will be demonstrated further. 
 
1.2. Public concern for crime: the role of emotions, victims and the media  
 
 Considerable changes have occurred in the last 30 years, in terms of the management 
of crime and public order, as well as in terms of contemporaneous mental representations 
of the criminal justice system and criminal acts (Garland, 2001). The ever-increasing 
attention of the media for criminality and insecurity has lead, in contribution with the 
exploitation of these matters by political discourse, to a heightened sensitivity of the 
public to the risk of being a victim. Daily exposure to sensationalized representations of 
crime depicted by tabloids and the greater salience of the mass media in ordinary 
people’s lives offer an inflated picture of the prevalence of crime (Pfeiffer, Windzio & 
Kleinmann, 2005). Moreover, in stark contrast with the rather weak attention afforded to 
crime at the beginning of televisual broadcasting, current representations of criminality 
and news briefs about local incidents have acquired a status of their own as newsworthy 
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issues and have become an integral part of people’s everyday intake of information 
(Sécail, 2010). Crime has become a major subject of popular conversations and political 
debates. Images of sanctified victims and dramatic depictions of violent acts are 
pinpointed in political discourse using language that appeals to the emotions of the public 
(Garland, 2007). Crime is the object of societal fascination but also public anxiety. This 
can lead to a growing demand for social order and security measures, but also to a better 
awareness of measures to prevent the occurrence of crime and the consequences of crime 
in terms of victimization.  
 Victims have been afforded an increased role and position in the moral vindication of 
crime (Rauschenbach, 2009; Sebba, 2009). Indeed, in addition to an increasing exposure 
to information about the risk of victimisation and to the plight of victims whose suffering 
is politically exploited, our society is also evolving in a climate of growing compassion 
for victimisation and of sensitivity to emotions (Furedi, 2002; Erner, 2006). In this 
context of “emotionalization” of social interactions (Williams, 2001), the public’s 
reactions of compassion to the suffering of victims can thus be used by politicians and the 
media to justify harsher sentences and an increased criminalisation of certain behaviours 
(Walklate, 2007). Stereotyped media representations of the offender and the victim, as 
incarnating the opposition between the Bad (cold blooded and unremorseful killer) and 
the Good (the innocent victim) can, in these circumstances, contribute to a positive 
influence of political populist punitive discourse on the public’s representations of 
criminal policy. Let us add that the criminal justice system itself seems to have become 
emotionalised, since more space than ever is given to the expression of individual 
emotions in the legal realm and in legal processes (Karstedt, 2002). The penal system is 
becoming more and more responsive to collective and public emotions and this trend is 
also quite clearly occurring in criminal policy-making, as well as in the courts (Laster et 
O’Malley, 1996). 
 The emotion-oriented climate explains also the prominent position of victims in the 
criminal justice system and in legal debates (Walklate, 2007). Victims are now 
acknowledged by the legal system, not only as participants to the criminal justice process, 
but also in terms of their suffering and their expectations of moral restoration and 
recognition. This current rise of victims in the penal scene is observed in the evolution of 
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legislation, but also in terms of everyday judicial practice. Let us add that the concern for 
crime victim rights emerged in a time where the enforcement and advocacy of human 
rights and the issue of minority rights were gaining increasing importance in international 
politics (Elias, 1986). In the same vein, one should mention that victims’ movements 
developed in parallel to and following the actions for increased rights carried out by 
various social groups such as women, workers, homosexuals or oppressed minorities. 
Through the actions of such oppressed groups, new victims were brought to light and 
new forms of violence were denounced: victims of domestic violence, workers submitted 
to exploitative work conditions, discriminated ethnic minorities or victims of 
homophobia.  
 Consideration for the suffering of victims is emphasized in the recommendations 
made by supranational European and International bodies. On the international level, one 
should first of all mention the 1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. This instrument is considered to reflect “the 
collective will of the international community to restore the balance between fundamental 
rights of suspects and offenders, and the rights and interests of victims”. Among other 
recommendations, it states that victims “are entitled to access to the mechanisms of 
justice and to prompt redress, as provided for by national legislation, for the harm that 
they have suffered”. Moreover, the 1985 recommendation of the Council of Europe 
advocated explicitly that “the needs of the victim should be taken into account to a 
greater degree, throughout all stages of the criminal justice process” 5. The Council of 
Europe, in addition to the adoption of a Convention on the compensation of victims of 
violent crimes6, made other recommendations7 related to victim rights issues. More 
recently, the Council of Ministers of the European Union also agreed upon a Framework 
Decision on the standing of victims of crime in criminal proceedings8 that recommends 
that member States should show “particular regard to the right to be treated with respect 
for their dignity, the right to provide and receive information, the right to understand and 
                                                 
5
 7th consid. of the Council of Europe recommendations R(85) 11 of June 25th 1985 on "the position of the victim in the framework of 
criminal law and procedure 
6
 Adopted on November 24th 1983 
7
 See the Council of Europe recommendations R(87) 21 of September 17th 1987 on "assistance to victims and the prevention of 
victimisation", R (99) 19 concerning “mediation in penal matters” and R(2006)8 on “assistance to crime victims”.  
8
 See the Council of Europe Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims of crime in criminal proceedings 
(2001/220/JHA) OJ, L82, 22 March 2001, p 1-4 
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be understood, the right to be protected at the various stages of procedure “9. It also 
recommends that its provisions do not only aim at the protection of the interests of 
victims in the criminal justice process stricto sensu, but that they also involve the 
development of necessary measures to assist victim during their entire experience with 
the criminal justice system in order to attenuate any suffering incurred during this 
period10.   
 However, the idea, which is largely supported by certain victim rights movements, 
that a penal sanction can symbolically restore victims psychologically and morally, as 
well as acknowledge their status and their suffering, turns out often to be only an illusion 
(Cesoni & Rechtman, 2005). The criminal justice processes, and, particularly the trial, are 
anything but therapeutic experiences for victims. They require victims to relive the 
violence suffered through the testimony at the trial, as well as at hearings. But these 
multiple and detailed recollections may create a risk of secondary victimization (Angle, 
Malam & Carey, 2003; Eliacheff & Soulez Larivière, 2007). Victims are often 
disappointed by their experience of the criminal justice process. Once their case is dealt 
with by the justice system, they are left with the lingering feeling that they did not obtain 
the acknowledgment of their suffering by a legal institution, which is indifferent to their 
needs and emotions (Rauschenbach, 2010a).  
 One should also mention the often-argued issue that criminal law reforms can be 
“victim driven” (Sebba, 2009). Legislation concerning such crimes as domestic violence, 
rape, sexual harassment, hate crimes, corporal punishment or human trafficking has been 
the object of much expansion and debates. This trend is not new as such, according to 
Kirchengast (2006), who claims that “the victim has always played a fundamental role in 
the formation of criminal law and justice on both a procedural and substantive level” and 
that “the genealogy of the victim is a vital aspect of the genesis of modern criminal law 
and procedure in common law systems”. What could be new in this victim-oriented 
criminalization trend is the influence of victims’ rights organizations and of the increased 
sensitivity to victim issues, which characterizes our contemporary society. One notable 
example of influence of victims’ rights organizations that comes to mind is the influence 
of Mothers against Drunk Drivers (MADD) in the United States, which was instrumental 
                                                 
9
 8th consid. of the Council of Europe Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 
10
 6th consid. of the Council of Europe Framework Decision of 15 March 2001  
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in the reform of laws relating to drinking and driving. These laws appealed to many 
members of the public, because they referred directly to a representation of a drunken 
driver as being a dangerous criminal that poses the risk of killing young and innocent 
children. They thus obtained quite an amount of public support. An emblematical 
example in Switzerland is the recent modification of legislation pertaining to the 
imprescriptibility of sexual acts committed on children. This modification is the result of 
a popular initiative11 generated by a child abuse victims association called “Marche 
Blanche”. This initiative demanded that penal action and sanctions become 
imprescriptible for “punishable acts of sexual nature or pornographic acts committed on 
an impuber child”. Considering that this initiative was excessive, the Federal Council 
opposed a counter-project proposing to apply the prescription delay of penal action, for 
serious offenses against physical integrity12, against life13 and against sexual integrity14 of 
children aged less than 16, to their majority, that is, 18 years of age15. The Parliament and 
the Federal Council had recommended that Swiss citizens reject the popular initiative and 
to vote for the counter-project, because they considered that the latter project created 
more problems than it resolved, and that it was not adapted to the needs of child victims 
of sexual abuse16 (for more information, see Rauschenbach, 2009). However, Swiss 
citizens, confronted with both the initiative and the counter-project, chose to adopt the 
former proposition by popular vote in November 2008. Following this, the Federal Office 
of Justice was mandated to elaborate a proposition to implement this initiative and to 
clarify the terminology used in this initiative which was considered fuzzy, such as 
“prepubescent child” and “punishable act of a sexual or pornographic nature”. Thus, the 
Federal Council decided to develop another modification to the penal code and the 
military penal code in order to tackle those issues17. This legislative project is currently 
under examination. We will not go into the details of these modifications, as this is not 
                                                 
11
 Initiative populaire fédérale pour « l’imprescriptibilité des actes d’ordre sexuel ou pornographique sur des enfants impubères ». See 
website http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis329t.html. Last visited on February 21st 2011.  
12
 Art. 122 of the Swiss penal code (CP) 
13
 Art. 111 à 113 of the Swiss penal code (CP) 
14
 Art. 182, 189 à 191 et 195 of the Swiss penal code (CP) 
15
 See Message concerning the popular initiative for « the imprescriptibility of child pornographic acts » and the Federal law on the 
prescription of penal action in cases of offenses against children (modification of the Penal code and the military penal code) of June 
27th 2007.  
16
 See the Federal Department of Justice and Police’s press release of October 21th 2008 concerning “actes of child pornography: the 
imprescriptibility is not the best of solutions”.  
17
 See Federal Department of Justice and Police’s press release of May 26th 2010 on the implementation of the initiative for the 
imprescriptibility of child pronographic acts. 
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the purpose of this discussion. Suffice is to observe that a popular initiative born through 
the public’s collective emotions stirred up by such words as “children” or “victim” was 
largely supported by a majority of voting citizens of a democratic country, despite its 
clear rejection by most political, legal and psychological actors, as well as specialists. 
However, by ignoring such rational arguments against this initiative, the Swiss citizens 
took a decision that may not, in the end, serve the interests of the victims in the name of 
whom they thought they were voting (Rauschenbach, 2009). This example shows the 
potential downsides of the influence of victim associations on penal reform.  
 Finally, in this context of increased victim-sensitivity of the public, let us add that the 
political arena can also be instrumental in using victims or their families in order to 
influence penal reforms. For example, a law, such as Megan’s law, directly appealed to 
the public’s emotions: the title of the law refers to a young child whose victimization 
justified the development of a sex-offender notification law (Simon, 2000). This “politics 
of identity” phenomenon shows the new influence of victims on criminal policymaking. 
Thus, as Sebba (2009) suggests, the influence of victims on the criminalization process is 
qualitatively different from their past influence on this process.  
 
 As discussed until now, penal policies can be affected by rises in crime, but also by 
variations in public sensitivities towards crime and victims, the relative influence of the 
media on policymaking, as well as the structure of the political and legislative system. 
However, the manner in which penal policies evolve from one European country to 
another differs due to cultural, historical, constitutional and political particularities 
(Tonry, 2007). Current penal policies are generally less punitive in most European 
countries (except for the UK) compared to the US, because they are more based on 
professional views than on populist demands for harsher sentences. Moreover, in most 
European countries, the judiciary is characterised by political neutrality and professional 
impartiality and are, thus relatively independent of political manipulations compared to 
the American judicial system. In a country like Switzerland, which is of particular 
interest here, public emotions and moral panic phenomena probably do not affect 
criminal justice policy as much, because of the importance afforded to professional 
norms of independence and impartiality that characterises its legal system.  
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 Thus, no dramatic punitive turn has been observed in Switzerland. To the contrary, 
the criminal system is less punitive compared to the beginning of the 20th century. As 
observed for Finland, Norway or Germany (Lappi-Seppala, 2007; Roché, 2007), we 
would argue that punitive-oriented political discourse and electoral pledges for harsher 
laws and sanctioning policies rarely seem to result in the implementation of stricter 
policies and legislation in Switzerland. However, some recent changes in the Swiss legal 
scene are worth mentioning, as they attest to a movement towards heightened 
punitiveness that could affect more criminal policy than actual sentencing practices.  
 
 
2. The evolution of penal legislation and criminal policies in 
Switzerland: punitivity on the rise 
 
2.1. The status of the Swiss legislation pertaining to sentencing practices 
and penal sanctions  
 
 Swiss criminal law is characterized by a continental and civil law tradition and its 
development, in terms of sentencing laws and practices, was influenced mainly by the 
French and German law. Judges in Switzerland enjoy a wide sentencing discretion and 
there are no sentencing guidelines, only rules concerning aggravating and mitigating 
factors and general principles. Judges must motivate their decisions in terms of the type 
of punishment and the particular sentence they chose to impose. The conformity of 
sentences imposed by cantonal courts with criminal code criteria and the interpretation of 
these principles is evaluated by the Swiss Supreme Court.  
 
 In terms of penal legislation concerning the sentencing system, practices in 
Switzerland have shown many transformations in the last decade. The Criminal Code was 
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revised in 2002 and in 2006, and is currently the object of another revision18. In a 
nutshell, we shall try to explain the main changes that were implemented in the 2002 and 
2006 revisions, and describe the changes that are likely to appear in the current revision. 
The 2002 and 2006 revisions will be covered together and considered as a single revision, 
since the 2002 revised version was the object of further modifications in 200619, even 
before it came into force and even though it had already been adopted by the Parliament. 
All these modifications came into force on January the 1st 2007. They concerned mainly 
the separation of the criminal law for minors from the one pertaining to adults and 
various reforms and changes in the sentencing system. As far as the transformations of 
the sentencing system are concerned, we only mention one alteration, which is of 
particular importance for the discussion here. This modification concerns the will to 
make the imposition of short-time prison sentences an exceptional rather than a regular 
practice, as they do not correspond to the sentencing philosophy of social reintegration 
guiding the Swiss penal system. Day fines and community service orders are to replace 
short-term custodial sentences, whenever possible.  
 However, this dramatic change towards the replacement of short custodial sentences 
with day fines and community service orders was not well received by some members of 
certain political parties who decided to counter these new modifications by invoking their 
leniency (Kuhn, 2008). Critical opinions against this sentencing system were increasingly 
expressed through various parliamentary interventions, some of which were accepted by 
the National Council during a special summer session in 200920. The parliament then 
accepted to examine these motions. A new legislative project, which includes certain 
adaptations that can be rapidly enacted, is, thus, currently being developed. It should 
follow the recommendations of the majority of cantons concerning the need to re-
establish the possibility to impose short custodial sentences, the need to abolish the 
                                                 
18
 See « Rapport explicatif relatif à la modification du code pénal et du code pénal militaire (réforme du droit des sanctions) et 
communiqué de presse du département fédéral de justice et police du 30 juin 2010 ». 
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/ejpd/fr/home/themen/sicherheit/ref_gesetzgebung/ref_sanktionensystem.html. Last visited on 
September 23rd 2010.  
19
 See « Message relatif à la modification du code penal dans sa version du 13 décembre 2002 et du code penal militaire dans sa 
version du 21 mars 2003 » of June 29th 2005. 
http://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/fr/home/themen/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/abgeschlossene_projekte/strafgesetzbuch_allg.html. Last visited 
on March 24th 2011. This revision allowed namely the inclusion of provisions relating to internment (extension of the list of 
infractions that can lead to an internment and possibilities for internment a posteriori) and a provision autorizing the combination of a 
suspended sentence and an unsuspended day fine or a fine. The modification of the Criminal code was accepted on the 24th of March 
2006. See RO 2006 3539 
20
 See BO 2009 N987 
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possibility for suspended day fines and community service orders and the possibility to 
introduce in the law a minimum sum for day fines. As for the abolition of suspended day 
fines and community service orders, it is interesting to note that this recommendation is 
justified by many because of the lack of deterrent effect inherent to such types of 
sanctions. Another stated objective of this revision which is noteworthy is the suggestion 
to give less importance to day fines and, thus, to eliminate the primacy of this sanction on 
custodial sentences21.  
 Finally, a recent decision by the Swiss Federal Council to operate certain adjustments 
to the special part of the Swiss Penal Code in terms of the provisions pertaining to 
sanctions related to various offenses should be highlighted22. In this context, it is worth 
mentioning that the special part of the Swiss Penal Code has been the object of 42 
modifications during the period lasting from 1978 to 2010. This latest revision will aim, 
for the first time in the history of Swiss Criminal law, to examine for each provision the 
correspondence between the sanction incurred and the gravity of the offense, as well as to 
compare sanctions incurred for offenses of similar seriousness. Such a detailed review is 
considered necessary in order for judges to have a more flexible range of sanction 
possibilities. Such adjustments aim to widen their margin of appreciation to pronounce 
sanctions that are adapted to the blameworthiness of the perpetrator. This latest 
legislative project will also result in a more punitive stance for sanctioning, among other 
offenses, violent offenses amounting to negligent homicide (art. 117), negligence causing 
serious bodily harm (art. 125, al.2), causing serious bodily harm (art. 122), endangerment 
of others’ lives (art. 129), robbery (art. 140) or representation of violence (art. 135). 
Other offenses, on the contrary, will incur less severe sentences, such as forcible entry 
(art. 186). Modifications directed at tougher sanctions for violent offenses are deemed 
“necessary and judicious” according to the explanatory report of the Federal Council on 
the reform of the sentencing law. They are justified, according to this report, in that they 
respond to a public opinion and to politicians expressing concerns about the leniency of 
                                                 
21
 See Rapport explicatif relatif à la modification du code pénal et du code pénal militaire (réforme du droit des sanctions). 
http://www.bj.admin.ch/content/bj/fr/home/themen/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/sanktionensystem.html. Last visited on January 25th 
2011.  
22
 See Rapport explicatif relatif à la loi fédérale sur l’harmonisation des peines dans le code pénal, le code pénal militaire et le droit 
pénal accessoire of the 8th of september 2010. 
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/ejpd/fr/home/themen/sicherheit/ref_gesetzgebung/ref_strafrahmenharmonisierung.html. Last 
visited on September 23rd 2010.  
 26 
 
sentencing practices in Switzerland. Another justification invoked by the Federal Council 
that indicates the importance of public opinion in legislative changes is that such 
alterations of the sanctioning practices aim to reassure citizens who are feeling 
increasingly insecure in the public sphere.  
 Political actors seem thus to be inclined to adopt and revise legislation relative to 
sentencing practices and criminal policy in a rather frenetic and impulsive manner, which 
reflects an overall climate of increased penal repression (Killias, 2006). This repressive 
mood seems somewhat to be getting out of control on and off since it has even lead in the 
last decade in Switzerland to the submission to popular vote of several propositions for 
penal reforms that are contrary to basic human rights. Two such reforms, which have 
been accepted recently by the Swiss population, are particularly noteworthy in this 
aspect. The first one concerns life internment for dangerous offenders and the other 
concerns the expulsion of foreign offenders. Since these penal reforms constitute a very 
significant and revealing reflection of the current criminal policy context in Switzerland, 
they will be discussed briefly. This will enable us to lay the framework for addressing the 
matter at hand in this research, which concerns road-traffic offenses and their regulation 
in Swiss penal law.  
 
2.2. The case of penal legislation concerning life internment for dangerous 
offenders and the expulsion of foreign criminals 
 
 To begin with the discussion on life internment for dangerous offenders, a brief 
introduction about the philosophies guiding sentencing in Switzerland is warranted. The 
principal aim of sanctions in Switzerland is the reintegration of the offender in society 
and the improvement of his social skills. Penal sanctions are, thus, considered as an 
ultimo ratio. In other words, they are to be used only if the behaviours that are being 
sanctioned cannot be dealt with other types of sanctions. Thus, the advantages of 
penalizing behaviours must outweigh, in the collective sense, the social and individual 
inconveniences it involves (Graven, 1988). Yet, when a penal sanction is necessary and 
includes an imprisonment sentence, retribution is the guiding principle in the Swiss 
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criminal justice system (Roth, 2009). This guiding principle emphasizes on the necessity 
to individualize sanctions, as well as to rehabilitate offenders through education and 
training aiming at improving their social skills and preventing further offending23. 
However, recently incapacitation has been emphasized as a more appropriate sentencing 
objective for the specific case of dangerous offenders, than retribution or social 
reintegration aims. The recent inclusion in the Swiss penal code of provisions allowing 
the internment for life of extremely dangerous offenders supports this observation.  
 
 The inclusion of such a provision was the result of a popular initiative, accepted in 
2004 by 56.2% of Swiss citizens, which provided for the possibility of life internment for 
extremely dangerous offenders. One should note here that this initiative had, prior to its 
public approval, elicited an unfavourable judgment from the part of the Federal Council 
and the Parliament, since both of them had recommended its rejection24. This initiative 
resulted in the introduction of a new provision in the Constitution (art. 123a Cst) which 
has as a stated objective the incapacitation of persons who are considered dangerous, who 
committed serious offenses25 and who demonstrate a great risk of recidivism for such 
acts. Thus, for such a measure to be pronounced, it should be demonstrated that it is 
highly likely that the offender will commit similar acts and that he appears to be beyond 
redemption. According to this provision, these persons are not entitled to a leave of 
absence and their possible release is dependent on further scientific knowledge that could 
establish their potential for reform and their non-dangerousness for society. However, the 
legitimacy of such a provision is questionable, since the release of an offender who is 
interned for life should not only depend on scientific developments, but also on potential 
improvements that could have been observed in this person (Kuhn, 2010). Moreover, this 
provision also stipulates that the decision of life internment can be lifted by a judge based 
on the assessment of at least two independent experts. But whoever expresses an opinion 
in favour of lifting the life internment for a given case will also be accountable in case of 
recidivism according to this provision. This could in effect discourage experts from 
expressing such a favourable opinion (Jung, 2008). This also increases the likelihood that 
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 Art. 75 of the Swiss penal code CP  
24
 Message of June 20th 2003 declaring the popular initiative valid and recommending its rejection (FF 2003 3979) 
25
 See art. 64, al. 1 of the Swiss penal code for more details on the types of offenses that are considered serious. 
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the judge may never take the risk of releasing the interned person, in light of the 
difficulties related to predicting accurately recidivism for dangerousness. Indeed, this 
qualification is not based on any valid medical or legal definition (Gravier, 2008), but 
based on statistical and probabilistic assessments, which are characteristic of actuarial 
justice (Pratt, 2001). The risk of violence can only be limited, but not predicted. The 
inaccuracy of such actuarial methods creates the risk of false-positives. This means that it 
is likely that incorrect predictions of a high probability of recidivism will be produced, 
since it is difficult to guarantee valid prognoses for indeterminate periods of time (Ebner, 
Dittmann & Kurt, 2005). Let us add that provisions, for the enforcement of art. 123a, 
have been developed in order to specify its conditions of implementation26. This article 
was indeed considered somewhat imprecise in terms of its conditions and the procedure 
of re-examination of the internment (Jeanneret, Kuhn & Moreillon, 2007). Moreover, this 
legislative modification was, in some respects, incompatible with the respect of basic 
human rights, such as those guaranteed by article 5 of the European Human Rights 
Convention or article 9 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights27. Provisions for the enforcement of article 123a regulating the conditions 
in which a life internment decision can be made by a judge were adopted on December 
21st 2007. These provisions necessitated a modification of the Penal Code, which came 
into force on August the 1st 200828. However, one can only hope, as Jeanneret et al. 
(2007) suggest, that life internment will be difficult to implement in the future, in spite of 
these new provisions regulating its enforcement. One fact that can support this optimistic 
outlook is that, to this day, such a decision has only been taken once (in October 2010) 
since this new constitutional provision came into force29. This may be an indication of a 
certain reluctance to pronounce such measures. Such prudence is understandable, given 
that the Swiss penal system is founded on the premise of the social reintegration of 
offenders.  
 
                                                 
26
 A working group was responsible for developing legislative provisions in order to make this new constitutional provision concrete.  
27
 This working group was also responsible to find solutions to render it compatible with the Europen Convention for Human Rights. 
See also note 14. 
28
 See RO 2008 2961 
29
 See website http://www.tsr.ch/info/suisse/2560502-premier-internement-a-vie-decide-en-suisse.html. Last visited on October 8th 
2010.  
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 As for the initiative on the expulsion of foreign criminals, let us briefly examine its 
origins and its legislative outcomes. This initiative, introduced by members of a Right-
wing political party30, was submitted in February 2009 to the Federal Council31. It 
proposes that any foreigner who is convicted for certain offenses32 or for having enjoyed 
welfare payments improperly should be deprived of his rights to reside in Switzerland 
and should be expulsed.  
 Considering that this initiative was difficult to implement because it is potentially 
contrary to the principle of proportionality and because it is not compatible with certain 
basic human rights guaranteed by the Europe Convention for Human Right, the Federal 
Council decided to develop a counter-project. A consultation process was engaged about 
this counter-project and most of the participants agreed to the principle of expulsing 
serious foreign offenders. This counter-project aimed at retaining the substance of the 
initiative, but without contradicting the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and human 
rights33. Thus, it provides for an adaptation of the Federal Law on Foreigners. Foreigners 
who wish to reside in Switzerland will have to be well integrated, which implies 
respecting the Swiss legal order, adhering to basic constitutional values and willingness 
to participate in the economic life and undergo training as well. Motives to revoke an 
authorization of residence in Switzerland for foreigners will be specified and such 
decisions will take into account the degree of integration demonstrated by the foreigner. 
Cases of serious offenses will yield systematic decisions of revocation and such 
considerations will no longer be subject to a margin of appreciation. A residence 
authorization will be revoked if a foreigner commits an offense which is punishable by a 
minimum one year prison sentence or if he has been imposed at least a two-year prison 
sentence.  
 The Federal Council and the Parliament had recommended the rejection of the 
popular initiative and the acceptance of the counter-project for the popular votes held on 
November 28th 2010.34 However, the popular initiative was favoured over the counter-
project by a majority of voters. The future will tell whether Switzerland will be able to 
                                                 
30
 Union démocratique du centre (UDC). 
31
 See FF 2008 1745 
32
 Murder, rape, other serious sexual offenses, acts of violence like robbery, traffic of human beings, drug trafficking or burglary.   
33
 See Message concerning the popular initiative “for the expulsion of foreign criminals (initiative of expulsion)” and the modification 
of the Federal law on foreigners. FF 2008 4571. http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2009/4571.pdf . Last visited on September 24th 2010. 
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implement effectively this new legislation in compatibility with the constitution and 
international law. The outcome of the vote anyhow sends a clear message that levels of 
tolerance are decreasing in Switzerland and that, consequently, repression is gaining 
ground.   
 
2.3. Road traffic offenses: heightened penalization in the current evolution 
of sentencing laws in Switzerland  
 
 Given the relative instability of legislation pertaining to sentencing and the increased 
tendency to repress certain specific criminal behaviours in Switzerland, one can wonder 
whether this trend has affected offenses that are more common, that is, they are more 
susceptible to be committed by people who are not necessarily criminals. We are of 
course thinking of road traffic offenses. According to Kuhn (1987, 2000), there is a 
tendency to impose longer sentences for offenses such as those related to the Road 
Traffic Act (i.e. drunken- driving or dangerous driving). This increased penalisation is 
more related to a rise in the ascribed seriousness of certain offenses (i.e. drunken-driving) 
encompassed in this legislation, than to a marked increase in the punitivity of judges. As 
the principal issue at stake in this discussion is the criminal responsibility for fatal road 
traffic offenses, a brief overview of sentencing laws and legislative transformations 
related to road traffic violations is indispensable to understand this penalisation trend 
better.  
 
 Let us begin this overview by relaying an observation that is supported by many 
specialists of road traffic legislation. The legal regulation of road traffic is a domain that 
has seen many reforms and penal convictions denoting a heightened criminalisation of 
offenses (Bolle, 1989; Jeanneret, 2008; Wichtprächtiger, 2009). But how did the road 
traffic legislation evolve in Switzerland? What where the main noteworthy developments 
in terms of criminalisation of such offenses? The current Road Traffic Act in Switzerland 
has been in force since 1958 and is the result of a major reform of its legislative 
predecessor dating from 1932. Indeed, the 1932 Road Traffic Act was mainly developed 
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in order to regulate traffic; safety and fluidity were the main objectives. For example, no 
distinction was made between an intentional and a negligent act in the 1932 law (Bolle, 
1989). Road traffic accidents were more considered to be due to fate and unluckiness 
than a culpable action. The 1958 reform of this legislation aimed principally at adding 
penal provisions to this act. The necessity to penalize and criminalize behaviours that 
were not considered criminal until this reform developed mainly from the shocking 
realization of the high prevalence of fatal road traffic incidents in Switzerland after 
WWII (Killias, 1989). Thus, this reform established, for example, drunken-driving as an 
offense that was punishable with imprisonment and/or a fine, whereas this behaviour was 
only punishable with a fine before. From then on, sentences pronounced in the courts 
became harsher and unsuspended prison sentences were increasingly imposed as a 
substitution for fines (Killias, 1989).  
 Yet, statistical studies (Annuaire statistique de la Suisse, 2003, 823 ss.) showed that 
the rise in severity of sanction and the increasingly frequent recourse to imprisonment did 
not influence recidivism rates in the context of road traffic offenses. Prison sentences are 
not the most adequate way to deal with such offenses, since the perpetrators of such acts 
are not criminals as such. They do not need to expiate their actions and benefit from an 
educational action that would prepare them to reintegrate the social net (Rusconi, 1985). 
Moreover, such penal stigmatization cannot be effective if those behaviours that are 
criminalized are not the object of a widespread condemnation from the part of the 
population (Pérez-Diaz, 1997). Yet, most people do not perceive most serious violations 
of road-traffic offenses as dangerous and constitutive of criminal conduct (Federal Office 
of Statistics, 200835). Only 15% of respondents seem to think that excess speeding is a 
criminal behaviour and 47% of respondents consider such behaviour, at the most, 
careless. Regardless of the demonstrated lack of effect of harsher sentences and the 
certain gap between legal and social norms about road-traffic offense, the movement 
towards heightened criminalisation in road traffic legislation and criminal policy current 
is stronger than ever.  
 In that sense, one can mention that, during parliamentary debates concerning the 
aforementioned revision of the general part of the Penal Code of 2002, concerns were 
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expressed about the inadequacy of this new reform for road traffic offenses. The 
possibility of introducing a specific provision containing specific rules only applicable to 
those offenses was thus raised. These propositions were rejected, but they are illustrative 
of the sensitivities that are involved in this field of law (Jeanneret, 2008).   
 Another example concerns a new project of reform of the Road Traffic Act which is 
embodied in a larger action project called Via Secura36. The purported aim of Via Secura 
is to increase road safety. Yet, the number of deaths and injured persons has dramatically 
decreased in the past 40 years. This is all the more interesting since, according to a press 
release from the Federal Department of Environment, Transports, Energy and 
Communications, Switzerland, along with the Scandinavian countries, has the lowest 
rankings in the world in terms of the number of deceased and seriously injured due to 
road traffic37. It seems that even few deaths and serious injuries are already too much to 
tolerate in our society and, especially on our roads. This low tolerance for risk on the 
roads reflects, however, unrealistic expectations, since road traffic offenses are 
essentially committed by negligence and are often the result of human imperfection, not 
of a criminal will (Rusconi, 1985).  
 Via Secura is supposed to include measures that will implement more efficiently the 
already existing norms and rules. These numerous measures have different aims, such as 
prevention, the improvement of the implementation of rules, repression, the improvement 
of road infrastructures and increased accuracy of the statistical measurement of accidents. 
One of the measures that should be mentioned briefly for our discussion concerns the 
inclusion of a new provision (art. 901P-LCR) in the road traffic legislation that allows the 
possibility for the confiscation or destruction of the vehicle used by a person having 
committed a serious road traffic offense, such as a driving at excess speed. However, this 
decision will only be possible if the offender acts unscrupulously (driving at excess speed 
in a particularly dangerous situation) and if he/she is likely to commit another road traffic 
offense. This program was submitted to the parliament in October 2010 and is currently 
under parliamentary scrutiny.  
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 Let us add that against the backdrop of such initiatives as Via Secura, a multitude of 
parliamentary debates have tackled the issue of road traffic legislation and its reform. For 
the sake of brevity, we will limit ourselves to mentioning the most recent ones. In 2008, 
an initiative demanding the modification of the Road Traffic Act was submitted in order 
to sanction more harshly the offense of driving without having a licence38. It was 
followed the same year by a parliamentary motion asking for specific harsher penal 
reforms and other measures to deter and sanction dangerous driving more severely39. In 
2009, various other parliamentary initiatives or motions were submitted concerning 
different measures to prevent and deter dangerous driving. They comprise the publication 
of judgments against dangerous drivers and the indication of such judgments in the 
driving licence of the incriminated driver40, the confiscation of dangerous drivers’ 
vehicles41, the compulsory installation of a black box in the vehicle of persons convicted 
for dangerous driving42 and imposing harsher punishment on dangerous drivers43. Finally, 
let us also mention a cantonal initiative that was brought out in 2010 concerning legal 
measures against dangerous drivers which aim to increase the maximum penalty for 
negligent homicide from 3 to 5 years of imprisonment44. One can conclude from the 
intense political attention afforded to road traffic penal reform that road traffic offenses 
are considered as significant issues in the Swiss social scene.  
 This last observation is all the more true, given a recent popular initiative created at 
the beginning of 2010 by a road traffic victims’ association called Road-Cross45. This 
initiative demands the modification of the Federal Constitution by the addition of art. 
123c related to the protection against dangerous drivers. Among the provisions it 
contains, some aim specifically at imposing harsher penal sanctions for dangerous 
drivers. Drivers who intentionally violate elementary road traffic rules and who wilfully 
disregard the high probability of the risks of causing an accident that can lead to serious 
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injuries or even death incurred by their actions46 are to be punishable by a prison sentence 
of minimum one and maximum four years. Harsher imprisonment sentences are to be 
imposed if the dangerous driver’s actions resulted in serious injuries or even death for 
others. Road-Cross has until the 27th of October 2011 to obtain 100.000 signatures for 
this initiative to be valid. If they are successful, this initiative will have to be taken into 
account by the Federal Council and will be probably followed by a popular vote. 
However, this initiative has been the object of much criticism by legal experts. It 
provides, just like the previously mentioned life-internment and imprescriptibility 
initiatives, for a constitutional change concerning a penal issue. This new trend poses the 
risk of creating legislation that is specific to a given category of offenders, when the 
objective of the Swiss penal code is to allow for a sanctioning system which is applicable 
to all perpetrators of offenses (Depraz, 2010). Whatever the outcome of such an initiative, 
it is reasonable to expect harsher sanctions to be imposed for road traffic offenses, such 
as dangerous driving, given the recent proposal to revise the special part of the Penal 
Code that was mentioned previously. This revision provides, among other propositions, 
for an increase of the maximum penalty for offenses of negligent homicide and offenses 
causing serious bodily harm. These legal qualifications being generally applied to serious 
road traffic offenses which result in harmful consequences, dangerous drivers could be, in 
the future, liable to prison sentences of more than 3 years (which is the maximum penalty 
for negligent homicide currently).  
 
 As demonstrated until now, the field of road traffic legislation and criminal policy is 
currently undergoing significant transformations. Penal reforms and changes in the legal 
regulation concerning the issue of road traffic are countless and many are considered by 
some specialists (Giger, 2009) as superfluous.  
 Aside from the fact that road traffic offenses are the object of increasing attention 
from legislators, other reasons explain why this issue was chosen for its particular 
relevance to research concerning criminal responsibility attributions. First, driving is an 
everyday life activity which concerns the majority of citizens and which is related to 
many different social representations and attitudes. It is an activity that has contributed 
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greatly to our modern world, in terms of mobility, flexibility and time management. It is 
also a source of anxiety, because of the risks of accidents related to driving and also 
because of the regulatory processes attached to it (traffic laws and rules, traffic controls, 
accident prevention campaigns), as well as the potential problems attached to it (traffic 
jams, aggressive interactions with other motorists). Most people have thus opinions and 
representations about driving, in terms of the advantages and inconveniences associated 
with it, as well as in terms of the potential risks and the problems it involves. It is a social 
fact that is attached to many different representations in people’s minds whether positive 
(i.e. liberty, speed, mobility, prestige, comfort) or negative (i.e. accidents, legal sanctions, 
traffic jams, pollution). Moreover, as demonstrated above, it is a domain of legal 
regulation which is particularly affected by penal reforms and penal repression trends 
(Jeanneret, 2008). Finally, it is a domain of life which is greatly influenced by 
uncontrollable factors such as human error, fate and situational circumstances (traffic, 
weather, road infrastructure and conditions). Thus responsibility attributions are often 
difficult to make and have to take into account various aspects of the situation that is 
judged.  
 
3. What about public attitudes about punishment? 
 
 A tendency for certain offenses to be increasingly criminalised in Switzerland has 
been discussed until now. This tendency is however not generalised and seems to be 
affecting certain areas of criminal law more than others. Moreover, judges do not seem to 
be following this trend until now, since they often favour penalties situated at the 
minimum end of the continuum of the sentence scale at their disposal for a given offense. 
Judges could be, however, imposing sentences that are harsher than what the public 
would impose when confronted with concrete cases (Kuhn & Vuille, 2009, 2010). Since 
public opinion and attitudes concerning punishment and the administration of justice are 
often invoked by politicians and the media to justify harsher sanctions and increased 
criminal responsibility for certain offenses, these issues will be developed further in this 
section. We will begin with an overview of research on public attitudes about punishment 
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and discuss about the measurement of such attitudes and continue by considering the 
issue of more general attitudes concerning the criminal justice system and its 
administration. Research findings concerning public attitudes towards punishment and 
the administration of justice in Switzerland will also be addressed.   
 
3.1. Overview of research on public attitudes about punishment 
 
 Much research has focused on the issue of public attitudes about punishment (Hough 
& Roberts, 2002; Kury & Ferdinand, 1999; Roberts, 1992). Two dimensions have been 
examined in particular: rational and knowledge-based attitudes and emotional attitudes. 
 On the knowledge-based or cognitive-level, studies focused on understanding the 
nature of the quality of the information the public bases its attitudes on (Hough & 
Roberts, 2004). Indeed, public misunderstandings of crime and justice can lead to penal 
populism if poor information is exploited for purely electoral objectives by politicians 
(via the media). Public attitudes vary indeed according to the degree and quality of 
knowledge possessed by members of the public about the criminal justice system. For 
example, as demonstrated by Kuhn (2002), the less people know about the penal system 
and its practices, the more punitive attitudes they display.  
 The emotional dimension of research on public attitudes about punishment 
highlighted the existence of symbolic and emotional meanings of crime. In that 
perspective, issues such as the experience of insecurity and fear of crime and, more 
generally, the exploitation and exacerbation of these feelings through political rhetoric 
have been the object of many analyses (Dowler, 2003; Garland, 2001). Being attuned to 
public emotions and moral panics is thus crucial when conveying penal policy-related 
information (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009); politicians, the sensationalistic media and 
various moral entrepreneurs operate clearly under this assumption (Kennamer, 1992). 
Punitive attitudes are thus formed through the experience of emotions (Forgas, 2008) or 
the formation of beliefs (Feather, 1982; Fischbein, 1967).  
 Apart from knowledge-based and affective influences, other factors have been found 
to influence punitive attitudes. As past behaviour related to an attitude can influence 
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attitude formation (Fazio, 1987), experience of crime has been shown to affect the 
formation of penal attitudes (Stack, 2000). Attitudinal shifts in terms of support for 
punishment aims have also been observed (Hough & Roberts, 1998; Roberts, 2002). 
Research shows that although members of the public seems, at first glance, more 
favourable to punitive sanctions, they also adhere to more rehabilitative aims for some 
offenders under certain conditions (Payne, Gainey, Triplett & Danner, 2004).  
 People are more likely to favour multiple sentencing goals; rehabilitative and punitive 
aims could coexist in their attitudes towards punishment (Doble, 2002). One reason for 
the recurrent finding of public punitive attitudes could be related to the fact that people 
may favour retributive means as a sanction, such as prison, simply because they are more 
familiar with this sentencing aim. Another reason for these discrepancies could be that 
studies finding an overwhelming support for retributive attitudes may have relied more 
on global questions to measure attitudes than on more specific situations (Applegate, 
Cullen & Fischer, 2002). Thus, giving careful attention to measurement issues is essential 
to ensure reliable and valid findings. It should definitely be considered, when carrying 
out such research.  
 
 Understanding public attitudes towards punishment is crucial, since they can be taken 
into account by policy-makers and legal decision-making actors to justify their decisions 
(Roberts, Stalans, Indemaur & Hough, 2002). This is all the more important since 
politicians, and maybe even judges, may have a distorted view of what the public thinks 
in matters of punishment. They indeed may base their representation of public attitudes 
on the somewhat poorly scientific findings of opinion polls and the sensationalistic media 
discourses (Pritchard, 1992; Roberts & Hough, 2002).  
 Public attitudes towards punishment are diverse and complex (Sprott, 1999). 
Contrasted differences in the public attitudes have been observed depending on the 
attitude measurement format and design used (Stalans, 2002). Thus, measurement of 
these attitudes should be carried out with a careful attention to validity and reliability 
issues related to attitude measurement and information processing (Stalans, 2002).  
 One should take into account the fact that attitudes are stored in memory in an 
associative network (Fazio, 1989). This means that the attitude measure constructed must 
 38 
 
capture the values, beliefs, emotions and experiences that are connected to the attitude it 
is related to (Lord, Desforges, Fein, Pugh & Lepper, 1994).  
 Moreover, some attitudes are easier to recall than others are, and are thus, more 
accessible; the former are referred to as surface attitudes and the latter are called inner 
attitudes. For example, most of the people who show support for the death penalty in 
general (surface attitude) will not be in favour of such a sentence if presented with a more 
concrete and detailed case. This discrepancy is explained by the fact that, when people 
are confronted to a more comprehensive description, they will tend more to take into 
account their inner attitudes and disregard their surface attitudes (Roberts & Stalans, 
1997).  
 Another important issue to consider is the tendency for people to hold stereotypic or 
unrepresentative conceptions of offenders that are related to media distortions and 
overrepresentations of certain criminal acts and deviant behaviours (Roberts & Stalans, 
1997). Thus, people who show punitive responses to general questions are often thinking 
of extremely serious and violent offenders whom they feel deserve a harsh sentence. 
When people resort to surface attitudes, stereotypic or unrepresentative conceptions of 
offenders, they rely on information that is most easily recalled using an availability 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
 Finally, the issue of attitude strength is also a crucial factor that must guide the 
construction of questions (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Such measures should thus consider 
assessing how important the attitude is for the respondent (personal relevance) and if the 
respondent shows some degree of ambivalence towards the attitude or conflicting values 
underlying this attitude (Stalans, 2002). Indeed, public views can be easily swayed in one 
direction or another and policy-makers and the media are well aware of the malleability 
of attitudes when they propagate penal populist and distorted visions of crime issues 
(Hough & Park, 2002; Indermaur & Hough, 2002). 
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3.2. Public attitudes to criminal justice and its administration 
 
 The evaluation of penal attitudes is part of the more global move to assess attitudes 
that are critical for the legitimacy and efficiency of the administration of justice (Roberts 
& Hough, 2005). The legitimacy of the institutions of criminal justice can indeed be 
easily undermined if the gap between the views of the public and the practice of the 
justice system is too wide. Such a discrepancy can also discourage people from 
cooperating with the penal system and undermine the administration of justice. Public 
attitudes concerning the administration of justice are thus a key factor to consider when 
assessing public confidence in justice and exploring ways of reducing the discrepancy 
between public opinion and criminal justice practices (Hough & Roberts, 2004). 
Assessing and promoting public confidence in the administration of justice is crucial, 
since the effective operation of the criminal justice system depends greatly on the 
members of the public believing in its fairness and effectiveness (Indermaur & Hough, 
2002).  
 Public confidence in criminal justice can be assessed in various perspectives: by 
considering levels of satisfaction and confidence with the penal response to crime, by 
comparing different actors or agencies within the criminal justice system or by evaluating 
trends in public confidence levels over time and across different countries (Roberts & 
Hough, 2005). Public attitudes concerning the administration of justice often reveal 
particularly negative evaluations pertaining to judges: they are criticized for being “out of 
touch with what ordinary people believe” and accused of sentencing leniency (Roberts, 
Crutcher & Verbrugge, 2007). However, in some cases, this perception may be 
unfounded and could be more the result of a lack of awareness of sentencing practices 
(Roberts et al., 2007). Negative views of the criminal justice system and its actors are 
often related to the exploitation of crime issues by politicians (and relayed by some media 
sources) who are more interested in propagating sensational and fear-stimulating 
information than evidence-based facts. This leads to people overestimating crime rates 
and underestimating the severity of current sentencing practice (Hough & Roberts, 1998). 
Social factors of informational influence, such as those related to policy-makers and the 
media, contribute to shaping people’s attitudes by conveying information and presenting 
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it as evidence about the nature of reality (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993). Thus, public attitudes about criminal justice are dependent upon their knowledge 
of this system, and of crime and criminal justice statistics (Roberts & Hough, 2005). 
However, as Mutz (1998) points out quite pertinently, the media’s influence on people’s 
attitudes about crime may concern more their perception of collective experiences than 
their immediate personal situation and experiences. Moreover, public confidence in 
justice is also affected by transformations in social values and expectations (Sherman, 
2002). Indeed, it can be argued that the advent of “post-materialist values” has resulted in 
an increasing and generalized public dissatisfaction with institutions (Inglehart, 1997). In 
our contemporaneous society, many forms of social hierarchy authority are being 
challenged in their legitimacy. One can cite as an example the parental authority over 
children, the authority of schoolteachers over their students or the authority of doctors 
over their patients. Legal cynicism could be another form of challenge of the legitimacy 
of authority (Sherman, 2002), whereby people trust laws, but not legal institutions. They 
support law because it corresponds to their personal sense of what is moral and not out of 
sense of communal obligation to an authority. As Sherman suggests “this new world may 
be one in which trust in criminal justice is no longer automatic; it must be earned every 
day, with each encounter between legal agents and citizens”. In that sense, Tyler’s (1990, 
1998) research findings on procedural justice come to a similar conclusion. People are 
more likely to obey and trust the law if they feel that they have been treated fairly and 
that they have been given adequate recognition and respect.  
 
3.3. Public attitudes towards punishment and the criminal justice system in 
Switzerland 
 
 Public attitudes about punishment in Switzerland have been the object of an 
increasing attention by research in the last decade. In the interest of brevity, we will 
restrict our focus on the results of two studies on this issue. These findings will help us to 
gain a clear picture of public attitudes towards justice and punishment in the Swiss 
context.  
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 A first research to be mentioned was conducted by Kuhn, Jayet & Villetaz (2001) 
concerning the differences between judges and the public in terms of punitivity and the 
role of the sanctioning unit used in the quantum of the sanction. For our discussion, we 
will only describe the results pertaining to the punishment goals that were associated to 
imprisonment and the results concerning punitivity levels as such.  
 The judges who participated in this study considered that punishment goals associated 
with imprisonment sentences that were the most relevant in their eyes were those related 
to special deterrence, punishment and social integration. However, for the public, the 
survey carried out shows that social integration obtained the most favour from 
respondents and was followed, in levels of adhesion, by punishment and protection of the 
community through incapacitation. The differences, in terms of the importance attached 
to various punishment goals, between judges and the public are probably not the result of 
divergent attitudes. According to Kuhn et al. (2001), they may be more the result of the 
public thinking of the enforcement of the sanction when responding, while the judges 
may be more referring to the judgment in their responses. Anyhow, a noteworthy 
observation concerning these results is that as much the public as the judges attach a great 
value to social integration and punishment, which are the two principal stated aims of the 
Swiss sentencing system. The public is, in that sense at least, thus quite in tune with the 
Swiss sentencing system and the judges in charge of enforcing it. However, even though 
the public and the judges show convergence for two punishment goals, let us not forget 
that they differ on a third one; the public favours the protection of the community through 
incapacitation and judges favour special deterrence.  
 Another notable result is that the majority of respondents from the public impose 
lower sanctions than those inflicted by judges when judging actual cases. However, when 
looking at mean levels of sanctions imposed by respondents, an opposite conclusion 
could be made, in line with previous findings (Tremblay, Cordeau & Ouimet, 1994). The 
public (subjective punitivity) tends to impose harsher sentences than judges (objective 
punitivity). However, this result being based on mean sentences, it is probably due to the 
fact that a minority of ultra-punitive respondents from the public tends to impose very 
harsh sentences. Indeed, when looking at the median values, one notices that a majority 
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of the public may be imposing less severe sentences than those imposed by judges. Thus, 
if one only focuses on means, the ultra-punitive minority creates a disproportionate 
finding of higher levels of subjective punitivity compared to judges (Kuhn, Villetaz, 
Willi-Jayet & Willi, 2004). Let us specify that this small proportion of respondents from 
the public who inflict extremely harsh sentences are more likely to stem from modest 
backgrounds, live in big cities, to not consider themselves capable of judging whether the 
criminal justice system is too harsh or too lax and to possess a low level of education. 
Thus, it is this fringe of the population that should be more informed about the criminal 
justice system and its sentencing practice. Such communication may contribute, 
according to Kuhn et al. (2001), to bridge the potential gap between the citizen and the 
criminal justice system.  
 These results point globally towards a certain divergence between the public and the 
judges in terms of punitivity, since the majority of the public, when evaluating concrete 
situations, could be more likely to favour slightly less repressive sanctions than judges in 
terms of the sentences imposed. Let us add that these findings were corroborated by a 
study carried out in 2007 in order to verify their replication.  
 Another research carried out in the Swiss context consisted of a quantitative survey 
on sentencing attitudes, in terms of values attached to penal sanctions and the criteria 
used to associate a legal sentence to an offense, as well as the relationship between these 
attitudes and the public’s knowledge and perceptions with regard to criminal offenses and 
offending (Languin, Kellerhals & Robert, 2006). Three conceptions of criminal justice 
corresponding to distinct punishment philosophies were highlighted.  
 A first perspective, which was held by half of the respondents, shows quite a positive 
stance and focuses on redemption. It purports that penal sanctions should aim primarily at 
the reintegration of the offender in the community. The offender is perceived in this 
conception as the product of social exclusion and economic hurdles. Alternative 
sentencing options such as community service orders, restitution or mediation are more 
often favoured in this perspective. In terms of more general attitudes towards the 
administration of justice, the redemption view reflects a great deal of trust in the judicial 
institution’s capacity to deal with offenses.  
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 Another dominant perspective focuses on the necessity of equity. This conception 
emphasizes the individual responsibility of the offender and the necessity for the sanction 
to be tailored to the objectivity of the offender’s culpability. Subjective factors, such as 
the social context surrounding the offender’s harmful actions, are not to be taken into 
account in the quantum of the penalty incurred. Retribution here is the main punishment 
goal that is attributed to the sanction. It aims at the reaffirmation of the social order and 
the protection of society. This perspective takes thus a harsher stance towards penal 
sanctions, without however being overly punitive. This conception implies that only a 
just punishment of the culpable individual can restore the social ties that were severed by 
the offense. Here the feeling that institutional responses are inadequate is perceptible.  
 A third and last perspective which is more infrequent, but which demonstrates a more 
extreme stance concerns stigmatisation. A recurrent vision here concerns the great laxity 
and inefficiency of the judicial system. Strong feelings of insecurity and of a breakdown 
of society are dominant. The power of moral vindication of penal sanctions is of 
particular importance in this conception. Thus, the principal sentencing aim is exclusion 
from society. The sanction should incapacitate the offender, but also create suffering and 
shame for him/her. In this perspective, there are no limits to the level of harshness of the 
sentence incurred by the offender.  
 In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, the only outstanding factor of 
influence seems, like in Kuhn et al. (2001) research, to be the level of education. A 
redemption conception is more likely to be found in individuals presenting a high level of 
education and a high social status. To the contrary, stigmatisation is more a tendency for 
individuals who have low-level skills and a low status. Finally, let us mention that high 
exposure to media representations about crime and the judiciary (newspaper accounts 
about crimes) and a high tendency to talk about crime-related topics in discussions with 
others seems to be associated with a higher tendency to demonstrate a stigmatisation 
view.  
 
 Languin et al.’s (2006) study is particularly striking on one issue: Two out of the 
three philosophies that are highlighted correspond to different views of responsibility. As 
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the theme of this research concerns the attribution of responsibility, this noteworthy 
observation should be detailed.  
 Two views of responsibility, one more individual and one more collective, 
correspond to the two most dominant philosophies highlighted in this Swiss survey 
(Widmer et al., 2004). First, the idea of individual responsibility is clearly visible in the 
equity perspective. The offender is considered to be totally responsible for his acts, acts 
he chose to commit out of his own free will. This conception is strongly influenced by a 
philosophy of the will whereby an individual deserves to pay for the acts that he 
committed in a wilful and informed manner. The offender is considered as a moral actor 
who entered in a contract with society when integrating it and who is, thus, required to 
respect its terms by paying his dues through the imposed sanction. In a redemption 
conception of responsibility, individual responsibility is reduced and the offender can 
count on the collective to help him/her re-establish the social contract that was severed by 
his/her actions. The collective is considered here as partly responsible for the offender’s 
actions. It is social exclusion or social inequality which encouraged offenders’ to commit 
crimes. The principal cause of crime is thus to be found in the social net.  
 However, Widmer et al., (2004) relate these two different conceptions of 
responsibility to the sanction to be imposed on the offender and not to the level of gravity 
of the offense (Hammer, Widmer & Robert, 2009). These perspectives of responsibility 
do not take into account the level of legal liability attached to the perpetrated actions or 
the mental state of the offender, which are important factors to consider when 
determining criminal responsibility.  
 This raises the issue of the different dimensions of criminal responsibility and 
particularly, the question of the nature of ordinary conceptions regarding this form of 
responsibility. How do people reason about criminal responsibility and what underlying 
dimensions do they rely on when doing so? Do these ordinary conceptions of 
responsibility differ from legal conceptions of criminal responsibility? Can divergences, 
such as those found in the aforementioned studies concerning punitivity, be found 
between ordinary conceptions and legal conceptions of criminal responsibility? This 
question will be discussed in the following section.  
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4. Ordinary conceptions vs. legal conceptions of criminal 
responsibility  
 
 The issue of lay perceptions of justice and their degree of convergence with regard to 
criminal law doctrines and criteria has been the object of much attention recently (Kahan, 
2000; Robinson & Darley, 1995). This perspective has been studied with regard to many 
different legal issues: punishment goals and philosophies (Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 
2002; Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Darley, 2007); procedural 
justice (Boeckmann & Tyler, 1997, MacCoun & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1988); criminal 
responsibility or culpability47 (Finkel, 1996; Roberts, Golding & Fincham, 1987); the 
perception of and distinction between various types of criminal offenses (Smith, 1991; 
Robinson & Kurzban, 2007); the confrontation of lay perceptions with legal reasoning 
(Darley, Sanderson & LaMantia, 1996; Green, 1968); and jurors’ understanding of legal 
criteria (Finkel, 1995; Finkel & Handel, 1989; Smith, 1993).  
 Findings of substantial divergences between legal rules and codes and lay perceptions 
of justice in various studies stimulated recurrent calls for criminal law and legal sanctions 
to take into account community standards (Darley et al., 1996; Darley, Tyler & Bilz, 
2003; Robinson & Darley, 2007). These claims are often justified by the need for the 
legal code to mirror the community’s moral sentiments, in order for citizens to comply 
with criminal law and to refer to it as a guide in their everyday moral behaviour (Tyler, 
1990). However, when the standards set by criminal law cannot be adapted to community 
standards, another strategy to avoid deviations from the community’ shared intuitions is 
to investigate ways of changing community intuitions about justice (Robinson & Darley, 
2007). Nevertheless, such changes are more likely to be successfully operated for 
violations that do not yield a widespread agreement concerning their wrongness and 
immoral nature across demographics and cultures. One example of such a violation 
                                                 
47
 Even though these two concepts are not equal as far as Swiss criminal law is concerned, we will consider these as equal for the 
needs of this research. Criminal responsibility presupposes culpability in Swiss criminal law. This means that a person cannot be 
considered legally culpable of an act if he/she is not deemed criminally responsible or criminally liable. Criminal responsibility, in the 
sense of Swiss penal law, is meant as capacity responsibility, that is, as Hart (1988) defines it “the ability to understand what conduct 
legal rules or morality require, to deliberate and reach decisions concerning these requirements, and to conform to decisions when 
made”. Here, however we will consider criminal responsibility in the sense of responsibility for crime and liability for punishment or 
legal responsibility, which corresponds to culpability. Culpability and legal responsibility are thus seen as identical concepts in this 
research.  
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would be drunken-driving. Such behaviour, until recently, did not stir a widespread moral 
condemnation in the community. Yet, vigorous and multiple campaign efforts to change 
public perceptions about the harmful consequences related to drunken-driving have 
proved successful in many countries.   
 Whatever the conclusions elicited by such findings of divergences between ordinary 
conceptions and legal thinking, determining the way in which concepts and criteria from 
legal theory relate to commonsense reasoning applied in everyday life is important. 
Commonsense standards, such as “the reasonable man standard” are often referred to in 
legal reasoning (Green, 1968). To that extent, the law uses concepts of responsibility that 
come from commonsense understandings of this notion (Lloyd-Bostock, 1979). Ordinary 
concepts and reasoning are central for legal decision-making, because they are involved 
in everyday processes that this same law is supposed to regulate (Hart & Honoré, 1985).  
 
4.1. Commonsense justice research on responsibility  
 
 Fincham & Jaspars (1980) were among the first researchers to reflect on ordinary 
conceptions of responsibility, that is, the meaning of responsibility in everyday life, and 
to analyse them with respect to the concept of responsibility used in criminal law. They 
defined responsibility in ordinary representations in terms of being “answerable to 
someone or some social institution for his actions or the outcomes of those actions”.  
 Finkel (1995), who defines commonsense justice as “the ordinary citizen’s notions of 
what is fair and just, and what is culpable and what is not”, applied this perspective to the 
issue of culpability and its legal and commonsense conceptualisations. His examination 
of citizens’ conceptions of culpability and legal notions of culpability demonstrated that 
the latter seem to underlie a more subjective view of culpability than the former 
conceptions (Finkel, 1996). For example, contextual factors seem to be considered in a 
broader perspective in ordinary reasoning, compared to the law: elements that are 
backward or forward in time, with respect of the incriminated action are more likely to be 
considered in commonsense. Moreover, ordinary reasoning considers a subjective factor, 
such as intent (understood in a subjective manner: as related to emotions, motives and 
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meanings), to be a more relevant feature to consider when determining culpability than 
objective acts or rules. However, this does not mean that ordinary conceptions of 
culpability are entirely subjectively based. Objective factors seem also to determine these 
ordinary conceptions (Finkel, Maloney, Groscup & Valbuena, 1995; Finkel & Groscup, 
1997).  
 Research on insanity decisions and responsibility (Bailis, Darley, Waxman & 
Robinson, 1995; Finkel & Handel, 1989; Hans & Slater, 1984) has tried to gain a better 
understanding of the nature of the differences that could possibly exist between 
commonsense notions of criminal responsibility and those used by the criminal justice 
system. Hans & Slater (1984) carried out a survey about the test of legal insanity during 
the time of John Hinckley’s trial, which had stirred considerable debate about insanity in 
the media. The findings were quite troubling, since most people’s responses where 
intuitive, but far from the definitions used in courts. People’s responses were often “don’t 
know what you are doing”. These results pointed thus towards a considerable gap in the 
public’s understanding of the legal definition of insanity. Finkel & Handel (1989), in a 
more experimental study where mock jurors had to decide on insanity cases without 
instructions, demonstrated that people take insanity decisions that are based on a much 
more complex array of factors than those proposed in legal test of insanity. Moreover, 
volitional and cognitive factors such as, respectively, irresistible impulse or distorted 
thinking, are not afforded the same relevance by jurors, as some legal tests of insanity 
would have allowed. The same observation can be made for impaired awareness and 
perception, which is not centrally relevant for respondents, whereas it is an important 
element in legal tests. The factors that are deemed more appropriate by respondents are 
related to the capacity-incapacity construct and to the culpable-non culpable dimension. 
Thus, the public could be more likely to relate insanity to moral concepts, such as 
culpability, as well as to assimilate insanity to more general concepts like capacity. 
However, ordinary conceptions may be less likely to relate more technical and specific 
conceptions, such as consciousness or voluntariness, to insanity. Finally, Bailis et al. 
(1995) compared community standards of criminal liability and insanity to corresponding 
legal standards. Their findings point to a certain convergence between lay standards and 
legal standards used in American courts. Respondents were more likely to consider both 
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control and cognitive impairment taken together as a determining criterion for their 
insanity decisions. This reasoning is in concordance with certain legal tests, which allow 
for the presence of both these criteria to yield insanity decisions. Culpability judgments 
made in ordinary reasoning are thus complex. They often reflect observations of grades 
of culpability and not expressions of absence/presence of culpability, which are 
characteristic of legal reasoning for insanity (Finkel & Slobogin, 1995).  
 This brief review of research shows that ordinary conceptions of criminal 
responsibility and culpability may underlie more complex dimensions than those 
reflected in legal reasoning. People may be more susceptible to perceive different grades 
of culpability, than produce all-or-nothing evaluations of culpability. Moreover, these 
graded judgments, in ordinary reasoning, may be more morally tainted and less 
spontaneously related to rational criteria such as consciousness and voluntariness. This 
complexity could be partly the result of the influence on ordinary reasoning of such 
factors as, knowledge and attitudes about culpability, or justice and the use of prototypes 
and schemas of criminal behaviour. The sources of influence on ordinary reasoning will 
be briefly detailed.  
 
4.2. Ordinary reasoning about responsibility and the role of social 
representations and individual schemas or prototypes 
 
 A social representations perspective (Doise, 2001) could explain why people reason 
about responsibility and culpability in a more complex and multi-dimensional way 
compared to legal experts. People, when confronted with a given concept such as 
responsibility, develop representations of it that are based on expert knowledge, but that 
result from the modification, or even popularisation of this knowledge, operated by 
communication tools, such as the media or social interactions. The representations are in 
a way transformed into a commonsense knowledge (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1984) by a 
process of objectification of notions, once abstract and general, into concrete concepts. 
Moreover, in order to render this representation less strange or more familiar, a second 
process, called anchoring, will insert this object of knowledge into pre-existing categories 
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or meanings (Jodelet, 1984; Moscovici, 1961, 1984). According to Doise (1990, 1992), 
social representations must be anchored into a familiar framework which is related to the 
person’s social reality and values. Different types of anchoring are possible. They can 
concern general beliefs and values that can determine the manner in which we give 
meaning to a given object of knowledge, such as the belief in equality. Social 
representations can be anchored in a person’s understanding of social categories or 
positions, such as their perception of the relationships between different racial or socio-
economic groups. Finally, a third source of anchoring can be related to a person’s 
particular social position or membership, since a given social insertion can lead to 
specific interactions and experiences that can shape a person’s representations of a given 
social object. In this perspective, several studies (Clémence & Doise, 1995; Doise, 2001) 
have demonstrated that ordinary reasoning about justice is based on expert theories of 
justice produced by legal and philosophical thought, but is underlain by a distinct process 
of reasoning. They described how an expert knowledge can be transformed into an 
ordinary conception about a given social fact, such as human rights. 
 Similarly, Haney (1997) uses the term of “symbolic legality” to describe the social 
representations of individuals who experienced the criminal justice system which are 
influenced by the way in which others interpret and perceive the legal system. Popular 
conceptions about the law and its principles strongly depend on the messages and 
information that are communicated by legal sources themselves and by the media acting 
as legal socialisation agents. However, these informational influences more often distort 
public ideas about justice than provide objective information (Haney, 1997).  
 Other researchers (Roberts, Golding & Fincham, 1987; Roberts & Golding, 1991; 
Wyer & Srul, 1986) consider people’s social and moral responsibility judgments as the 
result of a social construction whereby a person uses his/her individual schemas when 
cognitively assessing and categorising others. People who are presented the same facts 
and information come to very different verdicts, because of differences in their 
representation of the evidence and the instructions that are linked to their attitudes, life-
experiences, as well as their individual experiences and their inferences about the 
meaning of distinct events (Pennington & Hastie, 1986). In the same vein, juror studies 
show that jurors use prior knowledge to build naïve representations of legal concepts and 
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to perceive facts and verdict decisions (Smith, 1991). They often use crime prototypes to 
guide their decisions. Such typical exemplars of crime categories are associated with 
characteristic features. However, these typical representations are often not legally 
relevant and can conflict with the judge’s instructions for verdict selection. Responsibility 
in that way can be seen as a social fact and judgments of responsibility can be considered 
as rules that are applied to individuals, whether they originate from the court, from public 
opinion or from the individual. These rules are part of a system of collective 
representations of a given society concerning its institutions (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980).  
Let us add that attitudes and beliefs related to culpability and justice have been 
demonstrated to have a certain influence on the way people reason about culpability and 
responsibility (i.e. Louden & Skeem, 2007; Roberts et al., 1987; Roberts & Golding, 
1991).   
 
 Ordinary reasoning has most often been compared to legal standards for 
responsibility ascriptions48 that are made in insanity verdicts. However, the psychological 
study of responsibility attributions in criminal contexts with regard to ordinary reasoning 
of responsibility has been the object of less attention (Lloyd-Bostock, 1979). It is more 
philosophers such as Hart & Honore (1985) who have focused on the comparison 
between everyday commonsense reasoning of responsibility and principles used in law to 
determine responsibility. With regard to responsibility, psychology has more often 
contributed to decisions as to whether a person’s mental state reflects his/her 
responsibility for his/her actions. The examination of ordinary reasoning related to 
responsibility attributions for different contexts of life, in which people have to make 
sense of uncertainty, failure or unexpected events, has been an important focus for 
attribution theory research. Attribution theories have thus been developed to assess how 
people subjectively assign responsibility. Commonsense reasoning about responsibility 
and related concepts such as blame and intentionality have been extensively studied by 
social psychologists in the last decades. Moreover, philosophical and psychological 
studies have often related ordinary reasoning about responsibility to moral responsibility 
                                                 
48
 Responsibility ascriptions in that context are related to what Hart (1988) calls capacity responsibility. Capacity responsibility relates 
to a person’s ability to understand and behave according to the norms that are set by the law and morality. Thus, when a person is 
judged to possess capacity responsibility, one can determine his/her liability responsibility.  
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and argued that they should be distinguished from the concept of legal responsibility. The 
influence of emotional, attitudinal and normative factors on such attributions has 
increasingly been highlighted. These different issues will now be described in further 
details.  
 
 
5. Attributions and commonsense explanations of behaviour: 
responsibility-judgments and the role of emotional, attitudinal 
and normative factors 
  
 Research on commonsense explanations of behaviour related to responsibility-
judgments (responsibility, intentionality and blame) draws from attribution research. This 
research perspective focuses on understanding the causes of behaviour and the manner in 
which people use information to develop causal explanations for events. Psychology’s 
interest in the attribution of responsibility resulted from the idea that, when confronted 
with an event, individuals do not only search for their causes, but also need to credit an 
actor with intent, responsibility and blame for the action that caused the event (Heider, 
1958; Fincham & Jaspars, 1980). Responsibility attribution is essential for interpersonal 
relations, since these depend extensively upon people’s interpretations of other persons’ 
behaviour (Heider, 1958).  
 
5.1. Responsibility, intention, controllability and blame  
 
 It is a common understanding that the attribution of responsibility is one of the stages 
of a hierarchical model of decision-making that takes place when a person judges another 
person’s actions (Heider, 1958; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995a). This model starts with an 
attribution of controllability and cause, indicating a relatively simple link between the 
agent and the event (Jaspars, Hewstone & Fincham, 1983), follows with an attribution of 
responsibility and ends with an attribution of blame. Attribution of responsibility is a 
reflection of the degree to which agents are held accountable for the consequences of 
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their acts (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980) which depends on the perceived intention of the 
agent and circumstances (Ferguson & Rule, 1983; Heider, 1958). The level of 
responsibility attributed for an act can be variable. It depends on several factors, such as 
whether the act that brought the harmful consequences was controllable (Weiner, Perry & 
Magnusson, 1988), could have been voluntarily changed in the past (Weiner, 1995b), was 
intentional (Schultz, Schleifer & Altman, 1981), was reflected upon (Fincham & Jaspars, 
1983) or if the consequences of the act were predictable (Schultz et al., 1981). Thus, 
responsibility will be heightened if the person judged acted intentionally to produce 
predictable consequences and acted voluntarily without any external pressures or 
mitigating circumstances (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The role of context is thus essential in 
determining whether responsibility can be attributed, in assessing the extent to which the 
person is to blame and in interpreting the meaning of such an attribution. However, such 
contextual factors are also very important for the legal determination of the degree of 
legal responsibility or culpability. Indeed, degrees of legal responsibility, which reflect 
such actions described as committed “purposely”, “knowingly”, “recklessly” or 
“negligently” seem also to be understood by ordinary people in their differences of 
responsibility gradation (Heider, 1958). There seems thus to be some correspondence 
between legal frameworks of responsibility and ordinary reasoning (Hamilton, 1978; 
Lloyd-Bostock, 1979). 
 
 Intention is a very important factor to take into account in the process of attribution of 
responsibility, since such judgments will be more severe for an act committed with the 
intention to harm than for an act caused by negligence (Alicke, 2000; Schlenker, Britt, 
Penningtion, Murphy & Doherty, 1994; Weiner, 1995a, 1995b). According to the 
correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976), people 
can infer intention from a person’s conduct if three elements can be determined: a) the 
behaviour is acted out freely, b) the effects of this behaviour are foreseeable and c) the 
agent is able to achieve the desired goals.  
 However, evaluating responsibility is a process that involves decision-making that is 
more complex than simply identifying intention in terms of its presence or absence. 
Several degrees of intention can be perceived when judging the responsibility of someone 
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and the more clearly this intention is attributed to this person, the more responsibility will 
be assigned to him/her (Finkel & Groscup, 1997; Robinson & Darley, 1995). Thus, a 
person who committed an intentional act (that is deliberate and voluntary) will be judged 
as more responsible for it than a person who committed an act carelessly out of 
negligence. People will also attribute more responsibility to situations describing an act 
of recklessness, which is the commission of an act while ignoring deliberately and 
knowingly the probability of harmful consequences, compared to situations describing an 
act of negligence. Moreover, the gradation of intention that is attributed can also vary 
depending on the degree of planning of the act that is being judged (Alicke, 2000). These 
gradations in perceptions have been highlighted in commonsense responsibility 
judgments of offenses pertaining to civil law (Fincham & Emery, 1988; Fincham & 
Roberts, 1985; Roberts, Golding & Fincham, 1987) and criminal law (Roberts & 
Golding, 1991).  
 Furthermore, using a folk theory of mind perspective, Malle & Knobe (1997) 
demonstrated that most people seem to distinguish pretty well between an intentional act 
and an unintentional act and are consensual as to the commonsense notions they use to 
decide if an act is intentional. They also seem to make a distinction between intention 
(trying, attempting or planning) and intentionality (performing an act intentionally) in 
terms of their judgments of responsibility and blame, with harsher judgements for 
situations where the intentionality of the act is clear than for situations where there was 
only an intention, but the act in itself was accidental (Malle & Nelson, 2003). An 
example of a situation where there is only intention could be when X wants to kill Y with 
a gun, drives to the location where he can find Y and on the way to this location 
accidentally hits and kills Y (who was crossing the street) with his car.  
 
 Controllability is also an important factor to take into account when determining 
responsibility for an action, especially when judging unintentional behaviours that result 
in harmful events, such as acts of negligence (Weiner, 1995a). Indeed, negligence implies 
that precautions to avoid a harmful event were taken, but were not adequate, which 
denotes a failure to control the occurrence of harm. The fact that precautions taken to 
avoid a harmful event are presented as adequate or reasonable can thus, significantly 
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influence responsibility judgments (Karlovac & Darley, 1988). Indeed, conducts that 
involve taking the risk of harmful consequences can be judged less severely (less 
negligent, less risky, less morally blameworthy) if precautions that are deemed 
appropriate have been taken to avoid these consequences from occurring. Thus, 
responsibility judgments for an accident are predicted by the severity of potential harms, 
the precautions taken to prevent the accident and the likelihood of the accident 
happening.  
 Controllability and intention are thus both antecedents of responsibility attributions 
(Weiner, 1996). Controllability and intention are often interdependent as Weiner (1985, 
pp. 554) points out with the following words: “individuals intend to do what is 
controllable, and can control what is intended”.  
   
 Attribution of blame, which is the last stage of the hierarchical model described 
previously, is normally considered to presuppose the existence of judgments of 
controllability of the cause and of responsibility, and depends on what the observer thinks 
the agent should have done, that is on personal values (Harvey & Rule, 1978; Heider, 
1958; McGraw, 1987). Attribution of blame occurs if the observer evaluates and does not 
accept the validity of the justifications (disagreement concerning the immoral or unlawful 
nature of the act) or the excuses of the perpetrator for an act that is perceived as having 
been committed intentionally (mitigation). However, justification and excuses can also 
act as possible mitigation factors for levels of blame (Mantler, Schellenberg & Page, 
2003).  
 Research is divided as to the relationship between responsibility and blame. Some 
(Fincham & Schultz, 1981; Schultz et al., 1981; Schultz & Wright, 1985; Weiner 1995b) 
show that blame is a consequence of responsibility judgments that influences, in turn, 
social reactions towards the person perceived as responsible. Others (Critchlow, 1985; 
Harvey & Rule, 1978; Shultz & Schleifer, 1983) have used responsibility and blame 
interchangeably as equivalent concepts in their research. However, this equivalence is not 
acceptable to some authors who clearly distinguish between the two concepts (Shaver, 
1985, 1996a, 1996b; Shaver & Drown, 1986). Shaver (1996b, pp. 65) distinguishes blame 
from responsibility by stating the following: “blame is attributed only for those 
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intentional actions, performed voluntarily, for which no excuse or justification is 
accepted. Thus, blame, is a perceiver’s social judgment that would be disputed by the 
actor”. In that sense, it seems that responsibility could be more cognitively tainted, 
whereas blame could be a more emotional judgment (Shaver, 1996a). Responsibility 
could be meant as responsibility-as-causality and blame could reflect more responsibility-
as-culpability (Harvey & Rule, 1978).  
 In this research, a similar stance is taken through the distinction between moral and 
legal responsibility, whereby the latter is considered to relate more to responsibility and 
the former to blame; such a distinction was also previously suggested by other studies 
(Fincham & Shultz, 1981; Shultz et al., 1981). This differentiation is justified by the 
Fincham & Jaspars (1980) proposition that legal and moral responsibility “are not 
different meanings of the general concept of responsibility” but should be considered 
more as “different forms of answerability or accountability regarding to whom one is 
responsible”. Moral responsibility judgments do not necessitate the explicit consideration 
of relevant conditions and motives for which one holds someone responsible, whereas 
legal judgments do. The research supporting this distinction will now be discussed in 
further details.  
 
5.2. Moral and legal responsibility 
 
 Attribution of responsibility researchers (Hamilton, 1980; Lloyd-Bostock, 1979; 
Shultz & Schleifer, 1983) that included case law in their analysis of attribution processes 
demonstrated that legal culpability - which stems from liability responsibility49-, and 
moral responsibility are comparable, but non-identical concepts. The first is associated to 
legal judgments and the second is related to ordinary reasoning. An examination of the 
literature focusing on the dimensions that characterize these two concepts explains their 
underlying differences.  
 
                                                 
49
 Legal liability responsibility is the legal accountability ascribed to a person who is considered to possess capacity responsibility. 
When a person is held legally accountable in Swiss law, the culpability of the person is presumed and its extent (negligence, intention, 
or premeditation) must be determined.  
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5.2.1. Legal culpability in the framework of Swiss criminal law 
 
 When talking about liability responsibility in Swiss criminal law, legal experts use the 
notion of legal culpability, because, a person will only be considered liable to a penal 
sanction if he/she acted in a culpable way. This depends on whether the person was in a 
state of responsibility at the moment of his/her actions that is, possessed the faculty to 
appreciate the illegal nature of these acts (consciousness) and to take a decision based on 
this appreciation (minimal degree of voluntariness, in the sense of self-motivated capacity 
of action). Thus, in Swiss law, the notion of responsibility, as such, relates to what Hart 
termed “capacity responsibility” (Hart, 1988)50. The notions of irresponsibility and partial 
irresponsibility will be used if a person did not possess fully or partially the faculties 
necessary to be considered as being in a state of responsibility. Legal culpability, in legal 
theories, can be attributed to a person if it is possible to demonstrate that he/she acted 
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently. Legal philosophers, such as Hart (1988), 
contend, for example, that responsibility before the law, that is, for example, liability for 
punishment, can only be determined if certain mental or psychological criteria (i.e. a 
guilty mind, normal capacities to conform to the requirement of law and morals) are met. 
Once capacity responsibility is determined, one should examine the offense and decide 
whether it was intentional or negligent. Different criteria need to be considered to decide 
whether an action amounts to intentionality, negligence or is simply not culpable. Table I 
(p. 54) summarises these different possibilities.  
 
 Negligence is attributed if one can conclude to a violation of the actor’s duty of 
precaution which is culpable (art. 12, al.3, Swiss Penal Code CP). The existence of an 
element of culpability is determined if the agent acted without taking all necessary 
precautions, even though he could have acted otherwise. If necessary precautions were 
not taken, but no element points towards the fact that the agent could have acted in 
another manner, then one can conclude that the actor’s violation of the duty of precaution 
was not culpable. In other words, negligence will be ascribed if the agent is found to have 
not taken all reasonable precautions to avoid the negative outcome, when such measures 
                                                 
50
 See note 47.  
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could have been taken. Let us add that the extent of reasonable precautions is measured 
against the conduct of a reasonable person in an identical situation. Two forms of 
negligence exist in the Swiss legal doctrine: conscious and unconscious negligence. 
Conscious negligence means that the agent is aware of the possibility that his behaviour 
poses risks for others and may produce a harmful outcome, but underestimates this 
possibility and thinks he can avoid such an outcome. On the other hand, unconscious 
negligence characterises a situation in which an agent does not consider the possibility 
that his behaviour is attached to certain potentials risks of harming others. Let us add that 
both these forms of negligence are attached to similar sentences and involve the same 
degree of culpability. They, thus, do not differ in terms of the seriousness of the offense 
they represent. 
 Intentionality can be attributed to an agent who commits a crime or an offense with 
consciousness and voluntariness (art. 12, al. 2, Swiss Penal Code CP). Three forms of 
intentionality can be highlighted: Dessein, Dol simple and Dol éventuel. Dessein refers to 
pure intent to attain a harmful objective, such as when somebody points a gun to the head 
of another person and shoots. This form of intention can be related to deliberate and 
purposeful action or direct intention. Dol simple refers to the situation in which a person 
purposefully commits an action which is strongly associated to the occurrence of harmful 
consequences. These harmful outcomes are not an objective of the person’s actions 
(he/she does not desire their occurrence), but he/ she considers them as a collateral 
damage which is inevitable. This can happen when one puts a bomb under a car in order 
to kill its driver and one does not care whether other people (who are not the object of the 
intention to kill) may also be in the car when the bomb detonates. We can relate this 
category to acting knowingly or to the concept of oblique intention. Dol éventuel refers to 
reckless conduct and means that an agent who is behaving in an unlawful manner in order 
to attain a certain objective knows that he is committing an offense and accepts this if it 
occurs. In other words, he/she agrees to act anyway even though he/she knows that he/she 
may commit an offense in the process. This rather convoluted form of intentionality is 
conceptually difficult to demarcate from conscious negligence. Consequently, the 
complex distinction between the two notions has been the object of many debates among 
legal scholars (Killias, Kuhn, Dongois & Aebi, 2008). As we will discuss the problematic 
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issue of drawing a fine line between recklessness and conscious negligence in more 
details in chapter III concerning the second study carried out for this research, we will not 
go into further details at this stage. Let us only keep in mind that we will hereafter refer 
to the concept of Dol éventuel as recklessness.  
 
Table I: the different levels of legal culpability and the criteria to decide whether an action is culpable  
Culpable actions 
 
Direct intention (Dessein) 
 
Oblique intention (Dol simple) Intention 
Recklessness (Dol éventuel)  
 
Unconscious negligence (Négligence 
inconsciente)  
Negligence 
Conscious negligence (Négligence 
consciente) 
Non-culpable actions 
 
Action which constitutes a  
non-culpable violation of the duty of 
precaution (Acte commis sans 
imprévoyance coupable)  
 
 
No legal culpability 
 
N.B.: the different concepts that distinguish culpable actions from non-culpable actions are translated into English for readers who are 
more familiar with concepts used in common law. The original expressions used in Swiss Criminal Law and formulated in French are 
in italics.  
 
 
5.2.2. Moral responsibility vs. legal responsibility 
 
 Harvey & Rule’s study (1978) was the first to demonstrate that moral responsibility 
or blame was distinct from responsibility judgments. However, they tended, with regard 
to certain measures, to assimilate responsibility to causality, although these notions are 
not equivalent (Shaver, 1985). Alicke (2000) differentiates blame from responsibility. He 
specifically relates moral responsibility to blame and defines blame as a typically 
psychological concept and an aspect of everyday evaluation that allows the identification 
of behaviour as being socially unacceptable or immoral. Criminal or legal responsibility, 
for Alicke (2000), could be more related to rational criteria that are specified by case law 
and moral philosophy. For example, when a driver collides into another car due to his 
negligence, he may not be liable to punishment for this act, but will nevertheless be 
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blamed because of his failure to exercise due caution (Pepitone, 1976). Hart & Honore 
(1985) also make a clear distinction between legal and moral responsibility in that very 
different consequences are attached to them. Legal responsibility involves a liability 
under legal rules to be blamed, punished or be made to compensate for the harm done. 
This means that, not only does it follow the moral norms of society which dictate that a 
given action incurs a certain liability, but it has to also take into account the more general 
consequences for society that are related to a legal responsibility judgment (i.e. 
imprisonment, community service orders). Thus, not all harmful actions that are the 
object of a moral censure and outrage lead to a legal liability decision; some will only be 
the object of a moral responsibility judgment. This is the case, for example, for mentally 
disordered or very young children who cannot be held legally responsible even though 
their criminal actions are considered morally blameworthy. In everyday thinking, when 
people say that someone is responsible, they mean generally that this person is morally 
blameworthy. However, this does not necessarily imply that this person is liable to 
punishment. It is only when the statement “this person is responsible” is related to 
capacity responsibility, as demonstrated above, or to role-responsibility (i.e. a military 
commander is responsible of his men and is liable to punishment if his men commit mass 
violations under his supervision), that one can infer liability to punishment from this 
assertion.    
 
 Moral responsibility in the case of harm doing can be construed in terms of a moral 
evaluation and an act of blameworthiness (Bentham, 1789/1923; Hart & Honoré, 1985). 
This evaluation involves non-legal rules for attributing responsibility (Lloyd-Bostock, 
1979). In that sense, Hart (1988) gives a very comprehensive definition of moral 
responsibility:  
 
“to say that a person is morally responsible for something he has done or for some 
harmful outcome of his own or others’ conduct, is to say that he is morally blameworthy, 
or morally obliged to make amends for his harm, so far as this depends on certain 
conditions: these conditions related to the character or extent of a man’s control over his 
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own conduct, or to the causal or other connections between his action and harmful 
occurrences, or to his relationship with the person who actually did the harm”.(pp.225) 
 
 In psychological terms, blame or moral responsibility implies understanding how 
people assess, blame and try to control other people’s behaviours. Answerability to others 
compels people to explain and justify their behaviours when confronted to the judgment 
and blaming of external observers (Semin & Manstead, 1983; Tetlock, 1983, 1992). It 
involves a social process guided by the moral norms prevailing in a given society 
(Shaver, 1985). Blame necessitates a shared system of morality, whereby people judge of 
the good or bad nature of behaviour by comparing it to normatively accepted moral 
principles (Ferguson & Rule, 1983; Kohlberg, 1969; Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993). The 
degree to which a behaviour can be judged as bad depends thus on the cultural and social 
context in which it takes place, as well as the judging individual’s own moral beliefs 
(Shaver, 1996a). Blame can be attributed to negatively perceived behaviours committed 
in everyday life, such as being egocentric, impolite or not having consideration for others. 
In that sense, these judgments are social acts that allow a person to evaluate a person who 
commits a social transgression. These appraisals do not only take into consideration 
related elements like causality and intention, but also the emotional and motivational 
consequences resulting from these judgments. In that way, Mantler et al. (2003) suggest 
that blame attribution could be more strongly related to social attitudes and emotional 
responses of the perceiver than attribution of responsibility would be. Perceivers’ 
normative expectations and emotions have been shown to greatly influence moral 
responsibility and blame attributions (Alicke, 2000; Schlenker et al., 1994).  
 Alicke’s culpable control model, conferring a central role to normative expectations 
and emotional reactions, has even sought to understand better how these reactions 
contribute to mitigate or accentuate blame ascriptions. This also involves taking into 
account elements of personal control. Thus, judgments of whether the actions judged 
were purposeful or accidental, whether the outcomes of the action were desired or 
anticipated and whether the actor was a sufficient causal factor of those events are taken 
into consideration in this model. According to this theoretical perspective, perceivers’ 
spontaneous affective and normative evaluations can affect blame ascriptions either 
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directly, or indirectly, by affecting the perception of these different elements of personal 
control, which will then determine blame ascriptions. Spontaneous evaluation can 
influence blame ascription directly, for example, if a person reacts negatively (i.e. 
distress, revolt) to the harmful consequences of a person’s actions and, consequently, 
ascribes blame to this person, without first considering this person’s intentions or 
foresight. Indirect influences of such evaluations on blame ascriptions can also occur. For 
example, spontaneous evaluations can affect a person’s perception of control, which in 
turn, have an effect on the consequent blame attribution. This can happen when one 
misperceives the control a car driver had over the occurrence of the accident he caused 
and one uses this incorrect assumption to attribute more blame to the driver. These 
spontaneous affective evaluations may, according to Alicke (2000) contribute to the 
tendency of people to downplay mitigating circumstances in order to validate blame. Let 
us add finally that the tendency for spontaneous evaluations to influence blame 
ascriptions depends on whether the perception of control is ambiguous (unclear 
possibilities to foresee risks) or not (clear possibilities to foresee risks), ambiguity being a 
facilitating factor for these evaluations. Thus, as this model suggests, a perceivers’ beliefs 
and values are central in ascertaining blame and control when confronted to a given 
event.  
 
 Given the aforementioned posited influence of factors such as beliefs, values, 
attitudes, norms and emotions on blame attributions51, these factors should be considered 
in this discussion. Relevant research focusing on the role of these different factors 
concerning responsibility judgments52 will be now be reviewed.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 Moral responsibility attributions 
52
 The expression “responsibility judgments” refers to moral responsibility or blame and not legal responsibility. However, since 
research has often used the term “responsibility” to refer to moral responsibility, we chose in this section to use a more general term of 
“responsibility judgments”.  
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5.3. Responsibility judgments: the role of attitudinal, normative and 
emotional factors 
 
5.3.1. Attitudinal factors: punishment-related attitudes and internal control 
beliefs  
 
 Responsibility can be attributed in different degrees and different forms depending on 
different attitudinal factors. Studies mentioned above concerning ordinary 
conceptualizations of insanity pointed towards this influence (i.e. Louden & Skeem, 
2007; Roberts et al., 1987; Roberts & Golding, 1991), but this observation has also been 
made by various psychological studies on responsibility and blame attributions (Lloyd-
Bostock, 1979; Alicke, 2000; Mantler et al., 2003). Attitudes that have been the most 
clearly related to blame and responsibility judgments are those concerning punishment or 
punitive aims and the locus of control or internal control beliefs.  
 
Punishment-related attitudes  
 
 Punishment-related attitudes are part of a more general category of justice attitudes 
that have been studied in psychology. Even though this discussion will focus on punitive 
perspectives that are classically related to retributive and utilitarian justice, it is useful to 
briefly define the different forms of justice determining social regulation processes that 
have been highlighted by psychological research. Justice attitudes have been generally 
studied with relation to four perspectives: procedural justice, distributive justice, 
retributive justice and utilitarian justice.  
 Distributive justice concerns the principles that are generally considered by people 
when they make fairness judgments concerning a given outcome (Adams, 1965; Walster, 
Walster & Berscheid, 1978). This perspective, also known as equity theory, was 
originally used to explain how people in the organizational context perceive their pay and 
promotions. For example, when an employee receives his salary, he will tend to compare 
it to the salary obtained by other fellow employees whom he judges made similar 
contributions to the company. If he concludes that rewards have been distributed unfairly, 
feelings of psychological distress will motivate him to act in order to restore equity. 
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However, this assessment of the balance between awards and contributions is not unique 
to the work setting and has been highlighted in relationships, whether romantic or based 
on friendship (Berscheid & Reis, 1998).  
 Procedural justice concerns the fact that people, when confronted with a decision-
making process, will be motivated to evaluate the fairness of the procedures, which led to 
those decisions (Thibault & Walker, 1975). These types of justice evaluations have been 
demonstrated in various settings (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Procedural 
justice judgments have a strong influence on the manner in which people judge 
authorities, institutions or regulation processes. This form of justice is important to 
evaluate when determining whether people are likely to comply with an authority or with 
legal requirements, since unfair procedures tend to undermine the legitimacy afforded to 
decisions or rules and weaken compliance.  
 Retributive and utilitarian justice perspectives concern the punitive dimension of 
justice. Retributive justice evaluations are made when people are motivated to sanction a 
rule-breaking behaviour, whereas utilitarian justice concerns guide the need to deter an 
offender and others from committing crimes, as well as the need to protect oneself from 
further aggression. 
 
 Punishment has been classically demonstrated to have two main functions or aims 
that are retribution and utilitarianism (Bentham, 1843/1962; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; 
Hogarth, 1971; Kant, 1790; McFatter, 1982; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). Retribution aims at 
the reaffirmation of moral and legal principles that are prevalent in a given society and 
the public denunciation of the criminal act as a violation of social order. Thus, retribution 
implies that perpetrators of wrongful acts should be punished in proportion to the 
seriousness of their actions. Utilitarianism aims to prevent the offender from further 
offending (special deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation), but also to deter other 
members of the community from perpetrating similar offenses (general deterrence). 
Utilitarian punishment has a focus on the future and the positive consequences that 
sanctions can have in the long-term perspective.  
 Several studies (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley & 
Robinson, 2002; Oswald, Hupfeld, Klug & Gabriel, 2002) have examined the role of 
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punishment goals in people’s attitudes about punishment and sentencing decisions. 
Moreover, these punishment goals have also been considered in terms of individual 
differences, as well as their relationship with responsibility attributions. Some studies 
aimed indeed at gaining a better understanding of the factors that underlie a person’s 
preference for one punishment goal more than another (Caroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio & 
Weawer, 1987), whereas other studies have focused on the effect of beliefs concerning 
punitive aims on the attribution of responsibility (Graham, Weiner & Zucker, 1997). 
 Since punishment goals are a central element to consider when examining 
responsibility judgments, we will briefly discuss relevant research findings on ordinary 
reasoning about punishment and the linkages that have been highlighted with blame and 
responsibility attributions.       
 
 Punitive reactions are often the result of subjective feelings that are influenced by 
prevailing socialization processes and cultural norms of a given society. Thus, such 
factors as ideological beliefs and other beliefs can affect people’s punishment-related 
beliefs. For example, Caroll et al.’s (1987) research findings demonstrate that retribution-
related beliefs tend more to be expressed by people who believe in personal causality, 
who present low levels of moral development, who believe in a just world and who do 
not adhere to welfare beliefs. Thus, beliefs concerning personal causality (related to 
internal-focused locus of control beliefs) are more related to retributive perspectives than 
rehabilitation-orientations. Punishment attitudes have also been related to authoritarian 
attitudes and values (Duckitt, 2009). Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and Social-
Dominance orientation (SDO), according to such a perspective, are two social or 
ideological dimensions that could influence punishment attitudes. Indeed, people who 
show high scores in RWA afford great value to collective security factors such as order, 
stability, harmony, cohesion and control. They could thus be more likely to want to 
maintain security through punishment and control of behaviours that could threaten or 
violate social order. High scorers in SDO are committed to such values as power, 
dominance, hierarchy and inequality. Thus, punishment, for them, could contribute to the 
maintenance of power and dominance hierarchies that they value.  
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 However, even though individual differences in punitive beliefs may exist and be 
related to people’s beliefs and values, recent research has consistently demonstrated the 
prominent position that retribution seems to hold in people’s punishment decision-
making and reasoning. For example, Carlsmith (2006), in a study that sought to 
understand what information people rely on when they assign punishment, showed that 
people predominantly look more for information that is related to retributive aims 
compared to incapacitation or deterrence-oriented information. Darley, Carlsmith & 
Robinson (2000) examined the motives behind people’s punishment decisions and found 
that motives related to retribution (moral severity of an offense) were more likely to be 
taken into account in peoples’ judgments than factors related to incapacitation 
(recidivism likelihood). Moreover, such reliance on retributive factors is so ingrained in 
people’s minds that it is even an influence when explicit instructions not to rely on a 
retribution perspective are provided. As Carlsmith & Darley (2008) summarized this 
finding, “people spontaneously punish in a manner that is highly consistent with a theory 
of retributive justice and not in a manner consistent with the utilitarian goals of 
incapacitation”. Nevertheless, preferences for retribution may be more related to victims’ 
concerns than to the society’s needs (Oswald, Hupfeld, Klug & Gabriel, 2002). Finally, it 
seems that people associate the degree of blameworthiness of acts to the level of 
punishment assigned, whereby the more blameworthy the act, the higher the severity of 
the sanction will be (Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002). Ordinary reasoning in terms 
of punishment holds a hierarchical view of offenses and matches them to corresponding 
levels of blameworthiness and penalties. Thus, moral proportionality seems to 
characterize ordinary people’s assignment of punishment (Finkel, Maloney, Valbuena & 
Groscup, 1995). 
 
 Many scholars, as much in philosophy (Hart, 1988) as in psychology (Shaw & Sulzer, 
1964), suggest that punitive reactions depend on the degree of intentionality and 
responsibility that is attributed to an agent. Research has often demonstrated a 
relationship between punitive reactions and responsibility attributions (Feather, 1998, 
Shaver, 1985; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Weiner, 1995b). However, there is some debate as 
to whether punitive reactions are directly related to these attributions or are the result of a 
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direct relationship between the degree of harm and these reactions, which is mediated by 
attributed responsibility (Oswald, Orth, Aeberhard & Schneider, 2005).  
 Graham et al. (1997) show that the perceiver’s beliefs concerning punitive aims could 
influence the attribution of responsibility. Their findings suggest that retributive aims are 
strongly related to moral responsibility or blame and moral emotions of anger and 
sympathy, but that rehabilitation aims are more related to sympathy and beliefs about the 
stability of the cause. Moreover, punishment severity is, according to their findings, best 
predicted by blame, high support for deterrence aims, low support for rehabilitation aims 
and low feelings of sympathy. Thus, support for retributive aims for punishment and 
blame seem to be more related to harsh sentencing, whereas agreeing with rehabilitation 
goals for punishment and feelings of sympathy are predictive of a more lenient punitive 
response. These findings support Feinberg’s suggestion that beliefs of moral culpability 
and blameworthiness determine retributive punitive responses (Feinberg, 1970).  
 In support of the linkage between moral responsibility and retribution perspectives, 
let us also mention Feather’s (1996) findings that deservingness (degree to which a 
penalty is seen as deserved) is strongly related to perceived responsibility. In that same 
vein, let us also mention Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson’s (2002) findings that moral 
outrage may be a determining factor of the linkage between retributive motives and the 
level of punishment assigned.  
 Thus, given the moral foundations of retributive aims for punishment, blame 
ascriptions are more likely to be precursors to such punitive perspectives than 
responsibility attributions. This is all the more possible since some researchers (Averill, 
1983; Weiner, 1993) suggest a strong influence of emotions on the relationship between 
blame and punitive reactions. Anger could stimulate rejection or punitive behaviours 
from the part of the perceiver, whereas sympathy could produce more pro-social 
behaviours such as helping others or diminish the occurrence of antisocial behaviours 
such as negative evaluations or sanctions (Graham, et al., 1997).  
 
 In sum, retributive philosophies and their underlying moral outrage orientations seem 
to guide people’s spontaneous sentencing preferences. Thus, ordinary reasoning about 
punishment could be more related to an emotional and moral dimension of responsibility 
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such as blame than to responsibility in the legal and rational sense of it. Moreover, 
preference for a retributive perspective seems, not only to influence blame ascriptions, 
but is also related to beliefs in personal causal explanations, as demonstrated in Caroll et 
al’s research findings (1987). Thus, such beliefs, which are related to internal control 
beliefs, should be also considered in this discussion.  
 
Internal control beliefs 
  
 There is a widespread agreement with the fact that people need to know that they can 
control their environment. This reflects what some researchers (Dubois, 1987) have 
termed “the illusion of control”. People’s causal attributions tend to rely on internal 
explanations; this type of bias is related to the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). 
Yet, this tendency seems to be more accentuated for hetero-attribution (causal 
explanation for other people’s behaviours), than for auto-attribution (causal explanations 
for one’s own behaviours) (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). Thus, when people observe other 
people’s actions, the attributions they make depend more on these people’s dispositions 
than on the situation in which their actions occur.  
 According to Beauvois (1984), however, this tendency for internal explanations may 
be less a bias and more the reflection of an internality norm. Such a norm is considered in 
this perspective to be acquired through socialization and to be more characteristic of 
privileged social groups. Proponents of the internality norm (Beauvois, 1984, 1994; 
Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; Dubois, 1994) suggest that internal causal explanations are 
more socially valued in people’s evaluations of events. As Dubois (1997, pp. 28) 
explains, “Internality enters into play as a normative criterion in causal explanations of 
psychological events”. 
 Research not only focused on the manner in which people explain others’ people’s 
behaviours, but also investigated the manner in which people tend to explain events that 
happen to them. This perspective of research concerns the locus of control (LOC). LOC 
beliefs affect people’s causal attributions concerning their behaviour (Beauvois, 1984; 
Deschamps, 1997). People who perceive their behaviour to be out of their control will 
thus explain their actions by invoking external factors, whereas people who favour 
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internal control will consider their actions to be the result of their own doing (Rotter, 
1966). Measuring LOC beliefs aims thus at classifying respondents in terms of their style 
of perceived (internal or external) control. 
 
 Since the tendency to favour internal or external explanations is considered as a 
disposition reflecting a belief in control, several measures have been developed to assess 
it.  
 Rotter’s behaviour scale (1966), the I-E scale, is one of the most commonly used 
measures of LOC for situations of reinforcement. This measure is used to identify the 
extent to which an individual can perceive himself as in control of the occurrence of a 
reinforcement (internal) or can consider that reinforcements escape his control and is the 
result of external factors such as luck, powerful others or fate. LOC has often been used 
in learning situations in which reinforcement is central. This is due to the theory 
suggested by Rotter that reinforcing a given behaviour can only contribute to a learning 
process if the learner whose actions are rewarded perceives the causal link between his 
actions and this reward. He must consider that this reinforcement is dependent on his 
behaviour and thus, believe that it is under his internal control. LOC was considered an 
important belief to examine in learning situations, since it was a good indicator of the 
commitment of people to a learning process (Huteau, 1995). Internal people are 
characterized by traits such as perseverance, self-confidence, independence and are more 
resistant to failure, whereas external people are, to the contrary, more depend and are 
more likely to give up easily. Rotter’s (1966) LOC scale has a general and one-
dimensional format (participants’ scores for each item are added in order to yield a global 
score of internality or externality).  
 However, it has been suggested that multidimensional scales may be more 
appropriate to measure LOC beliefs, because control is considered to entail several 
dimensions (Levenson, 1974). Such measures may be more suitable to relate certain 
specific concepts to specific dimensions of control beliefs. For example, studies using 
multidimensional measures have demonstrated that internal people may be more 
susceptible to belong to high status groups (Wenzel, 1993) or are more likely to be 
Protestants rather than Catholics (Geist & Bangham, 1980), compared to external people. 
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 The Levenson scale (1974) entails a multidimensional structure. It is a revised version 
of Rotter’s original scale and includes three independent scales: Internality (I), Powerful 
others (P) and Chance (C). The decision to include two external loci of control, namely P 
and C, was justified by the theory that people may react differently whether they situate 
external control in others or in fate or luck. Moreover, this scale had a Likert format, 
unlike Rotter’s scale (1966). The Levenson IPC scale has been demonstrated to be more 
reliable than the Rotter’s scale (Rossier, Rigozzi & Berthoud, 2002) and has been used 
successfully in relationship to many aspects of social life such as alcoholism, socio-
political involvement and imprisonment (Levenson, 1981). Moreover, the Levenson IPC 
scale is frequently used by research and good validity has been attributed to it (Presson, 
Clark & Benassi, 1997). It will be used, thus, in this research. 
 As for the link between responsibility attributions and the locus of control orientation, 
let us start by pointing out to the well-established finding that responsibility ascriptions 
are necessarily dependent on the observation of an internal or personal cause (Heider, 
1958; Weiner, 1995a; Schlenker et al., 1994). It is normally accepted that people can only 
be held responsible for those actions and effects one can expect them to control. 
Moreover, various studies (Phares, Wilson & Kliver, 1971; Phares & Wilson, 1972; 
Sosis, 1974) have observed an influence of the tendency to favour internal or external 
explanations for behaviour (locus of control beliefs) on responsibility judgments. Thus, 
people who believe that each person is responsible for his/her own deeds, that is, people 
who favour internal explanations, are more likely to find a person whose actions caused a 
harmful outcome more responsible, compared to external-oriented people. Moreover, 
Sosis (1974) also observed that internal people seem to be also more likely to attribute 
foreseeability to the agent than external people are. Internals are thus more likely to think 
that an accident is the result of negligence, whereas externals will tend more to consider 
such an event as a hazard of life. He also suggests that internals are susceptible to be less 
lenient than external would be, and thus impose higher sanctions to an agent than 
externals would. However, all these studies used Rotter’s one-dimensional measure of 
locus of control. We will thus examine in this research, whether similar results can be 
found when using the Levenson IPC scale.   
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5.3.2. Normative factors: Social norms and normative expectations   
 
 Responsibility and blame are an essential part of interpersonal interactions as they 
help maintain social order by detecting and discouraging harmful or non-normative 
behaviour (Fauconnet, 1920). Normative behaviours are thus promoted because of their 
social utility. Violating a social norm amounts to risking a social sanction, that is, being 
held accountable, which is a process of naturalisation, according to Beauvois (1984). 
Social norms concerning responsibility range from very general to very specific norms. 
Some rules can pertain to anyone (i.e. homicide law), whereas other can be more 
contextual and only concern particular characteristics of situations (i.e. past acts of a 
perpetrator, threats or coercion from a third person). Somewhere between these two 
extremes, one finds norms that are related to an individual’s social position, such as the 
norms that concern the responsibility a parent has over the behaviour of his child. Thus, 
normative expectations concerning social roles, socially desirable conduct or social 
identity are an influential element in holding people accountable for their actions 
(Hamilton & Sanders, 1981; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy & Doherty, 1994). 
Responsibility judgments result from an assessment of what the actor did and compare it 
with what the actor was supposed to do or should have done.  
 
 Responsibility has also often been associated with the idea of obligation or duty, 
which suggests a strong relation between social positions or roles and responsibility 
(Fincham & Jaspars, 1980). Responsibility judgments, as Hamilton (1978) suggests, are 
thus determined by the actor’s social role, as well as by the expectations the people 
judging his acts have regarding his role. Social expectations encompass, thus, as much 
general norms that can be applied to everyone, as norms related to a person’s social 
position. Responsibility, as Hamilton (1978, pp.320) sums it up, can involve as much “the 
reliability of role performance” as the “enactment of social obligations”. Even though 
both these forms of responsibility imply responses to others’ expectations for one’s 
actions, they differ in terms of their social consequences.  
 On the one hand, “reliability of role performance” refers to such expressions as 
“responsible citizen” and constitutes an informal assessment of correspondence with 
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community standards of morality. Such factors as the victim’s or the perpetrator’s 
personality (Alicke, 1994; Alicke & Davies, 1989), social attractiveness (Alicke, 1994; 
Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; Landy & Aronson, 1969; Myers, 1980) or status (Shaw & 
Skolnick, 1996) can influence people’s responsibility ascriptions. For example, an agent 
who causes an accident is perceived as less responsible for his actions, if these were 
motivated by a socially desirable objective, than if these were the result of a socially 
undesirable motive (Alicke, 1992). A person will also be perceived as more blameworthy 
if he is described as displaying behaviours that indicate a negative disposition than if he 
his acts reflect a positive disposition (Alicke, 1994). Actors who display anti-normative 
or socially undesirable behaviours, which lead to negative outcomes, will be held more 
responsible than those who carry out normative and more socially desirable actions 
(Devos-Comby & Devos, 2001). In that sense, people hold certain schemas of events in 
their minds that can influence their normative expectations about a given conduct. Such 
social norms have been defined as “a set of behaviours perceived by a collective entity as 
desirable” and can be related to the notion of injunctive norms highlighted by Cialdini, 
Reno & Kallgren, (1990).  
 On the other hand, “social obligations” are more formal and imply generally a certain 
accountability towards others’ for one’s actions that is related to one’s social role. They 
encompass the obligations parents have concerning the supervision of their children or 
the responsibility superiors have over their subordinates in authority-oriented 
relationship. These obligations can concern the avoidance of harmful acts, but also 
harmful omissions (Haidt & Baron, 1996). This dimension of responsibility is related to 
what Hart (1988) calls role responsibility. Information about social roles is central to 
responsibility decisions; it can affect the way other information such as the actor’s mental 
or past behaviours is processed and interpreted by perceivers (Hamilton & Sanders, 
1981). However, social-obligation forms of responsibility (i.e. duty of care of mother 
towards it child, the duty of care of a driver towards the other drivers) can sometimes 
clash with normative principles of criminal responsibility (Heitzman, 2007; Kelman & 
Lawrence, 1972). They can diminish the responsibility attributed to an agent or aggravate 
the responsibility attributed if the perceiver considers that the breach of law is serious and 
that, in addition, the duties related to other responsibilities have been violated.  
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 Since normative factors, such as social expectations concerning human actions, are 
central to responsibility judgments, consideration of their influence is warranted in a 
research such as the one carried out here. Indeed, driving behaviour being an integral part 
of the everyday life of people, whether they drive or they are observers of driving habits 
(pedestrians, users of public transport), normative expectations or social norms related to 
such conducts are bound to be prevalent and hold a prominent position in people’s 
reasoning about responsibility for fatal road traffic offenses. 
 
5.3.3. Emotional factors: Negative emotions of anger and injustice  
 
 Blame is not only characterized by the importance of normative factors, but also by 
motivational biases such as those related to emotional reactions (Alicke, 2000; Weiner, 
1995b). Even though moral psychology has emphasized, for a long time, the fact that 
moral judgments are primarily the result of a process of reasoning and reflection 
(Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932/1973; Turiel, 1983), others have specifically related moral 
judgments to emotions such as anger. Various studies have examined how blame 
attributions and various degrees of intentions could affect emotional reactions of 
perceivers of harmful actions, such as anger (Averill, 1983; Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996; 
Weiner, 1986, 1996).  
 Weiner (1996) for example suggests that anger follows a judgment of responsibility 
and that it acts as a mediator between this judgment and a subsequent social response (i.e. 
aggressive reaction) (Weiner, 1996). Following this reasoning, he also contends that 
anger is the affective component of blame and that blame acts as a mediator between 
responsibility and action. Blame in this sense is a product of the combination of 
responsibility and anger, which Weiner assimilates to anger for conceptual clarity. 
 However, Quigley & Tedeschi’s (1996) findings do not seem to support the 
hypothesis of that blame and anger are merged into one single evaluation. They suggest 
rather that blame and anger may each relate to different affective constructs.  
 
 Emotions, such as anger, are not only affected by blame attribution, but have also 
been shown to influence those same attributions (Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996). This 
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influence is bi-directional. As for the nature of the influence of emotions on blame 
attributions, Feigenson & Park (2006) highlighted three main forms that have been 
consistently found in research.  
 Emotions can have an effect on people’s way of processing information, for example 
through a schema-driven processing. This can be observed when emotions influence 
jurors to use stereotypes, which will influence in turn their responsibility attributions by 
making them correspond to those stereotypes (Bodenhausen, Sheppard & Kramer, 1994). 
 Emotions can also bias a responsibility ascription by making it congruent with the 
valence of the mood in which the perceiver is. Thus, a juror who is in a negative mood 
may, when deciding of a defendant’s responsibility, will tend to perceive and recall more 
negative details about this defendant and, thus, use biased information to make his 
decision.  
 Finally, emotions can serve as informational cues when ascribing responsibility. For 
example, people who experience anger feelings will tend to blame more others for 
harmful actions. This occurs because their anger experience (cognitive feeling of anger 
that is related to the disapproval of the blameworthy action) will yield a causal search that 
emphasizes more dispositional factors than situation factors, which consequently 
produces blame ascriptions (Keltner, Ellsworth & Edwards, 1993). Anger can thus 
increase the likelihood that the perceiver will overlook mitigating information when 
attributing blame.  
 
 Some studies (Averill, 1983; Mantler et al., 2003; Rule & Ferguson, 1984; Weiner, 
1995a) have demonstrated that blame could be more related to emotional reactions than 
responsibility. However, this does not mean that responsibility, in the sense of legal 
responsibility for this discussion, cannot be influenced by emotions. Attempts have been 
made to examine the influence of emotions on legal responsibility (see for a review 
Feigenson & Park, 2006). However, these studies were mainly carried out on mock jury 
samples. Thus, it is quite probable that they concern more the impact of emotions on 
blame ascriptions than on proper legal responsibility judgments. This does not deny that 
emotions cannot influence legal responsibility judgments, but only that this influence is 
probably not as strong as the one observed for blame.  
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 Efforts to avoid or contain the influence of emotions are made in the legal realm, 
because of the necessity for legal decision making to be as rational and dispassionate as 
possible (Feigenson, 1997). Emotional reactions can occur in response to factors, such as 
the actor’s intentions, motives, knowledge, behaviours and their outcomes, but also in 
response to factors, such as the a person’s reputation, social position, race or gender 
(Alicke, 1994, 2000). Thus, emotions triggered by extra-legal factors, such as the 
defendant’s race or gender or the information propagated by the media, should be kept 
away from the courts because they can swing decisions in ways that are not legally 
justifiable. However, other emotions such as those related to the defendant’s character or 
values could be considered in legal settings as they can benefit the determination of 
responsibility (Feigenson & Park, 2006).  
 
 Let us add that various studies show that blame and intention attributions seem also to 
affect affective reactions related to justice judgments, such as perceived injustice (Folger 
& Cropazano, 2001; Mikula, 1993, 2003; Montada, 1991). Blaming, according to 
Mikula’s study (2003), acts as a mediator between judgments of causality, control, 
intention, lack of justification and perceived injustice. Injustice perceptions are thus an 
important dimension to take into account when considering emotional reactions and 
attributions. This inclusion of injustice feelings could be even more necessary, given the 
strong influence of feelings of injustice on consequent anger reactions (Goldberg, Lerner 
& Tetlock, 1999). 
 
 
 Notwithstanding the exact role of emotions with regard to responsibility judgments, it 
is quite clear from the studies reviewed above that affective experiences can influence 
moral responsibility ascriptions. Thus, emotional reactions will be considered in terms of 
their potential effects on blame attributions.  
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6. Summary and research goals 
 
 This discussion has until now revealed the legal backdrop against which the subject 
of this research, namely, the attribution of responsibility for fatal road traffic offenses, is 
set. The legal fervour that is observed throughout European countries seems, to a certain 
extent, to have also contaminated the Swiss penal and political realm. Several examples 
of criminal policies and developments of the criminal law can attest to this observation. A 
heightened concern for risk and its control, as well as a new sensitivity towards the plight 
of victims, has led to considerable legal changes. Such transformations in the law tend 
globally to a harsher stance in sentencing practices and penal sanctions.  
 Sentencing practices have seen considerable changes that denote a movement of 
back-and-forth in terms of leniency. In the last decade, there has been a move towards 
more lenient and flexible practices (the possibility to replace short prison sentences by 
day fines and community service orders). However, this trend has been recently offset by 
political demands for a harsher and more punitive stance implying the re-establishment of 
the possibility of imposing short custodial sentences and the suppression of suspended 
day fines and community service orders.  
 Another recent development that reflects this harsher stance concerns the decision to 
adjust the provisions pertaining to sanctions for various offenses that are included in the 
special part of the Swiss Penal Code. Criminal policy pertaining to particular offenses has 
also been the subject of some considerable development, as demonstrated by the changes 
in the penal legislation concerning the internment for life of dangerous offenders and the 
outcome of the popular vote on the expulsion of foreign offenders.  
 Finally, an intensification of the criminalisation and penalisation of road traffic 
offenses is clearly observed in Switzerland. More specifically, the punitive stance 
towards dangerous drivers is a particularly pertinent example and provides a compelling 
argument for the examination of ordinary reasoning concerning responsibility for such 
offenders.  
 
 Gaining a better understanding of the nature and processes underlying ordinary 
reasoning of responsibility for fatal road traffic offenses is all the more important since 
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driving is an everyday life activity which is relevant to most people and is thus, the object 
of various social representations and attitudes. This raises the issue of whether people 
may be more concerned about offenses that could affect them in their daily life and, thus 
be more in favour of diminishing the probability of such harmful behaviours to occur 
through their heightened penalization.  
 This issue is even more central with regard to Kuhn et al.’s (2004) finding that the 
majority of the citizens in Switzerland may have quite moderate views about sentencing. 
Moreover, two contrasted perspectives seem to dominate the public’s perception of 
criminal justice and punishment philosophies, as highlighted in Languin et al.’s (2006) 
study. On the one hand, some support the necessity to reintegrate the offender, whose 
offenses are conceived more as the result of social factors than of personal dispositions. 
On the other hand, others are more in favour of the necessity that the offender, whose 
individual responsibility is emphasized in this perspective, be sanctioned proportionately 
to the seriousness of his offenses and, consequently, to his culpability. These findings 
point towards the conclusion that most citizens, either favour a redemption perspective, 
which emphasizes collective responsibility for an offense, or support a retributive 
approach, which stresses individual responsibility.  
 Against the backdrop of the Swiss legal context and research findings on punishment 
attitudes, the main assumption of this research is that responsibility for fatal road traffic 
offenses entails overlapping moral and legal dimensions. Since ordinary conceptions of 
responsibility differ on some aspects from legal meanings of responsibility, we aim to 
shed some light on the nature of these divergences with the idea that accountability 
entails two different facets, one related to moral factors and the other to legal 
considerations (see Gély & Sanchez-Mazas, 2006; Elcheroth, 2006). In support with 
previous research findings, moral responsibility is assumed to be assimilated to blame 
attributions, whereas legal responsibility may be more related to responsibility per se. 
Moral responsibility, compared to legal responsibility ascriptions, is thought to be more 
prevalent in ordinary conceptualisations of responsibility, to be more based on moral 
values and attitudes, as well as to be more strongly related to emotional reactions (Alicke, 
2000; Mantler et al., 2003; Weiner, 1995b).  
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 Several research findings that were discussed in the previous section point towards 
the conclusion that the moral dimension of responsibility attribution is particularly 
influenced by normative factors and social expectations, as well as motivational biases 
related to negative emotions, punishment-related attitudes and beliefs related to internal 
control. However, dimensions of legal attribution are not immune to such factors, but 
may be just less likely to be influenced by them, because of their susceptibility to rational 
criteria such as consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality. In support of these 
assumptions, research findings on social representations show that people can have 
different conceptions of a given social fact depending on their individual anchoring in 
attitudes, beliefs or life experiences (Doise, 1992). Thus, different representations of 
responsibility could exist and people may refer to one or another dimension of 
responsibility depending on their legal background and familiarity with legal reasoning, 
as well as their normative expectations, attitudes and emotions. Moreover, people may 
refer to one or the other dimension of responsibility depending on the saliency of the cues 
that are represented in the situation that they have to judge. If cues relating to rational 
criteria such as consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality are emphasized, 
judgments may rely more on the legal dimension of responsibility. Responsibility 
ascriptions, when rational criteria are salient, may rely less on the moral dimension, as 
well as factors that are related to this dimension, pertaining to emotions, values and 
beliefs. Moreover, the weight of emotional, attitudinal and normative factors underlying 
ordinary reasoning of responsibility will be compared to the influence of the rational 
criteria that guide legal reasoning about responsibility. 
 The main goal of this research is, thus, to understand better the nature and the 
dimensions underlying responsibility judgments attributed for a given act and their 
relation to ordinary reasoning and legal reasoning. The consideration of ordinary 
representations of responsibility and their relation to legal responsibility criteria is 
deemed essential in this discussion given the current context of punitive and penal 
fervour, which is projected by the media and the political arena, concerning acts of social 
deviance, such as fatal road traffic offenses. The research questions guiding this study are 
detailed below. 
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7. Research questions and general hypotheses  
 
 The framework guiding this research contends that responsibility attributions include 
a moral and a legal dimension that are not totally distinct from each other, but that 
overlap. One or the other dimension may be more prevalent in responsibility assignments 
depending on the nature of the cues that are salient in a given judgment context, as well 
as the legal background of the perceiver. Thus, when rational criteria, such as different 
levels of responsibility53, are made salient in a situation in which responsibility has to be 
attributed to an agent for an offense, legal dimensions may be more sensitive to such 
manipulations, in particular, if the perceiver has been conditioned, through training, to 
take such criteria into account. However, when criteria related to social norms, such as 
age or justifications for acting irresponsibly, are rendered salient, moral dimensions are 
assumed to be more susceptible to be activated in the attribution of responsibility.  
 
 Thus, the following research questions were examined in three different studies 
manipulating rational factors, such as levels of responsibility (studies 1 and 2) and, 
normative factors, such as age and justifications for acting irresponsibly (study 3). Law 
students were chosen to reflect more legal reasoning, as they have had a certain exposure 
to legal criteria through their first-year legal training. Psychology students, on the other 
hand, were chosen to represent more ordinary reasoning, that is, reasoning about 
responsibility that would not be conditioned by sensitisation to legal criteria.  
 
 A first research question posits that overlapping dimensions related to moral and 
legal criteria are involved in responsibility attributions. In this perspective, the following 
general hypotheses will be examined. The moral dimension of responsibility is expected 
to be more related to blame and blame-related factors, such as emotions, values and 
beliefs. We also expect the moral dimension of responsibility to entail conceptions such 
as blameworthiness, being responsible for the death of a victim, being accountable before 
the justice system and publicly denouncing the agent’s acts. This moral dimension should 
                                                 
53
 The expression “levels of responsibility” is understood in the Heiderian sense of it and can be assimilated to “levels of 
intentionality”. This means that responsibility increases as one progresses in intentionality levels from careless actions or negligent 
actions (no intentionality), reckless actions (some intentionality is presumed), to purposeful and planned actions (intentionality is 
clearly presumed). 
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be also be more related to the feeling of negative emotions such as anger or injustice, as 
well as punitive beliefs related to retribution-oriented aims and internal beliefs about 
control. The legal dimension of responsibility, on the other hand, is expected to be more 
based on rational criteria such as consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality. The 
legal dimension is also not expected to be affected by affective evaluations, related to 
negative emotions or retributive punitive beliefs. These assumptions will be tested in all 
three studies described here.  
 
 A second research question suggests that moral responsibility concepts, such as being 
blameworthy, being responsible for the death of the victim, being accountable before the 
justice system or publicly denouncing the agent’s acts should not be affected by the 
manipulation of rational cues pertaining to legal levels of negligence (study 1) and legal 
culpability (study 2). Moreover, blame-related factors, such as negative emotions, 
retributive punitive beliefs and internal control beliefs are not expected to be affected by 
such legally related manipulations either. However, these manipulations should have an 
influence on respondents’ ratings of legal responsibility criteria that are relevant to the 
manipulation, as well their legal qualification of the situation.  
 
 A third research question suggests that a perceiver who has not had any exposure to 
legal training may have a more ordinary reasoning about responsibility and is, thus, 
expected to be less sensitive to rational criteria used in law to ascertain responsibility 
(consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality). Conversely, perceivers who have a 
greater experience of legal thought are expected to be more receptive to such rational 
criteria when they attribute legal responsibility. In terms of general hypotheses, this 
means that, when manipulating levels of intentionality54 with specific legal criteria that 
demarcate these levels in terms of various gradations in awareness and wilful conduct, 
people who are not very familiar with legal reasoning are expected to be less sensitive to 
such shades in intentionality. They should make, thus, less or no distinctions in terms of 
degrees of responsibility and intentionality. To the contrary, people with such a legal 
background, are expected to be more perceptive to the legal criteria that demarcate 
                                                 
54
 See note 53 
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different legal levels of responsibility, and, consequently, attribute responsibility 
according to legal criteria of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality.  
 These assumptions will be tested in the two first studies. The first study aims at 
manipulating two levels of negligence (conscious and unconscious negligence) the 
second study will consist in the manipulation of level of intentionality, that is, either 
intentionality will be absent (conscious negligence) or will be low (recklessness).  
 
 A fourth general question posits that criteria related to social norms, such as 
justifications for irresponsible conduct, should influence moral responsibility dimensions, 
but should not affect legal responsibility dimensions. In this perspective, the following 
general hypotheses will be examined. Higher moral responsibility should be ascribed 
when the reasons invoked to justify irresponsible conduct are less justifiable and 
frivolous, than when justifications are based on reasons linked to necessity. Acts that are 
justified by reasons related to necessity and that could be considered more socially 
desirable are expected to result in lower levels of agreement concerning blameworthiness, 
responsibility for the death of the victim, being accountable before the justice system or 
publicly denouncing the agent’s acts, compared to acts that are less socially desirable. 
Rational responsibility criteria such as consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality 
will not be affected whether the justifications for irresponsible conduct are more or less 
socially desirable. These hypotheses will be tested in study 3.  
 
 Overall, we expect to demonstrate across the three studies that ordinary and legal 
reasoning about responsibility may only differ in terms of the weight conferred to rational 
vs. moral dimensions when confronted to a situation in which cues related to legal criteria 
are presented. Thus, when levels of responsibility are manipulated and thus, cues that are 
relevant to responsibility in legal reasoning are salient in the situation to be judged, 
legally relevant attributions will be more affected by such a manipulation, compared to 
moral dimensions of responsibility. Moreover, confronted with the manipulation of levels 
of responsibility, legal reasoning will confer more weight to rational criteria compared to 
ordinary reasoning. We expect to observe this influence in studies 1 and 2. However, 
when the situation respondents have to judge does not include rational cues, but includes 
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more normative and non-legal factors, such as age or justifications for irresponsible 
conduct, both ordinary and legal reasoning should show similar moral and legal 
responsibility ascriptions for both moral and legal dimensions. Thus, whether they are 
legally trained or not, respondents should show higher blame ratings for the socially 
desirable situation, compared to the less socially desirable condition, whereas legal 
responsibility dimensions should not be affected by the manipulation of social norms. In 
other words, ordinary and legal reasoning are not expected to differ in the importance 
they confer to rational criteria and moral criteria, in terms of ratings, when legal cues are 
not salient in the situation that is evaluated. We expect to observe this effect in study 3.  
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II. Study 1. Moral and legal dimensions for responsibility 
attributions for different levels of negligence 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 In the last years, several fatal road traffic offenses involving motor-racing and 
generally excessive speeding by young male drivers have been publicly exposed and 
condemned by the media and political discourse. There has been a clear demand for 
harsher sentences and increased punitiveness for offenders responsible of “road traffic 
violence” and the subsequent “senseless murder” of an “innocent victim”. Political 
actors, and even some legal actors, have greatly contributed to this frenzy by singling out, 
in the media, these events as a particular and serious source of concern for the security 
and the well-being of all. Their discourse often insists on the vital need for harsher 
sentences and legal changes to elicit deep-rooted changes in mentalities and behaviours 
related to driving. Proponents of these sentencing and legal policies often highlight their 
value in terms of raising public awareness about the risks related to speeding and 
dangerous driving.  
 
1.1. Predominance of convictions for negligence for fatal road-traffic 
offenses  
 
 Most of the time, when there is the occurrence of a fatal collision involving a motor 
vehicle, there is a search for responsibility and, if it is considered that the person who 
caused the collision took inadvertently unreasonable risks, this person can be imposed a 
legal punishment for having committed a serious road-traffic offense. Negligence is most 
often the qualification that is afforded to such conducts. However, some argue that 
negligent conduct should not be culpable, since unawareness of risks, even if it is 
objectively unreasonable, should not result in culpability (Alexander, Ferzan & Morse, 
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2009). When people fail to avoid a risk and that this unreasonable failure is not the result 
of a conscious choice, they should not be held responsible, because their actions are not 
culpable. However, this argument is often countered by the idea that people will be more 
motivated to act with reasonable care if their actions can be defined as amounting to legal 
negligence (Bandes, 2010; Hart, 1988). The concept of duty is important in that sense. 
Negligence is often the result of an erroneous awareness of the circumstances that lead to 
the obligation of behaving in a certain manner or to refrain from particular behaviours, 
which is due most of the time to a careless mistake55. Negligence can also be the result of 
an inappropriate reaction or of the overestimation of one’s capacities, despite an 
appropriate perception of the immediate circumstances.  
 A person’s driving behaviour can constitute a road-traffic offense, if he/she is aware 
that he/she is violating road traffic rules, that this violation can lead to dangerous 
outcomes and that he/she is wilfully violating these rules by taking such risks. However, 
in order to consider a negligent behaviour as a penal offense that can be sanctioned, the 
behaviour must constitute a serious violation of road traffic rules; it must at least reflect 
gross negligence56. Objective circumstances and subjective circumstances are taken into 
account in such an assessment. In the objective assessment, the element that is considered 
is the comparison of the offenders conduct with the actions that a diligent person would 
have produced, the notion of diligent driver being understood with regard to the respect 
of road-traffic rules. The subjective assessment should take into the individual 
characteristics of the offender. For example, for case law the offender must behave 
without consideration for others57.  
 
1.2. Levels of negligence: conscious negligence and unconscious 
negligence 
 
 Within the definition of negligence, Swiss criminal law also differentiates between 
conscious negligence and unconscious negligence (Jeanneret, 2007). Conscious 
                                                 
55
 See Art. 90 Swiss law for road-traffic offense (LCR)  
56
 See Bussy & Rusconi (1996), LCR 90, ch. 2 , n. 4.3 et 4.4) ; See Mizel (2004) n. 31 et 58. 
57
 ATF 131 IV consid. 3.2.; ATF 130 IV 32 consid. 5.1; ATF 126 IV 192; ATF 123 IV 88 consid. 4a;  ATF 118 IV 285;  
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negligence implies that the offender was aware of the seriousness of the violation of road 
traffic rules and of the resulting endangerment of others’ lives, but fails to take 
reasonable precautions against the risk of harm. Unconscious negligence means that the 
offender did not think that his behaviour would create a serious danger for others. This 
can happen if a driver is not paying attention to the road, assesses wrongly the situation 
or appraises incorrectly the consequences of his behaviour. Thus, a failure to take 
reasonable precaution against a harmful outcome can amount to conscious negligence “if 
one did not think that the harmful outcome will occur” or can reflect unconscious 
negligence “if one does not think that the harmful outcome could occur”58. The difference 
between the two definitions is thus subtle and relies on the consideration of probability of 
risks occurring. Let us add that both these forms of negligence are attached to similar 
sentences and involve the same degree of culpability. They, thus, do not differ in terms of 
the seriousness of the offense they represent. 
 
 Acts that reflect conscious negligence generally lead to a legal liability. However, the 
link between actions that could amount to unconscious negligence and legal liability is 
not as automatic. Not all situations in which a person commits an act without knowing 
that it could result in endangering other people’s lives will be considered as pertaining to 
unconscious negligence and, consequently, engender a legal liability. Case law has 
specified the conditions under which behaviour can amount to unconscious negligence. 
Not all actions resulting from human error should be liable to penal sanctions, but only 
the actions that could and should have been anticipated and prevented. Thus, case law 
states that the lack of awareness of the endangerment risk for others must be particularly 
blameworthy and defines the criteria for making this blame assessment59. Particular 
blameworthiness will be considered if the offender violates a duty of care that was self-
evident given the specificities of the circumstances surrounding this act. For example, 
when it is raining, traffic is high, visibility is low and the speed is high, the driver is 
supposed to be more careful. He will also be considered particularly blameworthy, if he 
did not appraise the situation in relation to his own driving capabilities correctly. The 
                                                 
58
 Art. 90, ch. 2 of the Swiss law for road traffic offenses (LCR)  
59
 ATF du 20 mars 2002 (cause 6S.11/2002); ATF 126 IV 192 consid. 3 ; ATF 123 IV 88 ; ATF 118 IV 285 consid. 4 ; ATF 106 IV 
48 
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subjective seriousness of the violation of road-traffic rules should also be taken into 
account when judging whether an act amounts to unconscious negligence. For example, a 
professional driver, whose professional obligation encompasses to refrain from driving 
when he/she is tired, can be liable for unconscious negligence if he caused an accident 
due to his fatigue (Boll, 1999, note 17). This may however not be the case if an ordinary 
driver does not depend on such a duty obligation when he is driving. Motives can also 
influence the gravity of a given violation, since a person, who creates an accident, while 
trying to impress his/her passenger by driving daringly or because he did not clear of the 
snow from his windshield properly, can be considered to have acted in unconscious 
negligence60.  
 In sum, to be considered particularly blameworthy, a given negligent conduct should 
reflect a marked indifference towards others (Mizel, 2004, note 32). The absence of 
scruples is, in that sense, an important factor to determine whether the conduct amounts 
to gross or only slight negligence. It is here noteworthy to observe that the conditions 
defined by case law to determine whether a given negligent action reflects unconscious 
negligence and is liable, or is considered only as slight negligence and does not involve 
any penal outcomes, are partly founded by subjective and morally tainted criteria 
(indifference, absence of scruples, blameworthy).  
 
1.3. Risk consciousness: contrasted perspectives between current policies 
and the public opinion 
 
 The increased criminalization for driving offenses that lead to fatal consequences has 
been justified by criminal theorists (Clarkson, 2000) by the argument of situation 
relevance, whereby these types of offenses concern everyone, because driving is a 
widespread activity that anyone can identify with (Lloyd-Bostock, 1979). Legal and 
social policymakers often refer to automobiles as “potential weapons that can cause death 
and injury”. Thus, laws are passed to regulate their use and with the aim of reducing 
fatalities and injuries resulting from car-crashes (Cunningham, 2008). Fatal road traffic 
                                                 
60
 ATF (non-published) of April 6th 2006 consid. 2.2.1. (cause 6A. 16/2006).   
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offenses have been particularly the target of new laws because of their inherent nature of 
“ultimate harm” that is particularly difficult to accept for most human beings.  
 In contrast to this rather alarmist discourse, citizen’s perceptions of driving offenses 
in general reflect more a vision that most violations of road-traffic offenses are not 
dangerous and do not constitute criminal conduct (Federal Office of Statistics, 200861). 
For example, only 15% of respondents seem to think that excess speeding is a criminal 
behaviour and 47% of respondents consider such behaviour, at the most, careless.  
 This last result begs the question of whether people make the difference between 
different levels of negligence. This is all the more important given that negligence is 
liable to penal sanctions. These penal sanctions can be particularly severe if negligence 
results in a fatal outcome, since people who behave in a manner which corresponds to the 
requirement of negligence and which results in the death of another person are currently 
liable to up to 3 years of imprisonment62. Let us also not forget that, as discussed earlier, 
such liability may even be raised in the future, if the newest proposal to revise the special 
part of the Penal Code is adopted63.  
 
 As discussed before, the legal reasoning that seems to ground negligence in Swiss 
criminal law is largely based on the notion of awareness of risks. Negligent acts, such as 
those involved in fatal car-crashes, can be considered as conscious or, but this is more 
tenuous to determine (Jeanneret, 2007, note 38, p. 51), unconscious. The difference 
between both these forms of negligence is thus very subtle and is partly grounded on 
subjective and specific criteria related to the awareness of probability of risks. Moreover, 
the criteria to determine negligence, as we briefly reviewed them, are linked to the notion 
of reasonable precaution, which is a subjective assessment that is partly related to a 
person’s evaluation of the situation in which his is performing a given action. Given the 
role that is attributed to awareness of risk, reasonable precaution and negligence in legal 
reasoning, this raises the questions of how these issues are perceived in ordinary 
conceptions. A few noteworthy studies have tackled this issue.  
 
                                                 
61
 Office fédéral de la statistique (OFS), Results of a survey of motor-vehicule drivers 2008.  
62
 Art. 117 of the Swiss penal code (CP) 
63
 See chapter I, section 2.1 p.21.  
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1.4. Ordinary conceptions of negligence in responsibility attributions 
 
 Following Heider’s (1958) finding that foreseeability was a factor that could be taken 
into consideration to ascribe more responsibility to a person’s actions, instead of merely 
defining the individual as the cause of his behaviour, other studies have examined how 
factors, such as awareness and anticipation of risks, influenced people’s attributions. 
Foreseeability of the possibility that actions can lead to harmful outcomes has frequently 
been found to predict causal and moral responsibility ratings (Fincham & Jaspars, 1983; 
Fincham & Roberts, 1985; Schultz et al., 1981).  
 Ordinary reasoning of responsibility also makes a correct distinction between 
different levels of likelihood of the potential harms risked by an act, as well as different 
degrees of care to prevent such risks (Karlovac & Darley, 1988). Responsibility 
judgments are accurately predicted by the degree of precautions taken and by the severity 
of the risks incurred. People seem also to have a correct conception of the relationship 
existing between the assessment of the riskiness of an act, in terms of its harmful 
outcome, and the fact of taking precautions to minimize such risks.  Karlovac & Darley’s 
(1988) study also examined the relationship between people’s assessment of negligence 
and the extent to which the agent was careful and acted in adequacy with a reasonable 
person’s conduct. Findings suggest a strong relationship between the “reasonable nature” 
of precautions taken to avoid harmful outcomes from occurring and levels of negligence 
ascribed to an agent. Thus, the more the precautions taken were reasonable and 
appropriate, the less the agent was considered negligent.  
 Greene, Johns & Bowman (1999), in a study about liability for negligence, 
demonstrated that reasonable and careless conduct is clearly distinguished in ordinary 
conceptions. More specifically, they make such a differentiation in terms of their 
evaluations of different types of precautions taken to prevent harmful outcomes. They 
also found that negligence ascriptions are more likely if the conduct that is judged is 
careless, than if it is described as reasonable.  
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 The studies described above thus demonstrate that responsibility ascriptions in 
ordinary reasoning are influenced by factors such as the degree of awareness of risk and 
the extent of precautions taken to prevent such risks. Moreover, such factors are also 
understood as being interdependent, since the more one is aware of risks, the more 
precautions one should take to prevent them. Finally, these studies demonstrate that, not 
only do ordinary people take into account foreseeability of harmful outcomes in their 
ascriptions of responsibility for negligent conduct, but they also consider such factors as 
the fact of taking precautions to prevent such risks and the adequacy and reasonableness 
of such precautions. Thus, the notion of controllability, which encompasses evaluations 
of precautions taken to prevent such risks and foreseeability, could be a crucial element 
in ordinary perceptions of negligent conduct (Weiner, 1995a). Let us add here that 
controllability is an important antecedent of blame ascriptions (Alicke, 2000; Mantler et 
al., 2003).  
 
 Given these facts, the question that comes to mind is whether ordinary people would 
make a difference between conscious and unconscious negligence in their responsibility 
ascriptions. Moreover, since these legal concepts are partly based on subjective standards 
related to the offender’s awareness of risks, blameworthiness and his personal 
particularities, will moral and legal responsibility be attributed in the same manner for 
both types of negligence?  In addition, what is the role of the controllability element with 
regard to these two forms of responsibility? 
 Thus, this first study aims, not only at understanding whether and how people make 
the distinction between moral and legal dimensions of responsibility when judging a 
negligent conduct, but also at examining if and how they distinguish between the two 
different levels of negligence that exist in legal reasoning. The roles of controllability 
elements, such as precautions taken and foreseeability, will be also the object of scrutiny.  
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1.5. Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
 A first hypothesis is that responsibility attributions are constituted of co-existing 
dimensions related to moral and legal criteria. The moral dimension of responsibility is 
thus expected to be more related to blame and to blame-related dimensions, such as 
negative emotions, punitive responses and attitudes concerning internal explanations 
about the event and punishment goals. The legal dimension of responsibility, on the other 
hand, should be more based on rational criteria. From this hypothesis, three more specific 
predictions, concerning the effect of the manipulation of levels of negligence, follow.  
 First, we expect the manipulation of the levels of negligence to have only an effect on 
legal responsibility criteria pertaining to negligence, that is, consciousness and 
voluntariness evaluations. Thus, consciousness and voluntariness ratings should be higher 
in the conscious negligence condition than in the unconscious negligence condition. This 
manipulation should not have any impact on intentionality ratings, since negligence, 
whatever the level, implies no intention. Thus, intentionality ratings are expected to show 
low levels, whatever the condition.  
 Second, the manipulation of negligence levels should not affect moral responsibility 
ratings related to blameworthiness, responsibility for the death of the victim, 
accountability before the justice system or publicly denouncing the act, since these are 
not related to rational criteria used in law. This manipulation should not affect 
respondents’ ratings on factors that are related to the moral dimension of responsibility 
either. Thus, negative emotions such as anger and injustice, as well as measures about 
punitive responses that can attenuate the harm done to the victim’s family and reasons 
that could explain the event in terms of internal explanations, should show similar 
ratings, whatever the negligence condition.  
 Third, as they are related to negligence, such dimensions as “could have taken some 
precautions to avoid this from happening”, “acted carelessly”, “could have acted 
otherwise” and “acted negligently” could be affected by the level of negligence. This 
means that respondents will show higher ratings concerning the fact that the agent could 
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have taken some precautions to avoid this from happening, acted carelessly, could have 
acted otherwise, and acted negligently in the conscious negligence condition than in the 
unconscious negligence condition.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
 Ordinary people who evaluate responsibility, given their non-exposure to legal 
training, are expected to be less sensitive to rational criteria used in law to ascertain 
different levels of responsibility. Conversely, people who have a legal background, given 
their greater experience of legal thought, are expected to be more receptive to such 
rational criteria. Two sets of predictions follow.  
 First, law students are assumed to be more receptive to rational criteria used to 
determine responsibility in law, than psychology students. They are expected to have a 
more legally-consistent understanding of the different dimensions of the rational criteria 
used in law to determine responsibility (consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality), 
than psychology students.  
 Second, a person who has undergone a legal training (law students) should be more 
sensitive to and thus, show a more legally-coherent understanding of, the legal criteria 
that are taken into account to ascertain different levels of negligence in legal settings, 
than a person who was not exposed to such a training (psychology students). This means 
that law students are expected to differentiate between both levels of negligence, in terms 
of their consciousness and voluntariness ratings, whereas psychology students should not 
differentiate between conscious negligence and unconscious negligence. Therefore, law 
students will rate consciousness and voluntariness higher in the conscious negligence 
condition, compared to the unconscious negligence condition, whereas psychology 
students will show similar ratings of consciousness and voluntariness, no matter the 
condition.  
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2. Method 
 
2.1. Participants  
 
 Participants to this study were 98 first-year psychology students (Median age = 21 
years old; 83 female and 13 male, 2 respondents did not indicate their gender) and 117 
first-year law students (Median age = 20 years old; 70 female and 47 male) were 
recruited during their ex-cathedra classes. They were randomly assigned to one of the two 
conditions manipulated in this study, as indicated in Table 1.1 below. In order to preserve 
the validity of the experiment, all respondents were informed prior to responding to the 
questionnaires of the precautions to be taken, such as reading the questions carefully 
before answering them, responding spontaneously to the items and scales in the order in 
which they are presented or responding individually.  
 
 Table 1.1.: Frequencies by type of study and by negligence condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Procedure 
 
 The questionnaire study was introduced to the participants as being part of a research 
on justice. It was also stressed that there were no good or bad answers to the different 
items they had to respond to and that the point of this study was to gather their opinions. 
They responded to the questionnaires during their class. 
 The questionnaires used in the three different studies that will be described here 
entailed certain identical parts, although some scales were different and the scenario 
presented to the respondents was modified depending on the variable which was 
Negligence condition 
Type of study 
Total 
Psychology Law 
Conscious negligence 49 55 104 
Unconscious negligence 49 62 111 
Total 98 117 215 
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manipulated. Thus, some scales were identical in all studies and will thus only be 
described in the methodology section for study 1. The questionnaire was divided in three 
parts in all studies. 
 
Questionnaire part 1: representations of consciousness, voluntariness and 
intentionality 
 
 In study 1 (as in study 2), the first part included a small vignette (see Appendix 1a) 
describing a situation where a person, living on the fifth floor of a building, throws a 
flowerpot out of her window, in a moment of rage. The flowerpot falls and injures a 
passer-by on the head. After having read this, respondents must evaluate a certain number 
of items related to the different conditions that could render this act voluntary, conscious 
or intentional.  
 This allowed us to gain a better general understanding of the way in which the 
respondents evaluate and perceive voluntariness, consciousness and intentionality64. This 
also helped us to identify, whether certain dimensions were considered to be more 
constitutive of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality than others, when 
evaluating behaviour, and whether these differences are related to the respondents’ type 
of study.  
 
Questionnaire part 2: manipulation of conscious negligence vs. unconscious 
negligence  
 
 The second part comprised one scenario65, presented in the form of a vignette, and 
different items related to moral and legal responsibility that the respondents had to 
respond to after having read the scenario (see Appendix 1b).  
                                                 
64
 These criteria are used in legal reasoning to ascribe responsibility, but let us be reminded that intentionality, in such a legal 
perspective, is made of the combination of consciousness and voluntariness. However, as we are here trying to ascertain respondents’ 
perceptions of these three criteria, we are considering each criteria separately.   
65
 All participants evaluated in fact two vignettes, inspired from real-life facts, describing, for one a situation in which a person 
accidentally kills a friend by hitting him with his car  (vignette 1), and for the other, a situation in which a child is accidentally killed 
after having been bitten by a dog that escaped from the owner’s supervision (vignette 2). The rational for including this second 
vignette was justified at the time by the fact that several cases of fatal dog attacks were the object of much media and political 
attention in Switzerland. Dog-owners whose negligent care of their animal had resulted in someone being fatally mawled were all of a 
sudden described as dangerous offenders. This heightened public sensitivity to cases that were before considered as accidents resulted 
in legislative changes modifying and increasing dog-owners’ responsibilities and duties. However, only the fatal car-crash scenario 
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 All respondents were presented a vignette in which an agent fatally hits a friend with 
his car without having any intention of harming him. This agent is either described as 
being aware of the consequences of his acts and haven taken precautions to avoid them 
(conscious negligence) or not having this awareness (unconscious negligence) (see 
Appendix 1b). Half of the respondents of each field of study had to then evaluate this car-
crash vignette in the conscious negligence condition or the unconscious negligence 
condition on the following measures.  
 
 The measures (see Appendix 1c) the respondents have to respond to entailed 5-point 
Likert scales going from 1 (I do not agree at all) to 5 (I agree totally) which concerned:  
 
1) The different emotions (revolt, injustice, anger, pity, sympathy for the family and 
friends of the victims, compassion for the victim, indifference) that the subject could feel 
when thinking of the death of the victim.  
 For the purposes of the analyses that were carried out, we used two mean ratings 
yielded by the computation of negative and positive emotions. They were produced by 
the following operation on all measures of emotions. A factorial analysis in principal 
components with the Varimax rotation method was carried out on the items related to 
these different emotions. A negative emotions factor (30.94%) and a positive emotions 
factor (27.03%) resulted from this factor analysis (total variance = 57.98%). The ratings 
included in the negative emotions factor were then computed into one mean rating 
(Memoneg, α=.708) and the same was done for the ratings entailed in the positive 
emotions factor (Memopos, α=.624). 
 
2) Two questions controlling for the plausibility and the frequency of the situation 
described in the vignette. These were included in order to check for the validity of the 
scenario.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
results were kept for the purpose of this discussion, since the results for the other scenario were uncomparable. Indeed, the results for 
the vignette concerning the fatal dog attack were unclear and difficult to compare to the ones pertaining to the fatal car-crash 
(probably because the victim is a child in the dog-attack vignette, whereas the victim in the vignette car-crash is an adult).  
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3) Legal responsibility items measuring the rational criteria of consciousness (“…was 
aware that the fact of driving at high speed in a curve could lead to the death of the 
victim”), intentionality (“…intentionally caused the accident”) and voluntariness (“… 
took freely the decision to drive knowing that this could lead to an accident”) attributed 
to the perpetrator.  
 
4) Items related to moral responsibility such as “…is responsible for the death of the 
victim”, “…act should be publicly denounced”,  “…should be blamed for what he did” 
and “…should be held accountable by the criminal justice system”.   
 
5) Items related to the controllability of the act such as “…could have acted otherwise”, 
“…could have taken some precautions to avoid this from happening”, “…acted 
carelessly”, and “…acted negligently”. These items were added in this questionnaire, 
because the determination of controllability is a precursor of responsibility attributions 
for negligent and intentional conduct (Schlenker et al., 1994; Weiner, 1995a, 1996). 
 
6) Items attenuating responsibility such as “… has acted with mitigating circumstances” 
or “the fact that the perpetrator did not want to harm or kill the victim is a factor 
diminishing his responsibility”. These items were added, since mitigating factors are an 
important element in legal and in moral responsibility judgments (Barnett, Brodsky & 
Manning Davis, 2004; Weiner, 1995a). 
 
7) Items related to ways of qualifying the situation such as “accident”, “negligent 
homicide” and “intentional homicide”. These items were added because they were 
expected to be related differently to moral and legal responsibility dimensions.  
 
8) Items related to the different ways of attenuating the harm caused to the family of the 
victim, such as sentencing the agent to prison time, agent has to pay a fine, agent has to 
pay a sum of money for moral redress, agent has to do some community work, agent has 
to apologize and explain the circumstances of the event or the agent has to acknowledge 
his mistakes. As observed previously, research shows that moral responsibility is 
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particularly related to retributive responses (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Graham et al., 1997) 
and that such responses may be more spontaneously invoked in ordinary reasoning when 
related to victims’ needs (Oswald et al., 2002). Therefore, we included these measures, 
since they are, for some, related to punitive responses, such as a prison sentence, and 
could be related to moral responsibility. 
 
9) Items related to the responsibilities of other actors such as the parents of the agent, the 
victim or the authorities in charge of motor-traffic regulations. The assessment of 
respondents’ conceptions of such responsibilities was taken into account with the hope 
that it may hone our understanding of their representation of the offender’s responsibility. 
However, this measure did not yield any significant results and will thus not be 
mentioned in the following discussion concerning the results of this study.  
 
10) A scale comprising thirteen items related to different explanations that could be put 
forward for the situation described in the vignette like external or esoteric reasons 
(fatality, god’s will, luck, fate, unavoidable), reasons related to the lack of norms, values 
or education prevailing in our society, and victim-blaming reasons. This scale was 
developed for this study and was conceived to assess the way in which people understand 
events in terms of types of explanations. Given that internal-external locus of belief and 
beliefs related to blaming the victim have been related to attribution of responsibility by 
previous research (Gerbasi, Zuckerman & Reis, 1977; Kleinke & Meyer, 1990; Phares, et 
al., 1971; Phares & Wilson, 1972; Sosis, 1974; Wyer, Bodenhausen & Gorman, 1985), 
explanations related to such beliefs were included in this scale.  
 These measures were used in their computed form as mean ratings through the 
following operation. A factorial analysis of these explanatory measures yielded 3 factors 
(52.24% total variance). The first factor included measures related to external and 
esoteric explanations and was named external explanations (18.92%). The second factor 
comprised explanations, in terms of lack of values, of norms and of education, which 
were all related to the individual (18.44%); it refers, thus, to individual explanations. The 
third factor includes measures that attribute the blame to the victim and refers, thus, to 
victim-blaming explanations (14.87%). The mean ratings for items corresponding to each 
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of these factors were then computed to create three mean ratings: Mextexpl (α=.647), 
Mintexpl (α=.796) and Mblame (α=.569).  
 
Questionnaire part 3: Anchoring variables of punitive attitudes, experiences of 
crime and socio-demographic data 
 
 The third part of the questionnaire entails general scales (see Appendix 1d) that will 
allow us to understand better the role of perceiver variables in anchoring respondents’ 
different representations of responsibility. These scales comprise:  
 
1) A scale on attitudes towards different punitive aims represented by 16 items, the 
majority of which were developed by Languin, Kellerhals & Robert (2006) in their study 
on the social representations of criminal sentencing.  This scale was used in the form of 
the mean ratings computed through the following operation. A factorial analysis of these 
punitive aims items yielded 3 factors (49.91% total variance): rehabilitation (19.43%), 
reparation by retribution (16.22%) and deterrence through incapacitation (14.87%). The 
ratings for items corresponding to each of these factors were then computed to create 3 
mean ratings: Mrehabilitation (α=.764), Mretribution (α=.697) and Mdeterrence 
(α=.652). 
 
2) Items concerning the topics of discussion respondents have with their friends and their 
family66 and items about the topics that are discussed on television and in the media that 
are of interest to the respondents67. These items were included, because of their potential 
role as anchors of people’s social constructions of responsibility (Haney, 1997; 
Pennington & Hastie, 1986). 
 
3) Items on whether the respondents know/have been a victim or a perpetrator of a 
voluntary or an involuntary act that lead to harmful consequences for others. The 
inclusion of these items was justified given that the experience of violence (as a 
perpetrator or as a victim) could also have an influence on the assignment of 
                                                 
66
 These items were also originally develloped by Kellerhals, Languin & Robert (2006) 
67
 See note 66 
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responsibility (Pennington & Hastie, 1986; Roberts, Golding & Fincham, 1987; Roberts 
& Golding, 1991). The influence of such experiences has also been to be related to 
sentencing judgments (Przygodski & Mullet, 1993). Such research supports the 
assumption that experiencing negative events such as violence or serious accidents could 
also have an influence on the attributions of responsibility for a given negative event. 
However, this influence could be either positive or negative, as demonstrated by two 
different observations. Cusson (1998) suggests that people who have suffered an 
aggression are generally harsher in their judgments of criminal acts than people who have 
not suffered an aggression. However, Killias (1989), in a Swiss victimisation survey, 
makes the exact contrary observation: victims are never more punitive than non-victims; 
non-victims may even be more punitive than victims. 
 
 Finally, all respondents had to provide socio-demographic information pertaining to 
their age, their gender, their marital status, their nationality, their native language, their 
field and level of study, their parent’s profession and educational status, their religious 
affiliation, their political preferences and whether they have a profession and are a 
member of an association.  All scales comprised in the third part of the questionnaire 
were also used in the next study, except for the one concerning punitive aims.   
 
3. Results  
 
 In order to test our hypotheses, the following analyses were carried. We first used a 
factor analysis in principal components to highlight respondents’ representations of 
rational criteria for legal responsibility, as well as their representations of moral and legal 
responsibility. A MANOVA was then carried out in order to test the effect of the 
negligence condition and the type of study on moral and legal dimensions of 
responsibility, as well as negligence ratings. Mostly main effects of study and negligence 
conditions were examined, since only one interaction effect bordering significance was 
observed for the negligence rating. In order to understand better respondents’ evaluations 
of negligence, the links between negligence ratings and relevant measures were examined 
using regression analyses and Pearson correlation analyses across the 4 experimental 
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groups produced by the combination of type of study and negligence condition. 
Moreover, a one-way ANOVA was also carried out to investigate the effect of type of 
study on measures related to rational criteria for legal responsibility. The effect of 
condition was not considered for these measures, since they were evaluated in the first 
part of the questionnaire, before the car-crash scenario manipulation. Regression analyses 
were then carried out to assess the role of different predictors for moral and legal 
responsibility dimensions, as well as controllability. Finally, correlational analyses using 
the Pearson method, as well as partial correlations were then used to examine the 
relationships between the responsibility dimensions and some of their relevant correlates, 
for each experimental group formed by the combination of type of study and the 
negligence condition.  
 
 
 
3.1. Manipulation checks  
 
  We began by checking whether the vignette used in this study was considered as 
plausible and as frequent in both the conscious and the unconscious negligence condition. 
An ANOVA tested whether respondents evaluated the plausibility and the frequency of 
the event differently depending on the negligence condition. Respondents did not seem to 
evaluate differently the plausibility (F (1,214) = .04; ns) of this vignette and the frequency 
of occurrence of such events (F (1,214) = .66; ns) as a function of the condition in which 
they are assigned. One can thus assume that the wording used to manipulate the level of 
negligence did not affect the credibility or frequency perceptions concerning the situation 
evaluated in this study. Let us add that the mean ratings for these two items were rather 
high, with plausibility (m=4.18) being rated even higher than for frequency (m=3.14). 
This indicates that the scenario that was constructed from a real-life event is rather close 
to reality and does not seem created artificially, which adds support to the validity of 
respondents’ ratings on the items concerning the various dimensions of the evaluation of 
the agent’s actions.  
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3.2. Existence of overlapping dimensions of responsibility related to moral 
and legal criteria in respondents’ representations 
3.2.1. Respondents’ representations of rational criteria for legal 
responsibility  
 
 One of the principal assumptions underlying the hypothesis of the existence of a legal 
dimension of responsibility - in addition to a moral conception related to blame - is that 
legal responsibility depends on three rational criteria of consciousness, voluntariness and 
intentionality. Consequently, a first analysis aimed at verifying whether respondents 
correctly identified the different dimensions related to the three criteria that are used in 
law to determine responsibility.  
 A factor analysis in principal components with the Varimax rotation method was 
carried out on all items related to the criteria of consciousness, voluntariness and 
intentionality. 4 factors explaining 71.61% of the total variance were highlighted. The 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity was significant (χ2(78) = 1290.85, p <.001) and the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy (KMO68) was satisfactory (0.818). The 
items included in the four resulting factors and their corresponding saturations are 
displayed in Table 1.2. The first factor (29.39%) comprised items related to total 
consciousness and intentionality and is named TotCI. The second factor (18.98%) 
included all the items relating to voluntariness and is named Vol. The third factor 
(14.02%) concerned the different levels of consciousness of the probability of the 
occurrence of harmful risks and is called Risk. Finally, the fourth factor (9.23%) 
encompassed the items related to ambiguous intentionality and consciousness69 and is 
referred to as Amb. It is to be noted that for some items, saturations higher than .30 were 
sometimes observed for two different factors. However, in these cases, we chose to take 
into account the highest value of saturation to decide to which factor the item 
corresponded to. Such cases concerned only three items included in Vol, Risk and Amb. 
  
                                                 
68
 We will hereafter refer to this test as KMO. The Bartlett’s test of Sphericity  was significant and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
of sampling adequacy are tests that allow to evaluate if the factor analysis is valid and can be conducted. If the Bartlett test is 
significant and the KMO is higher than .6, the factor analysis can be used.   
69
 “Anne threw a pot out of her window, but after having committed that act, she does not understand what happened” and “Anne 
wanted to throw the pot out of the window, but then decided not to do it, but fell and slipped which resulted in the pot from falling out 
of the window” 
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Table 1.2.: Principal component analysis of the scales pertaining to the different dimensions of 
consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality 
*Saturations that are higher than .30 are displayed in bold.  
** S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
 
 
 These results demonstrate that respondents related correctly the different dimensions 
of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality to the logic of legal reasoning. They 
differentiated between, on the one hand, dimensions of total consciousness and 
intentionality (TotCI factor) and, on the other hand, voluntariness (Vol factor). They also 
associated the dimensions of consciousness related to two different levels of probability 
of occurrence of harmful risks that are classically related to negligence and recklessness 
(Risk factor). Finally, they also accurately associated two dimensions of intentionality 
and consciousness that can be considered ambiguous (Amb factor). This means that they 
differentiated these evaluations as being less constitutive of intentionality and 
consciousness than the dimensions in the other scales. Evidence for this explanation is 
provided by the finding, reported in Table 1.2., that the mean ratings for both scales 
comprised in factor Amb are much lower than the mean ratings for the scales comprised 
in other factors. However, one notices that, in terms of the mean ratings, the dimension of 
ambiguous intentionality was more firmly rejected, as reflecting intentionality, than the 
dimension of ambiguous consciousness, as a reflection of consciousness. Respondents’ 
mean ratings and standard deviation values for the ambiguous consciousness scale 
Scales Saturations* Mean  Ratings S.d.** TotCI Vol Risk Amb 
 
Anne wanted to hurt someone by throwing the flowerpot out of the 
window 
 
.855 
 
.085 
 
.162 
 
.030 4.14 1.57 
Anne thought about her act and its consequences before committing it .851 .152 .183 -.013 3.99 1.45 
Anne thought about her act before committing it and threw the flower pot 
knowing that her actions could harm someone .823 .115 .250 -.077 4.09 1.44 
Anne’s one and only aim was to hurt someone by throwing the flowerpot 
out of the window .821 .119 .208 -.110 4.37 1.36 
Anne knew before throwing the pot that her actions were liable for 
punishment by the law .572 .192 .321 .256 3.72 1.45 
Anne acted freely without any physical or moral constraint from others -.078 .866 .052 .104 4.25 .989 
Anne wanted to throw this flowerpot .128 .815 .063 -.166 4.21 .986 
Anne acted without the intervention of any external force .159 .770 .126 .104 4.11 1.08 
Anne was motivated to throw this flowerpot .411 .592 -.021 .035 3.99 1.11 
Anne knew that the flowerpot she threw could fall on someone .244 .054 .854 -.038 3.84 1.12 
Anne knew that, by throwing a flowerpot out of the window, the odds 
were great to harm someone .372 -.017 .826 -.054 4.02 1.11 
Anne was intending to throw the pot out of the window, but then decided 
against it, but slipped and the pot fell out of the window .072 -.061 -.157 .878 1.50 .832 
Anne threw a pot out of her window, but after having committed that act, 
when she thinks about it, she does not understand what happened 
 
-.518 .094 .307 .549 2.67 1.21 
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showed hesitation in agreeing or not to rate this measure as reflecting consciousness. 
Conversely, respondents were much more consensual about discarding the intentional 
ambiguous measure as a reflection of intentionality, as shown by the corresponding 
standard deviation values.  
 
 At a first glimpse, when examining the mean ratings related to consciousness and 
intentionality, one could conclude that all respondents not only correctly distinguished 
between intentionality, consciousness and voluntariness measures, but also seem to 
correctly perceive the different dimensions and levels of consciousness and intentionality. 
However, t-test analyses for each student group show that this conclusion may be more 
likely for law students than for psychology students. Mean ratings for consciousness and 
intentionality measures for each group of respondents are displayed in Table 1.3. T-test 
analyses showed that law students were more likely to accurately grade the different 
levels of consciousness and intentionality that were entailed in Tot CI and Risk, 
compared to psychology students.  
 Law students rated “having as one and only aim to hurt someone” as more 
significantly characteristic of an intentional act than “wanting to hurt someone” (t (115) = 
-2.04, p <.05), “knowing that the odds were great to harm someone by one’s actions” (t 
(115) = 6.49, p <.001) or “knowing that one’s actions could harm someone” (t (115) = 
7.07, p <.001). Law students were also more likely to rate “wanting to hurt someone” as 
significantly more intentional than “knowing that one’s actions could harm someone” (t 
(115) = -4.24, p <.001) and that “knowing that the odds were great to harm someone by 
one’s actions” (t (115) = 3.77, p <.001). However, they did not rate “knowing that one’s 
actions could harm someone” and “knowing that the odds were great to harm someone by 
one’s actions” as significantly different in terms of their intentional nature (t (115) = -
1.77, ns). As for consciousness levels, law students rated “thinking about one’s act and its 
consequences” (t (115) = 4.75, p <.001) and “thinking about one’s act and acting while 
knowing that one’s actions could harm someone” (t (115) = 5.80, p <.001) as more 
characteristic of a conscious action than “knowing that one’s act is liable for 
punishment”. However, law students rated “thinking about one’s act and its 
consequences” and “thinking about one’s act and acting while knowing that one’s actions 
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could harm someone” as both entailing the similar levels of conscious action (t (115) = -
1.30, ns).  
 As for psychology students, the following results indicate that they were less likely to 
accurately grade the different levels of consciousness and intentionality entailed in these 
measures. Out of all intentionality measures, they rated “having as one and only aim to 
hurt someone” as significantly more intentional than “wanting to hurt someone” (t (96) = 
-2.52, p <.02). Moreover, they also were more likely to rate “knowing that the odds were 
great to harm someone by one’s actions” as significantly more intentional than “knowing 
that one’s actions could harm someone” (t (115) = -2.77, p <.008) and “wanting to hurt 
someone” (t (96) = -2.02, p <.05). As for consciousness measures, psychology students 
did not rate any of these significantly differently from each other.  
 In addition to the fact that law students may have graded these different measures 
more in line with legal reasoning about the different levels of intentionality and 
consciousness, law students may have also rated these different measures in a more 
consensual manner, than psychology students. Standard deviation values point towards 
such an interpretation at least, since those are always higher for psychology students than 
for law students.  
 
Table 1.3.: Mean ratings for consciousness and intentionality measures for law and psychology students 
* S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
 
 
Measures Law Students 
 
Psychology  
students 
 
 
 Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* 
Consciousness 
Items 
Thinking about one’s act and its consequences before committing it 4.27 1.21 3.66 1.63 
Thinking about one’s act before committing it and acting while knowing that 
one’s actions are harmful 4.40 
 
1.19 
 
3.71 1.61 
Knowing before acting that one’s actions are liable for punishment by the law 
 
3.78 1.39 3.65 1.51 
Intentionality 
Items 
Having as one and only aim to hurt someone  
 
4.68 0.97 4.01 1.64 
Wanting to hurt someone by one’s actions 
 
4.47 1.31 3.75 1.76 
Knowing that the odds were great to harm someone by one’s  actions 
 
3.99 1.01 4.06 1.24 
Knowing that one’s action could harm someone 3.86 1.00 3.81 1.25 
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3.2.2. Respondents’ representations of the moral and legal dimensions of 
responsibility  
 
 Since respondents showed a correct understanding of the rational criteria used to 
ascribe responsibility in the legal sense, it is important to examine how they use these 
criteria to ascribe responsibility to a person who has caused a road-traffic accident, 
compared to other morally tainted criteria related to blame.  
 Thus, a factorial analysis in principal components with the Varimax rotation method 
of all responsibility-related items was conducted. Three factors accounting for 58.66% of 
the total variance were yielded, as shown in Table 1.4. Factor 1 (26.40%) included all the 
items related to moral responsibility, as well as two evaluations related to the 
controllability of the act. We will refer to this factor as Moral. Factor 2 (17.50%) entailed 
all rational criteria of legal responsibility and is called Legal. Factor 3 (14.76%) brings 
together all items related to negligence and is named Negligence. The Bartlett’s test of 
Sphericity was significant χ2(45) = 487.432, p <.001 and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) was satisfactory (0.787). It is to be noted that, for 
two items (necessary precautions and acted very carelessly), saturations higher than .30 
were observed for two different factors (Moral and Negligence). For these cases, we 
chose to take into account the highest value of saturation to decide to which factor the 
item corresponded to. Thus, “acting carelessly” was included in Moral and “necessary 
precautions” was integrated into Negligence.  
 
 These findings clearly demonstrate that respondents differentiated between, on the 
one hand, rational criteria such as consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality, and on 
the other hand, evaluations that are more related to moral dimensions of responsibility 
such as blame, being responsible for the death of someone and accountability before 
justice, as well as morally-tainted evaluations of controllability. Moreover, the negligence 
factor indicates that respondents associated evaluations that are relevant when judging a 
negligent conduct, such as the extent to which one acted out of negligence and one did 
not take all the necessary precautions to avoid a harmful occurrence.  
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 Table 1.4.: Principal component analysis of the scales pertaining to the different measures related to 
responsibility 
*Saturations that are higher than .30 are displayed in bold  
** S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
 
 
3.3. Effect of the level of negligence on moral and legal dimensions of 
responsibility as well as negligence ratings  
 
The manipulation of level of negligence was successful in this study, since all 
respondents differentiated these in terms of the relevant legal criteria they corresponded 
to. A 2 (type of study) x 2 (negligence condition) MANOVA was carried out and 
produced a main effect of condition (see Table 1.5). Respondents in the conscious 
negligence (m=3.27) situation evaluated significantly (F (1,214) = 18.90; p <.001, η =.08) 
more that the agent was aware that the fact of driving at high speed in a curve could lead 
to the death of the victim70 than respondents in the unconscious negligence (m=2.49) 
situation. Moreover, respondents in the conscious negligence situation evaluated 
significantly (F (1,214) = 46.76; p <.001, η =.18) more that the agent took freely the decision 
to drive knowing that this could lead to an accident71 than respondents in the unconscious 
negligence situation. No significant main effect of type of study or interaction effects 
were observed for consciousness and voluntariness measures. These results indicate that 
evaluations pertaining to the rational criteria of consciousness and voluntariness were 
affected by the level of negligence of the agent. Thus, consciousness and voluntariness 
ratings were higher for respondents in the conscious negligence condition, compared to 
the unconscious condition. This means that respondents in the former condition attributed 
more legal responsibility to the agent, than respondents in the latter condition did. 
                                                 
70
 Hereafter this item will be referred to as «consciousness » 
71
 Hereafter this item will be referred to as « voluntariness » 
Scales Saturations* Mean 
ratings S.d.** Moral  Legal Negligence 
 
Blameworthiness 
 
.829 
 
.093 
 
.104 
 
4.27 .910 
Responsibility for the death of the victim  .794 .034 -.078 3.80 .988 
Accountability before justice .687 .171 .149 4.31 .831 
Could have acted otherwise .599 .234 .214 4.41 .874 
Acted very carelessly .553 .138 .449 4.63 .686 
Consciousness .120 .846 .049 2.87 1.36 
Voluntariness .072 .802 .188 3.56 1.39 
Intentionality  .246 .511 -.263 1.32 .637 
Acted out of negligence -.001 -.057 . 785 4.23 1.05 
Did not take the necessary precautions to avoid the harmful outcome .325 .121 .683 4.48 .860 
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Moreover, in line with the predictions of this study, the subtle legal difference between 
conscious and unconscious negligence only affected these criteria of legal responsibility. 
The legal responsibility measure of intentionality was not rated differently between both 
conditions of negligence.  
 Also in support of our predictions, respondents’ responses to all measures of moral 
responsibility were similar no matter what the condition of negligence in which they 
were. The negative feelings of anger, revolt and injustice rated by respondents did not 
differ significantly either depending on the negligence condition. Responses on measures 
related to the punitive responses that can attenuate the harm done to the victim’s family 
did not show any significant differences between both conditions of negligence. 
Moreover, all measures of explanations of the events were rated with the same levels of 
agreement for both conditions.   
 However, contrary to predictions, respondents’ assessments as to whether the 
perpetrator had acted negligently, carelessly or had not taken the necessary precautions 
were not rated differently depending on the condition of negligence. These findings could 
indicate that, for the respondents, a situation in which a conduct is described as 
amounting to the legal definition of conscious negligence or unconscious negligence is 
perceived differently in terms of rational criteria, but not in terms of assessments of the 
extent to which he acted out of negligence, of level of precautions taken and of 
carelessness. This also implies that the negligence rating or the necessary precautions 
measure were not affected by the legal level of negligence, contrary to what would have 
been intuitively expected.  
 
 Table 1.5.: Mean ratings for all legal responsibility-related measures for each condition 
Measures Conscious negligence  Unconscious negligence 
 Mean ratings S.d.* Mean ratings 
 
S.d.* 
 
Consciousness 
 
3.26 1.37 2.51 1.24 
Voluntariness 
 
4.14 1.11 2.96 1.39 
Intentionality 
 
1.41 0.70 1.25 0.56 
  * S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
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3.4. Effect of type of study on moral and legal dimensions of responsibility 
as a function of levels of negligence 
 
 The second main hypothesis of this study suggested that psychology students should 
be less sensitive to the manipulation of negligence levels than law students would be, 
since these nuances in legal culpability are based on legal standards that may not be as 
perceptible for perceiver who was not trained to identify such rational cues. Results do 
not support this hypothesis, since no main effect of type of study or interaction effect 
between condition and study was found for responses concerning consciousness and 
voluntariness. Law students do not evaluate ratings of consciousness or voluntariness 
significantly differently than psychology students for these scenarios (see Table 1.6.).  
 However, as demonstrated in Table 1.6, a main effect of type of study was observed 
for the rating of negligence (F (1,212) = 16.43; p <.001, η =.07). Psychology students 
(m=4.53) tend to agree more that the agent acted negligently than law students (m=3.97). 
Let us also add the finding of an interaction effect of type of study and condition 
bordering significance (F (1,214) = 3.70; p <.06, η =.02), whereby law students rated 
negligence lower for conscious negligence, compared to unconscious negligence, 
whereas negligence was rated highly by psychology students, independently of the legal 
level of negligence. Additional post-hoc analyses, conducted with the Scheffe method, 
confirm these findings. They indicate that law students in the conscious negligence 
condition rate negligence significantly (F (3,213) = 7.67; p <.001) lower compared to the 
other law students and the psychology students in both negligence conditions.  
 
 Table 1.6.: Mean ratings for all legal responsibility-related measures and the negligence rating  
 for each condition and for each student group 
 
Conscious negligence condition 
 
Unconscious negligence condition 
 
 
Law 
students  
Psychology 
students  
Law 
students  
Psychology 
students  
Measures Mean 
 
S.d.* 
 
Mean 
 
S.d.* 
 
Mean 
 
S.d.* 
 
Mean 
 
S.d.* 
 
Negligence 3.73 1.27 4.55 0.84 4.23 0.98 4.52 0.80 
Consciousness 3.38 1.24 3.14 1.51 2.39 1.22 2.62 1.27 
Voluntariness 4.13 1.17 4.16 1.05 2.85 1.48 2.95 1.39 
Intentionality 1.36 0.62 1.45 0.79 1.16 0.41 1.33 0.69 
 * S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
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3.5. Negligence ratings and their relationship to other relevant correlates as 
a function of type of study and negligence condition  
 
 Since the type of study seems to have an influence on negligence ratings and since 
previous results did not show an effect of the negligence condition on these ratings, 
further analyses should be carried out to verify the nature of the effect of the type of 
study with regard to negligence ratings and necessary precautions. Indeed, such ratings 
are important elements to consider when evaluating an event that could be qualified as a 
case of negligent conduct. As necessary precautions are an element to be considered in a 
legal determination of liability for negligence, their role with regard to negligence could 
be perceived differently depending on the type of study of the participant and the 
negligence condition. The following analyses were all carried out by separating 
respondents by their type of study and the negligence condition they were assigned to.   
 Following previous research findings, the negligence measure was assumed to be 
related to the necessary precautions measure and, in accordance with legal reasoning in 
Swiss Criminal law, could also be related to the qualification of negligent homicide and 
the legal responsibility mean rating (Mlegal)72. Four resulting regression analyses were 
conducted on the negligence measure, using as predictors the legal responsibility mean 
rating (Mlegal), the qualification of negligent homicide and the measure of precautions 
taken. Significant predictors were only found for the unconscious negligence condition. 
The appraisal of the extent to which the respondents consider that the offender acted out 
of negligence seems to be only strongly predicted by the evaluation that the precautions 
to avoid the outcome were not taken, for both psychology students (β= .665, p <.001) and 
law students (β= .297, p <.04). However, not taking precaution to avoid the outcome 
seems to be a stronger predictor of negligence ratings for psychology students (R2=.50), 
than for law students (R2=.23). The legal responsibility mean rating and the negligent 
homicide qualification did not significantly predict negligence ratings in any of the 
conditions. Let us add that the portion of the variance of the negligence rating explained 
by necessary precaution was much higher for psychology students compared to law 
students. A closer examination of the correlation between negligence and necessary 
                                                 
72
 These mean ratings was yielded by computing the items included in the factors Moral and Legal that were described in section 
3.2.2., p. 99: Mmoral (α =.745) and Mlegal (α =.605). 
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precautions for all four conditions confirms significant results for both types of students 
(rpsy= .700, p < .001; rlaw= .424, p < .002) only for the unconscious negligence condition, 
as found previously. Moreover, the r value for psychology students was significantly 
different from the one for law students (z = 2.10, p < .04). 
 
 Negligence ratings do not seem to be associated to legal and rational elements, as 
shown by the absence of relationship with the negligence condition and the legal 
responsibility mean rating in these regression analyses. Correlational analyses for all four 
conditions confirmed this observation, since no significant results were found for the 
association between negligence ratings and legal responsibility mean ratings.  
 However, one can wonder if a moral element of responsibility, such as 
blameworthiness, would be associated to negligence ratings and if this association would 
depend on the type of study of the subject and the negligence condition. We chose to 
consider the effect of blameworthiness and not the effect of the moral responsibility 
rating that was previously yielded in the factor analyses presented in section 3.2.2, 
because the resulting moral responsibility mean rating did not only include purely moral 
responsibility-related measures, but also controllability-related ones. Indeed, the moral 
responsibility factor (which was at the source of the computation of the moral 
responsibility mean rating) entailed items that were clearly related to blame, but also 
factors that were less related to blame and more to controllability, such as carelessness 
and possibilities of acting otherwise. Regression analyses on the dependent variable of 
negligence, using, in addition to blameworthiness, the same predictors as those used 
previously, were carried out. Significant results were observed again solely for the 
unconscious negligence condition, but, they differed this time depending on the type of 
study of the respondents. For psychology students, negligence ratings were only strongly 
predicted by necessary precautions (R2 = .53; β= .664, p <.001). As for law students (R2 = 
.30), negligence was positively associated to necessary precautions (β= .445, p <.004) 
and negligent homicide (β= .266, p <.04) and negatively related to blameworthiness (β= -
.340, p <.02). Since negligent homicide was not a significant predictor of negligence for 
law students when blameworthiness was not included in the regression (as demonstrated 
above), blameworthiness could have an influence on whether negligence ratings are 
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related to a negligent homicide qualification. Correlational analyses between negligence 
and the negligent homicide qualification for the four different groups of respondents 
show that law and psychology students associate significantly negligence and the 
negligent homicide qualification in the unconscious negligent condition (rpsy= .348, p < 
.02; rlaw= .365, p < .005), but not in the conscious negligence condition. However, when 
controlling for blameworthiness in a partial correlation between negligence and the 
negligent homicide qualification, in the unconscious negligence condition, this 
association is no more significant for psychology students, whereas it becomes even 
stronger for law students (r= .369, p < .003). This correlation remains non-significant for 
all participants in the conscious negligence condition.  
 Another explanation for the lack of influence of different legal levels of negligence 
on negligence ratings could be that these ratings are more evaluative than rational in their 
formulation. They may therefore simply not be related to rational criteria for 
responsibility. In other words, respondents may have not assessed negligence differently 
between conscious and unconscious conditions, because they considered that negligence 
does not depend on being or not conscious of the risks one is taking. The observation of 
an absence of relationship between negligence ratings and ratings of rational criteria of 
consciousness for all four conditions warrants support to this explanation. However, one 
should mention that negligence was found to be significantly related to the voluntariness 
rating for law students in the unconscious negligence condition (r= .260, p < .05). This 
linkage was not found for any of the other conditions. These results indicate that law 
students associate the negligence rating to a rational element such as voluntariness in the 
unconscious negligence condition, whereas psychology students do not make this 
linkage. Moreover, a similar result appears when examining the association between the 
measure concerning rational criteria related to the consciousness of the probability of the 
occurrence of harmful risks (Risk) and negligence ratings. Law students in the 
unconscious negligence condition are the only group of respondents to associate 
significantly Risk and negligence (r= .525, p < .001). This association is not found for the 
other three groups of respondents. This result and the regression findings concerning the 
predictive value of necessary precautions, the negligent homicide qualification and 
blameworthiness for law students in the unconscious negligence condition, indicate that 
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psychology students and law students reasoned about the negligence rating using 
different processes. This interpretation is supported by the finding that psychology 
students consistently associate the negligence rating to the carelessness rating in both 
conditions (rpsyCN= .385, p < .006; rpsyUN= .752, p < .001), whereas law students do not 
relate both ratings, whatever the condition. Let us add that psychology students seem to 
relate negligence and carelessness more strongly in the unconscious negligence 
condition, compared to the conscious negligence condition, since the correlations 
corresponding to these two conditions are significantly different (z = -2.73, p < .007). 
Last but not least, when examining the relationship between negligence ratings and blame 
for all four groups of respondents, findings suggest manifestly that psychology students 
are more likely to make this association than law students are. Psychology students 
associated significantly negligence to blameworthiness for the unconscious negligence 
condition (rpsyUN= .351, p < .03) and also related those two ratings in the conscious 
negligence condition, although more weakly (effect bordering significance: (rpsyCN= .271, 
p < .07). Law students never associated negligence to blameworthiness.  
 
3.6. Effect of type of study on the representation of rational criteria of 
consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality 
 
 Other findings point towards the assumption that psychology students were less 
sensitive to legal cues pertaining to legal criteria that are important in determining legal 
responsibility. These concern respondents’ responses on items in the first part of the 
questionnaire concerning the different dimensions of the criteria of consciousness, 
voluntariness and intentionality.  
 
 Using the factor structure that was yielded by the aforementioned73 factor analysis of 
all measures related to the rational criteria of consciousness, voluntariness and 
intentionality, items corresponding to each factor where computed into four 
corresponding mean ratings: TotCI74  (Total consciousness/intentionality mean), Vol75 
                                                 
73
 See section 3.2.1. page 95-96 
74
 α = .898 
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(Voluntariness mean), Risk76 (Consciousness of the probability of risks mean) and 
Amb77 (Ambiguous intentionality and consciousness mean). These mean ratings were 
compared between respondents of the two fields of study with a multivariate analysis of 
variance. Law students’ mean ratings for TotCI (m=4.32) and Vol (m=4.25) are 
significantly (F (1,214) = 11.53; p <.002, η =.05) higher than psychology students’ mean 
ratings (TotCI, m=3.76; Vol, m=4.02), which could indicate that law students are more 
likely to identify explicit descriptions of the legal criteria of consciousness and 
intentionality as such, compared to psychology students.  
 However, a more detailed and individual look at each of the item ratings that entail 
TotCI and Vol shows that this may be more the case for criteria of consciousness and 
intentionality, than for voluntariness. Indeed, differences between psychology and law 
students, in terms of their mean ratings for the four measures related to voluntariness, 
were only found for the item pertaining to the absence of intervention of any external 
force, (F(1,210) = 4.27; p <.05, η =.02). Law students (m=4.25) showed higher 
agreement that the absence of intervention of any external force can imply voluntariness 
than psychology students (m=3.95). Nevertheless, as indicated in Table 1.3 (p.94), 
significant differences between types of respondents were found for most items related to 
total consciousness and intentionality. Law students were more likely to agree that 
thinking about one’s act and its consequences before committing it (F(1,213) = 10.01; p 
<.003, η=.05) and  thinking about one’s act before committing it and acting while 
knowing that one’s actions are harmful (F(1,213) = 13.40; p <.001, η =.06) correspond to 
conscious behaviour, than psychology students. Moreover, law students tended also to be 
more favourable to assimilating wanting to hurt someone by one’s actions (F (1,213) = 
11.40; p <.002, η =.05) and acting with the one and only aim to hurt someone (F (1,213) 
= 14.01; p <.001, η =.06) to intentional action, compared to psychology students. No 
differences between law and psychology students were found for the item related to 
knowing before acting that one’s actions are liable for punishment by the law.  
 An additional finding of a main effect of type of study (F (1,214) = 9.49; p <.003, 
η=.04) for the mean rating for the ambiguous consciousness and intentionality factor 
                                                                                                                                                 
75
 α  = .780 
76
 α  = .833 
77
 α  = .318 
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(Amb) should also be mentioned. However, since the alpha index for Amb is very low, 
we will examine the mean ratings for the two measures that constitute Amb individually. 
Psychology students agree significantly more than law students that “intending an action, 
but decided against it and involuntarily committing that action” (mpsy=1.62; mdroit=1.40; 
(F (1,214) = 3.97; p <.05, η =.02) and “committing an action, but not understanding what 
one has done after having acted” (mpsy=2.91; mdroit=2.47; (F (1,214) = 7.33; p <.008, 
η=.04) constituted respectively, intentional action and consciousness of one’s actions. 
Thus, situations that are, in legal reasoning, very difficult to consider as consciousness 
and intentionality, because of their ambiguity, are considered more as corresponding to 
consciousness and intentionality by the psychology students than the law students. This 
could indicate that law students understand the legal subtlety of this ambiguity better than 
psychology students do.  
 
 We assumed that moral and legal dimensions of responsibility were underlain by 
different processes. Testing this theory requires an examination of the relationships 
between respondents’ ratings of legal and moral responsibility and their ratings of the 
negative emotions they felt about the victim’s death, as well as their ratings concerning 
the different explanations that could be put forward for the situation, punitive responses 
and retributive punitive aims and different qualifications for the event. Moreover, socio-
demographic variables, experiences of being a victim or a perpetrator, as well as topics of 
discussion and of interest in the media will also be taken into account in their relationship 
to moral and legal dimensions of responsibility ascriptions.  
 
 
3.7. Moral and legal dimensions of responsibility and their underlying 
predictors 
 
 We assume that moral responsibility is more likely to be associated to negative 
emotional reactions, agreement with internal explanations for the event and disagreement 
with external explanations for the event, agreement with retributive punitive aims, as well 
as favouring prison as a way to attenuate the harm done, than legal responsibility. Legal 
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responsibility is expected to be more related to agreeing with rational criteria for 
responsibility related to the awareness of probability of risks, to legal qualifications of the 
event, as well as being a law student and being in the conscious negligence condition of 
level of negligence. In order to test our predictions, linear multiple regression analyses 
with the method enter were carried out on blameworthiness78 ratings and the legal 
responsibility (Mlegal) mean rating.  
 As for the predictors used in these analyses, a few explanations concerning their 
nature seem necessary. For purposes of clarity, for some predictors, we used the mean 
ratings corresponding to the following groups of items: measures of the consciousness of 
probability of risks yielded by the factorial analysis of rational criteria for 
responsibility79, measures corresponding to negative emotional reactions80, measures 
related to the internal and external explanations for the event81 and all items related to 
retributive punitive aims82.  The resulting mean ratings were the following: Risk, for 
rational criteria of responsibility related to the awareness of the probability of risk; 
Memoneg, for negative emotional reactions; Mextexpl and Mintexpl, for external83 and 
internal84 event explanations; and Mretribution, for retributive punitive aims. The other 
following predictors were used in their original format: the measures related to the 
qualification of the situation of accident and of negligent homicide, the measure of 
agreement with prison time being a way of attenuating the harm done, as well as the 
negligence condition in which the respondents were assigned and their type of study.  
 Since independent variables such as gender, religious affiliation and political 
orientation, socio-economic status, life experiences of being or knowing a victim or a 
perpetrator as well as topics of discussion and of interest in the media, were not 
                                                 
78
 We chose to use the blameworthiness rating instead of the moral responsibility mean rating, since the latter rating was not purely 
composed of moral responsibility-related measures. 
79
 The mean ratings of rational criteria for responsibility related to the consciousness of probability of risks (Mrisk) are the result of the 
computing of items related to the Risk factor yielded in section 3.2.1. p. 95-96.  
80
 The mean rating for negative emotions was produced through the computation of all measures of negative emotions that were 
included into one factor. See section 2.2. p.89.  
81
 The mean ratings for internal explanations and external explanations were the product of the computation of the measures entailed 
in the internal and external factors yielded by the factorial analysis of the measures of the different explanations for the event. See 
section 2.2 p.91. 
82
 The mean rating for retributive punitive aims is the mean value of all measures related to the reparation through retribution factor. 
See section 2.2 p.92. 
83
 Mextexpl includes items related to external and esoteric reasons to explain events. Hereafter, we will refer to it as external 
explanations for events for reasons of clarity.  
84
 Mintexpl includes items concerning explanations for events related to lack of values, norms and education. Hereafter, we will refer 
to it as internal explanations for events for reasons of clarity. 
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significantly associated to the moral or legal responsibility dimension, we did not include 
them as predictors in the regression analysis. 
 
3.7.1. Moral and legal responsibility dimensions and their predictors 
 
 A first analysis tested the influence of negative emotions (Memoneg), of internal and 
external event explanations (Mextexpl and Mintexpl), retributive punitive aims 
(Mretribution) and considering prison as a way of attenuating the harm done on 
blameworthiness. The ratings of the rational criteria for legal responsibility concerning 
the consciousness of the probability of risks (Risk), qualifications of the situation, as well 
as the level of negligence condition and the field of study were also added as predictors in 
order to rule out their possible relation to blameworthiness. Thus, the dependent variable, 
which was the object of this prediction, was the participants’ ratings of blameworthiness 
(Blame). As demonstrated in Table 1.7., Blame is significantly predicted by 
disagreement with external reasons to explain of events, agreeing with internal 
explanations of events, agreeing that prison time can attenuate the harm done, agreeing 
with the qualification of negligent homicide, as well as feeling strong negative emotions. 
The strongest predictors are, as follows: not perceiving external and esoteric reasons to be 
good explanations of these events, considering that lack of education and norms are good 
explanations of such events and feeling strong negative emotions. Moreover, contrary to 
our predictions, retributive punitive aims were not significantly associated to Mmoral. 
However, in line with our assumptions, the field of study, the level of negligence 
condition and rational criteria for responsibility related to the consciousness of the 
probability of risks did not have any significant influence on Mmoral.  
 
 A second analysis tested the influence of the same dependent variables as those used 
in the previous regression on the dependent variable of mean ratings of legal 
responsibility (Mlegal). As a result, as displayed in Table 1.7., Mlegal is significantly 
predicted by the conscious negligence condition, the tendency not to qualify the situation 
as an accident and agreeing that different levels of consciousness of probability can 
reflect intentionality. Retributive punitive aims, negative emotions as well as the 
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qualifications of negligent homicide and of intentional homicide were not significant 
predictors. Thus, as expected, being in a conscious negligence condition and 
consciousness of probability of risks were good predictors of legal responsibility mean 
ratings, although the predictive strength of Risk was less important than that of the 
negligence condition. In conformity with our expectations, negative emotions, as well as 
agreeing that prison can attenuate the harm done and favouring retributive punitive aims 
were not significant predictors of Mlegal. However, some unexpected results were also 
found. Mlegal was strongly predicted by disagreement with the qualification of accident 
and was predicted by agreement with internal explanations for events. Moreover, Mlegal, 
contrary to what was expected, was not significantly predicted by the type of study of the 
respondent. 
 
Table 1.7.: Multiple regression analyses: Prediction of moral and legal responsibility as well as 
controllability mean ratings 
 
Independent variables Mmoral Mlegal 
Mextexpl -.283*** -.070 
Memoneg .192** -.079 
Mintexpl .164* .147* 
Negligent homicide qualification .148* .081 
Prison as a way of attenuating the harm done .162* .071 
Conscious negligence vs. Unconscious negligence .020 -.368*** 
accident qualification -.056 -.242*** 
Risk -.087 .142* 
   
Mretribution .032 -.065 
Law vs. psychology students -.007 -.073 
   
 
R2 
 
.284 
 
.378 
Adjusted R2 .248 .340 
R .533 .615 
  *** p <.001, ** p <.01, * p <.05 
 
 These regressions confirmed some of our assumptions, but some unexpected results 
were also found. Thus, additional analyses are warranted in order to gain a better 
understanding of the following issues, especially with regard to the manipulation of the 
negligence conditions and the type of study of respondents. Thus, these further analyses 
will all be carried out separately for the four groups of participants resulting from the 
combination of type of study and negligence condition.  
 We expected moral responsibility ratings to be predicted by retributive punitive aims 
and findings did not support this assumption. Moreover, moral responsibility ratings were 
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associated to an unexpected predictor: the legal qualification of negligent homicide. 
These unexpected results could be due to the type of study of respondents and the 
condition in which they responded. Hence, we need to verify whether blameworthiness is 
related to retributive punitive aims and negligent homicide when one examines these 
linkages for each condition. Moreover, the associations, which are relevant to punitive 
attitudes, between blameworthiness, negative emotions and favouring prison as a manner 
of attenuating the harm done will also be broken down for the four conditions.  
 Moreover, results in section 3.2.2 (see Table 1.4.) showed that the moral 
responsibility factor included all blame-related measures except the measure concerning 
the public denunciation of the agents. As this result contradicts our assumptions, further 
analyses will be carried in order to clarify the role of the assessment of public 
denunciation with regard to blameworthiness. As this measure has a punitive and 
condemnatory undertone, it could be related to blameworthiness as an ensuing social 
response to the ascription of blame. However, such a response could have a different role 
depending on the type of study of participants and the negligence condition.  
 Legal responsibility mean ratings were, in line with our assumptions, predicted by 
rational criteria and the negligence condition and were not associated to emotions, 
punitive responses and punitive aims. However, unpredicted associations were found 
with disagreeing with the non-legal qualification of accident and favouring internal 
explanations. Further analyses carried out separately for the four different conditions will 
help us get a better understanding of these relationships. 
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3.8. Correlates of blameworthiness and the effect of type of study and 
negligence condition on these linkages 
 
3.8.1. Blameworthiness and its relationship to retributive punitive aims, 
negative emotions and punitive responses 
 
 In line with our assumption, a measure that strongly pertains to moral responsibility, 
such as blameworthiness, was significantly predicted by all the variables that had been 
anticipated to have such an effect, except for the retributive punitive aims mean rating.  
 Yet, previous research has often demonstrated the existence of a strong link between 
punitive reactions, blame and negative emotions (Averill, 1983; Weiner, 1993). 
Retributive punitive aims are thought to determine emotions and moral responsibility 
(Graham et al., 1997) and emotions could influence the linkage between the 
blameworthiness judgment and the subsequent social response (i.e. a punitive response). 
We thus carried out further analyses to verify whether blameworthiness was related to 
negative emotions and the punitive response favouring prison time as a manner to 
attenuate the harm done to the victim’s family, as well as to retributive punitive aims, 
when examining separately the four conditions in which respondents evaluated these 
elements.  
 To begin with, we checked whether negative emotions were associated to 
blameworthiness in all four conditions. Negative emotions were significantly correlated 
to blameworthiness in all conditions for the law students (rCN= .273, p < .05; rUN= .254, p 
< .05), but were only significantly associated for psychology students in the unconscious 
negligence condition (rUN= .304, p < .04). However, when controlling for retributive 
punitive aims mean ratings (Mretributive), these significant associations diminished 
significantly for law students in both conscious and unconscious negligence conditions, 
but remained as they were for psychology students in the unconscious negligence 
condition (rUN= .305, p < .04). Let us add that Mretributive were only significantly 
related to blameworthiness for law students in the unconscious negligence condition (r= 
.434, p < .001). Respondents in all other conditions did not associate significantly 
Mretributive and blameworthiness. Finally, when examining if Mretributive was still 
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significantly related to blameworthiness when controlling for negative emotions, for law 
students in the unconscious negligence condition, partial correlation findings show that 
this association remains strong, even after partialling out for negative emotions (r= .398, 
p < .003).  
 Moreover, the association between blame and favouring prison time was also 
investigated to verify the effect of the type of study and negligence condition on this 
linkage. As it turns out, blameworthiness was significantly related to prison time in all 
conditions except for the one in which law students were assigned to the conscious 
negligence condition. Thus, psychology students significantly related blameworthiness to 
favouring prison for the agent in both the conscious negligence condition (r= .305 p < 
.04) and the unconscious negligence condition (r= .352, p < .02). Law students also 
significantly and strongly associated blameworthiness and favouring prison time for the 
agent, but only in the unconscious negligence condition (r= .469, p < .001).  
 Finally, as we assume, in line with previous findings (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008) that 
punitive responses favouring prison are only associated to retributive punitive aims and 
are not related to utilitarian attitudes, we verified whether this was the case and whether 
this could be generalised to all groups of respondents independently of their type of study 
and the negligence conditions. The association between Mretributive and favouring 
prison time for the agent is significant for all groups of respondents (rlawCN= .488, p < 
.001; rlawUN= .495, p < .001; rpsyCN= .401, p < .005), except for psychology students in the 
unconscious negligence condition. However, no significant relationships were found 
between Mdeterrence and the punitive response favouring the imprisonment of the agent 
for any of the groups of respondents. 
 
 Findings until now show that participants seem to relate blameworthiness to punitive 
reactions and attitudes differently depending on their student status and the condition in 
which they were assigned to. More specifically, the conscious and unconscious 
negligence conditions could have a discriminating influence on whether law students 
associate blameworthiness to punitive attitudes or reactions, whereas the negligence 
condition may not have such an effect on psychology students’ tendency to make such 
associations. Given these results, we could expect public denunciation ratings to be 
 119 
 
differently associated to blameworthiness depending on the type of study and the 
negligence condition of respondents.  
 
3.8.2. Blameworthiness and its relationship to public denunciation 
 
 As we make the assumption that the public denunciation rating could be associated to 
blameworthiness and could be assimilated to a condemnatory response that ensued a 
blameworthiness ascription and that could lead to a punitive response (favouring prison), 
we checked the links between these three measures for all four conditions. 
Blameworthiness was significantly associated to public denunciation for all groups of 
participants (rpsyCN= .352, p < .02; rpsyUN= .516, p < .001; rlawUN= .395, p < .003), except 
for the law students assigned to the conscious negligence condition. As for the 
association between public denunciation and favouring prison time for the agent, the only 
group of participants for which it was significant concerned law students ascribed to the 
unconscious negligence condition (r= .367, p < .005). In all other conditions, this 
association was not significant.  
 As shown until now, psychology students always associated blameworthiness to 
prison and to public denunciation, whereas law students only associated these in the 
unconscious negligence condition. Moreover, law students in the unconscious negligence 
condition were the only group of participants to associate public denunciation to prison 
time. This may indicate that favouring the public denunciation of the agent’s actions 
could have an effect on the association between blameworthiness and favouring prison 
time, but that this effect would concern more law students in the unconscious negligence 
condition. Partial correlations confirmed this interpretation, since, when controlling for 
the influence of the public denunciation response, the association between 
blameworthiness and prison time weakened significantly for psychology students in both 
negligence conditions, but remained for law students in the unconscious negligence 
condition (rlawCN= .058, ns rlawUN= .378, p < .004).  
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3.8.3. Blameworthiness and its relationship to the negligent homicide 
qualification  
 
 Concerning the relationship between blame and the negligent homicide qualification, 
all groups of respondents show significant correlations (rpsyCN= .455, p < .002; rpsyUN= 
.357, p < .02; rlawUN= .336, p < .008), with the exception of law students in the conscious 
negligence condition. These differences in the association of blame to the negligent 
homicide qualification between law students and psychology students as a function of the 
negligence condition are intriguing and could mean that this qualification entailed a 
different meaning for each type of student. More specifically, one assumption could be 
that psychology students associated blameworthiness to this qualification with a legal 
liability in mind, whereas law students may just be more likely to qualify a blameworthy 
act of negligent homicide in the unconscious negligence condition, because they believe 
it amounts more to a negligent conduct, compared to the conscious negligence condition. 
This is all the more possible, since the negligent homicide qualification was not related to 
legal responsibility by most respondents, except for psychology students in the conscious 
negligence condition (rpsyCN= .337, p < .02). Thus, law students do not associate this 
qualification to legal responsibility, whereas psychology students do make such an 
association for the conscious negligence condition.  
 
3.9. The correlates of legal responsibility and the effect of type of study and 
negligence condition on these linkages 
 
3.9.1. Legal responsibility ratings and their relationship with the non-legal 
qualification of accident as a function of type of study and negligence 
condition 
 
 Legal responsibility mean ratings were, in line with our assumptions, predicted by 
rational criteria and were not associated to emotions and punitive aims. As they were also 
associated to disagreeing with the non-legal qualification of accident, further analyses 
were performed to understand this relationship with regard to the participants’ type of 
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study and the negligence condition in which they responded. We decided to focus on the 
role of variables that are considered important in legal reasoning when deciding whether 
a conduct amounts to negligence and involves a legal liability or is an unfortunate 
accident that will not be considered in penal terms. These variables are respondents’ 
responses concerning the different levels of probability of risks taken and their 
correspondence to intentionality (Risk) and their assessments of the precautions taken to 
avoid the harmful outcome. We thus analysed the relationship between these different 
variables and legal responsibility mean ratings (Mlegal) across the four groups of 
respondents.  
 Mlegal was significantly negatively associated to the accident qualification for all 
four groups of respondents (rpsyCN= -.514, p < .001; rpsyUN= -.307, p < .04; rlawCN= -.401, p 
< .003; rlawUN= -.341, p < .008). Yet, Mlegal was only significantly associated to the Risk 
measure by law students in the unconscious negligence condition (r= .272, p < .04). This 
association was not found for all psychology students, as well as law students in the 
conscious negligence condition. Moreover, when examining the relationship between 
Mlegal and necessary precautions, one observes that such associations are only 
significant for law students in the unconscious negligence condition (r= .327, p < .01). 
These two ratings are not significantly associated for the three other groups of 
respondents. 
 Finally, one should mention that since necessary precautions, legal responsibility and 
the element of awareness of the probability of risks are important factors to consider in 
legal reasoning when deciding whether a given conduct constitutes a serious offense and 
is liable for negligence or is just an accident, one can expect law students to related these 
elements to the qualification of accident differently, compared to psychology students. In 
order to gain a better understanding of the roles of these different evaluations in 
determining whether a respondent would agree or not to qualify the event of accident, 
regression analyses were carried out separately for each group of respondents, taking into 
account the type of study and negligence condition. The accident qualification was found 
to be significantly predicted by one or more of these variables for law students in all 
conditions and psychology students in the conscious negligence condition. Mlegal (β= -
.491, p < .002) was the only significant predictor for disagreement with the accident 
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qualification (R2= .275) for psychology students in the conscious negligence condition. 
As for law students, the accident qualification was found to be significantly predicted by 
low agreement with Mlegal (β= -.348, p < .008) and low agreement with necessary 
precautions (β= -.342, p < .007) in the conscious negligence condition (R2= .275), 
whereas low Mlegal was the only significant (β= -.330, p < .02) predictor of the accident 
qualification in the unconscious negligence condition (R2= .136).  
 
 
3.9.2. Legal responsibility and its relationship with blameworthiness as a 
function of type of study and negligence condition 
 
 Previous regression analyses discussed in section 3.5 demonstrate that, when 
considering possible predictors of negligence ratings, such as necessary precautions, legal 
responsibility ratings, the negligent homicide qualification and blameworthiness, law 
students’ negligence ratings in the unconscious negligence condition depended on low 
acceptance of blameworthiness and high agreement with the fact that necessary 
precautions were not taken and the negligent homicide qualification. Given these 
linkages, we wanted to check whether blameworthiness and legal responsibility were 
related and whether such an association was more likely for law students in the 
unconscious negligence condition. Correlational analyses support this expectation, since 
only law in the unconscious negligence condition showed a significant association 
between blameworthiness and legal responsibility (r= .359, p < .005). These two ratings 
were not significantly associated for the three other groups of respondents.  
 
 
3.10. Additional relevant analyses concerning punitive attitudes 
 
3.10.1. Respondents’ acceptance of different punitive attitudes  
 
 As a preliminary analysis, we examined mean ratings for all punitive aims and found 
interesting differences in terms of the nature of the punitive aims that reach most 
agreement from respondents. A hierarchical cluster analysis using the Ward’s method 
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highlighted three distinct groups of items according to mean ratings. The first group 
incorporated items related to special and general deterrence, as well as incapacitation, and 
was called deterrence. The second group entailed items concerning the education and 
rehabilitation of the offender. We will refer to this group of measures as rehabilitation. 
The third group of items is related to retribution and restoration of moral order and will 
be referred to as retribution and restoration. T-test analyses confirmed that respondents 
significantly rated these three groups of measures differently and these differences were 
found both for law and psychology students. Mean ratings for each group of items and for 
each group of respondents are displayed in Table 1.8. As law and psychology students 
rated these different mean ratings in the same way and significantly differentiated 
between these ratings, we will only present the t-test values for all respondents, without 
presenting these for each group of respondents depending on the type of study (see 
footnotes below for these). Deterrence motives seem to be significantly more favoured 
by respondents, compared to Rehabilitation (t (212) = 10.22, p <.001)85 or Retribution 
and restoration (t (212) = 26.93, p <.001)86. Moreover, rehabilitation also reached 
significantly (t (212) = 12.40, p <.001)87 more agreement than retribution and 
restoration.  
 These findings suggest that, in terms of mean ratings, retribution is not favoured by 
respondents. However, this does not mean that all respondents do not endorse such a 
rationale. Indeed, when categorizing respondents in terms of whether the rated retribution 
high or low88, only a minority (n=51, 23.9%) was found to highly endorse such a punitive 
aim.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85
 Difference between deterrence and rehabilitation: Law students (t (114) = 8.35, p <.001); Psychology students (t (97) = 6.26, p 
<.001).   
86
 Difference between deterrence and retribution and restoration: Law students (t (114) = 21.26, p <.001); Psychology students (t (97) 
= 16.87, p <.001).   
87
 Difference between rehabilitation and retribution and restoration: Law students (t (114) = 10.64, p <.001); Psychology students (t 
(97) = 7.01, p <.001).   
88
 We computed the retribution mean rating into high retribution (ratings between 4 and 5) and low retribution (ratings between 1 and 
3) in order to obtain this classification of respondents. 
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 Table 1.8.: Mean ratings for deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution and 
  restoration punitive goals for each group of students 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
 
 
3.10.2. Respondents’ punitive attitudes and their socio-demographic 
characteristics 
 
 Socio-demographic variables were expected to have an influence on responsibility 
judgments, but no evidence of such an effect was found in this research. However, since 
previous research (Caroll et al., 1987; Languin et al., 2006) shows that socio-
demographic variables, related to religion, politics and socio-economic status (SES), can 
have an effect on punitive attitudes, these links were investigated.  
 Political orientation had only an influence on responses concerning punitive aims 
related to the just deserts rationale. A main significant effect of political orientation was 
observed for “he should get what he deserves” (F (1, 197) = 4.83; p <.01, η=.05) and 
“learning discipline” (F (1, 197) = 3.29; p <.04, η=.03). Thus, people who have a more 
left (mdes=2.61; mdisc=3.07) and centre (mdes=2.64; mdisc=2.98) orientation are 
significantly less likely to agree with the just deserts measure of getting what he deserves 
and the discipline measure compared to respondents who consider themselves to be from 
the right political orientation (mdes=3.24; mdisc=2.53). However, post-hoc analyses with 
the Scheffe method show it is especially the just deserts measure that opposes 
significantly (p < .02) respondents from the left orientation to respondents from the right 
orientation. 
 Religious belief was found to have an influence on certain punitive aims related to the 
just deserts rational and the incapacitation perspective. A main significant effect of 
religious belief was found for the just deserts measure of “he should get what he 
deserves” (F (1, 210) =5.02; p <.008, η=.05) and for the incapacitation-related measure of 
“preventing him from harming society” (F (1, 210) = 5.23; p <.007, η=.05). Thus, 
respondents who consider themselves believers practicing their religion (mdes=2.69; 
Punitive goals Law students Psychology students Total 
 
Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* Mean 
Deterrence 4.06 0.61 4.02 0.72 4.04 
Rehabilitation 3.46 0.75 3.40 0.86 3.43 
Retribution and restoration 2.55 0.75 2.67 0.83 2.61 
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mincapa=4.34) or without practicing their religion (mdes=3.10; mincapa=4.37), could favour 
more the just deserts and the incapacitation measures than non-believers (mdesert=2.51; 
mincapa=3.93). However, post-hoc analyses with the Scheffe method show that it 
especially believers who do not practice their religion who are significantly opposed to 
non-believers, in terms of their acceptance of the just deserts (p < .02) and the 
incapacitation measures (p < .02). 
 Finally, one should mention that socio-economic status had no significant effect on 
punitive attitudes in this study. Let us add that the type of study did not affect punitive 
attitudes either and did not interact with the effects of religious beliefs and political 
orientation that were yielded for attitudes favouring just desert-related punitive aims.  
 
 
 
 4. Conclusions 
 
4.1. Moral and legal dimensions to responsibility highlighted 
 
 The findings of study 1 are consistent with most of the predictions. Results confirmed 
the first hypothesis concerning the existence of responsibility dimensions, which are 
related to moral and legal criteria, in respondents’ representations. As expected, the moral 
dimension of responsibility was found to entail blame-related and moral attributions of 
responsibility, whereas the legal dimension of responsibility included rational criteria 
such as consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality.  
 On the one hand, participants’ representations associated all moral and blame-related 
criteria with each other under one dimension. This dimension clearly reflects a moral 
orientation, since it relates assessments, such as blameworthiness, responsibility for the 
death of the victim and accountability before justice (as a public condemnation of the 
harm done). On the other hand, participants’ responses associate all the rational criteria 
together under another dimension. Since these criteria are used to ascribe responsibility in 
law, they constitute the legal dimension of responsibility. In sum, these results indicate 
that both moral and legal dimensions of responsibility exist in subjects’ representations.  
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 Let us add that the fact that the moral responsibility dimension included also two 
measures that were more controllability-related concerning the idea that the agent could 
have acted otherwise and carelessness may not contradict this interpretation, since 
controllability has been observed as a central factor for blame ascriptions in previous 
research (Alicke, 2000). Moreover, intuitively, the assessment that the agent could have 
acted otherwise and the assessment of carelessness reflect more of a lay moral evaluation 
used in everyday life than an evaluation that would be used in legal settings. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that negligence and necessary precautions ratings, 
which are more relevant to legal settings when judging of a negligence act, were 
separated from carelessness and acting otherwise in respondents representations, as 
demonstrated by the factorial structure. Hence, these latter measures were perhaps more 
associated to blame-related measures in this study by respondents, in contrast to the 
negligence and precautions measures that were given a status of their own.  
 
 The examination of respondents’ mean ratings of such morally related measures of 
responsibility also indicates that they are evaluated relatively high, compared to rational 
criteria for legal responsibility that could also be relevant to the scenario, such as 
consciousness and voluntariness. Respondents were thus more susceptible to agree with 
moral evaluations than with legal criteria for this scenario, even though all subjects 
generally perceived the differences between both conditions related to legal criteria of 
consciousness and voluntariness. As previous findings had suggested, people can blame 
another person for his actions if they judge that he should have acted otherwise 
(Hamilton, 1980; Lane, 2000), even if they do not consider that these behaviours were 
intentional (Harvey & Rule, 1978). In other words, moral responsibility evaluations of 
responsibility may not depend on legal responsibility assessments.  
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4.2. Effect of the manipulation of levels of negligence 
 
 What is more, in line with the predictions of hypothesis 1, the manipulation of legal 
levels of negligence, such as those pertaining to conscious negligence and unconscious 
negligence, only affected participants’ assessment of consciousness and voluntariness and 
no other responsibility judgment. Thus, only the legal dimensions of responsibility that 
were relevant to the manipulation were sensitive to the differences in legal levels of 
negligence and no measure related to moral responsibility was affected. This provides 
further support for the assumption that rational criteria such as consciousness or 
voluntariness represent the legal dimension of responsibility.   
 
 An intriguing result is that the manipulation of level of negligence did not affect 
participants’ ratings of negligence. Participants did not relate the manipulation of two 
forms of legal criteria of negligence (using legal definitions of conscious negligence and 
unconscious negligence) to their commonsense notion of acting out of negligence. 
Further analyses showed that only respondents in the unconscious negligence condition 
strongly related negligence ratings to necessary precautions. Such an association was not 
observed in the conscious negligence condition. This result is not surprising, since the 
agent is described as having taken precautions to avoid harmful consequences in the 
conscious negligence condition, whereas he is described as not being aware that his 
actions can bring about harmful consequences and, consequently no information is given 
in the vignette as to the precautions taken by the agent, in the unconscious negligence.  
Respondents did not associate negligence to not taking necessary precautions when they 
had to evaluate a car-crash situation in the conscious negligence condition, because the 
agent is described as having taken precautions to avoid a risk he was aware of taking. 
These results point towards the conclusion that even though respondents did not evaluate 
negligence differently depending on the negligence condition, they seem to have 
differentiated between both negligence conditions, in terms of the association between 
negligence and necessary precautions. Consequently, the more respondents in the 
unconscious negligence condition ascribed negligence to the agent, the more they thought 
that the agent did not take all necessary precautions, whereas respondents’ evaluations of 
 128 
 
negligence were not related to their perception of necessary precautions when they were 
in the conscious negligence condition. Respondents, thus, correctly identified the element 
of absence of necessary precautions taken in the unconscious negligence condition (i.e. 
Florian calls Julien to make sure that he is ready to film the scene, without thinking that 
what he is going to do is dangerous) and associated this to heightened negligence. The 
fact that respondents’ evaluations of negligence did not correspond to their necessary 
precautions ratings for the conscious negligence condition indicates that they identified 
for this condition that the agent had taken some precautions to avoid harmful 
consequences (i.e. calling Julien to make sure that the road is clear and that there are no 
cars coming).  
 
 Moreover, findings indicate also that respondents, whatever the negligence condition, 
did not associate negligence to legal responsibility (Mlegal). But, even though negligence 
ratings were not associated to the legal responsibility dimension, this does mean that 
participants did not associate negligence to legal liability. Indeed, findings indicate that 
negligence was related to the qualification of negligent homicide in respondent’s 
conceptions, but only for the unconscious negligence condition.  
 Respondents’ conceptions of negligence were thus found to be both related to not 
taking precautions to avoid a harmful outcome and to the qualification of negligent 
homicide, but uniquely in the unconscious negligence condition. This suggests that 
respondents in the unconscious negligence condition could be more likely to qualify the 
event of negligent homicide and consider that necessary precautions to avoid the harmful 
event from occurring have not been taken if they agree that the agent acted out of 
negligence.  
 Negligence ratings were thus not associated to the condition of legal negligence or the 
legal dimension, but were consistently found to be related to necessary precautions and to 
the negligent homicide qualification in the unconscious negligence condition. This leads 
to the conclusion that people may conceive negligence less in terms of mental states such 
as awareness or foreseeability, than in terms of concrete actions to prevent bad things 
from happening. However, this interpretation might apply more to psychology students 
than to law students, as we shall see in the discussion about the effect of type of study. 
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Let us for now keep this argument in mind, as this issue will be discussed in greater 
details in the next section. 
 
 
4.3. Effect of type of study of the respondents 
 
4.3.1. Effect of type of study on rational and legal criteria of responsibility  
 
 As for the second hypothesis concerning law students’ more precise grasp of the 
rational and legal criteria of responsibility, in comparison with psychology students, 
results provide partial support for it.  
 
 The hypothesis, in relation to the manipulation of level of negligence in the car-crash 
scenario, that law students are more sensitive to the legal cues added to differentiate 
negligence levels in the description of the agent’s actions, than psychology students do, 
was not supported by our findings. Law students did not evaluate that consciousness and 
voluntariness was higher in the conscious negligence condition than in the unconscious 
negligence condition, compared to psychology students (who were expected to evaluate 
negligence similarly no matter the condition). All participants made the distinction 
between the two conditions in terms of consciousness and voluntariness levels.  
 
 However, findings concerning representations of rational criteria of responsibility, in 
the first part of the questionnaire, do provide evidence to law students’ greater sensitivity 
to legal criteria. Law students were found to be more likely to agree that voluntariness 
encompasses the idea that intervening external forces cannot explain the commission of 
the act than psychology students. This is probably due to their training, which imposes 
greater consideration for the situational constraints, such as those brought about by 
mechanical dysfunctions, physical dysfunctions or coerced action, when determining 
voluntariness (Killias, 2001, n. 319 and 320). They are also more likely to agree to 
assimilate different forms of awareness and intent to conscious and intentional action.  
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 Moreover, the criterion of intentionality was more likely to be perceived, in terms of 
its different gradations, in a more legally-consistent manner by law students compared to 
psychology students. When examining differences between ratings related to 
intentionality, law students were more likely than psychology students to grade these 
different measures in line with legal reasoning about levels of intentionality. Law 
students made a clear difference, with decreasing intentionality attached to each items, 
between total desire to hurt (having as one and only aim to hurt), intent to hurt (wanting 
to hurt) and foreseeing and being aware of the probability that one’s actions can be 
harmful (knowing that the odds are great to harm someone or knowing that one’s actions 
could harm someone). Yet, they did not differentiate, in terms of intentionality ratings, 
between the two measures related to the Risk factor: “knowing that one’s actions could 
harm someone” and “knowing that the odds were great to harm someone by one’s 
actions”. Psychology students, on the other hand, rated total desire to hurt (one and only 
aim) as equivalent to knowing that there is a high probability that someone will be 
harmed (odds are great). They also seem to have considered that intent to hurt (wanting to 
hurt someone) is equivalent to knowing that there is a probability that someone will be 
hurt (could be hurt).  
 Globally, psychology students perceived the fact that, depending on the strength of 
the assessment that a harmful outcome was preventable and could have been avoided, 
intentionality can be inferred. This type of intentionality is however not as clear and cut 
as desiring a harmful outcome to occur and has, therefore, been defined as intentional 
controllability (Malle, Moses & Baldwin, 2001). They, thus, seem to be less sensitive to 
the difference between desire to harm and awareness of the probability of risks attached 
to one’s actions, when they evaluate whether an action is intentional, compared to law 
students.  
 Law students also judged ambiguous situations more in line with legal reasoning than 
psychology students did. They made a distinction between intent and intentional action: 
they ascribed less intentionality to a person who intended to harm someone, who then 
decided finally against this harmful action, but accidentally harmed this person anyhow, 
than psychology students did. They also took into account the possibility that a person 
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may act and may not understand why she acted in that manner (for example, if the person 
was under the influence of drugs without her knowing it at the time of her actions) and, 
consequently, ascribe less consciousness than psychology students did.  
 One should, however, mention that all respondents, whatever their legal training, 
perceived the rough differences between rational criteria used to evaluate legal 
responsibility. They associated forms of consciousness and intentionality that are 
conceived as being total and distinguished them from the dimensions of voluntariness or 
the different levels of consciousness of the probability of the occurrence of a harmful 
outcome. All respondents, thus, globally perceived that total awareness of the possible 
consequences (foreseeability) is a determining factor to attribute intent, in conformity 
with Heider’s (1958) model about levels of responsibility. As for the measures of 
ambiguity of intentionality and consciousness, all respondents seem to have distinguished 
these from the other measures as reflecting lower levels of intent and awareness of one’s 
actions. These results indicate that, not only did respondents generally distinguish 
between total intent and low intent (levels of consciousness of the probability of the 
occurrence of a harmful outcome), but they also demarcated these assessments from 
situations in which an intent is not followed by an intentional action (ambiguous intent). 
This could indicate that they understood that acting intentionally involves not only 
wanting and desiring to act in a certain manner (action plan), but also enacting this action 
plan to attain a given and desired aim (Goldman, 1976).  
 
 In sum, law students were not more likely to perceive differences between the two 
negligence conditions, in terms of their consciousness and voluntariness ratings, 
compared to psychology students. Nevertheless, several findings suggest that they were 
certainly more sensitive to the different nuances to intentionality and more likely to relate 
rational criteria to the legal realities attached to a negligent conduct, such as throwing a 
flower pot out of a window and injuring someone in the process, than psychology 
students. As findings, related to the evaluation of the car-crash event, concerning 
negligence ratings and their correlates provide more evidence for law students’ 
heightened focus on the legal underpinnings of these situations, compared to psychology 
students, we will now turn to these results. 
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4.3.2. Effect of type of study on negligence ratings and related evaluations 
 
 Certain findings related to the negligence rating suggest differences in perceptions of 
negligence related to the type of study, which could denote the existence of different 
processes underlying law and psychology respondents’ evaluations.  
 One should first mention the finding that law students were more likely to evaluate 
that the agent acted negligently in the unconscious negligence condition, compared to the 
conscious negligence condition. On the other hand, psychology students rated the 
situation as entailing more negligence than law students did, whatever the level of 
negligence described in terms of legal criteria (condition of negligence).  
 Moreover, psychology students, in the unconscious negligence condition, associated 
the extent to which they considered that the agent acted out of negligence to the fact of 
not having taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the harmful consequences from 
occurring significantly more strongly, compared to the law students, in the same 
negligence condition.  
 Additional findings indicate that the association between negligence ratings and 
necessary precautions could depend on different processes depending on the type of study 
of the respondent. More specifically, findings indicate that, when examining only 
predictions for the unconscious negligence condition, the addition of blameworthiness to 
the model of prediction of negligence ratings affects the strength and the nature of 
predictors only for law students. Indeed, for law students, this new model of prediction 
shows that low blameworthiness and agreement with the negligent homicide 
qualification, along with agreement that the necessary precautions were not taken, are all 
strong predictors of negligence ratings. The comparison of beta values for both regression 
models also reveals that necessary precautions could be even a stronger predictor of 
negligence ratings for law students, when the effect of low blameworthiness is accounted 
for. However, for psychology students, when comparing beta values for necessary 
precautions between both models, this model adding blameworthiness does not change 
the predictive power of agreeing that necessary precautions were not taken on the extent 
to which these respondents agree that the agent acted out of negligence. On the whole, 
these results suggest that law students are more likely to consider that the agent acted out 
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of negligence, if they agree that he did not take all the necessary precautions to avoid the 
harmful events, if they agree to qualify the event of negligent homicide and if they do not 
agree that the agent is blameworthy for the harmful consequences of his actions. 
Psychology students may be more likely to just consider the fact that the agent did not 
take the necessary precautions to avoid the event from happening when they evaluate the 
extent to which the agent acted out of negligence.  
 Finally, the association between negligence and other relevant correlates, such as the 
negligent homicide qualification or the measure of the consciousness of probability of 
risks, may also be affected by the type of study of respondents. Law and psychology 
students in the unconscious negligence condition were more likely to qualify the event of 
negligent homicide when they agreed that the agent acted out of negligence. However, 
when controlling for the influence of blameworthiness, this association disappeared for 
psychology students, whereas it grew even stronger for law students. Thus, 
blameworthiness was more likely to be taken into account by psychology students when 
they related negligence to the negligent homicide qualification. As for law students, not 
only did they not rely on blameworthiness to make such an association, but they were 
even more likely to relate negligence to negligent homicide if they did not consider that 
the agent’s was blameworthy. This suggests that psychology students could be more 
sensitive to moral dimensions of responsibility when evaluating negligence and 
qualifying a negligent conduct, compared to law students. Psychology students may be 
thinking of the fact of “acting out of negligence” as an evaluative judgment, than as a 
rational judgment, compared to law students. Another result which suggests such an 
interpretation concerns the fact that negligence was always related to carelessness and 
blameworthiness by psychology students, whereas law students never made these 
associations, whatever the condition. Other findings show that law students may be more 
likely to rely on rational criteria to make negligence evaluations, compared to psychology 
students. Law students in the unconscious negligence condition were the only group of 
respondents who significantly associated negligence ratings to voluntariness ratings and 
to mean ratings related to consciousness of probability of risks measure (Risk). Thus, 
only law students who were in the unconscious negligence condition perceived a 
relationship between respectively, freely taking the decision to drive knowing that this 
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could lead to an accident and the criteria of consciousness of probability of risks, and 
acting out of negligence. They did not associate these in the conscious negligence 
condition. In other words, law students in the unconscious negligence condition were 
more likely to agree that the agent acted out of negligence, if they also thought that he 
had acted voluntarily and agreed that different levels of probability of risks corresponded 
to matching intentionality levels.  
 These results could indicate globally that negligence ratings were more likely to be 
related to rational and legal evaluations related to the consciousness of the probability of 
risks for law students, whereas negligence was more likely to be underlain by moral and 
evaluative judgments, such as blameworthiness and carelessness, for psychology 
students. This suggests that legal standards of negligence that are related in part to 
rational criteria, such as consciousness, may not correspond to ordinary evaluations of 
negligent conduct. Findings showing that necessary precautions could be more strongly 
related to negligence ratings for psychology students, than for law students, add one more 
element to this interpretation. This could mean that ordinary evaluations of negligent 
conduct are more likely to consider only necessary precautions to evaluate negligence, 
whereas legal reasoning may not only consider necessary precautions, but also the 
element of awareness of probability of risks.  
 Thus, the standard of reasonable precaution, used in Swiss criminal law to determine 
whether a conduct is liable for negligence, may be, in psychology students’ conceptions,  
less related to an awareness of risks per se than to an instinctive reaction that would be 
considered appropriate and necessary. This finding is, for that matter, in tune with 
previous findings (Karlovac & Darley, 1988) of the central role of element of precautions 
taken in determining negligence for a given conduct. Legal standards of negligence that 
are related in part to rational criteria, such as consciousness, may not correspond to 
ordinary evaluations of negligent conduct.  
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4.4. Factors underlying blameworthiness and legal responsibility 
dimensions  
 
4.4.1. Correlates of blameworthiness 
 
 As we had anticipated, regression analyses demonstrated that blameworthiness was 
mostly predicted by very different factors, compared to the legal dimension of 
responsibility.  
 Blameworthiness was strongly predicted by disagreeing that external and esoteric 
factors can explain this event and by feeling intense negative emotions. It was also 
predicted, although less strongly by agreeing that harm done to the victim’s family can be 
attenuated by imprisoning the offender, by qualifying the situation of negligent homicide 
and by agreeing that factors inherent to the individual, such as lack of education, values 
and civic sense (internal factors), can explain such events. Contrary to our predictions, 
however, blameworthiness was not significantly predicted by retributive aims.  
 However, more detailed analyses carried out separately for each group of 
respondents, according to their type of study and the negligent condition they were 
assigned to, indicate that the associations between blameworthiness, punitive responses 
and attitudes, negative emotions and the negligent homicide qualification often depended 
on the type of study of the respondent.  
 
 
4.4.2. Blameworthiness and its association to negative emotions, punitive 
responses and retributive punitive attitudes 
 
 Regression analyses showed that blameworthiness was strongly related to negative 
emotions, in conformity with our predictions and with previous findings (Quigley & 
Tedeschi, 1996; Weiner, 1986, 1996). However, when examining this association 
separately for each of the four groups of respondents a more nuanced picture emerges. 
Negative emotions are associated, although not very strongly, to blameworthiness for all 
groups of respondents, except for psychology students who are in the conscious 
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negligence condition. However, this association, for law students in both conditions, 
could depend on retributive punitive attitudes, whereas it is independent of such attitudes 
for psychology students in the unconscious negligence condition. Indeed, when 
controlling for the effect of retributive punitive aims mean ratings (Mretributive), the 
association between blameworthiness and negative emotions disappears for all law 
students, but becomes even stronger for psychology students in the unconscious 
negligence condition. Thus, retributive punitive attitudes seem to have a different 
influence on these moral-emotional linkages depending on respondents’ type of study.  
 Another result that adds support to this analysis concerns the fact that only law 
students in the unconscious negligence condition significantly associated their punitive 
retributive mean ratings to their blameworthiness ratings. Thus, the more law students in 
the unconscious negligence condition ascribed blameworthiness to the agent, the more 
they favoured retributive punitive aims. This relationship was not observed for the other 
groups of respondents and further analyses showed that it did not depend on the negative 
emotions felt by law students in that negligence condition. Thus, contrary to Graham et 
al’s (1997) findings, the relationship between blameworthiness and retributive punitive 
attitudes was independent of whether the law students felt intense negative emotions. 
Moreover, our prediction that blameworthiness would be associated to retributive 
punitive attitudes was supported only for law students who were ascribed to the 
unconscious negligence condition.  
 Let us add that the association between blameworthiness and punitive responses 
favouring the imprisonment of the agent as a way to attenuate the harm done to the 
victim’s family showed also noteworthy differences depending on the student status and 
the negligence condition. All psychology students associated blameworthiness to 
favouring the punitive responses of prison, whereas only law students who were in the 
unconscious negligence condition made this association. The same differences between 
groups of respondents were found for the link between blameworthiness and public 
denunciation. Psychology students always associated ascribing blameworthiness to the 
agent to favouring the public denunciation of his acts, whereas law students adopted this 
stance only in the unconscious negligence condition. Moreover, public denunciation was 
only found to be associated to favouring the imprisonment for the agent for law students 
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in the unconscious negligence condition. Additional analyses showed that public 
denunciation was an important element to consider for psychology students to associate 
blameworthiness to favouring prison time for the agent, whereas this was not the case for 
law students. Indeed, when controlling for the effect of public denunciation on the 
association between blameworthiness and prison time, this effect disappears for 
psychology students, but remains strong for law students. These results suggest that the 
public denunciation rating could act as a condemnatory response that makes 
blameworthiness ascriptions more likely to be matched with punitive responses favouring 
the imprisonment of the agent for psychology students, compared to law students. Law 
students may not depend on the extent to which they agree with the public denunciation 
of the agent’s actions to associate their blameworthiness ratings to their acceptance of a 
punitive response. However, agreeing with the public denunciation of the agent’s acts 
may be more likely to lead to favouring the imprisonment for law students, especially in 
the unconscious negligence condition. Another observation that is worth mentioning in 
this context is that blameworthiness and legal responsibility were only significantly 
associated by law students in the unconscious negligence condition. Thus, the more they 
ascribed moral responsibility to the agent, the more likely they were to also consider that 
the agent was legally responsible for his actions.  
 
 In sum, all these results indicate that the association between blameworthiness and 
retributive punitive attitudes, as well as legal responsibility, is more likely for law 
students in the unconscious negligence condition, than for the other groups of 
respondents. Moreover, this association between blameworthiness and retributive 
punitive attitudes, for law students in the unconscious negligence condition, does not 
depend on negative emotional feelings. Findings also show that public denunciation is 
more likely to be related to favouring prison for law students in the unconscious 
negligence condition, but not for other respondents. These various findings, as well as the 
findings discussed previously concerning negligence, seem to suggest that law students 
may be more likely to show a harsher tendency in their judgments in the unconscious 
negligence condition, compared to the conscious negligence condition. They may be 
more likely to favour a punitive stance when the agent who causes the fatal event is 
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described as not being aware of the risks attached to his behaviour, than when he has 
such awareness and takes precautions to avoid harmful risks from occurring.  
 Moreover, findings also indicate that favouring the public denunciation of the agent’s 
actions could be a strong determining factor for psychology students to be more likely to 
blame the agent and to associate this blameworthiness ascription to favouring punitive 
responses. The link between blameworthiness and punitive responses could be influenced 
by different processes depending on the type of study of respondents: it could be less 
dependent on emotional (negative emotions) and condemnatory responses (public 
denunciation) for law students, compared to psychology students.  
 Thus, for psychology students, the public denunciation of the agent and negative 
emotional feelings could act, in that sense, as a retributive-oriented (public condemnation 
which denounces the violation of the moral order) and condemnatory response that would 
render punitive responses more likely when high blameworthiness is ascribed. The extent 
to which psychology students who cast blame on the agent tend to respond in a punitive 
manner may depend strongly on their tendency to favour a retributive-oriented 
condemnation of his actions. These findings are in line with Feinberg’s (1970) contention 
of a moral linkage to retributive aims. Furthermore, the fact that public denunciation is 
more likely to determine the association between blameworthiness and punitive responses 
for psychology students, but not for law students, could indicate that psychology students 
are more likely to follow a moral outrage stance than law students. This interpretation can 
also be connected to Feather’s (1996) finding that attributions of blame are related to 
whether the respondent thinks that agent deserves to be sanctioned, which in turn 
determines his attitudes about the harshness of the punishment that is to be imposed to 
the offender. The public denunciation rating being a form of public condemnation of a 
blameworthy act that leads to favouring retributive punishments such as imprisonment, 
such a condemnatory evaluation could reflect the deservingness attributed to the agent 
with regard to sanctioning his actions. 
 However, agreeing with the imprisonment of the agent may be less due an emotional 
and moral outrage response for law students than for psychology students. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact several other related findings. Only law students in 
the unconscious negligence condition associated retributive punitive aims to 
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blameworthiness and this link did not depend on feeling negative emotions. Moreover, 
after partialling out the effect of public denunciation, law students, in the unconscious 
negligence condition, still associated blameworthiness to favouring prison time, whereas 
this association disappeared for psychology students. Finally, results also suggest that 
when it comes to whether favouring the public denunciation of the agent’s acts will 
actually lead to agreeing with a punitive response such as prison time, only law students 
in the unconscious negligence condition could be more likely to make such an association 
of responses. Similarly, law students in the unconscious negligence condition are the only 
ones to be more likely to ascribe legal responsibility, if they also ascribe moral 
responsibility. This result and the other linkages that were specific to law students in the 
unconscious negligence condition between moral responsibility and favouring prison, as 
well as between public denunciation and prison, could mean that the unconscious 
negligence condition, for these respondents, is more likely to not only trigger high blame 
evaluations, but also a high legal liability to harsh penal outcomes 
 
 Finally, let us add that as retributive motives were found to be related to blame and 
were not related to legal responsibility, retributive attitudes could be the product of an 
intuitive and non-rational reasoning process, in line with Carlsmith’s & Darley’s (2008) 
theory. Moreover, associations between retributive punitive aims and favouring prison 
were found for most groups of respondents, whereas such associations between utilitarian 
punitive attitudes and this punitive response were not found for any of the groups of 
respondents.  This means that respondents may have relied only on a retributive stance to 
assess whether imprisoning the agent could attenuate the harm done to the victim’s 
family. This finding can be assimilated to Carlsmith and Darley’s (2008) suggestion that 
people are “intuitive retributivists” and that utilitarian motives do not determine the 
manner in which they reason about punishment.  
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4.4.3. Blameworthiness and its association to the negligent homicide 
qualification 
 
 As for the association between negligent homicide and blameworthiness, it was 
observed for all groups of respondents, except law students in the conscious negligence 
condition. This could indicate that law students, were less likely to associate 
blameworthiness to the negligent homicide qualification in this condition, compared to 
the unconscious negligence condition, because they consider that the conscious 
negligence condition is less likely to amount to a moral responsibility evaluation that 
could lead to a legal qualification, compared to the unconscious negligence condition. 
Psychology students do not make such a distinction between both conditions on this 
association, because they may not be sensitive to the same cues that triggered law 
students’ perceptions. However, here one should also note that the negligent homicide 
qualification is not at all related to the legal responsibility dimension for all law students, 
as well as psychology students in the unconscious negligence condition. Only psychology 
students in the conscious negligence condition made this association. Consequently, law 
students in the unconscious negligence condition may be more likely to think of the event 
as a negligent homicide when they blame the agent, but that does not mean that such 
qualifications are accompanied by heightened evaluations of legal responsibility also. All 
in all, this could mean that law students agree that the agent’s actions are serious and 
blameworthy and should be liable to some sort of sanction, but they also understand that 
the legal responsibility attached to such behaviour is minimal and should not be taken 
into account. This could explain why, as we shall see also in section 4.4.2, they were also 
more likely to qualify the event of accident if they rated the legal responsibility as low, 
whereas psychology students did not base their judgment of the accidental nature of the 
event on legal responsibility for the unconscious negligence condition.  
 
4.4.4. Correlates of legal responsibility 
 
 As for the legal responsibility dimension, regression analyses confirmed an absence 
of relationship between legal responsibility and emotional and attitudinal factors. The 
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only predictors of this dimension that were highlighted were the conscious negligence 
condition, disagreement with a non-legal qualification of “accident”, agreement with the 
different levels of awareness of the probability of a harmful outcome (Risk) and 
agreement with internal explanations for events. These results point overall towards the 
conclusion that the legal responsibility dimension is generally more affected by rational 
elements of reasoning and less by moral criteria related to values, attitudes and emotions.  
 
 Further analyses were then carried out, as we expected the relationship between the 
accident qualification, Risk and legal responsibility to vary depending on the type of 
study of respondents and the condition. Moreover, as the evaluation of whether necessary 
precautions were taken to avoid the harmful event from occurring is an important element 
to consider when evaluating negligent conduct in legal reasoning, we also checked 
whether this element’s association to legal responsibility was in anyway influenced by 
the type of study of respondents and the condition.  
 As a result, all respondents were more likely to disagree with the accident 
qualification when they ascribed high legal responsibility, no matter what their student 
status and the negligence condition in which they were. However, only law students in 
the unconscious negligence condition were more likely to ascribe high legal 
responsibility, if they also agreed that different levels of consciousness of the probability 
of risks corresponded to different levels of intentionality. These results suggest that, 
although all respondents agree that higher responsibility is more likely to mean that the 
event will not be considered as accidental, only law students in the unconscious 
negligence condition associate higher ratings of Risk (agreeing that consciousness of 
probability of risks amounts to a certain level of intentionality) to legal responsibility. 
Likewise, only law students in the unconscious negligence condition associate necessary 
precautions to legal responsibility.  
 Thus, law students in the condition in which the agent is described as being unaware 
of the risks he is taking and is not described as taking any precautions to avoid this risk 
(he has not anticipated) are the only respondents to associate the element of 
consciousness of probability of risks and the fact of not taking necessary precautions for 
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avoid the event to the legal responsibility dimension. However, they are also the only 
group of respondents who associated blameworthiness to legal responsibility.   
 Regression analyses using necessary precautions, consciousness of the probability of 
risks and Mlegal as predictors for the accident qualification add further elements to this 
discussion. They indicate that Mlegal was the sole significant predictor of agreeing with 
the accident qualification for psychology students in the conscious negligence condition 
and law students in the unconscious negligence condition, whereas Mlegal and necessary 
precautions were found to predict this qualification for law students in the conscious 
negligence condition. All these relationships were negative. Thus, psychology students 
were more likely to base their evaluation of whether this event was accidental on low 
legal responsibility in the unconscious negligence condition, but did not evaluate the 
possibility that the event was accidental on legal responsibility or necessary precautions 
in the unconscious negligence condition. Law students were more likely to consider that 
this event was accidental if they ascribed low legal responsibility to the agent and did not 
agree that he did not take all necessary precautions in the conscious negligence condition, 
whereas they were more likely to make such a qualification if they only ascribed low 
legal responsibility to the agent in the unconscious negligence condition.  
 
 Overall, these results indicate that ascribing low legal responsibility is a crucial 
element in participants’ reasoning process when they perceive that a negligent conduct is 
not accidental and is susceptible to be dealt with by the penal system. However, results 
seem to suggest that law students were more likely to take into consideration the element 
of necessary precautions, in addition to legal responsibility when deciding whether this 
event was accidental in the condition in which such precautions were described as having 
been taken by the agent (conscious negligence). Law students were probably more 
receptive to the presence of necessary precautions taken in the conscious negligence 
condition when agreeing with the accident qualification, compared to psychology 
students who just took into account low legal responsibility to agree that this was an 
accidental event. This could mean that law students discriminated between both levels of 
negligence and understood that both of these events could be qualified as an accident but 
that this qualification would depend on a different reasoning depending on the negligence 
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condition and the cues corresponding to it. Psychology students were more likely to 
qualify the event as accidental when they ascribed low legal responsibility to the agent in 
the conscious negligence condition, maybe because they felt that the awareness of the 
probability of risks element in this condition was an indicator that the event did not 
happen just by accident. This result can be related to the finding that psychology students 
did not relate legal responsibility to the negligent homicide qualification for the 
unconscious negligence condition, whereas they did make such association for the 
conscious negligence condition. Thus, legal responsibility was probably considered less 
relevant to the manner in which psychology students qualified the event in the 
unconscious negligence condition, because they were less likely to consider this 
condition to be to be relevant for such a liability, compared to law students. 
 These results reveal that law students are more likely to associate rational elements, 
such as the consciousness of the probability of risks, as well as relevant factors for 
negligence, such as necessary precautions, to the legal responsibility dimension, in 
coherence with the negligence condition they are evaluating. Law students were probably 
more likely than psychology students to understand that the elements that could be used 
in legal reasoning to evaluate liability were different depending on the condition. In the 
conscious negligence condition, the degree of necessary precautions taken and the 
awareness of the probability of risks were to be considered to decide whether or not the 
person was liable, whereas, in the unconscious negligence condition, the lack of 
awareness of probability of risks (and the consequent lack of precautions taken) was the 
most determining factor to decide whether a penal outcome could follow. Psychology 
students did not follow such a reasoning process: they just detected that in the conscious 
negligence condition, the agent was described as being aware of risks and taking 
precautions to avoid them. They consequently reasoned that the less he was aware of the 
risks, the less he acted voluntarily and intentionally (elements entailed in the legal 
responsibility dimension) and the more this event could be considered as accidental.  
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4.5. Punitive attitudes and the effect of respondents’ religious affiliation, 
political orientation and SES  
  
 Findings show that respondents, in terms of mean ratings, whether they study law or 
psychology, seem to favour more deterrence and rehabilitation punitive aims, than 
retributive punitive aims. Only a minority of respondents were shown to have favoured 
strongly the retributive rationale. Moreover, only retributive attitudes were found to be 
related to punitive responses favouring prison and no such associations were found for 
utilitarian goals. Thus, ordinary reasoning may consider deterrence as an important 
punishment goal, but does not necessarily assimilate this perspective to punishment, in 
line with previous findings (Carlsmith et al., 2002). 
 Moreover, not only were retributive punitive attitudes only favoured by a minority of 
respondents, but this minority is also characterized by specific religious and political 
attributes. A right political orientation and believing in a religion made respondents more 
likely to favour just deserts punitive aims, compared to respondents from the left political 
orientation and who do not have a religious affiliation. These results are in line with 
previous findings that retributive attitudes are more likely to be found in people who hold 
conservative political values and religious beliefs (Caroll et al., 1987; Languin et al., 
2006).  
 Finally, let us mention that socio-demographic information, such as religious 
affiliation and political orientation did not predict moral and legal responsibility ratings in 
this research.  
 
4.6. General conclusion and limitations  
 
 Overall, results in this study imply considerable evidence for the hypothesis of a legal 
and a moral dimension of responsibility. Moreover, these dimensions seem also to be 
determined by very different elements. Findings provided indeed a convincing 
demonstration that blameworthiness is more likely to be related to punitive-related 
attitudes, attitudes favouring internal explanations and rejecting external ones, as well as 
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negative emotions, than to rational and legal criteria. The legal dimension is, on the other 
hand, clearly more based on rational criteria of consciousness, voluntariness and 
intentionality. Thus, the negligence condition only had an effect on relevant legal 
responsibility criteria and factors related to legal evaluations of negligence were 
consistently associated to legal responsibility.  
 As for the hypothesis that law students may be more sensitive to legal levels of 
negligence and legal criteria related to responsibility, some results provide support for 
this theory. Law students may integrate more rational criteria in their judgments of 
responsibility and negligence than psychology students do. However, findings concerning 
the differences between more ordinary reasoning of responsibility and more legal 
conceptions of it are not robust and do not generalize to the manipulation of level of 
negligence. Indeed, contrary to our expectations, law students did not rate consciousness 
and voluntariness differently from psychology students depending on the level of 
negligence they were judging. 
 Finally, although moral and legal dimensions of responsibility may be determined by 
different processes, the fact that blameworthiness and legal responsibility were related for 
law students in the unconscious negligence condition points towards the hypothesis that 
these dimensions could also be related.  
 
 Even though these results were quite promising, some limitations should be 
highlighted.  
 First, the moral responsibility dimension that was yielded in this study did not entail 
only blame-related measures and rendered results concerning the factors underlying the 
moral dimension unclear. Blameworthiness was the only assessment that was clearly 
related to the dimensions we expected to be associated to moral responsibility. The fact 
that the moral responsibility dimension was clouded in this study by the presence of 
controllability measures could be because the scenario used was not salient enough, in 
terms of the level of culpability of the agent. Moreover, this study was done with students 
from the University of Geneva and this scenario was based on a real story that happened 
a few months before to a student coming from this same university. Thus, many students 
may have known of this story before assessing it and may even have known personally 
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the agent. Their ratings may have been biased in that sense, because they may have 
already had a preconceived opinion or attitude about the agent’s blameworthiness. Thus, 
the next study will be carried out with a student population from a different university, 
namely the University of Lausanne. It will assess respondents’ responsibility ratings to a 
scenario in which the legal level of culpability is more salient than the one used in this 
study. We expect the moral responsibility dimension to be more blame-related and the 
differences between this dimension and the controllability elements to be more marked 
with these changes. The linkage between negative emotions and the moral responsibility 
dimension should also be more explicit.  
 Second, psychology students and law students showed a different sensitivity to legal 
cues in the measures related to the dimensions of rational criteria for legal responsibility, 
but did not evaluate the scenario differently with regard to the manipulation of the level 
of negligence. This could again be due to the lack of salience of the legal cues in the 
scenario. The next study will thus use more distinct levels of responsibility (negligence 
vs. intentionality) to examine the manner in which psychology students, compared to law 
students, judge this situation. Such pronounced gradations of responsibility should result 
in more marked differences in participants’ ratings of legal responsibility. More 
specifically, law students’ responses concerning rational criteria should be clearly 
distinguishable, compared to psychology students’ ratings. They should demonstrate 
more markedly that law students are more likely to be attuned to the presence of legal 
cues and are more likely to respond in a legally-consistent manner, compared to 
psychology students. They could also reveal a tendency, observed mainly for negligence 
ratings and their correlates in this study, for psychology students to show more moral and 
evaluative response patterns.  
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III. Study 2. Moral and legal dimensions of responsibility 
for different levels of culpability: the limit between 
negligence and recklessness 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 Serious road traffic offenses have been particularly the target of proposals for new 
legislation and sentencing laws because of their inherent nature of “ultimate harm” that is 
particularly difficult to accept for most human beings (Cunningham, 2008). This 
increased penalization could be the result of society’s intolerance for risks (Garland, 
2000; Zedner, 2009). In such a perspective, the identification of criminal responsibility 
prevails over the acceptance of the accidental and involuntary nature of certain acts, such 
as those involved in fatal road traffic offenses. This leads to a growing tendency, for the 
media and political actors, to denounce publicly road traffic offenders and to demand 
more punitive legal action, especially when they lead to fatal consequences. 
Consequently, the harsher stance towards road traffic offenders has not only affected 
criminal policy and yielded recurrent demands for harsher sanction for such offenses, but 
has also impinged upon sentencing practices. Court decisions concerning fatal road traffic 
offenses have been particularly influenced by this punitive turn. This is partly due to an 
increasing tendency, especially in the last five years, for courts to favour the legal 
definition of recklessness89 over the legal definition of conscious negligence, and thereby, 
apply harsher sentences to these situations. This tendency towards recklessness 
judgments seems to be prevalent not only in Switzerland (Jeanneret, 2008), which has a 
civil law tradition, but also in the United States (Rapp, 2008) and England (Cunningham, 
2008) which have a common law system. 
                                                 
89
 Switzerland has a civil law tradition. Thus Swiss law uses the term “dolus eventualis” to describe an action where a person is not 
only aware of the probability of the risk he/she is taking by his/her actions, but accepts this risks and decides to accept this possibility 
and act anyhow. “Dolus eventualis” is comparable to recklessness, in terms of the state of mind it describes, according to Lareau 
(2001). According, to Killias (2001), recklessness can be considered as a form of culpability used in American law, which is located 
between “dolus eventualis” and conscious negligence. We choose here to use the term recklessness to refer to dolus eventualis for 
reasons of clarity. However, we do not consider that dolus eventualis and recklessness are totally identical, in terms of their legal 
meanings. 
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 Yet recklessness implies a wilful disregard for the risk of serious harm an agent knew 
was a highly probable outcome, whereas negligence means that the agent failed to take a 
reasonable precaution against a risk of harm that he knew could occur. In other words, 
following Killias et al’s (2008) reasoning, conscious negligence implies that one knows 
the risks attached to one’s actions, but one does not, consequently, attempt to act in a 
different manner, because one does not think that a harmful outcome will occur; one 
would not persist in such actions, if one was sure that they would produce a harmful 
outcome. Conversely, recklessness means that one knows about the risks too, one accepts 
the possibility for these to lead to a harmful outcome, without wanting these to occur; one 
would act even if one were certain that this harmful outcome will be produced.  
 
1.1. The limit between recklessness and negligence in Swiss Criminal law  
 
 Driving offenses that occur out of negligence, such as careless driving, are punished, 
with a hope to improve the way in which people generally drive and to make them drive 
more carefully. However, this is difficult to justify sometimes because one can 
theoretically only criminalize an act that is committed by a person possessing at least the 
awareness of the risk of harm linked to his actions. Only acts in which this awareness is 
explicitly identified and reflects gross negligence, are generally liable to custodial 
sentences, but such sanctions are less harsh compared to those incurred for offenses 
involving recklessness. As a remedy, courts have tried, not always successfully90, to 
resort to the legal definition of recklessness to determine harsher sentences for some 
borderline cases, in which the limit with negligence was not clearly demarcated. 
Recklessness and conscious negligence imply both that the agent is conscious of the 
probability of risks that a harmful outcome will occur. However, they differ from each 
other, in terms of the presence or absence of voluntariness. Recklessness entails an 
element of intent, because it implies the presence of voluntariness in addition to 
consciousness. Conversely, conscious negligence only involves the element of 
                                                 
90
 In Switzerland, cantonal jurisprudence has been contradictory on that matter in the past years. Comparing between similar fatal road 
traffic offenses, some cases were judged as entailing negligence and other cases were judged as entailing recklessness. See 
Rauschenbach (2009) and Jeanneret (2008) for more information.   
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consciousness. The determination of the fine line between the absence and the presence 
of the element of voluntariness (and thus, intent) has been, in some cases, an edgy matter, 
as we will see further. 
 
 Recklessness is considered in Swiss criminal law as a form of culpable intention 
whereby the perpetrator, 1) anticipates that his actions can lead to the occurrence of an 
offense 2) desires such a consequence, if it were to occur: “he accepts or disregards such 
an outcome”91. Thus, an offense is considered intentional if an offender “considers the 
possibility that an offense will result and accepts this possibility in the case it occurs”92. It 
is considered that the higher the probability that the offense will occur and the more 
serious the violation of the duty of precaution, the more likely the perpetrator accepted 
the occurrence of such liable outcomes93. However, this definition raises an issue 
suggested by Guignard (1988): Is it realistic to assume that a person who commits a fatal 
road traffic offense accepts the death of others, without having an idea as to of who will 
be killed, how many deaths will be caused and in what circumstances will such events 
happen?  
 
 Several definitions of the limit between negligence and recklessness have been made 
by the Swiss Federal Court in the last decade. Acting out of recklessness was defined in 
one judgment94 as meaning that “the acting person takes seriously into consideration the 
possibility for an outcome to occur, counts on this occurrence and accepts it”. This 
judgment also stated, “It is not necessary for the perpetrator to approve of the outcome”. 
Such a definition was also confirmed for a recklessness judgment concerning a fatal road 
traffic offense95. The notion of acceptance was specified in another judgment concerning 
a fatal road traffic offense96 stating that for recklessness to be assumed, “it must be 
proven that the risk of the danger incurred was so high that it is only reasonable to expect 
the perpetrator to have foreseen it and accepted it”. In yet another judgment97, conscious 
                                                 
91
 FF 1999 1808-1809 N. 212.21 ; Graven & Sträuli (1995), 207 ; Killias (2001)  445 N. 321 et 47 N. 325 
92
 FF 1999 1808-1809 N. 212.21  
93
 ATF 125 IV 242 c. 3c, Journal des Tribunaux 2002 IV 46 ; ATF 119 IV 1 c. 5a, Journal des Tribunaux 1994 IV 157 
94
 ATF 96 IV 99 ; 103 IV 65 
95
 ATF 130 IV 58 
96
 TF, 6B_519/2007 of January 29th 2008 
97
 6S.114 2005 of March 28th 2006 
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negligence was rejected in favour of recklessness with the argument that the perpetrator 
showed a total indifference as to whether the risks related to his actions would lead to a 
harmful outcome. The unlawful outcome was afforded less value by the perpetrator than 
the objectives pursued by his conduct. The perpetrator’s hopes for a strike of luck to 
avoid such outcomes were thus not a sufficient reason to conclude that he “only” acted 
out of conscious negligence. After that, the Swiss Federal Court showed less enthusiasm 
at pronouncing recklessness verdicts for fatal road traffic offenses and decided 
systematically for negligence verdicts instead (Jeanneret, 2009). For example, in a case 
where a person was speeding in a curve, lost control of his car and collided into a pillar, 
killing his 13-year-old nephew who was his passenger, an initial cantonal judgment of 
recklessness was quashed by the Federal Court in favour of a negligence decision98.  
 Let us also mention that at the cantonal level, a tendency to reject recklessness in 
favour of negligence has been observed in recent judgments99. This cantonal tendency 
was also supported by a Federal Court decision that confirmed a negligence verdict, by 
rejecting a reasoning implying recklessness. One should also point out a recent decision 
made by the Federal Court in which a person who caused fatal road traffic offense was 
condemned for both the offenses of negligent homicide and endangering a person’s life. 
Let us add that each offense concerned a different victim. The concurrent consideration 
of both these offenses allowed the Court to impose a harsher sentence on the offender, 
without making use of the somewhat controversial qualification of recklessness. The 
Swiss Federal Court demonstrated, thus, an acknowledgment of the increasing difficulties 
it was facing in assimilating a dangerous driver to a murderer by using a qualification, 
which implies that the actor accepted the eventuality of a fatal outcome (recklessness) 100.  
 However, let us mention a very recent decision that was made by the Federal Court101 
and which contradicts this new trend favouring negligence ascriptions. This concerns a 
driver who made a dangerous overtaking manoeuvre, which resulted in his losing control 
of the car and colliding with another car. His girlfriend who was his passenger, as well as 
the driver of the other car died. This cantonal court had pronounced a recklessness 
homicide verdict against the perpetrator. This decision was confirmed by the Federal 
                                                 
98
 TF, 6B_519/2007 of January 29th 2008 
99
 C.Cass./GE, ACAS 73/09, decision of the district court of Zürich of November 24th 2009 (cited in 6B_183/2010) 
100
 See Le Temps, Mai 15th 2010. See also Abo Youssef (2010). 
101
 6B_168/2010 of June 4th 2010 
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Court. This decision was motivated by the argument that the perpetrator could not have 
ignored that he was risking his passenger’s life and other’s lives by speeding on a sinuous 
road.  
 
 The prominence of recklessness decisions in recent court decisions concerning fatal 
road traffic offenses may also be linked to the fact that such a label puts a strong and 
explicit emphasis on the blameworthy nature of such harmful behaviours. Recklessness, 
unlike negligence, entails some element of bad attitude, malicious behaviour or bad faith. 
Such terms, as “disregard”, “total indifference”, “accepting the possibility of fatal 
outcomes”, are quite illustrative of the moral tone of recklessness. Moreover, during 
recent trials pertaining to fatal road traffic offenses, prosecutors have been persistently 
justifying the need for recklessness verdicts, through the media, by invoking motives 
such as “the need for harsher sentences towards people who consider roads like racing 
tracks”, “he knew that he was taking a colossal risk, but he overlooked it in favour of an 
egotistic pleasure of overtaking”102, “such a judgment will finally provide a strong signal 
to mad drivers”103. The moral tonality of such justifications for harsher sentences, using 
recklessness qualifications, is quite perceptible. This has also been observed by Rapp 
(2008) who suggests, “Courts are applying a sort of moral intuition in drawing the lines 
between recklessness and other types of conduct”. It is noteworthy to know that this point 
of view was already highlighted in 1988 in Switzerland in a virulent critique of the first 
judgment of recklessness for a fatal road traffic offense104. This analysis had emphasized 
the Court’s explicit reference to “a suicidal person driving a living bomb” who had been 
described as “acting out of egoistic motives and of the desire to impress his girl-friend”, 
when justifying the verdict and sentence imposed to the offender. These critiques are also 
valid in current analyses of judgments for fatal road-traffic offenses. Abo Youssef (2010) 
recently made the observation that intention is increasingly more often attributed than 
established in such cases. He also suggests that a tendency to validate criminal policy and 
public feelings of right and wrong could be increasingly guiding such judgments. Given 
the underlying moral tone in recklessness judgments, one can wonder whether it reflects 
                                                 
102
 Statement made by Daniel Zappelli, the general prosecutor for the canton of Geneva, during a trial related to a fatal road traffic 
offense, recounted in the June 11th 2008 edition of Tribune de Genève.  
103
 Interview of Eric Cottier, general prosecutor for the canton of Vaud, September 14th 2006 
104
 JdT 1988 IV 130 
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ordinary reasoning of reckless conduct. In other words, do ordinary people distinguish 
between negligent conduct and reckless conduct in terms of different levels of moral 
responsibility? 
 
1.2. The limit between negligence and recklessness in ordinary reasoning 
about moral responsibility 
 
 Research shows that people generally seem to have a correct understanding of the 
concept of intentionality and its relation to negligence and responsibility. Intentionality is 
identified as an important precursor of responsibility (Alicke, 2000; Schlenker, Britt, 
Pennington, Murphy & Doherty, 1994; Weiner, 1995a). Perceived intention has been 
suggested to have a mediating role in aggressive behaviours or judgments concerning 
responsibility, blame or sanction (Crick, 1995; Shaver, 1985; Shultz & Wright, 1985). 
Intentionality ascriptions yield higher ratings of responsibility than negligence ascriptions 
(Shultz & Wright, 1985). Ordinary reasoning can also detect and make a distinction 
between different levels of intentionality (Finkel & Groscup, 1997; Schultz et al., 1981). 
For example, higher responsibility ascriptions have been observed when people judge a 
situation describing an act of recklessness (commission of an act while ignoring 
deliberately and knowingly the probability of harmful consequences), than when they 
assess a situation describing an act of negligence. 
 Furthermore, most people seem to distinguish pretty well between an intentional act 
and an unintentional act and are consensual as to the commonsense notions they use to 
decide if an act is intentional (Malle & Knobe, 1997). They also seem to make a 
distinction between intention and intentionality in terms of their judgments of 
responsibility and blame, with harsher judgments for situations where the intentionality 
of the act is clear than for situations where there was only an intention, but the act in 
itself was accidental (Malle & Nelson, 2003). An example of a situation in which there is 
only intention could be when X wants to kill Y with a gun, takes the car to drive to 
location where Y lives, Y is walking on the street near his house without paying attention 
to the traffic and X accidentally runs over this person. 
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 However, let us add that recklessness may be difficult to ascribe to people’s 
behaviours in ordinary reasoning, because it may not correspond to their subjective 
appreciation of the circumstances of their offense (Rapp, 2008). Specialists such as 
Jeanneret (2009), express, in that sense, their unease with the characterization of fatal 
road traffic offenses as amounting to recklessness in these terms. In the light of the legal 
system’s struggle to define recklessness and the fine limit separating it from negligence 
in the specific case of fatal road traffic offenses, the complexity of cognitive processes 
involved in such evaluations must be considered (Cunningham, 2008; Rauschenbach, 
2009). The concept of negligence may be more appropriate to characterize such situations 
than recklessness, because it implies an incorrect appreciation of the risks related to a 
given conduct, without involving an element of intent.  Indeed, it is highly improbable 
that a person is aware of and disregards the strong probability of a specific risk of 
harmful outcomes from happening (Rapp, 2008). It is instead more probable, as 
suggested by Rapp (2008), that “a person might unreasonably disregard the risk due to 
over-optimism, quick decision-making or instinct” and, hence, demonstrates negligence. 
Behavioural law and economic research findings (Parisi & Smith, 2005) concerning 
human decision making indicates indeed that human beings are not quite as capable of 
consciously disregarding known risks as the legal recklessness concept seems to 
represent it. Over-optimism biases and availability heuristics behavioural traits (Jolls, 
2005) indicate that people may tend to grossly underestimate the level of risk their 
conduct could pose. This does not mean that human beings are not capable of 
appreciating risk, but it certainly calls into question the accuracy or preciseness of this 
appreciation.  
 
 This discussion has demonstrated the difficulties and contradictions in defining the 
fine line between recklessness and conscious negligence when judging of responsibility 
for fatal road traffic offenses in Swiss courts. This raises the noteworthy question as to 
whether ordinary people understand what legal definitions of conscious negligence and 
recklessness mean in terms of responsibility and whether they differentiate between these 
two qualifications when attributing responsibility for fatal road traffic offenses. Given 
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that a person who is found guilty of recklessness incurs a minimum of five years of 
imprisonment, compared to negligence which is liable to up to three years of prison, 
understanding whether the legal subtleties involved in both negligence and recklessness 
ascriptions are apprehended by ordinary reasoning is warranted.  
 This study aimed therefore at examining how commonsense reasoning apprehended 
the difference between conscious negligence105 and recklessness and whether ordinary 
conceptions correspond to legal reckonings on this matter. Furthermore, the assumption 
that responsibility entails a moral and a legal dimension was partly confirmed in the 
previous study concerning negligence. This theory will be tested again in this study for a 
negligent behaviour in comparison to more intentional action. This will enable us to 
determine whether legal and moral dimensions are more clearly highlighted when 
participants are confronted to a situation in which the legal liability of the agent is higher 
due to the existence of an element of intent. Using the same vignette as in the previous 
study, the distinction between negligence and recklessness was manipulated with 
formulations containing legal criteria that correspond to an act of negligence or an act of 
recklessness.  
 Finally, the relationship between controllability and moral and legal responsibility 
dimensions will also be the object of a close examination in this study. Controllability-
related measures were more related to moral responsibility measures than to legal 
responsibility measures in the previous study and blame is presented as highly dependent 
on evaluations of control, in Alicke’s (2000) culpable control model. The role of 
controllability with regard to both the moral and legal dimensions of responsibility should 
thus also be considered. 
 
 
 
                                                 
105
 For the purpose of this study, we will hereafter refer to conscious negligence by using simply the term “negligence”.  
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1.3. Hypotheses 
Moral and legal responsibility dimensions, controllability and the effect of the legal 
level of culpability  
 
 In accordance with the findings of the previous study, we expect respondents’ 
representations of responsibility to distinguish between a moral and a legal dimension. 
Moral and blame-related measures should thus be associated to each other and 
distinguished from measures of rational criteria related to legal responsibility. Like in the 
previous study, participants’ responses should also distinguish moral and legal 
dimensions from controllability-related measures. This hypothesis leads to three specific 
predictions.  
 First, since the manipulation of levels of culpability in this study is based on 
rendering salient legal cues pertaining to either negligence or recklessness, it is expected 
to only affect the legal dimension of responsibility and, specifically only intentionality. 
Indeed, as discussed previously, legal reasoning contends that conscious negligence and 
recklessness imply both consciousness, but differ in terms of intent, since the latter 
entails an element of intent, whereas the former does not. Thus, participants’ ratings on 
measures related to the rational criteria of intentionality should differ depending on 
whether the agent’s behaviours are negligent or reckless, whereas consciousness ratings 
should be similar no matter the condition. Thus, intentionality should be rated higher in 
the condition of recklessness, compared to the condition of negligence, whereas 
consciousness will not be affected by the condition. Since recklessness and conscious 
negligence are related to different legal qualifications, which are respectively, intentional 
homicide and negligent homicide, we expect participants’ ratings of these qualifications 
to be affected by the level of culpability. Thus, participants should rate intentional 
homicide as higher in the recklessness condition compared to the negligence condition, 
whereas they will rate negligent homicide as higher in the negligence condition, 
compared to the recklessness condition. 
 
 Second, the moral responsibility dimension is not expected to be influenced by the 
manipulation of level of responsibility. Thus, participants’ ratings of blameworthiness, 
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responsibility for the death of the victim and accountability before the justice system 
should be similar, whether they correspond to the negligence or the recklessness 
situation. Moreover, in line with the previous study’s results, we expect moral 
responsibility to be related to negative emotions, as well as punitive responses, whereas 
the legal responsibility dimension should not be related to such factors. Moreover, since 
blame was associated to a tendency to disagree with external explanations for events 
(external factors) and to agree with explanations related to norm-related shortcomings 
that affect individuals (internal factors) in the previous study, we expect the moral 
dimension of responsibility to be also related to the tendency to favour internal 
explanations (internality as a disposition). Let us add that we do not expect factors, such 
as negative emotions and retributive responses, which should be related to moral 
responsibility, to be affected by the level of responsibility condition.  
 
 Third, the level of legal responsibility is purported to have also an impact on 
measures related to controllability, since one of the conditions in which participants had 
to respond to was a situation of negligent conduct. Consequently, we expect participants 
to rate higher negligence in the negligence condition, compared to the recklessness 
condition. Ratings of the precautions necessary to avoid such harmful outcomes, as they 
were related to negligence assessments in the previous study, should be influenced too. 
Since recklessness, in legal reasoning, is related to the idea of “knowing about a risk, 
accepting it and acting anyway”, the measure as to whether the agent could have acted 
otherwise may be rated higher in the recklessness condition, compared to the negligence 
condition. Moreover, in line with the findings in the previous study and Alicke’s culpable 
control model, we expect controllability-related measures to be more related to moral 
responsibility ascriptions than to legal responsibility judgments.  
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Effect of type of study and level of culpability on moral and legal responsibility 
dimensions 
 
 In line with the findings of the previous study, we expect law students to be more 
sensitive to the rational cues used to determine legal responsibility, compared to 
psychology students. Three sets of predictions result from this assumption. 
 
 As in the previous study, concerning the first part of the questionnaire, law students 
should identify more accurately the different dimensions and levels related to rational 
criteria of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality, than psychology students. 
Moreover, as observed in study 1, they should be also more sensitive to ambiguous 
dimensions of consciousness and intentionality than psychology students are. They 
should, thus, be less likely to assimilate to a conscious action the measure that “Anne 
threw the dart out of her window, but after having committed that act, she does not 
understand what happened”, compared to psychology students. They should also agree 
less that the measure “Anne was intending to throw the dart out of the window, but then 
decided against it, but slipped and the dart fell out of the window,” reflects intentional 
action, compared to psychology students. Finally, law students should be more sensitive 
to the three specific assessments of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality that 
were added in this study concerning Anne’s actions, compared psychology students. Thus 
law students, even though the situation describes an accidental event, where no intent or 
consciousness can be inferred from the scenario, should attribute more consciousness, 
voluntariness and intentionality to Anne’s actions, compared to psychology students. This 
assumption is made because law students will be more likely to evaluate these criteria in 
terms of the possible legal liability incurred by Anne’s actions.  
 
 Law students are also expected to differentiate more clearly between the salient legal 
cues corresponding to each level of culpability that is manipulated than psychology 
students. They should thus rate these two conditions according to the level of culpability 
and its corresponding rational criteria. This means that law students are expected to 
attribute more intentionality to the perpetrator in the recklessness condition than in the 
negligence condition, because they are expected to be sensitive to the legal cues that are 
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rendered salient for each level of culpability. In the same vein and following the same 
reasoning, law students should also attribute more negligence in the negligence condition, 
compared to the recklessness condition. The psychology students, to the contrary, should 
not differentiate between both levels of culpability in terms of their ratings of 
intentionality and negligence.  
 
 Finally, the previous study provided evidence for the assumption that psychology 
students may be less sensitive to rational criteria and more susceptible to demonstrate 
morally-tainted patterns of response. Consequently, we predict that psychology students 
may show higher ratings on moral responsibility measures, than law students will.  They 
could also be more likely to relate moral responsibility to other related punitive and 
emotional dimensions, compared to law students.  
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants  
 
 177 participants were included in this study, out of which 82 1st year psychology 
students (Median age = 20 years old; 74 female and 8 male) and 95 2nd year law students 
(Median age = 21 years old; 59 female and 36 male) were recruited during their ex-
cathedra classes at the University of Lausanne. They were randomly assigned to one of 
the two conditions manipulated in this study, as demonstrated in Table 2.1 below. The 
same instructions as in the previous study were given to the participants prior to this 
experiment.  
 
 Table 2.1.: Frequencies by type of study and by culpability condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Culpability condition 
Type of study 
Total 
Psychology Law 
Recklessness 36 53 89 
Negligence 46 42 88 
Total 82 95 177 
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2.2. Procedure   
 
Questionnaire part 1: internality-externality tendency scale and measures 
concerning representations of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality  
 
Internality-externality scale 
 
 A scale was added to measure participants’ tendency to internality and externality 
(see Appendix 2a). This scale includes 16 items that were originally comprised in the 
internality and luck subscales of the Levenson IPC control scale translated in French 
(Rossier, Rigozzi & Berthoud, 2002).  
 The rationale behind adding these internality and externality subscales is explained by 
the results yielded in the previous study concerning the measure of different explanatory 
factors for the situation. Disagreement with external factors and favouring factors related 
to the individual were found to be strong predictors of moral responsibility ratings. 
However, the results of the previous study were based on participants’ ratings on a scale, 
entailing items about different explanatory factors, that was newly created for this study 
and thus exploratory. Although the dimensions that were yielded by a factor analysis of 
the items of this scale showed generally acceptable alpha index values, this scale may not 
be very reliable, in terms of the dimensions it wants to measure (external explanations, 
victim-blaming explanations and individual explanations), because it was never tested 
before this study.  
 We thus decided to use a more widely used scale to measure participants’ agreement 
with external and internal explanations for events and used the items related to these 
explanations that were included in the internal and external subscales of the Levenson 
IPC control scale. As our objective was to verify the link between the tendency to 
internality and externality and respondents’ moral and legal responsibility ascriptions, we 
needed to create two global ratings, one for responses for internality items and the other 
for externality items. When used the following procedure to create these two ratings. A 
factor analysis of the items of the internality and externality scale yielded 2 factors 
(29.75% total variance explained): Internality (15.47%) and Externality (14.28%). Mean 
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ratings for each factor were then computed from the corresponding items. We obtained, 
thus, two mean ratings: Minternal (a=.601) and Mexternal (a=.617).  
 
Measures of the representations of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality  
 
 The vignette used in study 1 in the first part of the questionnaire was modified for this 
study to increase its validity in terms of plausibility. This vignette was also intended to be 
as neutral as possible in terms of consciousness, voluntariness and intent, in order to 
measure the respondents’ general understanding of the different dimensions of these three 
criteria. It had, thus, to be perceived by the participants as an accident and the situation 
had to be described in such a way that it was free from any element of intention or 
consciousness of the probability of a harmful outcome. Thus, the vignette was modified 
to describe the following situation:  
 
Anne is playing with darts in her apartment and the target she is aiming at is next to the window that she 
left open because of the heat. While throwing a dart, she misses her target and the dart goes through the 
window and hurts a passer-by walking on the sidewalk.  
 
 The scales measuring, in general terms, different dimensions of consciousness, 
voluntariness and intentionality, which were used in the previous study, were included 
without modifications (see Appendix 1a). However, three items were added to evaluate 
more explicitly and specifically the extent to which participants, after having read the 
situation, assessed the voluntariness of Anne’s acts, her intentionality and her 
consciousness of the risks she was taking (see Appendix 2b). 
 
 
Questionnaire part 2: manipulation of levels of culpability (negligence vs. 
recklessness)  
 
 The manipulation of levels of culpability was done using the same vignette of the car-
crash incident as the one used in the previous study. Half of the participants of each field 
of study had to then rate this scenario in either a negligence condition or a recklessness 
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condition. The core content of the scenario was the same in both conditions except for 
one paragraph that was different depending on the condition (see Appendix 2c). In the 
negligence condition, the perpetrator was described as “knowing that what he wants to do 
may be dangerous, because he can lose control of his car and cause an accident”. In the 
recklessness condition, the perpetrator was described as “knowing that the chances of 
losing control of his car and causing an accident are high, but wanting to reach his goal at 
all costs”. 
 All scales used in this part of the questionnaire were identical to the ones used in the 
previous study (see Appendix 1c).  
 
 
Questionnaire part 3: different life experience measures and socio-demographic 
questions 
 
 This part included the same measures concerning topics of discussions, topics of 
interest discussed in the media and life experiences as a victim or a perpetrator, as well as 
socio-demographic questions that were used in the previous study (see Appendix 1d). 
The measure of punitive aims that was used in the previous study was not included in this 
study.  
 
3. Results   
 
 In order to test our hypotheses, the following analyses were carried. We first used a 
factor analysis in principal components to highlight respondents’ representations of 
rational criteria for legal responsibility, as well as their representations of moral and legal 
responsibility, and controllability. A MANOVA was then carried out in order to test the 
effect of the legal culpability condition and the type of study on moral and legal 
dimensions of responsibility, as well as measures related to the qualifications of the 
event. Interaction effects between the type of study and the culpability condition, as well 
as main effects of study and culpability were examined. Moreover, a one-way ANOVA 
was also carried out to investigate the effect of type of study on measures related to 
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rational criteria for legal responsibility. The effect of condition was not considered for 
these measures, since they were evaluated in the first part of the questionnaire, before the 
car-crash scenario manipulation. Regression analyses were then carried out to assess the 
role of different predictors for moral and legal responsibility dimensions, as well as 
controllability. Finally, correlational analyses using the Pearson method, as well as partial 
correlations were then used to examine the relationships between the responsibility 
dimensions and some of their relevant correlates, for each experimental group formed by 
the combination of type of study and culpability condition.  
 
3.1. Manipulation check 
 
 The same finding, as in study 1, concerning the equal plausibility (F (1,177) = 1.15; ns) 
and frequency (F (1,177) = .23; ns) of vignettes between conditions was observed. One can 
once again assume that the wording used to manipulate the level of responsibility does 
not affect the credibility and frequency perceptions concerning the situation evaluated in 
this study.  
 
3.2. Existence of overlapping dimensions of responsibility related to moral 
and legal criteria  
3.2.1. Participants’ representations of rational criteria for legal 
responsibility  
 
 In line with the results of the previous study, we make the assumption that a legal 
dimension to responsibility exists in ordinary reasoning and that this dimension depends 
on three rational criteria of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality. The 
prediction in this study is thus similar to the one made in the previous one, except for the 
fact that the vignette on which these measures are based was modified for this study. 
Consequently, a first analysis aimed at verifying whether participants also identify 
correctly the rational criteria that are entailed in the legal dimension of responsibility and 
the underlying meanings of these criteria for this modified vignette.  
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 A factor analysis in principal components with the Varimax rotation method was 
carried out on all items related to the criteria of consciousness, voluntariness and 
intentionality. Three factors explaining 65.45% of the total variance were highlighted. 
The Bartlett’s test of Sphericity was significant (χ2(78) = 1163.85, p <.001) and the 
KMO was satisfactory (0.82). The items included in the three resulting factors and their 
corresponding saturations are displayed in Table 2.2. The first factor (33.14%) comprised 
all items related to the different dimensions of consciousness and intentionality and is 
named CI. The second factor (22.58%) included all the items relating to voluntariness. 
We will refer to it as Vol. Finally, the third factor (9.74%) encompassed the items related 
to ambiguous intentionality and consciousness. We will name it Amb. As already 
observed in the previous study, the two ambiguous measures relating to consciousness 
and intentionality are separated in participants’ representations of the other dimensions of 
consciousness and intentionality (which are assembled into one factor in this study). The 
ambiguous consciousness measure and the ambiguous intentionality measure show lower 
ratings than the other items, which indicates that they are less constitutive of respectively, 
consciousness and intentionality, in participants’ representations. All voluntariness 
measures are included in a same factor, thus participants clearly distinguish between 
voluntariness, on the one hand, and consciousness and intentionality, on the other hand.  
 
Table 2.2.: Principal component analysis of the scales pertaining to the different dimensions of 
consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality 
*Saturations that are higher than .30 are displayed in bold 
** S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
 
Scales Saturations* Mean  
ratings S.d.** CI Vol Amb 
Anne thought about her act before committing it and threw the dart 
knowing that her actions could harm someone .836 -.050 .140 4.07 1.36 
Anne’s one and only aim was to hurt someone by throwing the dart out of 
the window .826 -.112 .155 4.32 1.44 
Anne wanted to hurt someone by throwing the dart out of the window .818 -.112 .278 4.10 1.55 
Anne thought about her act and its consequences before committing it .801 -.083 -.028 3.98 1.31 
Anne knew before throwing the dart that her actions were liable for 
punishment by the law .777 -.025 -.207 3.53 1.39 
Anne knew that, by throwing a dart out of the window, the odds were great 
to harm someone .728 .037 .221 3.97 1.16 
Anne knew that the dart she threw could fall on someone .649 .076 -.093 3.77 1.10 
Anne was motivated to throw this dart  .856 -.087 3.13 1.30 
Anne acted without the intervention of any external force -.100 .855 -.146 3.39 1.27 
Anne wanted to throw this dart .078 .851 .009 3.32 1.43 
Anne acted freely without any physical or moral constraint from others -.136 .829 -.034 3.44 1.32 
Anne was intending to throw the dart out of the window, but then decided 
against it, but slipped and the dart fell out of the window .120 -.128 .609 2.03 1.18 
Anne threw the dart out of her window, but after having committed that 
act, when she thinks about it she does not understand what happened -.104 .027 -.802 2.41 1.03 
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 However, even though participants associate all dimensions of intentionality and 
consciousness together, a more detailed examination of their mean ratings, depending on 
their type of study, indicates that, like in the previous study, law students are more likely 
than psychology students to correctly perceive gradations in levels of consciousness and 
intentionality (see Table 2.3.). T-test analyses carried out between these different 
measures for each student group show quite clearly these differences.  
 Law students give significantly higher ratings to “having as the one and only aim to 
hurt someone” compared to “wanting to hurt someone” (t (94) = -2.04, p <.05) and 
compared to “knowing that one could hurt someone” (t (94) = 4.47, p <.001). They also 
rated “wanting to hurt someone” higher than “knowing that one could hurt someone” (t 
(94) = 2.76, p <.008). Finally, they gave higher evaluations to “knowing that the odds 
were great to harm someone” than to “knowing that one could hurt someone” (t (94) = -
2.12, p <.04), but rated the former lower than “having as the one and only aim to hurt 
someone” (t (94) = 3.18, p <.003). No significant differences were found between the 
rating of “wanted to hurt someone” and “knowing that the odds were great to harm 
someone” (t (94) = 1.56, ns). Thus, law students’ representations of the different 
dimensions of intentionality are graded in terms of the extent to which they constitute 
intent in legal reasoning. “Having as the one and only aim to hurt someone” is the 
measure that is the most assimilated to intentionality, followed by “wanted to hurt 
someone” and by “knowing that the odds were great to harm someone” that are 
considered to reflect the same degree of intentionality. Finally, one finds “knowing that 
one could hurt someone” at the lower end of the continuum, which is considered as less 
intentional than “wanting” or “knowing that the odds are great”.   
 As for psychology students, certain significant differences between intentionality 
measures were observed, which show that they also perceived some of the gradations 
between these measures. They showed higher ratings for “having as the one and only aim 
to hurt someone” compared to “wanting to hurt someone” (t (81) = -2.43, p <.02) and 
compared to “knowing that one could hurt someone” (t (81) = 3.11, p <.004). Moreover, 
they also rated higher “knowing that the odds were great to harm someone” compared to 
“knowing that one could hurt someone” (t (81) = -2.04, p <.05) 
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Table 2.3.: Mean ratings for consciousness and intentionality measures for law and psychology students 
 
 
 As for the consciousness dimension, one should mention that both law and 
psychology students rated “thinking about one’s actions before committing them and 
behaving knowingly” (tlaw (94) = 3.93, p <.001; tpsy (81) = 4.52, p <.001) and “thinking 
about one’s act and its consequences” (tlaw (94) = 3.09, p <.004; tpsy (80) = 3.69, p <.001) 
as more constitutive of consciousness than “knowing that one’s actions are liable for 
punishment by the law”. Like in the previous study, no significant differences were found 
between respondents ratings of “thinking about one’s actions before committing them 
and behaving knowingly” and “thinking about one’s act and its consequences” (tlaw (94) = 
-1.31, ns; tpsy (80) = -0.60, ns). 
 
3.2.2. Participants’ representations of the moral and legal dimensions of 
responsibility  
 
 The previous findings demonstrated that respondents, especially law students, have a 
graded understanding of the different levels of consciousness and intentionality that 
reflects an accurate representation of the different levels of legal responsibility. The 
question is now whether they also distinguish between the moral and legal dimensions of 
responsibility when judging of a situation in which different levels of culpability are 
manipulated. Since the previous study provided some evidence for this assumption when 
 
Measures Law Students 
 
Psychology  
students 
 
 
 Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* 
Consciousness 
Items 
Thinking about one’s act and its consequences before committing it 4.04 1.32 3.84 1.31 
Thinking about one’s act before committing it and acting while knowing that 
one’s actions are harmful 4.17 
 
1.29 
 
3.93 1.44 
Knowing before acting that one’s actions are liable for punishment by the law 
 
3.66 1.38 3.35 1.40 
intentionality 
Items 
Having as one and only aim to hurt someone  
 
4.45 1.31 4.12 1.57 
Wanting to hurt someone by one’s actions 
 
4.25 1.45 3.90 1.64 
Knowing that the odds were great to harm someone by one’s  actions 
 
4.04 1.15 3.87 1.17 
Knowing that one’s action could harm someone 3.84 1.07 3.67 1.14 
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manipulating levels of negligence, we will try to replicate this finding with more marked 
levels of culpability.  
 
 A factorial analysis in principal components with the Varimax rotation method of all 
responsibility-related items was conducted and yielded three factors accounting for 
57.13% of the total variance (see Table 2.4.). Factor 1 (21.71%) included all the items 
related to moral responsibility and is referred to as Moral. Factor 2 (18.61%) brings 
together all items related to controllability and is named Control. Factor 3 (16.80%) 
entailed all rational criteria of legal responsibility and is called Legal. The Bartlett’s test 
of Sphericity was significant χ2(45) = 360.52, p <.001 and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) was satisfactory (0.756).  
 These findings, in conformity with the previous study, demonstrate even more clearly 
that participants differentiated between, on the one hand, rational criteria such as 
consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality, and on the other hand, evaluations that 
are more related to moral dimensions of responsibility such as blameworthiness, being 
responsible for the death of someone and accountability before justice. This analysis also 
yielded a control factor, like in the previous study, which indicates that participants 
associated evaluations that are clearly related to controllability, such as acting carelessly, 
not taking all the necessary precautions to avoid a harmful occurrence or the judgment 
that the agent could have acted otherwise. One should mention here that the measure 
concerning voluntariness, that was associated in the previous study to the Legal factor, 
was here strongly associated to the Control factor. Thus participants’ assimilated taking 
freely the decision to drive knowing that this could lead to an accident more to other 
controllability measures than to a rational criteria of legal responsibility. Moreover, 
contrary to the previous study, participants did not associate negligence to the 
controllability dimension, but opposed their ratings of negligence to those concerning 
consciousness and intentionality in the Legal factor. It is to be noted that for some items, 
saturations higher than .30 were sometimes observed for two different factors. However, 
in these cases, we chose to take into account the highest value of saturation to decide to 
which factor the item corresponded to. These cases only concerned two items, namely 
“consciousness” and “could have acted otherwise”. 
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Table 2.4.: Principal component analysis of the scales pertaining to the different measures related to 
responsibility 
*Saturations that are higher than .30 are displayed in bold 
** S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
 
 
 
3.3. Effect of the level of culpability on legal dimensions of responsibility as 
a function of the type of study of respondents 
 
 Another prediction of this study was that psychology students should be less sensitive 
to the manipulation of culpability levels than law students are, since these nuances in 
culpability are based on legal standards that may not be perceptible for perceivers who 
were not trained to identify such rational cues. Results yielded in this study point towards 
this assumption. A 2 (type of study) x 2 (culpability condition) MANOVA was carried 
out and produced a significant interaction effect between culpability condition and type 
of study for the negligence rating (F (1,177) = 4.50; p <.04, η=.03), the intentionality 
evaluation (F (1,177) = 5.41; p <.03, η=.03) and the intentional homicide qualification 
(F(1,177) = 8.62; p <.005, η=.05).  
 In conformity with our hypotheses, law students differentiated between the two levels 
of culpability in their ratings of negligence and intentionality, whereas psychology 
students were less likely to make this distinction (see Table 2.5.). Law students in the 
recklessness condition agreed more than law students in the negligence condition that the 
agent intentionally caused the accident, whereas psychology students did not evaluate 
differently intentionality depending on the condition in which they were. Moreover, law 
students in the negligence condition attributed more negligence than law students in the 
recklessness condition did, whereas psychology students ascribed more negligence to the 
Scales Saturations* Mean  
ratings S.d.** Moral  Control Legal 
Responsibility for the death of the victim  .837 .090 .009 4.19 0.80 
Blameworthiness .782 .202 -.060 4.55 0.73 
Accountability before justice .647 .216 .266 4.46 0.76 
Voluntariness -.031 .662 .257 4.58 0.75 
Acted very carelessly .283 .661 -.138 4.70 0.67 
Did not take the necessary precautions to avoid the harmful 
outcome .223 .652 .006 4.47 0.86 
Could have acted otherwise .451 .516 .016 4.56 0.81 
Intentionality .030 .181 .804 1.89 1.14 
Negligence .057 .282 -.782 3.94 1.30 
Consciousness .319 .297 .511 3.44 1.27 
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agent than law students did, whatever the condition they were in. These findings point 
clearly towards the conclusion that law students distinguish between recklessness and 
negligence, in terms of their intentionality and negligence ratings, whereas psychology 
students do not make such a distinction.  
 Another finding that also supports the prediction of law students’ higher sensitivity 
to legal cues related to both culpability conditions concerns the fact that law students in 
the recklessness condition agree more with the intentional homicide qualification than 
law students in the negligence condition, whereas psychology student show similar 
disagreement levels  with this qualification in both conditions (see Table 2.5.).  
 
Table 2.5.: Mean ratings for legal responsibility measures and qualifications by type of study and 
culpability condition 
Measures Recklessness condition Negligence condition 
 Law S.d.* Psych. S.d.* Law S.d.* Psych. S.d.* 
Consciousness 3.85 1.12 3.22 1.25 3.64 1.28 2.96 1.28 
Intentionality 2.60 1.32 1.36 0.64 1.95 1.17 1.44 0.69 
Voluntariness 4.76 0.43 4.50 0.91 4.62 0.79 4.41 0.83 
Negligence 3.28 1.60 4.33 1.01 4.05 1.23 4.30 0.84 
Intentional homicide  2.43 1.52 1.33 0.76 1.45 1.13 1.35 0.71 
Accident  2.92 1.41 3.69 1.06 3.62 1.46 3.78 1.07 
 ** S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Effect of legal training on representations of rational criteria of 
consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality 
 
 Another hypothesis in this research was that law students, given their legal training, 
should be more attuned to rational criteria for ascribing legal responsibility than 
psychology students. Findings concerning participants’ representations of rational criteria 
of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality, as measured in the first part of the 
questionnaire, and the predicted heightened sensitivity of law students for such criteria 
show mixed results.  
 In contradiction to our predictions and to the findings of the previous study, law 
students did not show higher ratings on the measures related to the different dimensions 
of consciousness and intentionality than psychology students did. In other words, law 
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students and psychology students had similar views as to the extent to which different 
levels and forms of awareness and intent reflected respectively, consciousness and 
intentionality. They also, contrary to our expectations, did not rate the ambiguous 
intentionality and consciousness items lower than psychology students did. 
 However, a significant main effect for type of study for the three specific measures 
pertaining to the extent to which participants agreed that Anne’s actions reflected 
consciousness, were intentional and were voluntary. Significant differences on these three 
specific measures were observed between law students and psychology students. Law 
students agreed (mvol=2.35; mint=1.98; mcons=2.72), more than their psychology 
counterparts (mvol= 1.76; mint=1.56; mcons=2.17), that the agent’s actions are voluntary 
(F(1,177) = 10.02; p <.003, η=.05), that the agent’s actions are intentional (F(1,177) = 
7.15; p <.009, η=.04) and that the agent was conscious of the risks taken (F(1,177) = 
9.19; p <.004, η=.05). 
 
3.5. Effect of legal training on moral and legal dimensions of responsibility  
 
  We had also made the hypothesis that psychology students should be less sensitive to 
rational criteria, compared to law students, and could be more susceptible to respond to 
moral and emotional dimensions when ascribing responsibility. Some of the following 
results point towards these assumptions.  
 
 In addition to the interaction effects discussed previously, significant main effects of 
type of study were observed for the intentionality ratings, as well as for the intentional 
homicide qualification (see Table 2.5.). Moreover, significant main effects were also 
highlighted for the consciousness rating. More specifically, law students (mconsc= 3.76; 
mintent=2.32) agreed more than psychology students (mconsc= 3.07; mintent=1.40) that the 
agent was aware that driving fast in a bend could lead to the death of the victim (Fconsc 
(1,177) = 13.73; p <.001, η=.07) and that the agent caused the accident intentionally 
(Fintent (1,177) = 33.42; p <.001, η=.16). Moreover, law students (m=1.34) agreed 
significantly (1,177) = 12.63; p <.001, η=.07) more than psychology students (m=1.94) to 
qualify the event of intentional homicide. 
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 Let us mention here a main effect of type of study on negligence ratings and the 
qualification of accident, which indicates that psychology students differed from law 
students on these ratings (see Table 2.5.). Psychology students (m=4.53) tend 
significantly (F (1,177) = 13.51; p <.001, η=.07) to agree more than law students 
(m=3.97) that the agent acted negligently, whatever the level of culpability. They 
(m=3.74) also tend more (F (1,177) = 6.86; p <.02, η=.04) to qualify the situation of 
“accident” in all conditions, compared to law students (m=3.23). 
 As for the prediction that psychology students may show higher moral responsibility 
ratings than law students no matter the condition in which they are, findings showed 
partial support for it. Contrary to our assumptions, psychology students’ moral 
responsibility mean ratings (Moral106) were not higher, but significantly (F (1,177) = 
8.29; p <.005, η=.04) lower (m=4.26), than law students mean ratings (m=4.52). 
However, as shown in Table 2.6. displaying the mean ratings for each moral 
responsibility item included in Moral, this unexpected result could be mainly due to 
significant (F (1,177) = 13.59; p <.001, η=.07) differences between law and psychology 
students, in terms of ratings of whether the agent was accountable before justice. Law 
students were more likely to consider that the agent was accountable before justice than 
psychology students did. Yet, as also shown in Table 2.6., one can note that psychology 
students agree significantly (F (1,177) = 6.10; p <.01, η=.03) more than law students with 
a measure which was not included in the moral dimension of responsibility107 and which 
was related to “publicly denouncing the agent’s acts”.  
 
 
Table 2.6.: Mean ratings for moral responsibility measures and public denunciation evaluations by type of 
study and culpability condition 
Measures Recklessness condition Negligence condition 
 Law S.d.* Psych. S.d.* Law S.d.* Psych. S.d.* 
Responsibility 4.34 0.62 4.03 0.88 4.24 0.82 4.09 0.89 
Accountability before justice 4.74 0.44 4.31 0.86 4.55 0.80 4.20 0.83 
Blameworthiness 4.64 0.56 4.44 0.81 4.57 0.80 4.50 0.78 
Public denunciation 3.30 1.37 3.50 1.14 2.90 1.41 3.67 1.07 
 ** S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
                                                 
106
 A factor analysis of moral, legal and controllability responsibility measures yielded 3 factors (57.13% of total variance explained): 
Moral (21.71%), Control (18.61%) and Legal (16.80%). Items included in each factor were then computed into a single mean rating: 
Mmoral (a=.713), Mcontrol (a=.606) and Mlegal (a=.477). 
107
 See Table 2.4. p. 163. 
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 Results indicate that psychology students are more likely, compared to law students, 
to ascribe negligence to the agent’s conduct, whatever the level of culpability, to favour 
the public denunciation of his acts and to qualify the situation as an accident. Law 
students were, as expected, more likely to favour rational criteria of legal responsibility 
and to respond accurately to the manipulation of levels of culpability in terms of 
intentionality, negligence and intentional homicide qualification. However, in opposition 
with our predictions, law students were also more likely to agree with moral 
responsibility ratings such as accountability before justice, compared to psychology 
students. Thus, the only measure related to moral responsibility, which was rated higher 
by psychology students, compared to law students, is public denunciation.  
 Findings until now point, overall, towards the conclusion that law students, compared 
to psychology students, may be more sensitive to legal cues, as well as rational criteria. 
This means that law students rate more accurately different levels of culpability. Law 
students, in this study, were also more receptive to moral responsibility ratings, such as 
accountability before justice, compared to psychology students. Psychology students tend 
to subscribe more to non-legal concepts, such as public denunciation and qualifications 
like “accident”, and do not distinguish clearly between the two levels of culpability in 
terms of intentionality and negligence.  
 
3.6. Effect of the culpability condition on moral and legal dimensions of 
responsibility  
 
 Findings only partly confirm the hypothesis that the manipulation of recklessness vs. 
negligence affected only the legal criteria which corresponded to each level of 
culpability, for all respondents. Indeed, the hypothesis of a main effect of the culpability 
condition, in addition to the interaction effect of type of study and culpability condition, 
was confirmed for the intentional homicide qualification, but was not confirmed for the 
intentionality and negligence ratings. 
 A significant main effect of culpability condition (F (1,177) = 8.13; p <.006, η=.05) 
was observed for the intentional homicide qualification, whereby participants in the 
recklessness condition (m=1.99) agreed more than participants in the negligence 
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condition (m=1.40) to qualify the situation as an intentional homicide. However, no 
significant main effects of culpability condition were found for the intentionality and 
negligence ratings, contrary to our assumptions. Since significant interaction effects were 
observed previously, this indicates that only law students were more likely to correctly 
identify the two levels of culpability that were manipulated in terms of the relevant legal 
criteria of intentionality and negligence they corresponded to. Let us add that, contrary to 
our predictions, negligent homicide ratings were not affected by this manipulation, as no 
significant main effect of culpability condition was found for this qualification. 
 Moreover, in conformity with our predictions, this manipulation did not affect any of 
the moral responsibility measures. As for factors that are related to the moral dimension 
of responsibility such as, emotions felt by respondents, as well as the punitive responses 
that may attenuate the harm done to the victim’s family, none were influenced by the 
level of culpability of the agent either. Yet is also interesting to note that the manipulation 
affected the non-legal qualification of “accident”, since participants in the negligence 
condition (m=3.71) tended more than participants in the recklessness condition (m=3.24) 
to qualify the situation of accident (F (1,177) = 5.74; p <.02, η=.03).  
 Finally, contrary to our expectations, the measures of the necessary precautions to 
take, as well as the evaluation of whether the agent could have acted otherwise, were not 
affected by this manipulation.  
 
 We now have a better understanding of the factors that influence legal responsibility 
ratings and the role of the type of study on such an influence. Moreover, findings 
concerning to the absence of effect of the condition on moral responsibility measures and 
related factors, such as negative emotions and punitive responses, suggest that moral 
evaluations are not affected by rational factors. We will now turn to further analyses to 
gain a deeper understanding of the factors underlying moral responsibility and their 
relationship to legal responsibility. More specifically, since one of the assumptions held 
in this study, and that was confirmed in the previous study, concerns the role of punitive 
responses, internal tendencies and negative emotions in blame attributions, as well as the 
link between level of culpability condition, rational criteria and legal responsibility, we 
will consider these different influences in the following regressions analyses.  
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3.7. Moral and legal dimensions of responsibility and their predictors 
 
 The objective was to test the influence of negative emotional reactions, of the 
tendency to internality, of punitive responses, of assessments concerning the qualification 
the situation, of assessment of rational criteria of consciousness and intentionality, of the 
field of study and of the condition of level of culpability on legal and moral 
responsibility. We expected negative emotional reactions, the tendency to internality and 
the punitive response favouring prison to be associated to moral responsibility, but not to 
be related to legal responsibility. As public denunciation was related to blameworthiness 
in the previous study, it was also expected to be a predictor of the moral responsibility 
dimension. As for the legal responsibility dimension, we anticipated that the type of 
study, the culpability condition, as well as the assessment of rational criteria of 
consciousness and intentionality would be significant predictors. However, these latter 
variables should not predict moral responsibility. Thus, linear multiple regression 
analyses with the method enter were carried out on mean ratings for moral responsibility 
(Moral) and legal responsibility (Legal) factors108 using the above-mentioned factors as 
predictors. The interaction between type of study and the culpability condition was also 
introduced given its significant effects on legal responsibility measures and legal 
qualifications measures highlighted in section 3.3. We assume that this interaction could 
be a significant predictor of legal responsibility. 
 For purposes of clarity, we used mean ratings for some predictors, which were 
computed through the following procedures. For the assessment of rational criteria of 
consciousness and intentionality, we used the mean rating (MCI)109 corresponding to the 
CI factor yielded by the factorial analysis of rational criteria for responsibility. To assess 
the influence of negative emotional reactions, we used Emoneg, which was yielded by 
computing all items of negative emotions into one mean rating110. In order to assess the 
                                                 
108
 A factor analysis of moral, legal and controllability responsibility measures yielded 3 factors (57.13% of total variance explained): 
Moral (21.71%), Control (18.61%) and Legal (16.80%). Items included in each factor were then computed into a single mean rating: 
Mmoral (a=.713), Mcontrol (a=.606) and Mlegal (a=.477). 
109
 A factor analysis of rational criteria for responsibility yielded 3 factors:  CI, Vol and Amb.  Items included in each factor were then 
computed into a single mean rating: MCI (a=.900), MVol (a=.870) and MAmb (a=-.291). See section 3.2.1, p.158-159, Table 2.2. 
MAmb was not taken into account, given that the alpha for this rating was negative.  
110
 A negative emotions factor (30.73%) and a positive emotions factor (22.98%) resulted from the factor analysis of the emotions felt 
(total variance = 53.71%). Thus, the ratings for negative emotions were computed into one mean rating of negative emotions 
(Emoneg, α=.671) and the same was done for positive emotions (Emopos, α=.480).  
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influence of the disposition to internality, we used the internality mean rating 
(Minternal)111. Predictors such as gender, religious affiliation, political orientation, socio-
economic status, the participants’ life experiences concerning discussions and the media, 
as well as experiences of being/knowing a perpetrator or a victim, the externality mean 
rating and the accident qualification were not considered, as none of them were 
significantly associated to moral or legal responsibility.  
 
 A first analysis was carried out using moral responsibility ratings (Mmoral) as a 
dependent variable and all the predictors that were mentioned above. As reported in 
Table 2.7., Mmoral is significantly predicted by the qualification of intentional homicide, 
by the qualification of negligent homicide, by the tendency for internality, the public 
denunciation rating and feelings of negative emotions. In line with our assumptions, the 
tendency for internality, the public denunciation rating and negative emotions ratings 
were significant predictors of Mmoral. Contrary to our assumptions, the moral dimension 
of responsibility was not predicted by the retributive punitive response of imprisonment. 
However, Mmoral was predicted by the legal qualifications of negligent homicide and 
intentional homicide, which reflect punitive responses, since they are associated to harsh 
custodial sanctions. As expected, moral responsibility was not predicted by the 
assessment of rational criteria of consciousness and intentionality, the negligence 
condition or the type of study.  
 
 A second analysis examined which factors predicted legal responsibility ratings 
(Mlegal) and whether these predictors were different from those related to moral 
responsibility ratings. As displayed in Table 2.7., Mlegal was predicted significantly by 
the qualification of intentional homicide, being a law student and the tendency for 
internality. Thus, as anticipated, being a law student was significantly related to Mlegal. 
However, contrary to our expectations, the culpability condition, the interaction between 
type of study and the culpability condition, and the assessment of rational criteria of 
consciousness and intentionality were not significant predictors.  
 
                                                 
111
 See section 2.2. p. 155-156 for explanations as to how the internality and externality mean ratings were yielded 
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 Finally, controllability-related measures such as carelessness and possibilities of 
acting otherwise were associated to moral responsibility measures in the previous study, 
but were included in the controllability dimension in this study. We thus carried out a 
regression analysis, using the mean rating of controllability112 (Mcontrol) as a dependent 
variable, to examine whether it was predicted by the same or by different variables than 
moral responsibility. As indicated in Table 2.7., Mcontrol was significantly predicted by 
the negligent homicide qualification, by the intentional homicide qualification and the 
ratings of the different dimensions of rational criteria of responsibility of consciousness 
and intentionality. Mcontrol shared most of its predictors with Mmoral, but had the 
intentional homicide qualification in common with Mlegal.  
 
 
Table 2.7.: Multiple regression analyses: Prediction of moral and legal responsibility as well as 
controllability mean ratings 
Independent variables Mmoral  Mlegal  
 
Mcontrol 
 
 
MCI 
 
.129 
 
.038 
 
.200** 
Memoneg .145* -.029 .072 
Negligent homicide qualification .304*** .018 .307*** 
Intentional homicide qualification .334*** .429*** .233** 
Public denunciation  .184* .120 .046 
Minternal .182* .142* .120 
Type of study .093 .258** .036 
    
Type of Study x culpability condition .068 .040 .031 
Culpability condition -.053 -.058 -.105 
Prison as a way of attenuating the harm done -.004 -.061 -.079 
    
 
R2 
 
.284 
 
.367 
 
.195 
Adjusted R2 .241 .328 .146 
R .533 .605 .442 
 *** p <.001, ** p <.01, * p <.05 
 
 
 As in the previous study for blameworthiness, regression analyses suggest that moral 
responsibility is predicted emotional and condemnatory evaluations, but also by legal 
qualifications. Yet, we suspect that the influence of these predictors may vary as a 
function of the respondents’ type of study and the culpability condition. Further analyses 
for each of the four groups of respondents produced by combining the culpability 
condition and type of study must be carried out to examine this assumption. Moreover, 
                                                 
112
 See note 106 
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we will also check whether the absence of relationship between moral responsibility and 
favouring prison time can be generalised across all groups of respondents. Let us add that 
since the rating of public denunciation was found to be strongly related to favouring 
prison time and blameworthiness, with differences related to the respondent’s student 
status, in the previous study, these associations will be examined further for each group 
of respondent.  
 Regression analyses also indicate that the moral and legal dimensions of 
responsibility share the intentional homicide qualification as a predictor. Findings 
discussed previously, in section 3.3., suggest that law students are more likely to have 
identified the differences between both culpability conditions, in terms of the legal 
underpinnings of the car-crash event, compared to psychology students. This could imply 
that moral and legal responsibility may not be associated to the intentional homicide 
qualification by all four groups of respondents. These associations will, thus, be 
examined separately as a function of culpability condition and respondents’ student 
status.  
 Finally, since controllability shares also some predictors with Mmoral and Mlegal, 
the exact role of Mcontrol will also be evaluated. Once again, the role of Mcontrol with 
regard to Mmoral and Mlegal could vary depending on the culpability condition and the 
type of study of respondents. The associations will therefore be examined across all four 
groups of respondents.  
 
3.8. Correlates of moral responsibility and the role of type of study and 
culpability conditions on these linkages 
3.8.1. Moral responsibility and its relationship to negative emotions, public 
denunciation and legal qualifications 
 
 Regression analyses indicate that negative emotions, agreement with the public 
denunciation of the agent’s acts and legal qualifications are associated to moral 
responsibility. As for blameworthiness in study 1, we anticipated that these linkages 
could be more likely for psychology students, compared to law students. Correlational 
analyses across the four groups of respondents were carried to examine these 
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associations. The punitive response favouring prison was not found to predict moral 
responsibility in the regression analysis. We decided to also check whether this absence 
of relationship was generalised for all groups of respondents.  
 Negative emotions were found to be only significantly correlated moral 
responsibility for psychology students in the negligence culpability condition (rNpsy = 
.429, p < .004). This association was not significant for the other groups of respondents. 
Moreover, when examining the relationship between moral responsibility and favouring 
prison time, in line with the regression results, no significant relationships were found 
across the four groups of respondents. As for the association between moral 
responsibility and public denunciation, it was found to be significant for all groups of 
respondents (rRpsy = .474, p < .004; rNpsy = .321, p < .04; rRlaw = .280, p < .05), except for 
the law students in the negligence condition. However, when controlling for the effect of 
favouring prison time, this association disappears for law students in the recklessness 
condition, whereas it remains strong for psychology students in both culpability 
conditions (rRpsy = .436, p < .01; rNpsy = .320, p < .04).  
 Thus, for law students who are in the negligence condition, the association between 
moral responsibility and public denunciation may be more likely to depend on their 
acceptance that the imprisonment of the agent can attenuate the harm done to the victim’s 
family, compared to psychology students (who seem to make this association without 
considering this punitive response). We suspect that this finding may be explained by the 
fact that law students may be more likely to associate public denunciation to favouring 
prison time, compared to psychology students. We thus examined this association across 
the four groups of respondents. As it turns out, all respondents in the recklessness 
condition associate significantly the public denunciation of the agent’s acts and favouring 
his imprisonment (rRpsy = .386, p < .03; rRlaw = .330, p < .02), whereas no such 
associations are found for respondents in the negligence condition. Yet, further findings 
suggest that psychology students may base this association more on moral responsibility, 
than law students. Indeed, when controlling for the effect of moral responsibility on this 
relationship, this association diminishes significantly for psychology students (rRpsy = 
.333, p < .06, p value bordering significance), but not for law students (rRlaw = .317, p < 
.03).  
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3.8.2. Moral responsibility and its relationship to legal qualifications 
 
 
 Regression analyses indicate that moral responsibility is associated to legal 
qualifications related to negligent homicide and intentional homicide. As these 
associations are unexpected, we examined if they could be found for all groups of 
respondents across both culpability conditions and for both types of study. We suspected 
that psychology students would be more likely to make such an association, compared to 
law students. Indeed, law students, given their training, are more likely to associate legal 
responsibility to a legal qualification which reflects a legal liability to harsh penal 
sanctions, than to associate moral responsibility to such legal liability.  
 In line with our anticipations, law students did not associate moral responsibility to 
either negligent homicide or intentional homicide qualifications, whereas psychology 
students did make these associations depending on the culpability condition. A significant 
association between moral responsibility and the negligent homicide qualification was 
found only for psychology students in the recklessness condition (rRpsy = .618, p < .001), 
whereas moral responsibility and the intentional homicide qualification were significantly 
associated only for psychology students in the negligence condition (rNpsy = .315, p < 
.04). Let us add that psychology students in both conditions associated significantly (rRpsy 
= -.356, p < .04; rNpsy = -.336, p < .03) low moral responsibility to the accident 
qualification, whereas this linkage was never made for law students.  
 Findings until now suggest that law students are less likely to relate moral 
responsibility to qualifications that imply a legal liability for penal sanctions, compared 
to psychology students. We can thus wonder whether moral responsibility is more likely 
to be associated to legal responsibility for psychology students, compared to law students. 
The correlation between both responsibility dimensions was thus examined for the four 
groups of respondents. As it turns out, psychology and law students significantly 
associate moral responsibility to legal responsibility only for the negligence condition 
(rNpsy = .387, p < .009; rNlaw = .357, p < .03). No significant associations were found for 
the recklessness condition. Let us add that this association in the negligence condition 
could depend on controllability ratings, since the relationship between both responsibility 
dimensions disappears for all respondents in this condition, when controlling for the 
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effect of controllability (Mcontrol). In this context, one should also mention that the 
association between Mcontrol and Mmoral is more likely to be found for psychology 
students in all conditions (rRpsy = .449, p < .007; rNpsy = .553, p < .001), whereas only law 
students in the negligence condition make this linkage (rNlaw = .687, p < .001).  
 
3.9. Correlates of legal responsibility and the role of type of study and 
culpability conditions on these linkages 
3.9.1. Legal responsibility and its relationship to legal qualifications and 
rational factors  
 
 Regression analyses indicated that legal responsibility ratings were predicted by the 
intentional homicide qualification and the type of study of respondents. Correlational 
analyses concerning moral responsibility and its relation to legal qualifications showed 
that such a relationship could be more likely for psychology students, compared to legal 
students. These analyses, as well as findings related to the effect of type of study on legal 
responsibility evaluations as a function of the type of condition, also suggest that law 
students’ evaluations could be more consistent with regard to legal reasoning, compared 
to psychology students. We thus expect law students to associate legal responsibility to 
relevant rational criteria and legal qualification in coherence with legal reasoning, 
whereas psychology students’ responses may not follow such a pattern of reasoning. 
Findings point towards this conclusion.  
 
 Mlegal was significantly associated to intentional homicide by law students in both 
conditions (rRlaw = .566, p < .001; rNlaw = .340, p < .03), whereas psychology students 
only associated this qualification to legal responsibility in the negligence condition (rNpsy 
= .315, p < .04). In order to understand better why law students made this association in 
both conditions, whereas psychology students only made in the negligence condition, we 
checked for the effect of relevant factors that may explain variations in this association 
depending on the type of study.  
 We suspected that psychology students may be associating legal responsibility to the 
intentional homicide qualification, because they felt that this qualification was related to 
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harsh penal sanctions such as imprisonment. If this is true, favouring the imprisonment of 
the agent should have an effect on such an association. Partial correlations controlling for 
the prison time measure confirm this hypothesis. The association between Mlegal and the 
intentional homicide qualification diminished significantly for psychology students in the 
negligence condition and bordered significance (rNpsy = .291, p < .06), whereas it 
remained strong for law students in both conditions, when partialling out prison time 
(rRlaw = .565, p < .001; rNlaw = .343, p < .03).   
 Moreover, we also assume that law students base their association of Mlegal and the 
intentional homicide qualification in both culpability conditions on rational criteria that 
are relevant to this linkage in legal reasoning, such as controllability and the 
intentionality criteria113. However, these rational criteria should have more of an 
influence on this association for the negligence condition than the recklessness condition, 
because the linkage between this qualification and Mlegal should be stronger in the latter 
condition (because it is more relevant to recklessness). These assumptions were 
supported by the following findings. When controlling for the effect of controllability, the 
association between Mlegal and the intentional homicide qualification disappeared for 
law students in the negligence condition, whereas it persisted for the law students in the 
recklessness condition and psychology students in the negligence condition (rRlaw = .577, 
p < .001; rNpsy = .322, p < .04). Moreover, when controlling for the effect of the extent to 
which intentionality was ascribed to a negligent act, such as throwing a dart out of a 
window and hurting a passer-by, on the association between intentional homicide and 
Mlegal, the association disappeared again only for law students in the negligence 
condition (rRlaw = .559, p < .001; rNpsy = .305, p < .05). Moreover, previous analyses 
showed that moral responsibility was related to legal responsibility only in the negligence 
condition and that Mmoral and Mlegal were predicted by the intentional homicide 
qualification. We thus checked whether moral responsibility affected the association 
between Mlegal and the intentional homicide qualification for the negligence condition. 
Findings suggest that this is the case, since controlling for the effect of Mmoral makes the 
linkage between Mlegal and the intentional homicide qualification disappear for 
                                                 
113
 The intentionality criteria here is not the measure of intentionality used to evaluate the car-crash scenario, but the specific measure 
of the intentionality of Anne that was used in the first part of the questionnaire concerning the scenario of Anne throwing a dart out of 
the window.  
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psychology students in the negligence condition and diminishes significantly (to the point 
of bordering significance) for law students in the negligence condition (rNlaw = .307, p < 
.06). This association remains significant, however, for law students in the recklessness 
condition (rRlaw = .562, p < .001).  
 These results suggest that the law students associated legal responsibility to the 
intentional homicide qualification in both conditions, but were more likely to base this 
association on legal and rational factors for the negligence condition, whereas such 
factors did not affected this linkage in the recklessness condition. In the negligence 
condition, where an intentional homicide qualified is less applicable, compared to the 
recklessness condition (especially for law students), the linkage between legal 
responsibility and this qualification will be more probable if law students feel that the 
agent could have acted otherwise (control) or if they tend to attribute intentionality to a 
negligent conduct (dart situation). In the recklessness condition, law students are more 
likely to rate the agent’s actions as intentional and to qualify the event of intentional 
homicide, compared to psychology students. Thus, they do not need to consider any other 
factor to be more likely to perceive this event as an intentional homicide, if they think 
that he acted intentionally, since they detected the element of intent in this culpability 
condition. Psychology students may have based their association of Mlegal with the 
intentional homicide qualification more on moral (Mmoral) and punitive factors (prison 
time), with less consideration for the legal realities involved in the condition.  
 Thus, the law students seem to be more likely to associate legal responsibility to 
other relevant rational and legal factors in a way which is consistent with legal reasoning 
and which makes the distinction between the two culpability conditions. Psychology 
students could be, on the other hand, more likely to base such associations on moral and 
punitive dimensions.  
 
 Let us also add that other results support this explanation for law students’ tendency 
to a more “rational-oriented” reasoning. The associations between the specific measures 
of rational criteria for legal responsibility (used in the first part of the questionnaire) and 
legal responsibility as measured for the car-crash event are another example. Law 
students are the only ones to be more likely to associate the tendency to agree that a 
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negligent conduct was intentional and was enacted with the awareness of the risks taken 
to legal responsibility, depending on the culpability condition. Psychology students never 
associated their ratings of these rational criteria to their legal responsibility ratings. Thus, 
law students in the recklessness condition associated significantly the rating of the extent 
to which the dart situation constituted an intentional act to their evaluation of legal 
responsibility (rRlaw = .305, p < .03), but did not make such a linkage in the negligence 
condition. Law students made a similar association between the specific measure of the 
dart thrower’s awareness of the risks attached to her actions and the legal responsibility 
evaluations, but only for the recklessness condition (rRlaw = .350, p < .02).  
 
3.9.2. Legal responsibility and its relationship to controllability  
 
 As shown in section 3.7.2., controllability seems to play an important role in the 
association between moral and legal responsibility for the negligence condition. 
Moreover, controllability could play a different role with regard to legal responsibility 
depending on the type of study of respondents, as previous results seem to suggest. We 
thus, examined whether Mlegal was associated to Mcontrol and checked whether Mmoral 
influenced this association across the four groups of respondents. As it turns out, Mlegal 
and Mcontrol were significantly associated by all groups of respondents (rRpsy = .434, p < 
.009; rNpsy = .302, p < .05; rNlaw = .415, p < .007), except for law students in the 
recklessness condition. However, when controlling for Mmoral, this association 
disappeared for all respondents in the negligence condition, but grew stronger for 
psychology students in the recklessness condition (rRpsy = .483, p < .004).  
 Finally, let us conclude by mentioning that, when controlling for the effect of 
Mlegal, the associations highlighted between Mmoral and Mcontrol in section 3.7.2., 
remain strong for law and psychology students in the negligence condition (rNpsy = .497, p 
< .002; rNlaw = .634, p < .001) and grow even stronger for psychology students in the 
recklessness condition (rRpsy = .495, p < .003).  
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4. Conclusions  
 
4.1. The coexistence of moral and legal dimensions to responsibility in 
respondents’ representations 
 
 The main assumption guiding this study was that responsibility entailed two 
overlapping dimensions related to respectively, moral and legal factors. Evidence 
supporting this hypothesis was found in study 1 in which two levels of negligence were 
manipulated. In this study, in which two levels of culpability were manipulated this time, 
participants’ representations of responsibility also reflected a clear distinction between 
legal and moral dimensions of responsibility.  
 Contrary to the previous study, the moral dimension of responsibility entailed only 
evaluations that reflected a purely blaming stance. Moreover, the legal dimension of 
responsibility reflected clearly the manipulation of culpability levels, since the legal 
responsibility factor structure opposed negligence to consciousness and intentionality. 
This indicates that respondents, especially the law students, correctly perceived the 
manipulation of culpability levels. As we shall see in section 4.3, law students who 
assessed the situation in the negligence condition were more likely to favour negligence 
ratings, compared to consciousness and intentionality assessments, whereas the contrary 
tendency was found for law students who evaluated a reckless behaviour. One should 
mention that the factor structure of legal responsibility in this study is different from the 
one that was yielded in the previous study. The previous study manipulated two levels of 
negligence, which yielded a legal factor including all rational criteria. This study, 
however, manipulated two levels of culpability (negligence vs. recklessness), which 
explains the observed opposition of negligence ratings to intentionality and consciousness 
criteria in legal responsibility factor.  
 Finally, it is noteworthy to observe that respondents also identified a third dimension 
related to controllability, which includes measures related to the extent of control the 
agent was deemed to have had over his actions. This dimension seems to have been 
clearly distinguished from moral and legal responsibility in respondents’ evaluations. Let 
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us add, however, that the comparison of mean ratings and standard deviation values for 
the measures related to moral responsibility, legal responsibility and controllability, 
suggests that respondents were generally more likely to agree consistently with moral 
responsibility and controllability evaluations, than with legal responsibility judgments.  
 
4.2. Respondents’ perception of the gradations corresponding to the 
different levels of rational criteria used to evaluate legal responsibility  
 
 Moreover, findings concerning respondents’ responses to general measures 
concerning the different dimensions underlying rational criteria of consciousness, 
voluntariness and intentional that were included in the first part of the questionnaire 
indicated generally that all respondents made a distinction between, on the one side, 
measures  related to consciousness and intentionality, and on the other side, evaluations 
of voluntariness. Moreover, as in the previous study, all participants seem to have 
understood that measures of intentionality and consciousness that were formulated to be 
ambiguous reflected lower levels of intent and awareness of one’s action, compared to 
the other measures related to consciousness and intentionality.  
 However, when one examines differences between ratings related to intentionality, 
one notices even more clearly than in the previous study, that law students are more 
likely than psychology students to show an accurate representation of the different 
gradations of these criteria consistent with legal levels of intent. They correctly rated the 
different dimensions and levels of intentionality in correspondence with legal reasoning. 
The gradation of their mean ratings thus increased as a function of the level of culpability 
entailed in each of these dimensions. Moreover, they also seem to have correctly graded 
the subjective probabilities attached to each of these dimensions. This result is 
interesting, since the underlying dimensions of these three rational criteria were assessed 
in relation to a rather neutral vignette, in terms of culpability. Indeed, the vignette was 
constructed in such a manner that the agent who was depicted was not attributed any 
intent or consciousness as to her actions, the risks they entailed and their consequences. 
Law students’ responses concerned their evaluation, for each criteria, of the extent to 
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which the different dimensions measured corresponded to this given criteria. The 
different dimensions concerned the different degrees of consciousness, voluntariness and 
intentionality that could be attributed to the agent. The subject had to associate these to 
their representation of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality. Thus, with a 
neutral situation, in which no cues related to rational criteria were added, law students 
correctly graded the different levels that should be considered when determining 
responsibility with rational criteria of consciousness, intentionality and voluntariness. Let 
us add that the correct gradation made by law students was even more in line with legal 
reasoning than the one found in the first study, where the vignette concerning Anne was 
less neutral, compared to the vignette used in this study. Law students rated these 
different levels of rational criteria according to the reasonable man standard, whereby the 
higher the awareness of the probability that an act will occur, the higher intentionality 
and consciousness will be attributed.  
 As for psychology students, even though they did not demonstrate as much 
understanding of the gradations involved in the assessment of different levels of 
intentionality as law students, some findings suggest that they did perceive different 
levels of intentionality. They made a difference between the pure desire to harm and 
respectively, the intent to harm and the awareness that there is a probability for harm to 
occur. Moreover, they also distinguished between two levels of awareness of the 
probability of risks (could vs. odds are great), when rating intentionality. These findings 
can be assimilated to Karlovac & Darley’s (1988) finding that ordinary reasoning has a 
graded conception of the awareness of probability of risk which increases gradually from 
negligent, to reckless and finally, to intentional. Moreover, ordinary reasoning also seems 
to make an accurate distinction, in terms of intentionality, between harmful actions that 
are carried out because a person wanted them to harm someone, intended to harm 
someone purposely, knew that there was a high probability of harming someone and 
knew that someone could get hurt due to his actions. This indicates a good understanding 
of the difference between the desire and belief elements and the importance of foresight 
when evaluating intentionality. These findings are in line with Nadelhofer’s (2006) 
analysis of the role of foresight, desire and intentions in people’s perceptions of 
intentional action. 
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 Yet, as we will see in the next section, psychology students’ rather accurate 
perception of the gradations of intentionality did not generalize to their evaluations of the 
car-crash event.  Findings indicate, overall, that law students were more likely, than 
psychology students, to match the level of intentionality and negligence to the 
corresponding culpability level of behaviour that was manipulated in the scenario. But, 
all respondents were more likely to qualify the event as an intentional homicide in the 
recklessness condition, compared to the negligence condition. This could indicate that all 
respondents identified the recklessness condition as more likely to be attached to harsh 
sanctions and a penal outcome than the negligence condition. This interpretation is 
noteworthy, but should be taken with caution, given that mean ratings for this 
qualification were low for both conditions, indicating general low agreement with this 
qualification. Moreover, the interpretation that respondents’ did perceive that the 
negligence condition was attached to less serious legal consequences than the 
recklessness condition is also reflected in the finding that the qualification of “accident” 
was more likely to be favoured for the negligence condition. As findings concerning the 
effect of the manipulation of the level of culpability are strongly influenced by the type of 
study of respondents, results concerning the effect of condition as a function of field of 
study will now be discussed.  
 
4.3. Effect of type of study and level of culpability on moral and legal 
responsibility dimensions  
 
4.3.1. Law students’ heightened sensitiveness to rational cues and criteria 
related to legal responsibility 
 
 The hypothesis of an interaction effect between type of study and level of culpability 
condition was confirmed. Law students made a strong distinction between both 
conditions in terms of their intentionality ratings and their negligence ratings: the 
recklessness situation was rated as entailing more intentionality and less negligence, 
whereas the negligence situation was perceived as implying more negligence and less 
intentionality. A reckless behaviour was thus more likely to be evaluated by law students 
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as more intentional than a negligent act. Conversely, a negligent conduct was evaluated 
by law students as more negligent than an intentional one. Psychology students tended 
more to rate all situations as high in negligence and low in intentionality. This strongly 
suggests that law students understand better the legal subtleties involved in the 
formulation of the two conditions than the psychology students. Indeed, even if 
psychology students understand that the negligence condition involves a less serious 
offense than the recklessness condition, they are less likely to perceive that one or the 
other condition implies differences in intentionality and negligence per se. They consider 
the situation, whatever the condition, more as an act of negligence and tend to qualify it 
more as an accident. The law students, on the other hand, detect markedly this difference 
and relate it to differences in intentionality and negligence, as shown by the interaction 
effect observed. These results provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that exposure to 
legal training may render a perceiver more sensitive to cues that are related to rational 
criteria of legal responsibility.  
 This interpretation is also supported by the finding that law students agreed that a 
person, whose actions are neutral, in terms of dispositions and mental states of the agent 
(dart situation in the first part of the questionnaire), was conscious of the probability of 
the risks, acted intentionally and with voluntariness, more than psychology students,. 
This dart situation describes a person who is playing with darts in her flat, harms a 
passer-by on the pavement by missing her target and instead negligently throwing a dart 
through the window. Even though this situation can be considered as an accident in lay 
terms, a legal responsibility can be attached to it by the fact that it constitutes an act of 
negligence. Thus, psychology students answered according to their lay representation of 
this situation, perceiving this event as just being an accident and thus, rated 
consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality as being low. Law students, on the other 
hand, gave higher ratings for all three criteria, probably because they sensed that this 
situation could be characterized in legal terms as negligence. Law students were more 
susceptible to analyse the person’s actions and dispositions in terms of the harmful 
outcome of his/her actions. They may have tended, more than psychology students did, to 
think that the person described could have done otherwise. They may have responded as 
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intuitive lawyers, as suggested by Hamilton (1980), which would not be very surprising 
given their training.  
 However, one should mention that, contrary to our predictions and to the findings in 
the previous study, law students did not perceive the different dimensions and levels of 
consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality differently (in terms of their ratings of 
these measures) than the psychology students did. They also did not rate the ambiguous 
consciousness and intentionality items as less constitutive of conscious and intentional 
actions, compared to psychology students. These results, when compared to the 
differences found for the more specific measures of consciousness of the probability of 
risks, voluntariness of action and intentional action, indicate that all participants, 
whatever their legal training, have a good representation of the different facets of 
consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality. The reason why respondents rated these 
different dimensions of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality differently, 
depending on their field of study in study 1, but did not differ in their ratings of these 
different levels in this study, could be due to the vignette being more neutral in this study 
compared to the previous one. Differences between respondents due to their exposure to 
legal training were probably yielded in study 1 for these different dimensions, because 
the law students picked up more on certain details such as “throwing a flowerpot in a 
moment of rage” and rated the levels of rational criteria of responsibility accordingly, 
contrary to psychology students.  
 
 Thus, the finding in this study of differences related to the respondent’s field of study 
for specific ratings of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality, but not for the 
ratings of the different dimensions of such criteria, leads us to the following conclusion. 
This indicates that, even though all respondents perceive roughly the different forms of 
consciousness and intentionality in a similar manner, when these criteria are evaluated 
concerning a specific situation and a specific outcome, law students are more likely to 
use a legal reasoning process and use these criteria in that objective, compared to 
psychology students. Moreover, let us not forget the finding, discussed in section 4.2, that 
law students were more likely, than psychology students, to grade different nuances of 
intentionality in correspondence with legal understandings of forms of intent. These 
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various findings bring us to the conclusion that people, in ordinary reasoning perceive 
different shades of consciousness and intentionality, but may not necessarily use them to 
analyse a situation in a legal mind-set.  
 
4.3.2. Psychology students’ more ordinary and morally-oriented 
evaluations  
 
 Ordinary reasoning about responsibility may be less inclined to evaluate the car-crash 
event using a legal framework of reasoning and may be more likely to employ a more 
moral perspective, as demonstrated by psychology students’ patterns of response in this 
study. Psychology students, for the car-crash situation, reasoned differently than law 
students when having to rate the two levels of legal culpability of conscious negligence 
and recklessness. They attributed more negligence to the agent, whatever the level of 
culpability, compared to law students, whereas law students rated the recklessness 
situation as entailing more intentionality than the negligence condition. Let us also not 
forget that the legal responsibility dimension opposed negligence, on the one side, to 
consciousness and intentionality, on the other side. Respondents were, thus, more likely 
to favour one or the other pole of this dimension depending on their field of study. Law 
students were also more likely to qualify the reckless conduct of intentional homicide and 
tend more to qualify the negligent behaviour of negligent homicide. Psychology students, 
in all conditions, tend to disagree with the qualification of intentional homicide and to 
agree more with the qualification of “accident” and negligence. Thus, law students 
perceived more the subtleties that distinguished the two levels of legal culpability, in 
terms of rational criteria of intentionality, whereas psychology students were more likely 
to evaluate the situation in moral and descriptive terms such as negligence and accident.  
 Findings until now suggest overall that psychology students were more attuned to the 
moral implications of the car-crash and less receptive to the legal implications that 
accompanied the levels of culpability of negligence and recklessness. They may have 
rated the extent of negligence they attribute to the agent’s actions with the same intensity, 
whether the agent’s acts were legally constitutive of negligence or recklessness, because 
they did not take into account as much the rational criteria of intention, compared to law 
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students. Thus, in line with Malle & Nelson’s (2003) suggestions, psychology students 
were maybe less likely to make a distinction between the recklessness condition and the 
negligence condition, in terms of intention, because the formulation of intent in the 
recklessness condition did not correspond to their folk theory of intention. Indeed, 
according to Malle & Nelson (2003), in a folk conception of intention, the presence of an 
element of desire is essential and intention cannot be understood as such in ordinary 
reasoning if the agent whose actions are evaluated is not described as having wished for a 
harmful outcome to occur. This interpretation is all the more possible, since intentional 
behaviours are supposed to yield more blame and more anger (Alicke, 2000; Knobe, 
2003) and the recklessness condition did not affect blame or anger ratings, compared to 
the negligence condition.  
 
 Moreover, the prediction that psychology students would show higher moral 
responsibility ratings than law students was not confirmed. To the contrary, the law 
students showed stronger evaluations that the agent should be accountable before justice 
than psychology students did. This finding could be explained by the reasoning that law 
students were more sensitive to the liability to penal outcomes engendered by the 
situation, whether it constitutes negligence or recklessness. They may have interpreted 
accountability in a legal sense, due to the formulation of this measure: the assessment of 
accountability could be related to the legal system, as it includes the term “justice”. The 
only measure, which was given stronger ratings by psychology students compared to law 
students, concerned the public denunciation of the agent’s acts.  
 In sum, findings concerning mean ratings for moral responsibility measures only 
partly support the assumption that psychology students could evaluate the moral 
responsibility of the agent more strongly than law students. Indeed, the only measure that 
seems to be more strongly favoured by psychology students, compared to law students, 
concerns the public denunciation of the agent’s actions. However, as we will see in 
section 4.4., other findings suggest that psychology students are more likely to reason in 
moral terms about the car-crash scenario and its legal implications, whereas law students 
are more likely to reason about responsibility in a more rational and analytical manner 
consistent with the legal culpability manipulation.  
 191 
 
4.4. Correlates of the moral responsibility dimension and the influence of 
type of study and culpability condition  
 
 As for the predictions concerning the factors that would underlie moral responsibility 
ratings, most of these were supported by the findings. Blame-related measures, as 
expected and in line with the results of the previous study, were not evaluated as higher 
for the recklessness condition compared to the negligence condition. Thus, evaluations of 
blame, responsibility for a victim’s death and accountability before justice were not 
attuned to the degree of culpability of the agent. This indicates that moral responsibility 
evaluations are not affected by changes in legal levels of culpability that reflect the limit 
between negligence and recklessness. Moreover, factors related to blame, such as 
negative emotions and punitive responses to the harm done, were not given higher ratings 
when the level of culpability of the agent was described as higher (recklessness), 
compared to the negligence condition.  
 Regression analyses demonstrated, as for blameworthiness in study 1, that moral 
responsibility was related to negative emotions, to public denunciation ratings and to the 
qualification of negligent homicide. Moreover, it was also found to be associated to the 
intentional homicide qualification and the tendency to internality.  
 More detailed analyses were carried out separately for each group of respondents, 
depending on the type of study and the culpability condition, for associations between 
moral responsibility, negative emotions, public denunciation and legal qualifications 
related to negligent and intentional homicide. As we will discuss more extensively in the 
next sections, findings suggesting that these associations do not generalise to all 
respondents were highlighted. 
 
4.4.1. The relationship between moral responsibility, negative emotions, 
public denunciation and punitive responses 
 
 The association between moral responsibility ratings and negative emotions was only 
found to be significant for psychology students in the negligence condition. Law students 
and psychology students in the recklessness condition did associate high negative 
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emotional feelings to ascribing high moral responsibility. Such an association was 
already found to be more consistent for psychology students in study 1 and has been 
often found in ordinary reasoning about responsibility (Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996; 
Weiner, 1995b). 
 Psychology students, in all conditions, were more likely to agree that the agent’s acts 
should be publicly denounced, when they ascribed high moral responsibility to him, 
whereas only law students in the recklessness condition related these two evaluations. 
However, this association could be based on different premises depending on the 
respondent’s field of study. Indeed, for law students, further analyses suggest that this 
association could be more likely if they also agree that the agent should be imprisoned. 
Yet, this linkage is more likely to be independent of such a punitive response for 
psychology students in all conditions. Let us add that all respondents in the recklessness 
condition were more likely to favour the imprisonment of the agent as a manner to 
attenuate the harm done to the victim’s family, if they agreed with the public 
denunciation of the agent’s actions, whereas respondents in the negligence condition did 
not associate these two evaluations. Thus, respondents who agree that this harmful action 
should be publicly condemned may be more likely to favour a custodial sanction when 
the culpability level of the agent reflects higher legal liability, than when the actions are 
less culpable. However, this association may be more likely for psychology students if 
they also ascribe moral responsibility to the agent, whereas law students are more likely 
make this linkage independently of whether they consider the agent to be blameworthy 
for his actions. Let us add that, even though moral responsibility may influence the 
likelihood of relating agreement with the public denunciation with favouring a punitive 
penal response for psychology students, moral responsibility was not directly related to 
such a punitive response for any of the four groups of respondents. 
 
 These results provide further support to the interpretation that denouncing an act is a 
response which is related to a blame evaluation and which determines punitive responses. 
These results could be related to the findings of a previous study (Taylor & Kleinke, 
1992), which indicated the moderating role of punishment ratings on the link between 
blame and imposing a prison sentence. Public denunciation could follow blame rating 
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and determine the likelihood of favouring punitive penal outcomes. Like in the previous 
study, public denunciation could act as a condemnatory evaluation that the offender 
deserves a harsh sentence (Feather, 1996). Further support is provided for the contention 
that blame is related to a moral outrage reaction, which involves a moral condemnation 
emphasizing the deservingness of the penalty, and which can lead to punitive responses. 
The fact that this punitive moral outrage process of reasoning is more characteristic of 
psychology students replicates findings from the previous study. These results support 
also findings from previous studies concerning ordinary perceptions of punitive sanctions 
and their relationship to the ascription of blame (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Feather, 
1996; Feinberg, 1970). We can conclude that psychology students’ moral outrage 
perspective, in this study, may be more representative of ordinary reasoning about 
responsibility for actions that can lead to harsh penal outcomes, than law students’ 
response patterns.   
 
4.4.2. The relationship between moral responsibility and legal qualifications 
of intentional homicide and negligent homicide 
 
 Likewise to the previous study and, contrary to our expectations, moral responsibility 
was found to be associated to legal qualifications related to negligent homicide and 
intentional homicide. The association between moral responsibility and negligent 
homicide can be related to the relationship that was found in study 1 between this 
qualification and blameworthiness ratings. However, the association between moral 
responsibility and the intentional homicide qualification is more intriguing, since legal 
responsibility is also associated (even more strongly) to this same qualification. Since 
these qualifications are used in legal reasoning, we expected, and this assumption was 
verified, that the relationship between moral responsibility and such qualifications may 
be more likely for certain groups of respondents, compared to others, depending on the 
type of study and the culpability condition. More specifically, we expected moral 
responsibility to be more likely to be related to such qualifications for psychology 
students, compared to law students. Indeed, given their training, law students should 
intuitively be more likely to associate these qualifications to legal responsibility and less 
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likely to related them to moral responsibility. The following findings support this 
interpretation.  
 Law students never made any significant associations between respectively, negligent 
homicide and intentional homicide qualifications and, moral responsibility. Moreover, 
law students never associated low moral responsibility to being more likely to consider 
the event as an accident. On the contrary, psychology students were more likely to agree 
to qualify the event of negligent homicide, in the recklessness condition, and were also 
more likely to consider that the car-crash constituted an intentional homicide, in the 
negligence condition, if they ascribed high moral responsibility. Moreover, psychology 
students, no matter what the culpability level of the agent, were more likely to qualify the 
event as being accidental if they did not consider the agent to be morally responsible for 
his actions.  
 In sum, as we had anticipated, law students did not associate moral responsibility to 
qualifications that imply the possibility for a legal outcome and a penal response, whereas 
psychology students did relate both dimensions. Let us add that psychology students not 
only were more likely to associate moral responsibility to legal qualifications, but made 
these linkages following a reasoning process, which is not consistent with the legal 
realities of the two conditions. Indeed, they were more likely to qualify the event of 
intentional homicide, if they ascribed high moral responsibility to the agent who acted 
negligently (implying less intent and more negligence). Conversely, they were also more 
likely to favour a negligent homicide qualification, when they attributed moral 
responsibility to the agent who acted recklessly (more intent, less negligence).  
 These results indicate again that law students may be more likely to follow a strictly 
legal reasoning process when evaluating the situation and more likely to do this 
independently of moral judgments compared to psychology students. This interpretation 
is also supported by the findings discussed in the following section concerning correlates 
of legal responsibility and the role of type of study and culpability condition.  
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4.5. Correlates of the legal responsibility dimension and the influence of 
type of study and culpability condition 
 
 Contrary to our predictions, measures related to the legal responsibility dimension 
that were relevant to the manipulation of levels of culpability, such as intentionality and 
negligence, were not affected by the culpability condition for all respondents. This effect 
concerned more law students than psychology students. However, the legal qualification 
of intentional homicide was more favoured in the recklessness condition, compared to the 
negligence condition by all respondents (but this qualification produced low agreement 
ratings whether in one or another culpability condition). The qualification of “accident” 
reached more agreement in the negligence condition than in the recklessness condition 
for all respondents, whatever their type of study.  
 Thus, all respondents’ ratings related to the intentional homicide qualification were 
maybe in some way sensitive to the degree of foresight attributed to the agent concerning 
the possibility of a harmful outcome to his actions. As found in previous analyses 
(Nadelhoffer, 2006), the likelihood of evaluating the actions that lead to the harmful 
outcome as intentional was strongly determined by the level of the agent’s awareness 
concerning the probability that this outcome would occur. However, this does not 
contradict the observation that only respondents who were law students rated the 
intentionality measure higher in the recklessness condition than in the negligence 
condition. Indeed, identifying the fact that the agent was more aware of the probability of 
the outcome in the recklessness condition and relating it to a harsher legal qualification, 
may not be the same thing as attributing an intention to the agent, since the element of 
desire is lacking, in line with Malle & Nelson’s observations (2003). In this line of 
reasoning, anticipating that one’s actions can lead to a given consequence and not taking 
any preventive measure to avoid this outcome cannot be equated to intention as it is 
understood in ordinary reasoning. Thus, psychology students may have not attributed 
more intentionality to the agent’s actions in the recklessness condition compared to the 
negligence condition, because they did not identify any element indicating that the agent 
desired to harm the victim in the higher culpability condition. To reiterate the argument 
put forward in section 4.3.2., the criteria used to describe a situation of reckless conduct, 
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and thus to reflect an element of intent in the legal understanding of it, may not 
correspond to psychology students’ folk theory of intention.  
 Further findings demonstrate quite clearly that law students were more likely than 
psychology students to relate rational criteria and legal reasoning processes to their 
understanding of the legal responsibility involved in each culpability condition.  
 
 Regression analyses suggest that evaluations concerning the legal responsibility 
dimension are strongly related to the type of study of respondents, as well as to the legal 
qualification of intentional homicide. Legal responsibility dimension was, as anticipated, 
not related to emotional and punitive responses factors.  
 Moreover, further analyses show that that the association between intentional 
homicide and legal responsibility may be more consistent for law students across both 
conditions, than for psychology students (only exists for the negligence condition). As a 
matter of fact, when controlling for agreement with the imprisonment of the agent, this 
association diminishes for psychology students in the negligence condition, but remains 
strong for law students in both conditions. Thus, psychology students may be more likely 
to want to qualify the event of intentional homicide when they rate highly his legal 
responsibility, because they are also thinking that the agent should be sentenced to a 
custodial term. Law students may just associate these two measures, because they are 
consistent with legal reasoning: the higher the legal responsibility, the higher the 
likelihood that the actions will be qualified as an intentional homicide. This interpretation 
could be particularly relevant for law students in the recklessness condition. Indeed, the 
association between the intentional homicide qualification and legal responsibility 
diminishes significantly for law students in the negligence condition, when controlling 
for controllability, whereas this association remains strong for law students in the 
recklessness condition and psychology students in the negligence condition.  
 The fact that respondents in the negligence condition are more likely to qualify this 
event of intentional homicide when legal responsibility is considered to be high, whether 
they are law or psychology students is intriguing, since it is not consistent with legal 
reasoning for a negligent conduct. Further findings show that, for psychology students, 
this linkage could depend on their tendency to ascribe high moral responsibility to the 
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agent. Accepting imprisonment as a punitive response could also be an important factor 
for such an association to be made by psychology students in the negligence condition, as 
discussed previously. As for law students, as we shall see, controllability and 
intentionality ratings are important elements to consider for this linkage to be more likely. 
 Some results also indicate that even though law students are more likely to qualify the 
event of intentional homicide when they attribute high legal responsibility for both 
culpability levels, they differentiate between recklessness and negligence in terms of the 
factors they may consider to make such an association. For law students in the 
recklessness condition, high legal responsibility ascriptions seem to consistently make 
agreement with the intentional homicide qualification more likely. This association is not 
dependent on whether they consider the agent’s actions to have been under his control or 
on their perception of the extent to which a seemingly negligent conduct (dart situation in 
the first part of the questionnaire) can be intentional. However, law students in the 
negligence condition were more likely to make such an association 1) if they considered 
that the agent’s actions were under his control and; 2) if they believed that a negligent 
conduct, such as throwing a dart involuntarily through the window and harming a passer-
by in the process, could be characterized as intentional. Thus, law students follow a more 
rational and analytical pattern of reasoning when associating legal responsibility to the 
intentional homicide qualification. They are only more likely to make such an association 
in the negligence condition, if they consider that an agent who harms another person even 
though he took precautions to avoid the possibility of harmful consequences from 
happening, could have taken more precautions, could have acted differently and acted 
intentionally. Conversely, psychology students are less likely to make such an association 
if they do not consider the agent morally responsible or if they do not favour a punitive 
penal response to deal with this event.  
 In the same vein, let us also mention another finding which adds further support to the 
contention that law students are more likely to relate legal responsibility to relevant 
rational criteria used in legal reasoning for such evaluations, compared to psychology 
students. Correlational analyses indeed demonstrated that law students in the recklessness 
condition were the only respondents to relate the specific measures of rational criteria of 
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consciousness and intentionality (rated for the dart situation in the first part of the 
questionnaire) to the legal responsibility dimension.  
 Overall, these results reveal even more clearly that law students and psychology 
students follow very different logics of reasoning when evaluating legal responsibility. 
Law students are more likely to follow a rational-oriented pattern of reasoning, whereas 
psychology students are more likely to reason about legal responsibility in a more moral 
and punitive-oriented fashion.  
 
4.6. The relationship between moral responsibility and legal responsibility 
and the role of controllability 
 
 Given findings discussed until now, we suspected that moral and legal responsibility 
dimensions may be related in some way in respondents’ minds and that this linkage may 
be more likely for psychology students than for law students. However, an examination 
of this association across all groups of respondents does not support this hypothesis. 
Moral and legal responsibility dimensions were associated by all respondents in the 
negligence condition, but not in the recklessness condition. Thus, this association may 
depend more on the level of culpability of the agent’s actions, than on the legal training 
of respondents. Let us add that the fact that respondents in the negligence condition are 
more likely to rate high legal responsibility when they rate high moral responsibility 
could be strongly dependent on the extent to which they rate the controllability of the 
agent’s acts. Findings point towards the influence of controllability on the association 
between moral and legal responsibility dimensions for the negligence condition. This 
result is not surprising, since controllability could be a particularly relevant dimension 
when evaluating an act of negligence. However, the influence of controllability on this 
association could be stronger for law students than for psychology students. Indeed, even 
though this association is no more significant for all respondents when partialling out the 
effect of controllability, r values are more strongly reduced for law students, than for 
psychology students (compared to corresponding r values without controlling for 
controllability).  
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 Another point to mention is that controllability was more likely to be consistently 
associated to moral responsibility by psychology students in both conditions, whereas this 
relationship was only observed for law students when they were in the negligence 
condition. This could be mean that law students only associate controllability to moral 
responsibility when evaluating an event which corresponds to a negligent conduct in 
which no indication of intentionality and voluntariness is made salient and for which 
legal outcomes will be less harsh than for the other condition. Psychology students may 
associate moral responsibility to controllability whatever the level of culpability, because 
they do not take into account as much the differences between both culpability 
conditions, in terms of intentionality and voluntariness.  
 These latter findings can also be related to the observation of significant associations 
between controllability and legal responsibility for all respondents, except law students in 
the recklessness condition. Furthermore, when examining the effect of moral 
responsibility on these associations, results mirror the findings for the association 
between moral and legal responsibility and the effect of controllability:  this association 
disappears for all respondents in the negligence condition when partialling out for the 
effect of moral responsibility. Conversely, when controlling for the effect of moral 
responsibility, psychology students in the recklessness condition are even more likely to 
associate legal responsibility to controllability. 
 Finally, let us add that the linkage between moral responsibility and controllability 
that was observed for all psychology students and law students in the negligence 
condition does not depend on legal responsibility. Partialling out the effect of legal 
responsibility does not affect the fact that these respondents are more likely to consider 
that the agent’s actions were under his control when they ascribe high moral 
responsibility. 
 
 These findings bring us overall to the following conclusions. Moral responsibility and 
controllability are more likely to be related to legal responsibility when respondents are 
in the negligence condition. Controllability and legal responsibility are more likely to be 
related to each other through the influence of moral responsibility in the negligence 
condition. Controllability and legal responsibility could however be related to each other 
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independently of moral responsibility ratings for psychology students in the recklessness 
condition. Finally, controllability and moral responsibility are related to each other for all 
respondents, except law students in the recklessness condition and this association is 
independent of legal responsibility ratings. This could be even more the case for 
psychology students in the recklessness condition.  
 
 In sum, various findings point towards the conclusion that moral responsibility 
attributions are, in line with Alicke’s (2000) model of culpable control, significantly 
determined by the extent of control over the actions that are attributed to the agent.  
Moreover, this association may be more likely for ordinary reasoning concerning 
responsibility (psychology students evaluations being considered to be more 
representative of such reasoning), compared to law students response patterns.  
 What’s more, the relationship that was found between moral responsibility and legal 
responsibility ratings was highly dependent on controllability and was more likely for the 
negligent conduct than for the reckless conduct. Thus, a moral ascription of blame could 
be more likely to be accompanied by a legal evaluation of responsibility, if one considers 
that the negligent agent could have exercised more control over his actions. This 
interpretation makes sense, for that matter, since a negligent conduct is more likely to not 
only be considered blameworthy but also lead to penal outcomes, if it considered that 
such actions could have been prevented by taking reasonable precautions or acting 
otherwise.  
 In addition, results also suggest that the relationship between moral responsibility and 
controllability is more likely to be independent of the legal responsibility dimension, 
whereas the association between legal responsibility and controllability is more likely to 
be affected by moral responsibility evaluations, especially for negligent conducts. As 
these observations were more consistently found for psychology students and since these 
respondents are deemed to be more representative of ordinary reasoning, we contend that 
this pattern of responses concerns more ordinary reasoning than legal reasoning.  
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4.7. General conclusions  
 
 Many of the results in this study indicate that respondents hold moral and legal 
dimensions in their representations of responsibility. Several findings suggest that law 
and psychology students reason about responsibility in moral and legal terms. However, 
law students, because of their greater exposure to legal reasoning, may also rely more on 
the legal dimension of responsibility, when they are confronted with legal cues that are 
salient in the scenario, compared to psychology students. Moreover, several findings, at 
the correlational level of analysis, lead us thus to suggest that moral responsibility and 
legal responsibility are not only overlapping dimensions that exist in our representations, 
but may also be each underlain by different reasoning processes. Yet, correlational 
analyses also suggest that moral and legal dimensions of responsibility may be also 
related to each other in some way. This could be especially the case for ordinary 
reasoning about negligent conduct.  
 
 Let us conclude with the general observation that the manipulation of two degrees of 
culpability, like negligence and recklessness, produced more salient and distinct 
representations of legal and moral responsibility, as well as controllability, compared to 
the previous study’s findings.  
 Moral responsibility ratings were clearly distinguished from legal responsibility 
criteria in participants’ general conceptualizations of responsibility-related measures. 
Moreover, a controllability dimension was also highlighted and was found to be a central 
element to consider when attributing moral responsibility. Moreover, controllability was 
also found to be an important dimension for moral responsibility to be associated to legal 
responsibility in respondents’ evaluations of the negligence condition.  
 The manipulation of legal levels of culpability showed marked differences, compared 
to the manipulation of levels of negligence in study 1. All participants seem to have 
perceived that the negligence situation was less serious in terms of legal responsibility 
than the recklessness situation. Indeed, the accident qualification was more favoured in 
the negligence condition than in the recklessness one, whereas the intentional homicide 
qualification reached higher agreement levels in the recklessness condition, compared to 
 202 
 
the negligence one. This manipulation also yielded more clear differences, in terms of the 
effect of field of study on rational criteria and legal-related measures. Evidence for this is 
supported, for example, by the existence of interaction effects for measures directly 
related to the manipulation, such as negligence, intentionality and intentional homicide 
qualifications.  
 However, findings that law students and psychology students did not rate most moral 
responsibility measures differently indicates that moral and legal dimensions coexist in 
people’s representations and can be referred to when attributing responsibility, 
independently of whether the perceiver is more sensitive to legal or moral criteria. The 
fact that law students were more likely to perceive the legal cues that were rendered 
salient in the manipulation of legal culpability and differed in terms of their legal 
responsibility ratings, compared to psychology students may be due to their heightened 
sensitivity to rational criteria used in legal reasoning. What may thus influence a 
perceiver’s responses to these moral and legal dimensions is the salience and the nature 
of the cues that are included in the situation they have to judge. Depending on their 
training, they may be more sensitive, in terms of their legal responsibility ratings, to a 
rational cue (here “the agent knows that the chances of a harmful outcome are high, but 
wants to reach his goal at all costs”) that is rendered salient in a scenario and that is 
related to a legal definition of recklessness. If this assumption is exact, when cues related 
to extra-legal criteria are explicitly included in the scenario and are presented in more or 
less normative conditions, this manipulation should affect moral responsibility ratings, 
but not legal responsibility ratings.  
 The next study, therefore, will test the influence of normative criteria on respondents’ 
representations of moral and legal responsibility. Consideration for such an influence is 
even more justified, given the important role afforded by previous research (Alicke, 
2000; Hamilton & Sanders, 1981; Schlenker et al., 1994) to norms and values in 
influencing blame attributions. The inclusion of normative criteria will also help us gain a 
better understanding of the role of moral responsibility ratings with regard to legal 
responsibility ratings. More precisely, we will examine whether moral responsibility 
ratings are still associated to legal responsibility ratings when the cues of the scenario 
which are salient concern normative criteria and no more rational criteria pertaining to 
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legal reasoning. The influence of punitive aims will, like for study 1, be considered in the 
next study. Indeed, findings in study 1 suggest that just deserts (retributive) punitive aims 
are more related to the moral dimension of responsibility. An in-depth examination of the 
relationship between such punitive aims and moral and legal responsibility dimensions, 
when normative criteria are rendered salient, is therefore necessary.  
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IV. Study 3. Moral and legal dimensions of responsibility 
and social norms: the effect of the manipulation of the 
reasons for committing an offense and age of the 
offender 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 Findings until now have supported the idea of the existence of moral and legal 
dimensions to responsibility. Evidence supporting the assumption that such dimensions 
overlap and are interrelated in people’s representations of responsibility was also 
highlighted in studies 1 and 2. Moreover, the two previous studies demonstrated that 
moral and legal responsibility dimensions are determined by different underlying factors. 
Blame was more related to negative emotions, just-desert punitive aims, punitive 
responses, public denunciation or controllability. Legal responsibility was more likely to 
be related to rational criteria such as consciousness of the probability of risks, as well as 
the law student status.  
 Research (Alicke, 2000; Brauer & Chaurand, 2010; Schlenker et al., 1994) shows 
that, in addition to emotions and punitive attitudes, perceiver’s norms and values can 
affect the way in which people attribute blame to other’s actions. Normative expectations 
concerning what constitutes socially desirable behaviour have been related to 
responsibility attributions for behaviours that can lead to harmful outcomes for others 
(Alicke, 1992; Devos-Comby & Devos, 2001). If one takes this reasoning one step 
further, it may very well be possible that extra-legal factors, such age and justifications 
for behaving irresponsibly, will have an influence on responsibility attributions. The 
evaluation of this assumption will be the object of this study. The role of extra-legal 
factors in legal reasoning, as well as research findings on the influence of extra-legal 
factors on responsibility attributions will be briefly discussed, as they are important for 
understanding the assumptions guiding this study.  
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1.1. The role of extra-legal factors related to social norms in criminal law 
settings 
 
 In criminal law, many extra-legal factors that are related to social norms or social 
roles can be considered when determining the sentence to be imposed to a person found 
guilty of an offense. Some factors can be considered mitigating and will thus yield a 
lighter sentence, whereas other elements can aggravate the offender’s fault and increase 
the sentence. Mitigating factors can include, among other elements, the absence of a 
police record or the mild seriousness of the offender’s previous crimes, the age of the 
offender, the perpetrator’s alcohol intoxication during the commission of the incriminated 
act, the participation or consent of the victim, moral justifications and the fact of having 
acted under duress or threat (McPherson, 1995). The sentence is consequently the product 
of a complex assessment from the part of the judge of the offender’s personal 
characteristics, his situation and his behaviour.  
 But ordinary reasoning concerning such factors does not always point in the direction 
of mitigation. For example, being under the influence of alcohol, at the moment of the 
commission of a criminal act, is not considered as a diminishing factor, but an 
aggravating one (Leigh & Aramburu, 1994). Moreover, some factors, which are not 
supposed to be taken into account by judges in their decision-making process, are taken 
into account by ordinary persons in their judgments (Barnett et al., 2004). Characteristics 
of the agent such as physical attraction (Wuensch, Castellow & Moore, 1991), ethnic 
origin (Perez, Harmon, Hosch, Ponder & Chanez Trejo, 1993) or religious beliefs 
(Wainryb, 1991) can influence people’s responsibility judgments. Victim characteristics 
such as their “likeability” (drug dealer vs. voluntary worker) or their degree of co-
responsibility for the harm suffered can also affect the degree of responsibility and blame 
attributed to the offender (Haynes & Olson, 2006).   
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1.2. The role of social norms and their effect on ordinary reasoning of 
responsibility 
 
 Several explanations have been offered for this tendency for ordinary reasoning to 
take into account extra-legal factors that are, for some, the product of stereotypic 
representations of the offense that is being judged. Smith (1991) suggested, for example, 
that jurors use crime prototypes, that is, typical exemplars of crime categories that they 
hold in their memory and that are often not legally relevant, to perceive facts and guide 
their verdict decision. Moreover, Fincham & Jaspars (1983) contend that people may 
attribute more responsibility to an actor who is described as behaving in an uncommon 
manner, which does not fit any mental representation of crime that is familiar to them. In 
the same vein, Brauer & Chaudrand (2010), using Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren’s (1990) 
assumption of injunctive norms, demonstrated that social control responses (disapproval 
of a given conduct) were predicted by the perceiver’s conceptions about “what people 
ought to do”, that is, the social norms related to desirable conduct. Thus, people hold 
certain schemas of events in their mental representations that influence their normative 
expectations about a given conduct. Such social norms have been defined as “a set of 
behaviours perceived by a collective entity as desirable” and can be related to the notion 
of injunctive norms highlighted by Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, (1990).  
 
 Such social norms have been shown to influence blame ratings in various studies. 
These studies focused on the role of normative expectations about a victim’s or 
perpetrator’s personality (Alicke, 1994; Alicke & Davies, 1989), social attractiveness 
(Alicke, 1994; Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; Landy & Aronson, 1969; Myers, 1980), 
social desirable behaviours or motives for behaviour (Alicke, 1992; Devos-Comby & 
Devos, 2001; Heitzmann, 2007) or status (Shaw & Skolnick, 1996). Moreover, Darley et 
al.’s (2000) findings suggest that people, who have to judge an immoral and anti-
normative behaviour (murder) may respond with less moral outrage and lower sentences 
when this behaviour was caused by a brain tumour, than when it was due to jealous rage. 
Thus, people who are faced to a harmful outcome they have to judge the responsibility 
for, in a need to find someone accountable, may be more susceptible to identify cues that 
may help him/her blame the person for the negative outcome. As suggested by Alicke 
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(2000), they search for counter-normative behaviours that may support their ascription of 
responsibility to a given person. This need to favour blame can also lead the perceiver to 
disregard mitigating circumstances that could weaken the human agency attribution 
(Gilbert & Malone, 1995).  
 
1.3. The role of extra-legal factors related to social norms with regard to 
responsibility attributions in this present study  
 
 The extra-legal factors that were examined in the present study, in terms of their 
effect on responsibility attributions, were related to age and justifications for behaving 
irresponsibly.  
 Age was chosen, since it is a relatively important element to be considered when 
determining legal responsibility (McPherson, 1995).  
 As for justification for behaving irresponsibly, the rationale behind its inclusion as a 
factor in this study is linked to previous research (Comby, Devos & Deschamps, 1995; 
Devos-Comby & Devos, 2000) findings concerning the evaluative traits that are related 
to the sense of responsibility. This research suggests that traits such as “unreasonable”, 
“immature” and “irresponsible” are rated more negatively and may be less socially 
desirable. Thus, we decided to oppose justifications for behaving irresponsibly that would 
be considered to be more reasonable and more mature (working all night) to justifications 
that reflect less reason and maturity (partying all night). 
 Moreover, the agent’s behaviour that is judged concerns his creating a fatal collision 
due to fatigue. This particular cause for the collision was chosen, since driving when 
feeling tired can be considered as an offense, if the driver is aware of his fatigue, does not 
refrain from driving, and runs the risk of creating an accident (Jeanneret, 2007). This 
reasoning is guided by the argument that driving in a state of incapacity due to other 
reasons than alcohol consumption is also an offense (art. 91, al. 2 LCR). Among the 
various causes of incapacity, fatigue and overwork are considered important elements in 
the Road traffic act, since a tired driver can be as dangerous on the road as a drunken 
driver would be (Jeanneret, 2007, art. 91 LCR, n.34 and 36). Case law states, in addition, 
“a driver is considered to be in a state of incapacity from the moment he realizes that his 
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level of attention and concentration may impair his ability to drive safely in all 
circumstances”114. Thus, a healthy person, who disregards signs of drowsiness while 
driving with the hope of remaining awake until her destination, demonstrates obvious 
gross negligence (Mizel, 2004). 
 
 The situation evaluated by respondents in studies 1 and 2 was adapted from a real 
event in order to correspond to the legal requirements of unconscious negligence, 
conscious negligence or recklessness. This situation was constructed in such a way to 
avoid as much as possible the influence of unwanted biases. Thus, the context of the fatal 
road traffic accident was described in a very matter-of-fact language. The scenario were 
checked for the absence of qualitative terms that could bring a negative or positive 
valence to the elements described, of value-laden adjectives, and of contextual elements 
that could be related to certain normative expectations.   
 However, this present study involved scenarios that were developed and manipulated 
according to participants’ normative expectations concerning justifications for behaving 
irresponsibly and the age of the agent. More specifically, the reason for which the 
protagonist committed an offense was linked either to a duty or to pleasure. When the 
agent’s actions were the result of a duty-related activity, background information about 
the agent was formulated in such a way to portray the agent as mature and reasonable. 
Conversely, the agent’s background information gave more an impression of immaturity 
and wildness, when his actions were the result of a pleasurable activity. Moreover, the 
agent was, either described as a young man (18 years old), or as an older man (40 years 
old).  
 This study aimed, accordingly, to demonstrate that normative expectations related to 
a responsible and mature way of acting (acting out of a duty) vs. a less mature and 
responsible behaviour (acting out of pleasure) would influence moral responsibility. It 
also aimed, however, to show that a criterion, such as age, since it is an important 
element to consider in legal reasoning of responsibility, should not affect moral 
responsibility ratings, but may influence legal dimensions. The assumptions guiding this 
study will now be elaborated.  
                                                 
114
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1.4. Hypotheses 
 
 The main assumption of the existence of overlapping and interrelated moral and legal 
dimensions in responsibility attributions is contended in this study, in line with findings 
in the two previous studies. The salience of normative factors in the scenario that was 
evaluated is also expected to yield representations of responsibility including moral and 
legal facets. Three main sets of predictions are made from this general assumption.  
 
Effect of normative factors related to age and justifications for irresponsible 
conduct on moral and legal responsibility dimensions 
 
 The manipulation of normative factors of age and justifications for irresponsible 
behaviour aimed at rendering normative expectations salient in relation to such factors. 
Accordingly, this manipulation is anticipated to affect differently the moral and legal 
responsibility attributions, depending on whether the age or the justification for 
irresponsible conduct is manipulated. 
 
  Since the moral responsibility dimension has been related to normative expectations 
concerning socially desirable behaviours by previous research, we expect the 
justifications for irresponsible behaviour to affect blame-related ratings. These blame 
ratings should be lower when irresponsible behaviours are justified by duty-related and 
reasonable motives, than when irresponsible behaviours are justified by pleasure-related 
and immature motives. Thus, the agent who acts irresponsibly due to hedonistic reasons 
will be evaluated as more blameworthy, as more responsible for the victim’s death and as 
more accountable before justice, compared to an agent whose irresponsible conduct is 
related to his performing a duty. Factors that were related to the moral responsibility 
dimension in the previous studies, such as negative emotions and retributive punitive 
attitudes and responses (just desert aims, favouring the imprisonment of the offender, the 
level of sentence to be imposed) should also be rated higher when judging an 
irresponsible behaviour motivated by pleasure, than when judging an irresponsible 
behaviour motivated by duty. Moreover, justification for having taken the risks that lead 
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to this harmful outcome should be affected by this manipulation, in that we expect a duty-
related harmful behaviour to be more justified in the participants’ eyes than a pleasure-
related harmful behaviour.  
 In opposition, the manipulation of justifications for irresponsible behaviour should 
not affect legal responsibility criteria such as consciousness, voluntariness and 
intentionality. It should not lead to different levels of agreement with the qualifications of 
negligent or intentional homicide either.  
 Furthermore, since moral responsibility was strongly related to controllability in the 
previous study, we expect the justification condition to have an influence on 
controllability-related assessments pertaining to negligence, carelessness, possibilities to 
act otherwise and the level of precaution taken. Participants should agree more that the 
agent could have done otherwise, was careless, did not take all the necessary precautions 
to avoid the event and acted out of negligence in the pleasure-related justification 
condition, compared to the duty-related justification condition.  
 Finally, this manipulation concerns justifications for irresponsible behaviour that are 
assumed in this study to affect blame-ratings, in that the duty condition is supposed to 
yield lower ratings than the pleasure condition. The duty condition is assumed, thus, to 
act as a mitigating factor, compared to the pleasure condition. Consequently, the two 
measures related, for one, to diminishing the responsibility of the agent by considering 
that he did not intend to harm or kill the victim and related, for the other, to mitigating 
circumstances, should also be affected by this manipulation. Responsibility should be 
considered as more diminished, and mitigating circumstances should be more favoured in 
the duty condition, compared to the pleasure condition.  
 
 As for the age factor, given its importance in determining responsibility in legal 
settings, normative expectations attached to this element should be more likely to affect 
rational criteria for responsibility. The age factor is not expected to affect moral 
responsibility ratings. An agent who is described as young (20 years old) may be 
attributed less consciousness and less voluntariness than an older agent (40 years old). 
This prediction is based on the belief, which is sometimes emphasized in legal settings, 
that a greater experience of life renders a person more conscious of the risks involved in 
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certain actions and more responsible of taking freely such a decision. Participants may 
also follow this reasoning. If this prediction is verified, respondents may also be more 
likely to favour the qualification of intentional homicide when the agent is described as 
older than when he is younger.  
 
Factors underlying moral and legal responsibility  
 
 As for the factors we expect will be related to the moral and legal dimensions, the 
following predictions are made.  
 The moral dimension of responsibility is expected to be associated to factors that 
have previously been related to it, such as negative emotions and retributive punitive 
aims and responses. We also introduced measures related to justifications and 
counterfactual thinking (the agent should not have taken the risks he did and should have 
instead acted otherwise), as these dimensions have been associated by previous research 
to blame (Drozda-Senkowska & Orsero, 1993; Shaver, 1996; Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996; 
Wells & Gavanski, 1989). Hence, we expect justifications and counterfactual thinking to 
predict moral responsibility ratings, but to have no effect on legal responsibility ratings.  
 We expect the legal responsibility dimension to be more related to the legal 
qualification of intentional homicide, whereas the moral dimension of responsibility 
should not be related to such a qualification. Moreover, legal responsibility should not be 
associated to negative emotions and retributive punitive aims or responses, in conformity 
with the previous findings of this research. An absence of relationship between 
justifications and counterfactual thinking and the legal responsibility dimension is also 
anticipated, as mentioned above.  
 
Effect of field of study and the manipulation of normative factors 
 
 First of all, since normative factors are assumed to have the same effect on law 
students and psychology students’ responses at the level of mean ratings, we do not 
expect either the age or the justification condition to show an interaction effect with type 
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of study for any of the measures. Thus, any difference between law and psychology 
participants, in terms of mean ratings, should be explained solely by the type of study. 
 Moreover, participants’ responses are not expected here to differ as a function of their 
field of study in their ratings of legal responsibility. Indeed, the cues that are rendered 
salient in the scenarios do not pertain to rational criteria used in law to ascribe liability, 
but are related to social norms. They should not be differently perceived by respondents 
depending on their field of study. Law students are expected to judge these normative 
factors, in terms of rational criteria, with the same intensity as psychology students. They 
should rate consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality in a similar manner as 
psychology students, whatever the condition of age and justification.  
 However, in line with findings in the previous studies, law students could be more 
attuned to the legal realities of the situation they are evaluating compared to psychology 
student. We, thus, expect them to be more likely to agree that this situation, whatever the 
age and justification condition, amounts to negligent homicide, compared to psychology 
students. The agent they have to judge in the scenario is described as causing a fatal 
collision due to his fatigue and this latter element is susceptible to be considered in Swiss 
law, as increasing the liability of a person, depending on the circumstances. Since the 
agent is also described as being aware of his drowsiness and driving in spite of it, this 
situation could amount to negligent homicide. It is therefore possible that law students 
will be more sensitive to this possibility and be more likely to use such a legal 
qualification than psychology students are. In the same vein, law students may also be 
more susceptible to agree that the agent acted out of negligence, compared to psychology 
students. Finally, at the level of correlates of legal responsibility, law students may be 
more likely to associate legal responsibility to legal qualifications in coherence with the 
legal realities of the situation they are evaluating than psychology students. In this same 
line of reasoning, we expect law students to be less likely to associate moral 
responsibility to legal qualifications than psychology students, because such associations 
would not be consistent with legal reasoning.  
 Moreover, ratings concerning moral responsibility measures should not be influenced 
by the type of study either, since law and psychology students are both expected to show 
similar ratings on these measures, whatever the condition they evaluated. The same 
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assumptions are made for all other factors that are related to moral responsibility ratings. 
At the correlational level, as we expect moral responsibility to be more related to 
negative emotions and punitive response, we also expect, in line with previous findings, 
that these associations will be more likely for psychology students, compared to law 
students. Moreover, in consistence with previous findings in study 2, psychology students 
could be also more likely to associate moral responsibility to legal qualifications, 
compared to law students.   
 Finally, as we introduced new measures in this study, which pertain to the 
respondents’ perception of the criminal justice system, its processes, its actor’s decision-
making, as well as of causes of crimes, we expect to observe differences in these ratings 
due to the field of study. More specifically, we expect that, whatever the normative factor 
condition and given the nature of law students’ training, law students’ perceptions should 
reflect more satisfaction and agreement with the criminal justice system and its processes, 
compared to psychology students. Law students are also anticipated to agree more that an 
offender’s personal characteristics and situation should affect legal actors’ decision-
making, compared to psychology students (who may favour more situational factors). 
Law students are expected to be less in favour of causes of crime that are related to 
societal deficiencies, compared to psychology students. This assumption is based on the 
reasoning that psychology students, due to their training, may be more attuned to the 
effects of society on people’s behaviours.    
 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants  
 
 232 participants were included in this study, out of which 108 1st year psychology 
students (Median age = 21 years old; 85 female and 23 male) and 124 2nd year law 
students (Median age = 22 years old; 78 female and 45 male, one participant studying law 
did not indicate his gender) were recruited during their ex-cathedra classes. All were 
students at the University of Lausanne. They were randomly assigned to one of the eight 
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conditions manipulated in this study, as shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below (one for each 
type of student group). The same instructions as in the previous study were given to the 
participants prior to this experiment.  
 
Table 3.1.: Frequencies for psychology students by justification condition and by age condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2.: Frequencies for law students by justification condition and by age condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Procedure   
 
Questionnaire part 1: internality vs. externality tendency measure   
 
The first part of the questionnaire used in this study included solely the internality and 
externality scale that was also submitted to respondents in study 2 (see Appendix 2a).   
 
 
 
Justification condition 
x 
Age condition 
for psychology 
students 
Justification condition 
Total 
Work 
 
Partying 
 
Age 
condition 
20 29 27 56 
40 25 27 52 
Total 54 54 108 
Justification condition 
x 
Age condition 
for law students 
Justification condition 
Total 
Work 
 
Partying 
 
Age 
condition 
20 29 33 62 
40 32 30 62 
Total 61 63 124 
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Questionnaire part 2: manipulation of normative factors of age and justifications 
for behaving irresponsibly 
 
 The second part comprised a scenario where the age of the protagonist of the fatal 
road traffic offense (Younger vs. Older) and the reason for which he had committed this 
offense (Work-related fatigue vs. Party-related fatigue) were manipulated (see Appendix 
3a).  
 
It describes a man  
 
 Who is a) 20 (Younger) or b) 40 years old (Older) 
 
 Who has spent the whole night   
 
a) Working because he has to finance his studies (20 year old) or because he earns 
more money by working at night and has to take care of his children during the 
day (Duty-related justification) or  
 
 b) Partying in a discotheque with friends (Younger) or with colleagues (Older)  
 (Pleasure-related justification) 
 
 He is tired because  
 
 a) night-work is tiring and he never gets enough rest during the day to 
 compensate for his fatigue because he has his university classes (Older) or 
 because he has to take care of his children (Younger) (Duty-related 
 justification) 
 
 Or 
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 b) he is going out often late at night these days and never gets enough rest during 
 the day to compensate for this fatigue because of his university classes 
 (Younger) or because he has to work during the day (Older)  (Pleasure-related 
 justification) 
 
 Despite his fatigue, he must still drive 20 min to get back home and sleep. Out of 
fatigue, he loses control of his car in a road bend and crashes into a car coming 
from the opposite direction. The driver of the car he crashed into dies and the 
protagonist is hurt. (Same for all conditions) 
 
 This study had a mixed-design in which half of the participants of each field of study 
had to evaluate the scenario in a Younger*Duty-related justification condition (YD), in a 
Younger*Pleasure-related justification condition (YP), in an Older*Duty-related 
justification condition (OD) or in an Older*Pleasure-related justification condition (OP). 
Participants in all conditions had to rate the scenario on the same scales as the one used in 
the second part of the questionnaire used in the previous study (except for the measures 
of the responsibility of other protagonists which were not included in this study), as well 
as the following additional measures (see Appendix 3b).  
 
1) A measure evaluating the sentence that would be the most just to punish the 
protagonist (no sentence at all, no prison sentence, a suspended prison sentence, 1 to 6 
months prison time, 6 months to 3 years prison time, more than 3 years prison time). This 
measure was coded from 0 (no sentence at all) to 5 (more than 3 years prison time). 
 
2) A measure evaluating to what extent one agrees with the proposition that the fact that 
the offender wanted to go home as soon as possible to go to sleep justifies the fact that he 
took the decision to drive when feeling drowsy”. This measure, which is constituted of a 
5-point Likert scale going from 1 to 5, will be referred to hereafter as the “justification 
measure”.   
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3) A measure evaluating to what extent one agrees that the protagonist should have 
accepted the fact that he was tired and taken a little nap before driving, instead of taking 
the risk of creating an accident by driving when feeling drowsy. This measure, which is 
constituted of a 5-point Likert scale going from 1 to 5, will be referred to hereafter as the 
“counterfactual reasoning measure”.   
 
Questionnaire part 3: attitudes concerning punitive aims, the criminal justice 
system and its processes and causes of crime (see Appendix 3c) 
 
 The third part of the questionnaire entailed general scales that allow us to understand 
better the role of justice-perception variables in anchoring participants’ different 
representations of responsibility. The development of all these scales was largely inspired 
and taken from scales developed originally and used by Languin, Kellerhals & Robert 
(2006) and (Parmentier, et al., 2004). Except for the scale concerning punitive aims, all 
other measures included in this part were new and pertained to the respondents’ 
perceptions of the criminal justice system, its decision-making processes and the various 
causes of crime. These measures were added given the importance of examining people’s 
attitudes towards the criminal justice system and its practices when studying attitudes 
about the law and legal socialization (Martin & Cohn, 2004). 
 
These measures are the following: 
  
1) A scale on attitudes towards different punitive aims used also in study 1. However, the 
format of the scale was slightly different from the one used in study 1 (see Appendix 3c, 
III). Instead of a 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree) Likert scale format, we used a -1 
to +3 formats, in order to encourage participants to rate the extreme positions only if they 
really agreed with them. Thus, respondents were instructed to use the -1 rating, if they 
totally rejected this proposition, to use the 0 rating, if they were indifferent to this 
proposition, to use the 1 rating, if they agreed with it, to use the 2 rating, if they totally 
agreed with this proposition, and to use the 3 rating if they agreed unconditionally and 
with any reservations to this proposition.  
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 This scale was used in terms of participants’ responses to individual items, but also in 
terms of respondents’ mean ratings yielded by the computation of items into three mean 
ratings. This computation was the result of the following procedure. All measures related 
to punitive aims were added in a factor analysis with the Varimax rotation method115, 
which produced three factors (49.42% total variance explained). The first one included 
measures related to retribution and incapacitation and was named Retribution-
incapacitation (20.63%). The second factor, Deterrence, entailed all deterrence items 
(18.10%). The third factor was named restoration, because it included items describing 
restoration as a punitive aim (10.69%). The items belonging to each of these factors were 
then computed into three corresponding mean ratings: Retribution-incapacitation (α 
=.772), Deterrence (α=.742) and Restoration (α=.585).   
 
2) Different measures of respondents’ trust in different institutions, such as schools, 
Federal Ministers, the justice system, the media, the police and religious institutions. The 
different items were used in their original format for the analyses.  
 
3) Different measures of the procedural justice perceptions as well as of the functioning 
of justice and its procedures. These measures concern respondents’ perceptions of issues, 
such as the procedural fairness of trials in Switzerland, the justice system’s capacity to 
protect the fundamental rights of citizens, the fact that judges treat all citizens equally, as 
well as respondents’ trust in the justice system or their opinion as to whether the justice 
system provides enough information about its work.  
 These measures were used in their original format, but were also used in the form of 
computed mean ratings produced with the following procedure. These different measures 
were submitted to a factor analysis, which yielded two main factors (57.20% of variance 
explained in total): procedural justice (35.14%) and functioning of justice (22.06%). The 
items corresponding to each factor were then computed into two mean ratings: 
Mprocedural (α=.787) and Mfunctioning (α=.627). 
 
                                                 
115
 Since all factor analyses were carried out with the Varimax rotation method, we will hereafter just refer to the expression factor 
analysis when discussing about such analyses.  
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4) A measure of the level of satisfaction about the functioning of justice, which was used 
in the original format for the analyses.  
 
5) A measure comprising items evaluating the different factors that can influence a 
judge’s decision. This measure was used in the form of computed mean ratings yielded 
by the following factorial structure. All items pertaining to the scale of evaluation of the 
different factors that can influence a judge’s decision were put in a factorial analysis that 
yielded three factors explaining 49.21 % of the total variance: individual-related factors 
(20.31%), facts-related factors (15.28%) and socio-demographic factors (13.62%). Items 
corresponding to each factor were then computed into 3 mean ratings: Mindividual 
(α=.707), Mfacts (α=.629) and Msocio (α=.549) that were subsequently used for the 
analyses in this study. 
 
6) A measure that included items evaluating the different causes of crime. These different 
items were used in their original form for the analyses.  
 
 Finally, the same socio-demographic items used in all previous studies were also 
included here.  
 
3. Results  
 
 In order to test our hypotheses, the following analyses were carried. MANOVAs 
were first of all carried out in order to test the effect of the justification and age condition 
and the type of study on moral and legal dimensions of responsibility, as well as on 
controllability and measures related to the sentence imposed, punitive responses, 
justifications and factors diminishing responsibility. Only main effects of study and 
justification and age conditions were examined, since no interaction effects were 
observed. A MANOVA testing the effect of the type of study and type of condition was 
also carried out on measures related to respondents’ evaluations of different punitive aims 
and perceptions of the criminal justice system. Only main effects of type of study were 
observed and will be described. Regression analyses were then carried out to assess the 
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role of different predictors for moral and legal responsibility dimensions, as well as 
controllability. Finally, correlational analyses using the Pearson method, as well as partial 
correlations were then used to examine the relationships between the responsibility 
dimensions and some of their relevant correlates, for each experimental group formed by 
the combination of type of study and the justification condition.  
 
3.1. Manipulation check  
 
 No differences in terms of frequency and plausibility were found between all 
conditions. This means that whatever the age condition, plausibility (F (1,233) = .457; ns) 
and frequency (F (1, 233) = .226; ns) ratings were similar. Plausibility (F (1,233) = 2.61; ns) 
and frequency (F (1, 233) = .000; ns) ratings were also similar between both fatigue 
conditions. Thus, the wording used to manipulate age and fatigue variables in the four 
different resulting conditions did not create any biases in terms of perceived credibility or 
probability of occurrence of the scenarios. Moreover, it is to be noted that mean ratings 
for plausibility (m=4.55) and frequency (m=3.85) are quite high, which provides 
additional support to the validity of the manipulations.  
 
3.2. Effect of the manipulation of the normative factor of justification for 
irresponsible conduct 
 
 A 2 (justification condition) x 2 (age condition) x 2 (type of study) MANOVA was 
performed on all relevant measures in order to test for the effects of these different 
between-subjects-variables. As no interaction effects were found for any of the measures, 
we will only describe main effects of these three variables.  
 
 Results confirm the assumption that moral responsibility dimensions are influenced 
by the manipulation of justification for irresponsible behaviour, but not by the 
manipulation of the age of the protagonist. Thus, dimensions that are the most relevant to 
moral responsibility such as, being responsible of the death of the victim (F (1, 231) = 
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6.91; p <.01, η=.03), blame (F (1, 231) = 9. 84; p <.003, η=.04), and accountability before 
justice (F (1,231) = 9.34; p <.004, η=.04) were significantly influenced by the 
manipulation of the justification condition (see Table 3.3). Participants in the pleasure-
related justification condition116 found the protagonist more responsible of the death of 
the victim than participants in the duty-related condition, they also found him more 
blameworthy than participants in the duty condition and they also rated his accountability 
before justice higher than participants in the duty condition.  
 Moreover, as expected the manipulation of normative expectations concerning 
justifications for irresponsible behaviour also affected controllability ratings, such as 
could have acted otherwise (F(1, 231) = 12.40; p <.002, η=.05), carelessness (F(1, 231) = 
8.38; p <.005, η=.04),  taking all necessary precautions to avoid what happened (F(1, 
231) = 10.75; p <.002, η=.05) and acted out of negligence (F(1, 231) = 19.19; p <.001, 
η=.08). Mean ratings on these evaluations for each condition are shown in Table 3.3. 
Participants in the pleasure condition considered, significantly more than participants in 
the duty condition do, that the protagonist could have acted otherwise. Participants in the 
pleasure condition agreed also more that the protagonist was careless, did not take all 
necessary precautions to avoid what happened and acted out of negligence, then 
participants in the duty condition.  
 
 
Table 3.3.: Mean ratings for moral responsibility and controllability measures by justification condition 
 
Measures Justification condition 
 Work Party 
 Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* 
Responsibility for the death of the victim 3.96 0.90 4.24 0.82 
Blameworthiness 3.77 1.05 4.18 0.93 
Accountability before justice 4.26 0.86 4.57 0.70 
Could have acted otherwise 4.00 1.06 4.45 0.85 
Carelessness 3.94 0.96 4.30 0.90 
Not taking all necessary precautions  4.06 0.91 4.43 0.77 
Acting out of negligence 3.82 1.02 4.35 0.86 
 * S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
 
                                                 
116
 For purposes of concisness, we will hereafter refer to “pleasure related justification condition” as “pleasure condition” and use the 
expression of “duty condition” for “duty-related justification condition”. 
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 In line with our assumptions, a main effect of the reason for the justification condition 
was also observed for the two items pertaining to the diminution of responsibility: the 
protagonist benefits from mitigating circumstances (F (1, 231) = 51.90; p <.001, η=.19) 
and the fact that the protagonist did not want to kill or harm the victim is a factor 
diminishing his responsibility (F (1, 231) = 4.20; p <.05, η=.02). Mean ratings on these 
evaluations for each condition are shown in Table 3.4. Participants in the duty condition 
agreed more with mitigating circumstances and unintentional action diminishing 
responsibility than participants in the pleasure condition. 
 As anticipated, the justification condition also had a significant effect on the 
expression of negative emotions about the situation such as anger (F (1, 232) = 10.52; p 
<002, η=.05) and revolt (F (1, 232) = 10.02; p <003, η=.04). Mean ratings on these 
evaluations for each condition are shown in Table 3.4. Hence, participants in the pleasure 
condition tend to express more anger and revolt than participants in the duty condition 
do.  
 Let us add that, in conformity with our predictions, a main effect (F (1, 233) = 7.74; p 
<007, η=.03) of the fatigue condition was observed for the sentence that would be 
considered the most just to punish the protagonist (see Table 3.4.). This means that 
participants in the pleasure condition rated higher sentences than participants in the duty 
condition.  
 
Table 3.4.: Mean ratings for measures related to mitigation of responsibility, to negative emotions, and to 
the sentence imposed by type of study and justification condition 
 
Measures Justification condition 
 Work Party 
 Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* 
Mitigating circumstances 3.09 1.20 2.07 0.93 
Diminution of responsibility 3.25 1.38 2.88 1.32 
Anger  2.89 1.22 3.40 1.17 
Revolt 3.25 1.11 3.70 1.04 
Sentence imposed 2.32 1.00 2.71 1.10 
 ** S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
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 Finally, in line with our assumptions, most legal responsibility ratings were not 
affected by the manipulation of justification for irresponsible conduct. Thus, no 
significant differences (Fvol (1, 233) = 1.68; ns; Fint (1, 233) = .637; ns) between 
conditions were found for voluntariness (mduty=3.49; mpleasure=3.69) and intentionality 
(mduty=1.46; mpleasure=1.56) ratings. However, a main effect of the justification condition 
was observed for the consciousness ratings. Participants in the duty condition (m=3.77) 
gave higher (F (1, 232) = 6.20; p <02, η=.03) ratings of consciousness than participants in 
the pleasure condition did (m=3.40).  
 
3.3. Effect of the manipulation of the normative factor of age 
 
 As for the assumption that the age manipulation may affect legal responsibility 
dimensions, mixed results were obtained. The legal responsibility dimensions of 
consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality were not influenced by the age condition. 
However, other legal responsibility-related measures were influenced by the age 
condition.  
 In line with our predictions, a main effect of the manipulation of age on the 
qualification of intentional homicide was observed (F (1, 231) = 5.30; p <03, η=.02). 
Thus, participants in the older condition (m=1.48) rated higher qualifications of 
intentional homicide than participants in the younger condition did (m=1.22). Let us 
however nuance this result, given that all mean ratings are low, whatever the age 
condition. Respondents were less likely to disagree with this qualification in the older 
condition, compared to the younger.  
 In addition, one should note that the age condition had a significant effect on the 
measures related to the ways to attenuate the harm done to the family of the victim. This 
main effect of age condition concerned apologies and explanations (F (1, 232) = 7.19; p 
<009, η=.03), giving a sum of money as moral redress (F (1, 232) = 6.69; p <02, η=.03) 
and acknowledging one’s mistakes (F (1, 232) = 5.23; p <03, η=.02). Thus, participants 
in the Younger condition agreed more than participants in the Older condition that the 
protagonist could attenuate the harm done to the family by apologies and explanations 
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(myoung=3.58; mold=3.18), as well as by acknowledging his mistakes (myoung=4.06; 
mold=3.70). On the contrary, participants in the Older condition (m=2.32) agreed more 
than participants in the Younger condition (m=1.98) that the protagonist could attenuate 
the harm done to the family by giving a sum of money as moral redress.  
 
3.4. Effect of the type of study on moral and legal responsibility dimensions 
 
 We had anticipated that law students would not rate the situation differently from 
psychology students in terms of their moral and legal responsibility ratings. As expected, 
participants did not assess the moral responsibility ratings differently depending on their 
field of study, except for accountability before justice ratings. A main effect of type of 
study for the evaluation of accountability before justice was indeed observed (F (1, 231) 
= 18.57; p <.001, η=.08). Law students, contrary to our predictions, (m=4.63) were more 
likely to agree that the agent should be accountable before justice for his actions, 
compared to psychology students (m=4.20). Moreover, law students did not rate legal 
responsibility criteria such as consciousness and voluntariness higher than psychology 
students, but they (m=1.68) did show higher intentionality (F (1, 232) = 8.56; p <.005, 
η=.04) ratings than psychology students (m=1.32). However, again, given these low 
mean ratings, this only means that law students were less likely to disagree that the agent 
acted intentionally than psychology students. 
 
 Yet, in line with our predictions law students (mnegl=4.25; mneghom=3.60) rated the 
situation as entailing higher negligence (F (1, 231) = 7.01; p <.01, η=.03) and as being 
more constitutive of a negligent homicide (F (1, 231) = 10.14; p <003, η=.04) than 
psychology students (mnegl=3.92; mneghom=3.08). Let us add that, contrary to our 
predictions, they were (m=1.52) also more likely to qualify the situation of intentional 
homicide (F (1, 232) = 9.01; p <.004, η=.04), compared to psychology students (m=1.18). 
Yet, akin to previous findings about the intentionality rating, the low mean ratings 
observed for both groups of students indicates that law students were less likely to 
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disagree that the situation could be qualified as an intentional homicide than psychology 
students. 
 Moreover, in conformity with our predictions, law students showed ratings that 
reflected more satisfaction and agreement with the criminal justice system and its 
procedures than for psychology students. Law students (m=3.80) expressed more (F (1, 
231) = 24.59; p <.001, η=.10) trust in the justice system than psychology students 
(m=3.28). Moreover, they also express more agreement (mprocgeneral=4.08; mprocparty=4.04; 
mrights=4.06) about the procedural fairness of trials in Switzerland in general (F(1, 231) = 
39.12; p <.001, η=.15), the procedural fairness when being a party to a trial (F(1, 231) = 
41.88; p <.001, η=.16) and that justice protects the fundamental rights of citizens (F(1, 
231) = 10.80; p <.002, η=.05), compared to psychology students (mprocgeneral=3.40; 
mprocparty=3.43; mrights=3.72). They (mequally=3.22; minfo=2.65) also agree, more than 
psychology students (mequally=2.90; minfo=2.36), that judges treat all citizens equally (F (1, 
231) = 5.59; p <.02, η=.02) and that the system provides enough information about its 
work (F (1, 231) = 6.27; p <.02, η=.03).  
 These findings are also supported by the examination of mean ratings of justice 
perceptions that were yielded by the computation of items that were grouped into factors 
after a factorial analysis of all justice perception measures117. Law students (mproc=3.71; 
mfunc=2.81) showed higher ratings for Mprocedural (F (1, 232) = 24.06; p <.001, η=.10) 
and Mfunctioning (F (1, 232) = 8 26; p <05, η=.05), compared to psychology students 
(mproc=3.31; mfunc=2.55). Another interesting result concerns the fact that law students 
(m=3.57) express more satisfaction (F (1, 231) = 11.59; p <.002, η=.05) about the 
functioning of the justice system, than psychology students (m=3.26).  
 
 Moreover, as expected, when examining mean ratings of the different factors that can 
influence a judge’s decision118, law students (m=3.56) seem to agree more (F (1, 232) = 
16.73; p <.001, η=.07) with factors that are linked to the individual offender’s personal 
                                                 
117
 Justice perception measures, after a factor analysis, were grouped into 2 main factors (57.20% of variance explained in total): 
procedural justice (35.14%) and functioning of justice (22.06%). The items corresponding to each factor were then computed into 2 
mean ratings : Mprocedural (α=.787) and Mfunctioning (α=.627) 
118
 All items pertaining to the scale of evaluation of the different factors that can influence a judge’s decision were put in a factorial 
analysis that yielded 3 factors explaining 49.21 % of the total variance: individual-related factors (20.31%), facts-related factors 
(15.28%) and socio-demographic factors (13.62%). Items corresponding to each factor were then computed into 3 mean ratings: 
Mindividual (α=.707), Mfacts (α=.629) and Msocio (α=.549). 
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characteristics and situation (Mindividual), compared to psychology students (m=3.19). 
Conversely, psychology students (m=4.11) also agreed more (F (1, 232) = 11.12; p <.002, 
η=.05) with mean ratings related to facts (Mfacts) as being a factor of influence in a 
judge’s decision-making than law students do (m=3.79). 
 Also in line with our expectations, psychology students seemed to evaluate possible 
causes of crime differently from law students, since they tended to favour more social 
causes than law students did. Indeed psychology students (mmoral=3.94; mcivic=3.66) 
agreed more that the loss of moral values (F (1, 231) = 33.57; p <.001, η=.13) and the loss 
of civic sense (F (1, 231) = 24.65; p <.001, η=.10) can be factors leading to crime than 
law students did (mmoral=3.04; mcivic=2.92). An interesting result that should also be 
noticed is that psychology students (m=2.82) tended to agree more than law students 
(m=2.18) that crime is the result of the criminal justice system not being harsh enough (F 
(1, 231) = 18.92; p <.001, η=.08). 
 One should also note that law students seem to support, more than psychology 
students, restorative (F (1, 232) = 7.44; p <.008, η=.03) and financial (F (1, 232) = 15.84; 
p <.001, η=.07) ways to attenuate the harm done. Thus they (mrestor=3.58; mfinan=2.41) 
agree more that apologies and explanations (restorative measure), as well as money as a 
moral redress, can attenuate harm done to the family, compared to psychology students 
(mrestor=3.18; mfinan=1.89). This is all the more interesting, since law students (m=2.89) 
also agree more (F (1, 231) = 5.68; p <.02, η=.02) that treating the offender is an aim of 
the penal sanction, than psychology students (m=2.56).  
 
 Some other interesting differences between law and psychology students are 
noteworthy to describe, even though they were not expected. They concern assessments 
of responses to attenuate the harm and attitudes concerning punitive aims. 
 Psychology students (m=2.38) agreed more than law students (m=2.02) that the 
protagonist should pay a fine (F (1, 232) = 5.71; p <.02, η=.02). They (m=2.47) also 
tended to agree, more than law students (m=2.25), with punitive aims119 that seek 
retribution and incapacitation (F (1, 232) = 6.57; p <02, η=.03). However, they (m=2.60) 
                                                 
119
 Punitive aims measures were added in a factor analysis, which resulted in 3 factors (49.42% total variance explained): Retribution-
incapacitation (20.63%), Deterrence (18.10%) and Restoration (10.69%). The items belonging to each of these factors were then 
computed into three corresponding mean ratings: Retribution-incapacitation (α=.772), Deterrence (α=.742) and Restoration (α=.585).   
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also favoured restorative aims more (F (1, 232) = 4.80; p <03, η=.02) than law students 
(m=2.37). The examination of individual punitive aims shows that psychology students 
(mpay=3.39; mprevent=3.11; mdiscipl=2.76) show significantly higher ratings, compared to 
law students (mpay=2.98; mprevent=2.98; mdiscipl=2.46), for the following punitive aims: 
making him pay (F(1, 232) = 8.20; p <006, η=.03), prevent him from harming others 
(F(1, 232) = 6.63; p <02, η=.03) and learn discipline (F(1, 232) = 4.79; p <04, η=.02).  
 
 We now have a better understanding of the effects of the manipulation of normative 
factors on moral and legal responsibility, as well as on controllability, and the role of the 
type of study on such ratings. However, in line with findings in studies 1 and 2, we 
suspect that moral and legal dimensions, as well as controllability, are related differently 
to other relevant measures, depending on the type of study of respondents. Moreover, 
since the manipulation of the normative factor of justification for irresponsible conduct 
strongly affected the moral dimension of responsibility and controllability-related 
measures, we will also consider whether respondents relate relevant measures to the 
moral and legal responsibility dimensions, as well as controllability differently as a 
function of the justification condition.  
 More specifically, we will examine whether the different variables that have been 
found to be consistently related to moral responsibility (negative emotions, punitive 
responses and attitudes) in the two previous studies, along with justification and 
counterfactual thinking variables, show such a relationship when the salient cues 
manipulated in the scenario are normative. Moreover, we will also verify whether these 
variables, along with legal qualifications are related to legal responsibility when rational 
cues are not salient in the scenario that is evaluated. The predictive link between these 
different variables and controllability mean ratings will also be assessed. All these 
different relationships will, of course, be examined separately for all four groups of 
respondents yielded by the combination of the variables of justification condition and 
type of study.  
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3.5. Prediction of moral and legal responsibility dimensions 
 
 To begin with, a regression analysis carried out for all respondents will help us 
examine whether moral and legal responsibility mean ratings, as well as controllability 
mean ratings120 were predicted by the same independent variables that were found to 
predict them in the previous studies. Moreover, we also tested whether justification and 
counterfactual reasoning assessments were related to moral responsibility. Anchoring 
variables that were newly introduced, such as justice perceptions and other justice-related 
measures, as well as socio-demographic variables, such as gender, socio-economic status, 
religious affiliation and political orientation were not included, since they were not found 
to be significantly related to any of the dependent variables.  
 Thus, the following predictors were entered in all the regression analyses that were 
carried out: negative emotions mean ratings121 (Emoneg), the retributive punitive aims 
mean rating122 (Mretribution-incapacitation), favouring prison as a manner of attenuating 
the harm done, the internality mean rating (Minternal123), the assessment of the sentence 
to be imposed on the offender, the justification measure, the counterfactual thinking 
measure, the measures related to the qualifications of the situation of intentional and 
negligent homicide, the condition of justification for irresponsible conduct, as well as the 
type of study. These predictions are presented in Table 3.5.  
 
 The first analysis examined whether, as we assumed, negative emotions mean ratings 
(Emoneg), the tendency to internality (Minternal), punitive mean ratings related to 
retribution and incapacitation (Mretribution-incapacitation), the sentence level imposed 
to the agent, favouring prison as a response to attenuate the harm done, as well as 
                                                 
120
 These mean ratings resulted from the computation of items pertaining to each factor yielded by the factor analysis of all 
responsibility-related items. 3 factors came out of this analysis (60.27% of total variance explained): controlability (27.26%), legal 
responsibility (17.27%) and moral responsibility (15.73%). 3 mean ratings were then computed from the items corresponding to each 
factor: Mcontrol (α=.815), Mlegal (α=.666) and Mmoral (α=.663). 
121
 These mean ratings were yielded by the computation of all negative emotions items into one mean rating (Emoneg), as well as the 
computation of all positive emotions items into another mean rating (Emopos). This computation was possible, since a previous 
factorial analysis of all emotions items had highlighted two factors accounting for 57.4% of the total variance: Emoneg (29.80%) and 
Emopos (27.57%). Alpha ratings for negative emotions mean ratings and positive emotions mean ratings were respectively, α=.700 
and α=.671. 
122
 See note 119. 
123
 These mean ratings resulted from computing the items pertaining to each factor yielded by the factor analysis of the internality and 
externality measures. 2 factors were highlighted (37.8% of total variance explained): externality (19.67%) and internality (18.11%).2 
mean ratings were then computed from the items corresponding to each factor: Minternal (α=.529) and Mexternal (α=.574). 
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assessments of justifications124 and the counterfactual thinking assessment125 predicted 
mean ratings of moral responsibility (Mmoral). As one can observe in Table 3.5., 
Mmoral was significantly predicted by high negative emotions, agreement with the 
negligent homicide and the intentional homicide qualification, favouring the 
imprisonment of the agent, counterfactual thinking, disagreement with the justification 
measure, as well as the justification condition. The strongest predictors of Mmoral were 
high negative feelings, agreeing with the negligent homicide qualification and 
disagreeing with the justification measure. However, in contradiction with our 
predictions, the tendency for internality, the sentence imposed and retributive punitive 
aims were not significant predictors of Mmoral. Moreover, contrary to our expectations, 
but in line with findings in study 2, Mmoral was predicted by agreeing with the negligent 
and intentional homicide qualifications. Let us add that moral responsibility was also 
predicted by the pleasure justification condition, which is not surprising, given the strong 
main effects of this condition observed for all moral responsibility measures in the 
previous section 3.2.  
 
 As for legal responsibility mean rating (Mlegal), we anticipated that they would be 
associated to legal qualification of intentional homicide and to respondents’ type of 
study. We also assumed that Mlegal would not be predicted by factors related to moral 
responsibility, such as negative emotions, justifications, counterfactual thinking and 
retributive punitive aims and responses. Hence, we tested whether these predictions were 
verified. As a result, as shown in Table 3.5., we found that Mlegal was strongly predicted 
by the qualification of intentional homicide and agreement with the counterfactual 
reasoning. No other independent variables were significant predictors for Mlegal. Thus, 
contrary to our predictions, Mlegal was not only predicted by the intentional homicide 
qualification, but, it was also associated to counterfactual reasoning. The type of study 
was not a significant predictor as we had assumed it would be.  
 
                                                 
124
 This measure assesses the justification for taking risks that the agent wanted to go home and sleep as soon as possible. It will be 
hereafter referred to as the justification measure. 
125
 The measure is about the agreement that the protagonist should have accepted the fact that he was tired and taken a little nap before 
driving, instead of taking the risk of creating an accident by driving when feeling drowsy. From now on this measure will be referred 
to as “the counterfactual reasoning measure or counterfactual thinking”. 
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 As for controllability, we predicted that it would share certain predictors with moral 
responsibility, given the associations found in the previous study between controllability 
and moral responsibility. Moreover, given the main effect of the justification condition on 
controllability-related measures highlighted in section 3.2, this condition could also be a 
significant predictor. A third regression analysis was, thus, performed to examine 
whether the justification condition, negative emotions, disagreement with the justification 
measure, the counterfactual thinking measure and the negligent homicide qualification 
predicted controllability mean ratings (Mcontrol). This analysis highlighted that 
Mcontrol was strongly predicted by all of these independent variables. Thus, Mcontrol 
seems to be sharing all of its predictors with Mmoral and has one predictor in common 
with Mlegal (the counterfactual thinking measure).  
 
 
 
Table 3.5.: Multiple regression analyses: Prediction of moral and legal responsibility as well as 
controllability mean ratings 
 
Independent variables Mmoral  Mlegal  
 
Mcontrol 
 
Emoneg .204** .109 .171** 
Negligent homicide qualification .199** .034 .209** 
Intentional homicide qualification .152* .345*** .108 
Justification -.207*** .077 -.139* 
Counterfactual thinking .140* .260*** .293*** 
Justification condition .132* -.056 .198** 
Sentence .098 .054 -.108 
Prison as a way of attenuating the harm done .128* -.064 -.005 
    
Minternal .071 .099 .027 
Retribution and incapacitation -.116 -.012 .053 
Type of study .007 .009 .083 
 
R2 .429 .233 .346 
Adjusted R2 .398 .195 .313 
R .655 .483 .588 
 *** p <.001, ** p <.01, * p <.05 
 
 
 Given these regression analyses results, we will now examine the following 
relationships separately for the four groups of respondents constituted by the combination 
of type of study and justification condition. More specifically, the linkages between 
moral responsibility, punitive responses and attitudes and negative emotions will be 
examined, because we suspect that they may be more likely for psychology students, 
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compared to law students, given findings in the previous studies. Similarly, the 
relationship between respectively, the justification measure, the counterfactual thinking 
measure and, moral and legal responsibility, as well as controllability, will also be 
examined separately for each group of respondents as a function of their type of study 
and the justification condition. Finally, the relationships between legal qualifications and 
moral and legal responsibility, as well as the linkages between the two responsibility 
dimensions and controllability will also be verified again with the same assumption, 
supported by findings in the previous studies, that not all groups of respondents will 
associate these in the same manner.  
 
 
3.6. Correlates of moral responsibility and the effect of type of study and 
justification condition on these linkages 
 
3.6.1. Punitive aims negative emotions and their relationship to moral 
responsibility  
 
 Regression analyses indicate that moral responsibility was related to the retributive 
response of imprisonment to attenuate the harm done to the victim’s family and to 
negative emotions, but not to the retributive and incapacitation punitive aims mean 
ratings. This absence of relationship for the latter variable, although it contradicts our 
assumptions, was already found in study 1. In study, retributive punitive aims were found 
to be related to blameworthiness only for law students in the unconscious negligence 
condition. Negative emotions in that study did not have any significant effect on this 
relationship. We shall examine the linkages between retributive punitive aims, negative 
emotions and moral responsibility in this study to see whether differences as a function of 
type of study and justification condition can be highlighted.  
 
 As psychology students were found to be more likely to associate negative emotions 
to moral responsibility in the previous study, we began by examining whether such 
differences between student groups could be also found in this study. This finding was 
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also observed in this study, since psychology students in both justification conditions 
were the only respondent groups to associate moral responsibility to negative emotions 
(rWpsy = .391, p < .004; rPpsy = .579, p < .001). Law students never made this relationship. 
As retributive punitive attitudes were not found to be associated to moral responsibility in 
the regression analyses, we checked whether this lack of association was generalised to 
all groups of respondents. Correlational analyses show that non-significant relationships 
exist for all groups of respondents. However, as the rating encompassing retributive 
punitive aims also include some measures related to incapacitation, this lack of 
significant associations could be due to the incapacitation measures clouding the effect of 
retributive evaluations. We thus, verified these linkages for a purely retributive attitude: 
making the person suffer until expiation. As it turns out, moral responsibility and making 
the person suffer were significantly related only for psychology students in the party 
justification condition (rPpsy = .284, p < .04). No other group of respondents associated 
those evaluations. Moreover, when controlling for the effect of negative emotions, the 
significant association observed for psychology students in the party justification 
condition disappeared. 
 
3.6.2. Punitive responses and their relationship to moral responsibility and 
negative emotions 
 
 Two additional measures related to punitive attitudes and responses were included in 
this study, compared to the previous studies. These concern the sentence to be imposed to 
the agent and the assessment as to whether the justice system is not harsh enough. These 
two measures could be important variables to take into account when ascribing moral 
responsibility, given the linkages between blame, retributive aims and imposing a 
concrete sentence (Graham et al., 1997). Moreover, considering that the justice system is 
not harsh enough could be related to the link between negative emotions and retributive 
punitive aims, since Goldberg et al. (1999) suggested that people can get angrier and 
more punitive if they think that justice has not been served. The role of these two 
variables in the associations between moral responsibility, punitive responses and 
negative emotions will, thus, be assessed.  
 233 
 
 Let us begin by examining the linkages between moral responsibility and the 
punitive responses of respectively, favouring prison and imposing a concrete sentence. 
Findings show that both these linkages were only observed for psychology students. 
Moral responsibility was only significantly associated to favouring the imprisonment of 
the agent for psychology students in the party justification condition (rPpsy = .384, p < 
.005); no other significant associations were found for the other groups of respondents. 
Moreover, psychology students significantly related moral responsibility to imposing a 
concrete sentence in both conditions (rWpsy = .289, p < .04; rPpsy = .492, p < .001), 
whereas law students never made such an association. Thus, law students were less likely 
to relate moral responsibility to punitive responses in both conditions, compared to 
psychology students. Further analyses show that the significant associations found for 
psychology students in the party justification condition between moral responsibility and 
prison time disappear when partialling out the effect of negative emotions. Moreover, the 
associations between moral responsibility and imposing a sentence on the agent could, 
for psychology students who are making those evaluations in the work-related 
justification condition, depend on their tendency to express negative emotions and to 
favour the imprisonment of the agent. This influence of negative emotions and punitive 
responses was however not observed for psychology students responding in the party-
related justification condition. Indeed, when partialling out the effect of negative 
emotions, this association diminishes significantly for psychology students in the work-
related justification condition, but does not affect as much the linkages for the 
psychology students in the pleasure-related justification condition (rPpsy = .328, p < .02). 
The same effect is found when partialling out for favouring the imprisonment of the agent 
(rPpsy = .405, p < .004). Thus, moral responsibility is more likely to be related to the 
imposition of a concrete sentence, independently from the influence of negative emotions 
and favouring a punitive response, for psychology students in the party-related 
justification condition. This association is however more unlikely when high negative 
emotions and punitive responses are not favoured for psychology students in the work-
related justification condition.   
 
 234 
 
 As for the relationship between moral responsibility ratings, considering that the 
justice system is not harsh enough and feeling negative emotions, the following results 
were observed. Moral responsibility was only found to be related to considering that the 
justice system is not harsh enough for psychology students in the work-related 
justification condition (rWpsy = .360, p < .009). However, this linkage diminishes 
significantly for psychology students in the work justification condition when controlling 
for negative emotions. As for the retributive punitive aim of making the agent suffer, this 
attitude was found to be significantly related to considering the criminal justice system is 
not harsh enough for all respondents (rWpsy = .291, p < .04; rPpsy = .433, p < .002; rWlaw = 
.266, p < .04), except law students in the party-related justification condition. However, 
when partialling out the effect of negative emotions, one can observe that this effect 
significantly diminishes, for all respondents in the work-related justification condition, 
whereas it remains significant for psychology students in the pleasure justification 
condition (rPpsy = .382, p < .006). Thus, respondents in the work-related condition may be 
more likely to associate considering that justice is too lenient to being more likely to want 
the offender to suffer until expiation especially if they feel negative emotions concerning 
the agent’s actions. But psychology students in the pleasure condition may be more likely 
to associate perceptions of leniency of the criminal justice system to favouring retributive 
attitudes, independently of the level of negative emotions they may feel. Moreover, let us 
also make the observation that, psychology students, in the pleasure condition, associate 
more strongly perceptions of leniency and making the agent suffer, than respondents 
from the other groups, as shown by the r values corresponding to these different linkages.  
 
3.6.3. Moral responsibility and its relationship to public denunciation and 
punitive responses 
 
 Since moral responsibility was found to be strongly related to public denunciation, 
especially for psychology students, in the previous study, we examined whether this 
association was also more likely for psychology students, compared to law students in 
this study. It turns out that this relationship was observed for psychology students in both 
conditions (rWpsy = .671, p < .001; rPpsy = .597, p < .001), as well as for law students in the 
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work-related justification condition (rWlaw = .430, p < .001). Moreover, this relationship 
was not affected by controlling for the effect of favouring prison or imposing a concrete 
sentence. Let us add that when considering the association between public denunciation 
and imposing a concrete sentence, only psychology students seem to reason in such a 
manner (rWpsy = .476, p < .001; rPpsy = .361, p < .008). However, these significant 
associations disappear for psychology students in the party-related justification condition, 
when controlling for the effect of moral responsibility, whereas they remain for 
psychology students in the work-related justification condition (rWpsy = .398, p < .003).  
 
3.6.4. Moral responsibility, controllability and their relationship to 
disagreement with the justification measure  
 
 Regression analyses show that moral responsibility and controllability are both 
predicted by the justification measure and the justification condition. As discussed in 
section 3.2, most moral responsibility measures and all controllability measures were 
given higher ratings in the pleasure justification condition, compared to the duty 
justification condition. However, the effect of the justification condition was generally 
stronger for the controllability measures, than for the blame-related measures. This is 
even clearer when one compares the main effect of the justification condition on mean 
ratings of moral responsibility and controllability. The condition’s influence on Mmoral 
(F (1, 233) = 11.76; p <.002, η =.05) is weaker than the one on Mcontrol (F (1, 233) = 
18.71; p <.001, η =.08), as demonstrated by the F values and the effect sizes.  
 We thus suspect that the relationship between moral responsibility and the 
justification measure may depend strongly on controllability, especially for respondents 
in the pleasure justification condition. Correlational analyses for each of the four groups 
of respondents were thus carried out to explore this possibility. Moral responsibility was 
negatively associated to the justification measure for all respondents (rPpsy =- .386, p < 
.005; rWlaw = -.375, p < .004; rPlaw = -.365, p < .004), except for psychology students in 
the work-related justification condition. However, when controlling for controllability, all 
associations disappear for respondents in the party justification condition, whereas they 
remain for law students in the work-related justification condition (rWlaw = -.384, p < 
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.004). The fact that controllability did not have any effect of the association between 
moral responsibility and the justification condition for law students in the work 
justification condition could be explained by the fact that this is the only group of 
respondents who does not associate controllability ratings to the justification measure. All 
other groups of respondents associated controllability to disagreement with the 
justification measure (rWpsy = -.288, p < .04; rPpsy =- .362, p < .008; rPlaw = -.386, p < 
.003). Let us add here that the association between controllability and the justification 
measure is not very surprising if one takes into account the following information. The 
justification measure concerns the agreement with the fact that the protagonist wanting to 
go home quickly justifies the fact that he decided to drive even though he was tired. 
Moreover, measures that were computed to yield this controllability mean rating concern 
such issues as the possibilities of acting otherwise and necessary precautions taken to 
avoid the harmful consequences. One notices that such measures contradict the 
justification measure, in terms of their formulation. The negative linkage between 
controllability and the justification measure in that sense is coherent.  
 
3.6.5. Moral responsibility, controllability and their relationship to the 
counterfactual thinking  
 
 Moral responsibility and controllability were both found to be associated to the 
counterfactual thinking measure in previous regression analyses. As counterfactual 
thinking is a psychological concept that translates the tendency for human beings to 
imagine alternatives to real life events, that is, to think in terms of “what if”, we suspect 
that this relationship may be more likely to be found for psychology students (as they are 
assumed to respond in manner which is more characteristic of ordinary reasoning), 
compared to law students.  
 Findings provide support for such an assumption, since only psychology students 
significantly related counterfactual reasoning to moral responsibility (rWpsy = .519, p < 
.001; rPpsy = .483, p < .001). However, controllability seems to be a crucial factor for such 
an association to be more likely, since partialling out for controllability makes these 
associations diminish significantly.  
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3.6.6. Moral responsibility, controllability and their relationship to negative 
emotions 
 
 Since both moral responsibility and controllability were associated to negative 
emotions in regression analyses, we examined these associations for all four groups of 
respondents. We suspected that negative emotions, likewise to moral responsibility, 
would be more likely to be associated to controllability for psychology students, 
compared to law students. This expectation was supported by the finding of significant 
associations only for psychology students (rWpsy = .371, p < .007; rPpsy = .432, p < .002). 
Yet, these relationships for psychology students diminished significantly when partialling 
out the effect of moral responsibility.  
 
 
3.7. Moral and legal responsibility and their relationship to legal 
qualifications and counterfactual thinking as a function of type of study 
and justification condition 
 
3.7.1. Moral and legal responsibility and their relationship to legal 
qualifications  
 
 Findings in studies 1 and 2 suggest that psychology students are more likely to 
associate moral responsibility to legal qualifications, compared to law students. Legal 
qualifications were also more likely to be consistently related to legal responsibility, in 
coherence with the culpability level manipulated and legal reasoning, by law students, 
compared to psychology students. We will examine whether these findings can also be 
observed in this study, where normative cues are manipulated and legal cues are no more 
salient. Since the scenarios used in this study are more likely to be characterised as 
amounting to negligent homicide, we will only examine relationships concerning this 
qualification and the accident qualification.  
 
 In line with previous findings, psychology students were the only respondents to 
associate moral responsibility to the negligent homicide qualification in both justification 
conditions (rWpsy = .413, p < .003; rPpsy = .667, p < .001).  
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 As for the relationship between legal responsibility and the legal qualification of 
negligent homicide, the following results indicate that psychology and law students may 
be basing such associations on different processes. Legal responsibility was related to 
negligent homicide by all groups of respondents, except for law students in the work-
related condition. However, psychology students associated these evaluations positively 
(rWpsy = .281, p < .05; rPpsy = .324, p < .02), whereas law students in the pleasure 
condition associated these negatively (rPlaw = -.274, p < .04). Moreover, when controlling 
for controllability, these positive associations observed for psychology students 
diminished significantly, whereas the negative relationship for law students not only 
persisted, but became stronger (rPlaw = -.335, p < .009).   
 Finally, let us add that the accident qualification was negatively associated to moral 
responsibility by all respondents only for the pleasure related condition (rPpsy = -.301, p < 
.03; rPlaw = -.315, p < .02). Respondents in the work-related condition did not make such 
associations. However, when controlling for negative emotions, this association 
diminished significantly for psychology students, whereas it persisted for law students 
(rPlaw = -.315, p < .02).  
 
3.7.2. Moral and legal responsibility dimensions and their relationship to 
counterfactual thinking 
 
 Contrary to what had been expected and in addition to an association with moral 
responsibility, counterfactual thinking was also related to legal responsibility. 
Correlational analyses across all four groups of respondents show that most respondents 
made this association. Only law students in the party-related justification condition did 
not relate these evaluations (rWpsy = .325, p < .02; rPpsy = .385, p < .005; rWlaw = .322, p < 
.02). However, when controlling for the effect of moral responsibility, this association 
diminishes significantly for psychology students, whereas it persists for law students in 
the work-related justification condition (rWlaw = .279, p < .03).  
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3.7.3. Moral and legal responsibility dimensions and their relationship to 
controllability 
 
 As moral and legal dimensions of responsibility were associated to controllability in 
study 2, we may make such observations also in this study. Likewise to findings in study 
2, controllability and legal responsibility should be related to each other for all 
respondents, but this association may be subject to the influence of moral responsibility. 
As moral responsibility and legal responsibility, as well as controllability were mostly 
(but for accountability before justice and intentionality) rated in a similar fashion by law 
and psychology students in section 3.4, we do not expect respondents to associate these 
two dimensions to controllability in a different manner.  
 Moral responsibility was significantly and strongly associated to controllability by all 
respondents (rWpsy = .628, p < .001; rPpsy = .594, p < .001; rWlaw = .484, p < .001; rPlaw = 
.652, p < .001). Legal responsibility was also significantly related to controllability across 
all groups of respondents, although less strongly than the linkages observed between 
Mcontrol and Mmoral (rWpsy = .278, p < .05; rPpsy = .362, p < .008; rWlaw = .329, p < .02; 
rPlaw = .368, p < .004). Let us add in this same vein that the linkages between Mlegal and 
Mcontrol could depend be likely to depend strongly on moral responsibility evaluations, 
since these associations significantly diminish for across all groups of respondents, when 
controlling for the effect of Mmoral. However, the linkages between Mmoral and 
Mcontrol are less likely to depend on the evaluation of legal responsibility, since 
partialling out the effect of Mlegal does not affect the associations between Mmoral and 
Mcontrol observed for all four groups of respondents (rWpsy = .589, p < .001; rPpsy = .521, 
p < .001; rWlaw = .427, p < .002; rPlaw = .591, p < .001).  
 Finally, let us also mention that moral and legal responsibility were significantly and 
strongly associated by all respondents (rWpsy = .512, p < .001; rPpsy = .436, p < .002; rWlaw 
= .306, p < .02; rPlaw = .407, p < .002). However, when controlling for Mcontrol, this 
association only remained significant for psychology students (rWpsy = .452, p < .002; rPpsy 
= .295, p < .04). 
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3.8. Additional analyses concerning punitive attitudes  
 
 
 Like in study 1, mean ratings for all punitive aims were examined. Interesting 
differences again were found in terms of types of punitive aims that reached most 
agreement from respondents. A hierarchical cluster analysis using the Ward’s method 
highlighted three distinct groups of items according to mean ratings. The first group 
included items related to special and general deterrence and was called deterrence. The 
second group entailed items concerning incapacitation and restoration. We will refer to 
this group of measures as incapacitation to protect society. The third group of items is 
solely related to retribution and will thus be referred to using this term. T-test analyses 
confirmed that these three groups of measures were significantly differently rated by 
respondents. These differences in ratings were found both for law and psychology 
students. Mean ratings for each group of items and for each student group are displayed 
in Table 3.6. As law and psychology students rated these different mean ratings in a 
significant way and significantly differentiated between these ratings, we will only 
present the t-test values for all respondents, without presenting these for each group of 
respondents depending on the type of study (see footnotes below for those). Deterrence 
motives seem to be significantly more favoured by respondents, compared to 
incapacitation to protect society (t (232) = 17.51, p <.001)126 or retribution (t (232) = 
26.82, p <.001)127. Moreover, incapacitation to protect society also reached significantly 
(t (232) = 19.13, p <.001)128 more agreement than retribution.  
 
 
Table 3.6.: Mean ratings for deterrence, incapacitation to protect society and retribution punitive goals for 
each group of students 
 * S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
                                                 
126
 Difference between deterrence and incapacitation: Law students (t (124) = 14.09, p <.001); Psychology students (t (108) = 10.58, p 
<.001).   
127
 Difference between deterrence and retribution: Law students (t (124) = 21.19, p <.001); Psychology students (t (108) = 16.73, p 
<.001).   
128
 Difference between retribution and incapacitation: Law students (t 124) = 14.81, p <.001); Psychology students (t (108) = 12.24, p 
<.001).   
Punitive goals Total  Law students Psychology students 
 
Mean Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* 
Deterrence 3.42 3.45 0.57 3.38 0.63 
Incapacitation 2.72 2.69 0.54 2.75 0.61 
Retribution  1.88 1.80 0.72 1.97 0.77 
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 As in study 1, retribution was much less favoured than deterrence or incapacitation to 
protect the society. Moreover, when categorizing participants according to whether they 
were High or Low on retributive attitudes129, one-third (n=76) of respondents were found 
to favour retribution highly. However, Chi-square analyses demonstrated that these High 
retributive attitudes were just as likely to found for psychology students, than in law 
students. A proportionate amount of each of these student groups were found in the High 
retribution category (χ2(1, 232) = 1.68, ns).  
 Moreover, findings in section 3.7.2 suggest that considering that the justice system is 
not harsh enough was related to retributive punitive attitudes and this association seemed 
to be especially likely for psychology students in the pleasure condition. Since 
psychology students were also found to be more likely to agree that the criminal justice 
system is too lenient compared to law students, we checked whether psychology students 
were more likely than other respondents to rate high retribution and agree that the justice 
system is too lenient. We, thus, categorized respondents in terms of whether they agreed 
or disagreed that the justice system was too lenient130 and compared high and low justice 
leniency and retribution groups separately for each group of students. As it turns out, Chi-
Square analyses for each student group suggest that psychology students are more likely 
to be categorized as High retribution and High justice is too lenient (χ2(1, 107) = 6.05, p 
<.02), compared to law students (χ2(1, 124) = 3.10, ns). Thus, more than half (57.7%, 
n=15) of the psychology students who agreed that the justice system was not harsh 
enough (n=26) were also more likely to be in the category of respondents who favoured 
retribution highly. 
 Let us add that retribution is strongly related to the sentence imposed for both 
psychology (r = .416, p < .001) and law students (r = .191, p < .04), whereas no 
significant relationships were found, however, between utilitarian motives, such as 
deterrence, and the sentence imposed. Such significant results were also found for the 
link between retribution and favouring prison time for both groups of students (rpsy = 
                                                 
129
 In order to produce such a categorization, retribution mean ratings were computed into two categories: High retribution (for ratings 
between 3 and 5) and low retribution (for ratings between 1 and 2). 
130
 Respondents’ ratings that the justice system was not harsh enough was computed into two categories: High leniency (for ratings 
between 4 and 5) and low leniency (for ratings between 1 and 3) 
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.327, p < .002; rlaw = .213, p < .02), but not between deterrence and this punitive 
response.  
 
3.9. Additional findings on the effect of socio-demographic variables on 
perceptions of the criminal justice system 
 
 Since perceptions of the criminal justice system were not significant predictors of 
moral and legal responsibility ratings or controllability and since such perceptions were 
strongly affected by the type of study, we examined whether religious affiliation, political 
orientation and socio-economic status (SES) had an effect on such perceptions. We will 
only describe the significant main effects that were found for political orientation and 
religious practices and beliefs. No interaction effects between these two socio-
demographic variables and type of study were observed for these different perceptions of 
the justice system. 
 Political orientation had as strong effect on the justice perceptions and perceptions of 
the factors that should influence legal decision-making. Respondents who consider 
belonging to the political right (mproc=3.84; mfunct=2.97) are more likely to agree with the 
procedural fairness of justice in Switzerland (Mprocedural; F(1,223) = 7.50; p <.002, 
η=.06) and are more satisfied with the functioning of the justice system (Mfunctioning; 
F(1,223) = 5.45; p <.006, η=.05), compared to respondents from the left (mproc=3.42; 
mfunct=2.57) and centre (mproc=3.50; mfunct=2.65) orientations. Moreover, respondents 
from a left orientation (m=3.57) are significantly (F (1,223) = 5.96; p <.004, η=.05) more 
in favour that factors related to the individual should influence legal decision-making 
than respondents from the centre (m=3.32) or right political orientation (m=3.18). Post-
hoc analyses with the Scheffe method show it is especially respondents from the left 
orientation who are opposed significantly to respondents from the left orientation 
concerning their evaluation of the factors influencing legal decisions related to the 
individual (p < .008) and the functioning of justice (p < .006). Such post-hoc analyses 
also show that evaluations of procedural justice measures especially oppose respondents 
from the right to respondents from the centre (p < .02) and left (p < .002) political 
orientation.  
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 Religious affiliation also had an influence on perceptions concerning the functioning 
of justice and the factors influencing legal decision-making that are related to facts. 
Respondents who considered that they were believers and practiced religion (m=3.51) 
were significantly (F(1,228) = 3.37; p <.04, η=.03) less likely to favour factors related to 
facts as a source of influence on legal decision-making, compared to respondents who 
were believers, but do not practice their religion (m=3.98) or who are not believers 
(m=3.97). Moreover, respondents who consider that they are believers but who do not 
practice their religion (m=2.85) are significantly (F (1,228) = 3.38; p <.04, η=.03) more 
likely to be satisfied with the functioning of the justice system than respondents who are 
not believers (m=2.59). Post-hoc analyses with the Scheffe method show it is especially 
respondents who are believers and practice their beliefs who are opposed significantly to 
respondents from non-believers concerning their evaluation of the factors influencing 
legal decisions related to the individual (p < .04). Moreover, these post-hoc analyses also 
show that satisfaction with the functioning of justice especially opposes respondents who 
are believers but who do not practice their beliefs to non-believers (p < .04).  
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4. Conclusions 
 
4.1. The effect of the manipulation of justification for irresponsible conduct 
 
 This study aimed at examining the effect of the salience of social norm-related cues in 
a scenario on responsibility ratings. The main hypothesis was that a normative cue that is 
generally not considered important in the legal setting, such as a justification for 
irresponsible conduct, should not affect legal responsibility criteria, but should strongly 
affect moral responsibility measures. This hypothesis was supported by the following 
findings.  
 
 The fact of presenting the protagonist as being tired because he partied all night, no 
matter what his age is, yielded harsher moral responsibility and controllability judgments 
compared to when the protagonist is presented as tired because he worked all night. This 
harshness is also reflected in higher prison sentences being given to the agent, as well as 
in higher expressions of negative emotions, in the pleasure condition than in duty 
condition.  
 However, the fact of having worked all night seems to contribute to the feeling that 
the fact that there was no intent to hurt or kill the victim diminishes the agent’s 
responsibility and that he benefits from mitigating circumstances, more than if the agent 
partied all night. Thus, in the eyes of the participants, working all night is a mitigating 
factor and a reason for fatigue that makes the protagonist’s acts less culpable. Akin to 
with Kelley’s (1972) findings, working all night may have served a higher moral goal 
which may have mitigated the responsibility that was attributed to the agent, compared to 
the hedonistic reason for having stayed up all night. These results are also similar to 
Melburg & Tedeschi’s (1981) findings that an ambulance driver who is speeding and 
who hits a child is considered less blameworthy, if he was transporting a critically ill 
patient, compared to when the patient presented only a minor illness. Moreover, the fact 
that the agent had a reason implying maturity and responsibility for working all night 
(pay his studies or take care of the children) may explain why evaluations were less harsh 
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towards the agent in the duty condition, than in the pleasure condition. The agent’s role 
as a parent who has to work all night to take care of his children or as a citizen who has to 
work all night in order to pay for his studies may have mitigated the responsibility he was 
attributed. Conversely, the person who partied all night, not only behaved irresponsibly 
by driving when feeling drowsy, but behaved also in a manner that reflected a lack of 
responsibility for his duty, as an employee or as a student (i.e. staying up all night to 
party instead of going to bed). Here, this double irresponsibility may have acted as an 
aggravating factor and, thus, yielded harsher judgments. Thus, the conflict between 
normative expectations concerning duties and the agent’s responsibility with regard to the 
offense he committed may have played a considerable role in yielding different results 
depending on the condition of the scenario, in conformity with previous results 
(Heitzmann, 2007).  
 Legal responsibility ratings, on the other hand, were not influenced by the fatigue 
condition, except for the consciousness measure. The fact that the agent who worked all 
night is considered as more aware of the risks he is taking, than a person who parties all 
night, could be simply due to the participants’ assumption that he is more aware of the 
effects of fatigue on his driving, since he is working at night regularly. Another more 
general explanation is that the person who stayed up all night because of work can be 
considered as more responsible (thus, more conscious of the probability of risks), than the 
person who did not sleep all night because of hedonistic reasons.  
 
4.2. The effect of the manipulation of the agent’s age  
 
 In conformity with our predictions, moral responsibility ratings and factors related to 
these ratings such as emotions, justifications and counterfactual reasoning were not 
influenced by the age condition. Legal responsibility ratings were not affected by the age 
condition either, contrary to what we expected. However, legal qualifications related to 
legal responsibility were influenced by age. The older protagonist’s actions were more 
likely to be qualified as intentional homicide than the younger one’s behaviours. This 
finding can be related to previous research findings that demonstrated that attributions of 
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intent were higher for older offenders than for younger offenders (Prygotzki & Mullet, 
1997). This may be because respondents consider that a fully mature adult may show 
more reflection, more control over his behaviour and less impulsivity than younger 
adults. However, this effect may only be very minimal, since ratings for all age 
conditions were very low, showing little agreement for this qualification in all cases.  
 Moreover, some responses that could attenuate the harm done to the victim’s family 
were also affected by the manipulation of age. Restorative measures, such as apologies 
and explanations, as well as acknowledging one’s mistakes, were considered to attenuate 
harm done more for the younger protagonist than for the older one. However, participants 
also made the difference of age for financial measures, since they considered money as 
moral redress more susceptible to attenuate harm for an older protagonist than for a 
younger one. Thus, participants seem to have taken into account the age of the offender 
as a factor that could affect more the sentence imposed to the offender, than the actual 
level of culpability of his actions. These findings are in conformity to the practices in the 
legal system, since the new federal code of legal procedures only provides the possibility 
for restorative forms of sentencing, such as mediation, for minors.  
 Finally, let us add that the fact that all respondents were young adults. This 
uniformity in age group of the sample used in the study may, thus, have biased results 
concerning the effect of the age factor. If most respondents were mature adults, the 
manipulation of the agent’s age could have brought more effects in terms of legal criteria 
of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality. Older respondents would have maybe 
attributed less consciousness and voluntariness to a younger agent, compared to an older 
agent, because they would have referred to their own past experience and compared it to 
their present consciousness of the probability of risks. 
 
4.3. Effect of the type of study on moral and legal responsibility ratings and 
related measures 
 
 In line with our predictions, all moral responsibility ratings, except the accountability 
before justice measure, were unaffected by the participants’ field of study. The only 
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blame-related measure that was rated differently as a function of field of study was 
accountability before justice, since law students tended to rate this measure higher than 
psychology students did. This difference may indicate that law students understood better 
the legal implications of the situation they had to rate, whatever the condition of 
justification and age. This interpretation is also supported by the finding that law students 
were also more likely than psychology students were to consider that the agent 
intentionally caused the accident, that he acted out of negligence and that this situation 
can be qualified of negligent and intentional homicide. These results indicate that law 
students may have been more susceptible, compared to psychology students, to perceive 
that this situation may not be just an accident and may amount to a legal liability for 
negligence or intentional conduct.  
 
 A noteworthy result to highlight also concerning law students is their more positive 
perception of the criminal justice system and its procedures, compared to psychology 
students. They are less critical of this system and show more support for its role in 
society than psychology students. This is logical, given that they are at the beginning of 
their studies and because they cannot reject an institution, which they will, probably, 
serve in the future. They have to justify its role, because they have to justify their choice 
of study. They may thus identify more to the justice system and its principles than 
psychology students do. In that sense, they also support, more than psychology students 
do, the idea that apologies and explanations, as well as money as a moral redress can 
attenuate the harm done to the family of the victim. They also are more in favour of the 
idea that the treatment of the offender should be a goal when imposing a penal sanction.  
 
 As for the psychology students, they were less sensitive to the legal implications of 
the situation in terms of liability to punishment, as shown by their lower ratings of 
negligence, intentionality, accountability before justice, as well as of qualifications of 
negligent and intentional homicide, compared to their law counterparts. The fact that 
psychology students favour more paying a fine as a response that may attenuate the harm 
done to the victim’s family than law students suggests that the former student group may 
consider the situation more as an accident with minimal legal consequences than the 
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latter student group does. Moreover, psychology students tend more to agree with 
punitive aims related to retribution and incapacitation than law students (who favour 
more rehabilitation-oriented aims). Psychology students also favoured social-norms-
related causes, such as loss of civic sense and moral values, to explain crime more than 
law students do. Finally, they were also more in agreement with factors influencing a 
judges’ decision that are related to the facts and were less susceptible to agree with 
factors related to the individual. Law students showed the opposite dynamic.  
 
 
4.4. Correlates of the moral dimension of responsibility and the influence of 
the type of study 
 
 In line with our assumptions, factors related to negative emotions, to punitive 
attitudes and responses, as well as to justifications were highlighted as associated to the 
dimension of moral responsibility. Moreover, as expected, several findings suggest that 
such associations were globally more likely for psychology students, compared to law 
students.   
 
4.4.1. Responsibility in ordinary reasoning: Moral and emotional outrage 
responses 
 
 
 Mirroring findings from the previous studies, several findings bring further evidence 
to the assumption that a tendency for a moral and emotional outrage evaluation could be 
more likely to characterize psychology students’ patterns of response, compared to law 
students. Psychology students were more likely to ascribe moral responsibility to the 
agent, when they thinking about this event made them feel intense negative emotions. 
Law students did not show such patterns of responses. Moreover, psychology students, 
who were in the party justification condition, were the only respondents to be more likely 
to ascribe moral responsibility when they also agreed with the punitive aim of making the 
agent suffer until expiation. This linkage between making the agent suffer and moral 
responsibility was even more likely if they felt intense negative emotions about the event. 
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Let us add in this same vein that psychology students in the pleasure justification were 
the only group of respondents to be more likely to favour the imprisonment of the agent 
when they attributed moral blame to the agent. This relationship, however, is also more 
likely to be found when intense negative emotions are felt. Thus, both the linkages 
between moral responsibility and respectively, favouring prison time and agreeing with 
retributive punitive attitudes depended to a great extent on feeling negative emotions, for 
psychology students evaluating the agent who partied all night and created the fatal car-
crash.  
 Another result provides further support for the contention that psychology students 
are more likely to demonstrate punitive-oriented moral evaluations of responsibility. 
Psychology students who agreed that the agent was morally blameworthy for his actions 
were also more likely to impose a harsh concrete sentence, whereas law students did not 
make such relationships. Negative emotions, as well as favouring the imprisonment of the 
agent, may render this relationship more likely, but only for psychology students in the 
work justification condition. Psychology students in the party justification condition may 
be more likely to associate moral responsibility to imposing a harsh sentence even if they 
do not feel negative emotions about the event and do not want the agent to be imprisoned.  
 Let us add that psychology students were more likely to also agree that the agent’s 
action should be publicly denounced when they felt that the agent was morally 
responsible for his actions, than law students were. This latter student group only made 
such an association for the work justification condition, but with a lesser strength than 
psychology students, as the comparison of r values between these two student groups 
seems to suggest. However, only psychology students were more likely to go one step 
further in this moral condemnation stance by associating their will to condemn publicly 
the agent’s actions to the need to impose a concrete harsh sentence.  
 As shown previously in section 3.4, psychology students were, in terms of mean 
ratings, found to be more likely to consider that the criminal justice system is not harsh 
enough, compared to law students. Moreover, when they are in the work-related 
condition, they were also more likely to ascribe moral responsibility to the agent if they 
generally considered that offenders are not dealt with harsh enough. But, as for previous 
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linkages between punitive-related measures and moral responsibility, such processes of 
reasoning depended on whether they felt intense negative emotions.  
 In the same vein, let us observe that feeling negative emotions made it also more 
likely for all respondents who were in the work-related condition to agree that offender 
should suffer until expiation when they also considered that offenders were dealt with too 
leniently by the criminal justice system. However, psychology students who were in the 
party justification condition were more likely to favour making offenders suffer when 
they also agreed that offenders are getting away with their actions, independently of their 
negative feelings.  
 Overall, such results point once again towards the conclusion, supported by previous 
findings (Weiner, 1996), of a necessary linkage between blame, negative feelings and 
punitive responses in ordinary reasoning. Moreover, in line with Goldberg et al. (1999), 
feeling that justice is not served and that people are not dealt with harshly enough made it 
more likely for respondents’ to show retributive attitudes towards punishment. This was 
especially true for psychology students who were evaluating a situation in which an 
irresponsible behaviour which resulted in fatal consequences was the outcome of 
hedonistic and “irresponsible” motivations (partying all night). Thus, a threat to social 
order is more likely to be associated with retributive punitive responses, in line with 
Rucker et al.’s study, but this influence may even be more probable when the actions that 
are evaluated are highly blameworthy and considered as socially undesirable.  
 Globally, patterns of response reflecting moral outrage whereby moral responsibility 
accompanies punitive and condemnatory responses were clearly more likely to be 
observed for psychology students than for law students. These results provide support for 
the contention that retributive attitudes reflect a moral outrage response (Darley et al., 
2000) and that ordinary people may act as intuitive prosecutors when they think that 
norm violations are not dealt with harshly enough by justice (Goldberg et al., 1999; 
Rucker et al., 2004). 
   
 One should, however, note that generally retributive punitive aims were not 
significant predictors of moral responsibility, when examined in the form of the 
retribution mean rating. It is only when examining the individual measure of making the 
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offender suffer until expiation that such linkages are revealed for psychology students in 
the party justification condition solely. The fact that only one individual measure (and not 
the whole retributive punitive aim mean rating) was more likely to be favoured when 
these respondents ascribe moral responsibility to the agent in the party condition could be 
explained by the nature of the retributive mean rating itself. This mean rating was indeed 
the product of the computation of items that were not only related to retribution, but also 
to incapacitation (following the factorial structure produced for these punitive aims). 
Another source of bias could be related to the format of the measure used to assess 
punitive aims in this study which was modified with regard to the measures used in study 
(see section 2.2., p.212). This modification of the format of the scale used for these 
punitive measures could have polarized respondents ratings and may have biased their 
evaluations of these attitudes. 
 
4.4.2. Respondents’ punitive attitudes 
 
 Additional analyses showed that approximately ⅓ of respondents judged very 
favourably retributive aims and these respondents were not characterised by one or the 
other field of study. This group of high retribution-oriented respondents was composed 
proportionately of psychology and law students. However, further analyses showed that 
favouring highly retribution and agreeing that the justice system is not harsh enough 
could be more likely for psychology students, compared to law students. Indeed, more 
than half of psychology students who were found to strongly agree that the justice system 
is too lenient were also in the group of respondents who strongly support retributive 
punitive attitudes. These findings provide again support for the argument that retributive 
attitudes in ordinary reasoning are often associated to beliefs that norm are not dealt with 
harshly enough by justice. This suggests again that psychology students, as representants 
of ordinary reasoning, may be more likely to act as intuitive prosecutors (Goldberg et al., 
1999; Rucker et al., 2004), compared to law students. 
 
 Finally, another more general comment to make concerning punitive attitudes is that 
respondents, independently of their type of study, related their punitive responses 
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(sentence imposed and favouring prison) to retributive punitive aims, but never to 
utilitarian principles. These results support the suggestion, made by Carlsmith (2006) that 
people base their sentencing decisions on retributive factors, more than on utilitarian 
ones, because the latter goals are more relevant to their decision-making.  
 
4.4.3. Moral responsibility and its relationship to the justification measure 
with regard to controllability ratings  
 
 Moral responsibility was also found to be strongly related to the justification 
condition and the justification measure. Since the justification measure concerned the 
extent to which respondents agreed that the fact that the agent wanted to go home and 
sleep as soon as possible justified the agent taking the risks he took, we suspected that 
controllability, which encompasses measures such as “acting otherwise”, could be also 
related this measure. Supporting this theory, results show that all respondents, except for 
law students in the work justification condition, are more likely to disagree that the agent 
was justified in taking the risks he took when they consider that the actions were under 
the agent’s control. Moreover, all respondents, except psychology students in the work 
justification condition, were more likely to disagree with the justification of wanting to 
go home and sleep when they ascribed moral responsibility to him. This association was 
even more likely for respondents in the party justification condition, when they also 
considered that the agent’s actions were controllable. However, this relationship was less 
likely to be dependent on controllability ratings for law students in the work-related 
justification condition. Thus, respondents in the party justification condition who 
considered the agent blameworthy tended to be more likely to disagree with justifications 
for the risky behaviours of the agent, but this pattern of reasoning depended on the extent 
to which they thought he could have acted otherwise, was negligent, was careless and did 
not take the necessary precautions to avoid this event. Law students in the work-related 
condition did not need to base such an association on the assessment of controllability.  
These findings suggest that controllability may a more determining factor in respondents’ 
tendency to react negatively to the event by casting blame on to the agent and rejecting 
possible justifications for the risks that were taken when they are evaluating an 
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irresponsible behaviour underlain by hedonistic motives, compared to a same behaviour 
related to more responsible motivations. This result is not surprising, given that 
respondents generally were even more likely to show high ratings of the different 
controllability measures, than to agree with moral responsibility evaluations, in the party 
justification condition. Controllability, even more than moral responsibility, was a crucial 
element in respondents’ evaluation of the party justification condition, compared to the 
work-related condition. Respondents’, especially law students, may have, in that sense, 
followed the reasoning that the agent in the work condition had less possibilities to act in 
another way and to take necessary precautions (rest before driving), than the agent in the 
party condition, because he had to study the next day or take care of his children the next 
day.  
 Overall, these results could be explained by Alicke’s (2000) model, whereby 
normative expectations can lead respondents to spontaneous evaluations that can bias the 
way in which people will interpret control-related evidence and thus yield higher blame 
ratings. Since the pleasure-condition, in addition to producing higher controllability and 
blame ratings, yielded also higher negative emotions and higher sentences, these 
spontaneous reactions may have influenced controllability ratings, which in turn 
determined blame ratings and the rejection of justifications for taking risks.  
 
4.4.4. Moral responsibility and its relationship to other correlates  
 
 In addition, favouring a counterfactual reasoning for the event was, as predicted, 
more likely when psychology students ascribed moral responsibility to the agent, but was 
not more likely when law students made such evaluations. Moreover, these associations 
between counterfactual reasoning and moral responsibility for psychology students 
depended highly on their controllability evaluations. The fact that psychology students 
should be more likely, than law students, to agree that there were alternative behaviours 
that could have been produced by the agent, when they ascribed moral responsibility, 
especially if they also considered that the agent could have exercised more control over 
his actions is noteworthy. This is one more indication that psychology students were 
more likely to reason in manner which is characteristic of ordinary reasoning using 
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counterfactuals and controllability to ascribe moral responsibility, compared to law 
students. 
 Finally, contrary to our expectations and findings in studies 1 and 2, the tendency for 
internality was not a significant predictor of moral responsibility ratings. As the 
internality mean ratings used in this study had low alpha index values (see note 122, p. 
223), these non-significant results could be due to the lack of reliability of these mean 
ratings.  
 
4.5. Moral and legal responsibility dimensions: shared correlates but 
different reasoning processes 
 
 As for the legal responsibility dimension, in conformity with predictions, no link with 
negative emotions, the justification for taking risks measure, punitive responses and 
retributive attitudes was found.  
 However, contrary to our predictions, the legal responsibility dimension was strongly 
predicted by the counterfactual reasoning measure, which was also related to the moral 
responsibility and controllability ratings. Further findings suggest that the linkage 
between legal responsibility and the counterfactual reasoning measure may depend on 
whether respondents ascribe moral responsibility, especially if they are psychology 
students. Law students were more likely to make such an association only in the work 
condition and independently of whether they blamed the agent or not. They may have 
considered that the agent in the work condition, being tired because of responsible 
motives (work), was more likely to reason (consciousness and voluntariness, 
counterfactual thinking) about his drowsiness, than an agent who had partied all night 
long and who may have been less able to make a cost and benefits assessment of his 
fatigue. Psychology students were more likely to consider that the agent who was 
conscious of the risks he took and who acted voluntarily could have acted otherwise and 
avoided such an event, when they also blamed the agent. These findings demonstrate 
once again that ordinary reasoning about responsibility, whether legal or moral, is 
strongly related to the psychological tendency to imagine alternatives to a behaviour and 
to reason in a “what if” perspective.  
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 Further analyses show that moral and legal responsibility dimensions are associated 
to the negligent and intentional homicide qualifications. Moreover, law students were 
found to be more likely to agree with such qualifications than psychology students (see 
section 3.4.). Since the events that were evaluated were more likely to amount to a 
negligent homicide qualification, we decided to only examine the relationship between 
the two dimensions of responsibility and this qualification. We suspected that law 
students would be more likely to relate this qualification to legal responsibility than to 
moral responsibility, in coherence with legal reasoning. Psychology students may be 
more likely to relate this qualification to moral responsibility without considering the 
legal realities involved in the situation.  
 
4.5.1. Moral and legal responsibility and their relationship to legal 
qualifications 
 
 
 As legal and moral responsibility dimensions were both found to be related to the 
negligent homicide qualification, we examined these linkages separately across all groups 
of respondents. Akin to previous findings in studies 1 and 2, noteworthy results 
indicating that law students are more likely to reason in a more rational-oriented way that 
is consistent with legal reasoning, whereas psychology students are more likely to reason 
in a more moral and evaluative fashion.  
 Psychology students were the only respondents to be more likely to qualify the event 
of negligent homicide when they felt that the agent was to be blamed for his actions. 
They also indiscriminately related this qualification to higher legal responsibility. Law 
students never associated moral responsibility to negligent homicide, but were more 
likely to make such a qualification if they considered the agent was not legally 
responsible in the party justification condition. Let us also add that the positive 
association between legal responsibility and the negligent homicide qualification found 
for psychology students depended on whether they agreed that the agent’s actions were 
controllable. To the contrary, the negative linkage between these two evaluations found 
for law students in the party justification condition was even more likely if they did not 
consider that agent’s actions were controllable.  
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 Let us also add that all respondents in the party condition were more likely to qualify 
the event as accidental when they ascribed low moral responsibility However, this 
association was more likely for psychology students, if they also felt negative emotions. 
Thus, psychology students evaluating an irresponsible behaviour related to hedonistic 
motives were more inclined to associate low moral blame to the accident qualification, 
especially when this was accompanied by negative feelings, whereas law students made 
this association independently of these feelings. 
 
4.6. Controllability and its relationship to the moral and legal dimensions of 
responsibility 
 
 In line with findings in study 2 and with our assumptions, moral responsibility was 
more likely to be attributed to the agent if his actions were considered to have been under 
his control. Moreover, respondents were also more likely to ascribe legal responsibility to 
an agent they considered could have exercised more control over his actions, but this 
association was highly dependent on whether moral responsibility was attributed to the 
agent as well. Let us also add that when examining whether legal responsibility had any 
influence of the tendency for respondents to associate higher moral responsibility to 
higher controllability, no evidence for such an impact was found. It is, finally, 
noteworthy to mention that these influences were found for all respondents: they did not 
vary depending on the type of study and the justification condition.  
 These findings indicate once again that moral responsibility is strongly related to 
controllability and that this association could be stronger and more consistent than the 
linkage between legal responsibility and controllability. Moreover, legal responsibility is 
more likely to be associated to controllability ratings if moral responsibility is also 
strongly evaluated. People may find an agent more blameworthy when they think that he 
could have done otherwise and did not take all the precautions to avoid the event, but this 
do depend on whether they feel he was conscious of the risks he was taking or their 
assessment as to whether he acted voluntarily. However, if they think a person could have 
done otherwise and did not take all precautions necessary to avoid such harmful 
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consequences, they will also be more likely to consider that he was conscious of the risks 
and acted voluntarily, especially if they also blame the individual for his actions.  
 
4.6.1. Controllability as a stronger factor of influence for moral 
responsibility than for legal responsibility? 
 
 Overall, controllability was found, as in study 2, to be more related to the moral 
responsibility dimension than to legal responsibility. Several findings point indeed 
towards the hypothesis that controllability may be less of a determining factor for legal 
responsibility ascriptions, than for moral responsibility evaluations. Moreover, other 
findings provide further evidence that controllability and moral responsibility are strongly 
related dimensions and that the association between moral responsibility and correlates, 
such as rejecting justifications for taking risks or counterfactual thinking, depends highly 
on controllability, especially in ordinary reasoning (more likely for psychology students 
than for law students). These different relationships provide great support for the 
interpretation, confirming previous assumptions (Weiner, 1995), that controllability is an 
essential factor to consider when ascribing moral responsibility. 
 These findings are also in line with Shaver’s (1985) analysis of a strong link between 
excuses, controllability and moral blame. In his reasoning, a voluntary action (driving 
when feeling drowsy because one wants to go home) leading to an unintended or 
unforeseen consequence (losing control of the car, colliding into another car and killing 
its driver) is perceived by respondents as a morally reprehensible conduct for which 
responsibility cannot be denied. In other words, judging that a person is morally 
responsible for the harmful outcome of his actions makes the perceiver more likely to 
reject the agent’s perceptions that the agent just wanted to go home and did not mean to 
create this accident (justification) and to favour the reasoning that he should have acted 
otherwise instead of taking such risks (counterfactual reasoning). But these relationships 
are more likely if the agent was considered to have been able to exercise control over his 
actions (controllability).  
 The findings of a strong linkage between moral responsibility, counterfactual thinking 
and controllability also make sense: the agent was more blameful for wanting to go home 
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and sleep and taking the risk of driving while feeling drowsy, when he could have taken a 
nap before driving instead. Counterfactual thinking, as suggested by (Wiener et al., 
1994), plays a central role in the evaluation of controllability ratings.  
 Finally, these results provide evidence that counterfactual reasoning could be based 
more on moral judgments than on rational evaluations in ordinary reasoning. This is all 
the more possible, given the finding that legal responsibility was also more likely to be 
associated to counterfactual reasoning  by all psychology students, if they also considered 
the agent to be blameworthy. This influence of moral evaluations was not found for law 
students in the work-related condition. Thus, ordinary reasoning may be more likely to 
associate counterfactual reasoning to a legal evaluation of responsibility through the 
influence of moral evaluations. Since moral responsibility is strongly predicted by 
negative emotions, this could also mean, as suggested in some studies (Gleicher et al., 
1990; Macrae & Milne, 1992), that counterfactual thinking is more the product of an 
emotional interpretation of events, than of a rational appraisal process. Overall, these 
results demonstrate once more that the notion of choice (should have done otherwise) is 
essential in ordinary people’s punitive evaluations of immoral actions (Alicke & Davis, 
1990; Macrae, Milne & Griffiths, 1993).  
 
4.6.2. A stronger influence of the manipulation of the justification for 
irresponsible conduct on controllability ratings than on moral 
responsibility ratings 
 
 The fact that, at the level of mean ratings, moral responsibility and controllability 
were strongly affected by the justification condition also warrants an explanation. This 
means that the manipulation of the reasons for which the agent is tired and takes the risk 
to drive while feeling drowsy affect more respondents’ perceptions of the extent of 
control of the agent over his actions than their evaluations of his blameworthiness. The 
fact that moral responsibility and controllability were both strongly influenced by the 
manipulation of normative factors can be explained by Jones & McGillis’s (1976) notion 
of category-based expectancies. People may be more likely to believe that a person could 
have done otherwise and judge him more blameworthy, if the actions that were 
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performed are evaluated against the behavioural alternatives that are considered by the 
participants to be available when the agent took the decision to act. This tendency is 
expected to particularly strong if the perceiver expects the agent to act in conformity with 
his category-based expectations, that is, his conception of the likely behaviour of the 
agent given his characteristics (here a person who parties all night vs. a person who 
works all night). Thus, a person who parties all night and who engages in an irresponsible 
conduct (driving when feeling drowsy) may correspond more to a normative expectancy 
that categorizes him as an irresponsible and immature person, than a person who works 
all night and behaves in the exact same manner.   
 
4.6.3. The influence of controllability on the relationship between moral and 
legal responsibility  
 
Let us conclude by mentioning that all respondents were more likely to ascribe legal 
responsibility when they considered that the agent was morally responsible for his 
actions. However, for law students, this association depended on the extent to which they 
considered that the agent could have acted otherwise and did not take all the necessary 
precautions to avoid this event (controllability), whereas, for psychology students, this 
relationship did not depend on their controllability ratings. Controllability was, thus, a 
determining factor for moral responsibility ascriptions to be associated to legal 
responsibility judgments in law students’ responses, but not in psychology students’ 
responses. Law students, in line with legal thinking, may depend more on elements such 
as necessary precautions and acting otherwise to consider that a morally blameworthy act 
can also be assessed in terms of legal responsibility, compared to psychology students. 
This is again another example of the opposition between psychology students’ moral and 
evaluation-oriented reasoning and law students’ more rational and legal-oriented 
reasoning.   
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4.7. Participants’ perceptions of the criminal justice system: the role of 
religious affiliation and political orientation 
 
 To conclude, let us mention a few noteworthy results concerning the effect of 
participants’ religious beliefs and political orientation on the manner in which they 
perceive the criminal justice system.  
 Respondents who considered themselves as belonging to the political right expressed 
more satisfaction with the criminal justice system and its procedural fairness, than 
respondents from other political affiliations did. This result can reflect the higher 
tendency for rightist respondents to favour the status quo, compared to more left-oriented 
individuals (Giddens, 1998). Leftists may be more likely to show dissatisfaction with the 
criminal justice system’s procedural fairness, because they tend more to claim more 
equality. These results could also be explained by Altmeyer’s (1981) authoritarianism 
theory (RWA), since authoritarianism is related to conservatism (Wilson & Patterson, 
1968). This theory contends that, among other characteristics, authoritarianism reflects “a 
high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived as established and 
legitimate”. RWA has also been found to be strongly associated to justice attitudes 
pertaining to punishment and jury sentencing decisions (Altmeyer, 1996; Barnett et al., 
2004; Caroll et al., 1987; Narby, Cutler & Moran, 1993).  
 Finally, the fact that respondents who have a religious affiliation, without practicing 
actively this belief, are also more satisfied with the criminal justice system and show 
more trust in its decision-making, than non-believers, could also be explained by the 
authoritarianism theory, since such orientations could be related to religious beliefs (Leak 
& Randall, 1995)  
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V. Discussion 
 
1. Law and psychology students: legal reasoning vs. 
commonsense representations of responsibility 
 
1.1. Effect of type of study on perceptions of rational criteria for legal 
responsibility  
 
 Findings in studies 1 and 2 suggest the existence of common representations of the 
different dimensions of rational criteria of legal responsibility for all participants. All 
respondents correctly distinguished between consciousness and voluntariness and seemed 
overall to distinguish between commonsense intentionality levels, such as pure desire to 
hurt vs. intent to hurt vs. awareness of the probability of someone being hurt. They also 
clearly distinguished clear consciousness and intentionality from ambiguous 
consciousness and intentionality. In other words, all respondents understood that the 
measures depicting a situation in which consciousness and intentionality is not clear and 
would not be determined as existent in legal reasoning were less characteristic of 
respectively, consciousness and intentionality.  
 But even though generally all respondents differentiated between voluntariness and 
consciousness and discriminated between different levels of intentionality, these 
observations must be nuanced in light of the differences between respondents related to 
their type of study highlighted in both studies 1 and 2, in the first part of the 
questionnaire.    
 
 In study 1, law students, in the first part of the questionnaire, when confronted to a 
situation which describes an event which is accidental, but which can reflect legal 
negligence, given the presence of certain cues related to dispositional and motivational 
factors (the agent is described as throwing a flowerpot out of the window in a moment of 
rage) in the description, were more likely to identify the different rational criteria for 
responsibility, compared to psychology students. They were indeed more likely to 
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assimilate different levels and dimensions of consciousness and intentionality as 
reflecting respectively total or partial awareness and intent, compared to psychology 
students. Moreover, they were also more likely to grade different levels of intentionality 
in accordance with corresponding legal levels of intent, compared to psychology 
students. As far as intentionality is concerned, they understood that when a person has the 
unique objective to hurt someone, his actions are more intentional than when he wants to 
hurt someone, when he knows that the chances are great that he might hurt someone or 
when he knows that his actions could hurt someone. Moreover, they rated the 
intentionality as equivalent between “wanting to hurt someone” and “knowing that the 
chances are great that one might hurt someone”, as well as between two levels of 
awareness of the probability of someone getting hurt (“knowing that one’s actions could 
hurt someone” and “odds are great that one might hurt someone”). As for psychology 
students, they demonstrated more rough distinctions between levels of intentionality, 
since they only correctly perceived that “desire to harm” carried more intent than 
“intending to harm” and that “knowing that the odds were great” was more related to 
intentionality than “knowing that harm could occur”.  
 
 In study 2, results indicated once again that law students are more likely than 
psychology students to have an accurate representation of the different gradations of 
intentionality, which is consistent with legal understandings of intentionality. Levels of 
intentionality rated by law students for each measure increased as a function of the level 
of culpability entailed in the evaluation. Moreover, they also recognized that knowing 
that one’s actions could hurt someone reflected less awareness of the probability of risks, 
and thus, less intentionality, than knowing that the odds are great that one might hurt 
someone. As for psychology students, even though they did not grade the different 
measures of intentionality in scrupulous correspondence with legal nuances of 
intentionality as law students did, they perceived rather accurately different nuances to 
intentional conduct. Their ratings decreased from pure desire to harm to intent to harm 
and from pure desire to awareness of the probability of the risk to harm. Moreover, they 
also agreed that awareness that the odds were great for a harm to occur was closer to 
intent than awareness that harm could occur. These findings show that ordinary reasoning 
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has a graded conception of the awareness of the probability of risk element and perceives 
that according to this risk element, intentionality increases gradually from negligent (no 
intent), to reckless (some intent) and finally, to intentional (total intent) (Karlovac & 
Darley, 1988). Moreover, as ordinary perceivers distinguished, with decreasing 
intentionality ratings, between the desire to hurt, wanting to hurt and knowing that there 
is a probability of risks that one could hurt someone, this constitutes further evidence for 
the observation, highlighted by Nadelhofer (2006), that people may consider desire and 
belief elements, as well as foresight, when evaluating the extent of intentionality. Thus, 
not only may people be able to differentiate, in terms of decreasing responsibility ratings, 
between situations in which the agent’s actions are described as purposeful or deliberate, 
negligent or accidental, as demonstrated in Finkel & Groscup’s study (1997), but they 
may also perceive the rough nuances that exist in the attribution of rational criteria of 
intentionality.  Thus, people may have a fairly graded conception of intentionality, 
whereby such an evaluation is likely to increase with foreseeability, intent, purpose and 
motives. 
 
 One should point out that law students’ perceptions of the different gradations in 
intentionality were even more accurate in study 2 than in study 1. This noteworthy 
observation can be explained by the nature of the scenario used to contextualize these 
evaluations. The vignette used in study 2 to measure participants’ perception of these 
rational criteria was more neutral in its wording than the one used in study 1. The 
scenario used in study 1 could have biased respondents’ evaluations of these different 
measures of legal criteria. Indeed, it described a person acting in a manner that could 
have been perceived by respondents as intentional, because the harmful actions were 
depicted as being the result of a moment of rage. The scenario used in study 2 was thus 
modified, in order to remove any biases that could have existed in the first scenario. 
These findings thus replicated results found in study 1 and provided for even stronger 
evidence as to the conclusion that law students’ are more likely, than psychology 
students, to clearly understand and identify the different nuances of intentionality that can 
be considered in legal thought. 
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 Let us add here another important finding in line with what has been said until now, 
which concerns differences between law and psychology students for specific measures 
of the intentionality, consciousness and voluntariness. These specific measures, which 
were only used in study 2, followed the more general measures related to the different 
dimensions of consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality. They were formulated in 
such a way that they concerned the respondent’s evaluation of the actual degree of 
consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality he/she would agree to attribute to an act 
of apparent negligence (throwing a dart accidentally out of a window). Law students were 
more likely to attribute consciousness, voluntariness and intentionality to the dart thrower 
for her seemingly negligent act, compared to psychology students. We suggest that law 
students may have been more sensitive to the potential legal liability that could be 
identified for an event in which an individual’s negligent actions led to harmful and 
unintended consequences. It is to be expected that future lawyers may have been more 
receptive, compared to psychology students, to the interpretation of events in terms of 
such rational criteria, when confronted to a seemingly neutral (information concerning 
the disposition and thoughts of the agent are absent) event. As Hamilton (1980) 
suggested, as good intuitive lawyers, they sensed that the agent could have done 
otherwise and should have known and anticipated such an accident. 
 
1.2. Effect of type of study on moral and legal responsibility dimensions in 
relation to the manipulation of legal cues vs. normative cues  
 
 As for the respondents’ evaluations of responsibility for the car-crash scenarios that 
were manipulated in the three studies, results indicate that respondents gave more or less 
weight to legal criteria, when ascribing responsibility to the agent, depending on their 
exposure to legal thought and on the nature of the cues that were salient in the scenario. 
Law students were more likely to evaluate the responsibility of the agent through a 
rational and legal-oriented analysis of the situation using these rational criteria, especially 
when legal cues where manipulated. Psychology students, on the other hand, were more 
likely to evaluate the agent’s behaviours through a moral and “right or wrong” 
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perspective, especially when their normative expectations as to responsible conduct were 
strongly violated.  
 
1.2.1. Study 1: Rational vs. morally based negligence ratings 
 
 In study 1, several findings point towards the conclusion that law and psychology 
students did not give the same weight to rational criteria used to ascribe legal 
responsibility for negligence in their responses. Law students tended to evaluate 
negligence through a more rational and analytical lens, whereas psychology students 
were more likely to use a moral and evaluative perspective. The following results support 
such an interpretation. 
 Law students rated higher negligence for the unconscious negligence condition, 
compared to the conscious negligence condition, whereas psychology students considered 
the agent’s act to be negligent, whatever the level of legal negligence that was made 
salient in the scenario they were evaluating. Moreover, at the correlational level, law 
students in the unconscious negligence condition where the only group of respondents 
who were more likely to consider that the agent acted out of negligence, 1) when they 
considered that he had freely taken the decision to drive knowing that this could lead to 
an accident (voluntariness) or; 2) when they agreed that different levels of awareness of 
probability of risks reflected intentionality (Risk mean rating in the first part of the 
questionnaire). Let us also mention that regression analyses suggest that law students in 
the unconscious negligence condition were also more likely to make such a rating if 1) 
they did not ascribe moral responsibility to the agent; 2) thought that necessary 
precautions had not been taken and 3) qualified the event of negligent homicide. 
Psychology students were more likely to consider that the agent had acted out of 
negligence 1) when they thought that he had not taken all necessary precautions or; 2) 
when they perceived the agent as careless or; 3) when they consider the event to be a 
negligent homicide. However, psychology students were more likely to associate 
negligence to negligent homicide if they blamed the agent for his harmful action too.  
 Agreeing that necessary precautions were not taken was also more strongly related to 
considering that the agent acted out of negligence for psychology students, compared to 
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law students. This finding is not surprising, since ordinary reasoning about negligence 
strongly depends on the determination of whether necessary precautions were taken 
(Karlovac & Darley, 1988). Given the influence of elements such as voluntariness or 
probability of risks in law students’ reasoning about negligence, necessary precautions 
may be less strongly related to negligence for these respondents, because more rational 
factors are also taken into account in their negligence ratings.  
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that law students were also more likely to consider that 
the fact that the agent’s actions were not intentional diminished his responsibility, 
compared to psychology students. This is a further indication that law students perceived 
the car-crash situation as an act of negligence, which they related more to the evaluation 
that the agent did not act intentionally, than to a moral evaluation of the extent of his 
negligence.  
 Taken as a whole, these results hint towards the hypothesis that psychology students 
were more likely to evaluate the scenario in a moral perspective, whereas law students 
were more likely to cling on to a legal analysis of responsibility.   
 
1.2.2. Study 2: Law students’ perceptions of the legal subtleties 
discriminating recklessness from negligence 
 
 As for study 2, the heightened sensitivity of law students to legal cues, compared to 
psychology students, as well as the more morally-oriented evaluations of psychology 
students, compared to law students, became even more evident.  
 Law students correctly perceived the differences between the recklessness and the 
negligence situation, in terms of the rational criteria that corresponded to each level of 
culpability, as well as, in terms of the possible serious legal implications for the offender 
(intentional homicide qualification more likely for the reckless conduct). Psychology 
students were less likely to perceive the seriousness of the offender’s liability in the 
recklessness condition, compared to the negligence condition. Indeed, they were more 
likely to consider that the agent acted out of negligence, whatever the culpability level, 
and to view both culpability conditions as an accidental event, compared to law students. 
We suggest here that psychology students may not have been very sensitive to the legal 
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cue in the recklessness condition that indicated intentionality (knowing that the 
probability that one’s actions can lead to harmful outcomes and deciding to disregard this 
possibility because one’s wants to reach a goal at all costs), because these elements do 
not correspond to what ordinary reasoning considers to be intention (Malle & Nelson, 
2003). This interpretation is all the more possible, since blame and anger were not at all 
affected by the recklessness condition. Yet intentional behaviours are likely to produce 
more blameful and angry evaluations from ordinary perceivers, compared to negligent 
behaviours (Knobe, 2003). This suggests that psychology students did not detect this 
legal intentionality cue in the recklessness condition. Law students associated this legal 
cue to legal intentionality, because its wording mirrored legal definitions of recklessness 
as they were taught to them in their legal training. Finally, findings concerning 
psychology students suggest, in line with findings in study 1, that they were more likely 
to evaluate the situation in moral and descriptive terms (accident, negligence) and less 
receptive to the legal implications that accompanied the levels of culpability that were 
manipulated, compared to law students. This is all the more possible since they were also 
more likely to support the public denunciation of the agent’s acts than law students were.   
 
1.2.3. Study 3: Influence of normative cues on law and psychology 
students’ moral responsibility evaluations  
 
 The last study demonstrated that, when normative cues are salient and legal cues were 
not present in the scenario that participants had to rate, law and psychology students rated 
scenarios in the same manner and their responses were affected by normative cues in the 
same manner. This indicates that law and psychology students were just as susceptible to 
attribute higher moral responsibility, controllability, punishments, as well as lower 
mitigating circumstances and diminished responsibility to the agent in the pleasure 
condition, compared to the duty condition. In other words, even respondents with legal 
training considered that the agent who partied all night was more blameworthy, could 
have controlled his behaviour more and deserved a harsher sanction, compared to the 
agent who worked all night. Thus, an extra-legal factor, such as justification for 
irresponsible conduct, affected also respondents who, by their training, should not be 
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affected by such factors when they evaluate a behaviour and judge the sanctions incurred 
for it.   
 
 However, let us note that some results in study 3 also indicate that law students are 
more sensitive to the possibility that harmful behaviours can correspond to a legal 
liability, compared to psychology students. They were indeed more likely to assess that 
the agent’s acts could be intentional, that he may be accountable before justice and that 
his acts amount to a qualification of negligent or even intentional homicide. Law 
students’ higher ratings concerning the negligent homicide qualification and 
accountability before justice are quite comprehensible, given that fatigue is considered in 
case law as an element that can lead to incapacity to drive and, thus, produce legal 
consequences. As for the elements of intent, even though the situation did not contain any 
cues that could lead to an assessment of intentionality, law students may have taken into 
consideration the possibility that the agent’s fatigue was not only related to his night 
activities, but also to the consumption of alcohol or drugs. The presence of alcohol or 
drug use, when determining responsibility for a fatal car-crash, can indeed lead to 
judgments for reckless homicide (and thus the consideration of intentional behaviour). 
Law students may have considered this issue when making their evaluations.  
 Finally, one should also mention that important differences, concerning the 
perception of the legal system and its procedures, as well as causes for crime and factors 
that can influence legal decision-making, were found in study 3 between law and 
psychology respondents. Law students, not surprisingly, showed generally more support 
and satisfaction for the way in which the legal system functions and handles people, 
compared to psychology students. Psychology students were, conversely, more critical 
and distrustful of the legal institution and its practices. Law students’ responses 
concerning punitive aims (treatment, restorative and financial ways to attenuate the harm 
done to the victim’s family) and the legal system’s responses to harmful conduct (the 
individual’s characteristics and personal situation should influence decision-making) 
corresponded more to actual legal practices, than psychology students’ responses 
(importance of restoration and retribution, facts should influence decision-making). For 
that matter, let us observe that it is not surprising that law students are more likely to 
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support the normative values and processes, which guide the institution of law and its 
legal rationality, compared to psychology students. A similar finding was recently 
observed by Carvajal Sanchez (2010) for respondents coming from the same academic 
fields in Switzerland.  
 
1.3. Effect of type of study on the correlates of moral and legal 
responsibility  
 
 One of the main assumptions guiding this study is the fact that moral and legal 
elements of responsibility, although they overlap, do not involve the same patterns of 
reasoning, because they are determined by different factors. In conformity with our 
expectations, moral responsibility was found to be more likely to be related to negative 
emotions, condemnatory responses such as favouring public denunciation, supporting 
retributive punitive attitudes and punitive responses and rejecting justifications, compared 
to legal responsibility. Conversely, legal responsibility was not found to be related to 
such punitive, emotional and evaluative factors and was more likely to be associated to 
rational criteria and legal qualifications.  
 An additional and related assumption concerned the possibility that the tendency to 
favour a more moral or a more legal pattern of reasoning about responsibility may be 
related to the legal training of respondents. Psychology students, given their tendency to 
moral and evaluative judgments, would be more likely to associate moral responsibility 
to related factors such as negative emotions, condemnatory responses and punitive 
responses, compared to law students. Law students, compared to psychology students, 
would be more likely to associate rational evaluations or legal qualifications to the legal 
responsibility in coherence with the legal realities of the situation they were assessing. 
Findings from the three studies that were carried out support this assumption.  
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1.3.1. Psychology students’ emotional and “moral-outrage response” 
reasoning about responsibility 
 
 Concerning study 1, several findings about the correlational links between 
blameworthiness and factors such as negative emotions, punitive responses and 
retributive punitive attitudes indicate that psychology and law students do not reason 
about these linkages in the same way.  
 For a car-crash event which constitutes an act of negligence and which could be 
considered as liable for penal consequences, only law students in the condition in which 
the agent was described as not being aware of the risks attached to his conduct were more 
likely to blame the agent when they also support retributive principles for sentencing. 
Moreover, psychology students in the unconscious negligence condition and law students 
in all conditions were likely to ascribe blameworthiness to the agent when they felt 
negative emotions; but only the psychology students made this association independently 
of their support for retributive aims. Moreover, psychology students were more likely to 
associate blameworthiness to punitive and condemnatory responses such as public 
denunciation or imprisoning the agent across both negligence conditions, whereas law 
students only made these associations for the unconscious negligence condition. Finally, 
as for the linkage between blameworthiness and punitive responses (prison, retributive 
aims), findings suggest that psychology students could depend more on condemnatory 
and emotional responses to show such morally punitive responses than law students do. 
They may, in that sense, be more prone to express a moral outrage stance when favouring 
punitive responses, compared to law students. Law students, because they are only more 
likely to associate blameworthiness to prison or public denunciation for the unconscious 
negligence condition, may be more likely to reason in a more rational fashion. For them, 
a more negligent act (they considered the unconscious negligence condition to entail 
more negligence than the conscious negligence one) is likely to be more blameworthy 
and to be more likely punished by a public condemnation and imprisonment.   
 These findings provided us with the first hints that psychology students were more 
likely to favour a moral outrage pattern of response than law students. Their responses 
are a good illustration of ordinary reasoning about blame and sanctions: ordinary 
perceivers tend to cast more blame on an agent if they feel he deserved to be sanctioned 
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and publicly condemned for having violated the moral order (Feather, 1996; Feinberg, 
1970).  
 
 As for study 2, in which culpability levels were more markedly distinguished as they 
opposed negligence to recklessness (which entails a form of intent), evidence for the 
higher tendency for psychology students, compared to law students, to associate moral 
responsibility to emotional and condemnatory punitive responses became even more 
apparent. Psychology students in the negligence condition were the only respondent 
group to associate moral responsibility to negative emotions. Moreover, all psychology 
students favoured public denunciation when they found the agent morally responsible 
without this association depending on whether they favour his incarceration, whereas law 
students only made this association for the reckless conduct and were more likely to 
relate it to the imprisonment of the agent. Finally, both groups of students were more 
likely to want the offender to be imprisoned if they felt his actions should be publicly 
condemned, but this association was highly dependent on attributions of moral 
responsibility towards the rule violator only for psychology students.  
 These findings provide further evidence for the contention that the punitive moral 
outrage process of reasoning was more characteristic of psychology students’ 
evaluations, compared to law students’ responses. Given that ordinary perceptions of 
punitive sanctions have often been related to blame in previous analyses (Carlsmith & 
Darley, 2008; Feather, 1996; Feinberg, 1970), psychology students’ moral outrage 
response pattern may be more representative of ordinary reasoning about responsibility 
than law students’ evaluations. 
 
 Finally, the third study in which normative cues concerning justifications for 
irresponsible conduct revealed even more striking evidence that moral outrage response 
patterns were more likely to be part of ordinary reasoning, as illustrated by psychology 
students’ evaluations, compared to law students. Psychology students were more likely to 
feel intense negative emotions while thinking about the event if they also considered the 
agent to be morally responsible, whereas law students did not associate moral evaluations 
to such negative feelings. Moreover, psychology students in the party justification 
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condition were the only respondents to ascribe more moral responsibility to the agent if 
they also felt they wanted him to be imprisoned or if they generally felt that offenders 
should suffer until expiation. Let us add that these associations between moral 
responsibility and punitive responses and attitudes were especially likely if psychology 
students in the party justification condition also felt high negative emotions about the 
event. One should also mention that psychology students were also more likely to ascribe 
more moral responsibility if they felt that offenders were getting away easily with their 
criminal actions and constituted a threat to social order, but only in the work-related 
justification condition. Finally, psychology students were more likely to impose a harsh 
concrete sentence when they felt that the agent was morally responsible, whereas law 
students did not relate these two evaluations. In addition, psychology students who were 
in the work related justification were more likely to associate moral responsibility to 
harsher sentences, especially if they felt negative emotions or favoured prison. But for 
psychology students in the party-justification condition, this association did not depend 
on negative feelings or agreeing with punitive responses. It is also worth mentioning, in 
the same vein, that psychology students, whatever the condition, were also more likely to 
favour a harsh concrete sentence, when they also felt that the agent’s actions should be 
publicly denounced.  
 Thus, globally, psychology students were more likely to display moral and emotional 
outrage response patterns than law students. Furthermore, such moral outrage stance was 
especially marked when they were evaluating a situation in which an irresponsible 
behaviour which resulted in fatal consequences was the outcome of hedonistic and 
“irresponsible” motivations (partying all night). These findings reinforce the conclusion 
that retributive attitudes reflect a moral outrage response (Darley et al., 2000) and that 
ordinary people (perceivers who are not legally trained; here, psychology students) may 
act as intuitive prosecutors when they think that norm violations are not dealt with 
harshly enough be justice (Goldberg et al., 1999; Rucker et al., 2004) 
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1.3.2. Law students’ rational-oriented analytical evaluation of responsibility 
 
 Across the three studies, many findings provide support for the contention that law 
students were more likely, than psychology students, to evaluate the car-crash event in a 
more rational and analytical perspective which took into account the legal realities 
involved in the situation. We will discuss the most compelling findings supporting such 
an interpretation.   
 
 In study 1, law students were never more likely to qualify the event of negligent 
homicide when they attributed legal responsibility to the agent, whereas psychology 
students did associate both for the conscious negligence condition. Moreover, even if all 
respondents understood that the event was more likely to be accidental if the agent’s legal 
responsibility was low, law students were more likely, than psychology students, to 
detect the presence of relevant elements with regard to the situation, such as necessary 
precautions or awareness of the probability of risks, and associate these to legal 
responsibility. Thus, law students in the unconscious negligence condition (no awareness 
of the probability of risks and, consequently, no precautions taken to avoid such risks) 
were the only group of respondents to be more likely to ascribe legal responsibility if 1) 
they thought that necessary precautions had not been taken to avoid the harmful outcome 
or; 2) they agreed that different levels of awareness of the probability of risks 
corresponded to different levels of intentionality. Their patterns of responses for the 
unconscious negligence condition were, hence, consistent with the legal cues that were 
contained in the situation they evaluated.  
 Regression analyses testing whether necessary precautions, awareness of the 
probability of risks and legal responsibility are predictors of the accident qualification 
show even more convincing evidence of law students’ rational-oriented and legally-
consistent response patterns. They indicate that low legal responsibility was the sole 
predictor of such a qualification for both psychology students in the conscious negligence 
condition and law students in the unconscious negligence condition. Yet, law students in 
the unconscious negligence condition reasoned differently: low responsibility and low 
agreement with the fact that necessary precautions were not taken were more likely to be 
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associated to characterizing the event as accidental. Thus, law students clearly 
distinguished between the two negligence conditions: they perceived that both these 
conditions could be considered as accidental, but that different elements that are relevant 
to legal reasoning were to be considered for each condition to come to such a conclusion. 
Low legal responsibility (low awareness of the risks attached to ones’ actions, low 
voluntariness) was a relevant element for the unconscious negligence condition, whereas 
the consideration of low legal responsibility, in addition to the fact of having taken 
necessary precautions to avoid harmful outcome, was more pertinent to evaluate the 
conscious negligence condition. Psychology students used another reasoning process and 
only applied it to the conscious negligence condition: they detected that in the conscious 
negligence condition the agent was described as being aware of risks and taking 
precautions to avoid them, consequently, the less he was aware of the risks, the less he 
acted voluntarily and intentionally, the more this event was accidental.  
 These results suggest that law students may be evaluating the car-crash event in a 
more analytical manner considering all cues relevant to decide whether the agent was 
legally accountable or not, compared to psychology students.  
 
 Law students’ more legally-oriented reasoning was also quite manifest in study 2. 
Law students never made any significant associations between moral responsibility and 
legal qualifications that implied the possibility for a legal outcome and a penal response, 
unlike psychology students who did make these linkages. Moreover, law students were 
more likely to agree to qualify the event of intentional homicide, when they ascribed 
legal responsibility to the agent in both negligence and recklessness conditions, whereas 
psychology students only made such an association for the negligence condition. A 
related observation to make is that law students agree that more legal responsibility 
(higher consciousness, higher intentionality) makes it more likely that the event is an 
intentional homicide for both conditions, but these associations are based on different 
reasoning processes depending on the condition. In the negligence condition, law 
students are more likely to relate high legal responsibility to the qualification of 
intentional homicide if 1) they considered the agent’s acts controllable or; 2) if they 
believed that a negligent conduct, such as throwing a dart involuntarily through the 
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window and harming a passer-by in the process, could amount to intentional behaviour. 
In the recklessness condition, law students make this association independently of other 
rational factors, because they follow the reasoning that recklessness implies a certain 
level of intent, which logically could likely lead to an intentional homicide qualification. 
They do not need to consider any other factor to be more likely to perceive this event as 
intentional homicide, if they think that the agent acted intentionally, since they detected 
the element of intent in this culpability condition. Psychology students are less likely to 
demonstrate such a legally-based pattern of reasoning, since they are more likely to 
associate legal responsibility to intentional homicide only in the negligence condition 1) 
if they consider that the agent is morally responsible or; 2) if they agree that he should be 
imprisoned for his actions.   
 
 Finally, even in study 3, in which legal cues were not made salient, several findings 
indicate that law students were still more likely to evaluate the situation using a legally-
focused lens, compared to psychology students. These results add more evidence, at a 
correlational level this time, to the conclusions made previously, in section 1.2.3, (which 
concerned mean ratings) of law students’ tendency to a legal and rational standpoint in 
their evaluations.  
 Psychology students indiscriminately related moral responsibility to negligent 
homicide, as well legal responsibility to this same legal qualification. Law students, on 
the other hand, did not associate moral responsibility to negligent homicide and tended to 
ascribe less legal responsibility, when they agreed to qualify the situation of negligent 
homicide in the party justification condition. Let us add that the linkage between legal 
responsibility and negligent homicide depended highly on whether psychology students 
considered the agent’s acts to be controllable. Controllability had an opposite effect when 
this linkage was made for law students, since the evaluation of controllability made it less 
likely for law students to ascribe low responsibility if they qualified the action of 
negligent homicide. In other words, the negligent homicide qualification for psychology 
students was more likely, if they ascribed legal responsibility and, more so, if they agreed 
that the agent’s actions were controllable. This qualification was, conversely, less likely 
if law students in the party-justification ascribed legal responsibility to the agent, 
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especially if they also considered that his actions were controllable. These results suggest 
that negligent homicide, in law students’ perspective, was more likely to be considered as 
a qualification that is related to low legal responsibility and to the agent’s incapacity to 
act in another way to prevent the harmful outcome from occurring. Conversely, 
psychology students had a different reasoning: they perceived the negligent homicide 
qualification to be more likely if a person was legally responsible for actions that he/she 
could have prevented.  
 
1.3.3. The role of the influence of the academic training 
 
 In sum, law students, due to their training, were more likely to detect rational criteria 
for responsibility and to evaluate the situation in a rational and legal frame. Their patterns 
of responses indicated generally a heightened consideration for the legal realities 
involved in the situation, compared to psychology students. On the other hand, 
psychology students were more likely to be more attuned to evaluative and morally-
tainted ascriptions, such as public denunciation, acting out of negligence or the 
qualification of accident and less sensitive to the legal implications of the agent’s 
behaviours, compared to law students. Psychology students were also more likely to 
adopt a moral outrage and punitive-oriented pattern of response, compared to law 
students. However, when cues pertaining to rational criteria were not explicitly salient in 
the scenario evaluated and normative factors were manipulated instead, like in study 3, 
the manipulation of social norms had the same impact on respondents’ moral 
responsibility ascriptions, at the level of mean ratings, no matter what their training. Law 
students were just as likely as psychology students to ascribe more moral responsibility to 
the agent when his irresponsible behaviour was justified by hedonistic reasons (partying 
all night) than when his actions were justified by duty-related reasons (working all night). 
Thus, when law students could not “hang on” to rational criteria to base their 
responsibility judgments (like in studies 1 and 2), they were also more prone to normative 
and moral evaluations. However, law students, even in study 3, were more likely to 
reason about legal responsibility and their relationship to relevant legal qualification in a 
manner which is more consistent with the legal realities of the car-crash event than 
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psychology students were. Moreover, also in study 3, respondents with a law and 
psychology academic training, when evaluating the criminal justice system and its 
procedures, as well different causes for crime and factors that can influence legal 
decision-making, positioned themselves according to the specific ideologies guiding their 
respective fields of study. Law students, in accordance with the principles guiding the 
institution of criminal law in Switzerland, were more likely, than psychology students, to 
favour treatment as a goal for penal sanctions (rehabilitation-oriented aims), as well as 
consider that apologies and financial measures could help attenuate the harm done to the 
victim’s family. They were also more likely, in line with the reality of judicial practices, 
to consider that factors related to the individual’s personal characteristics and behaviour 
should guide judges’ decisions, than psychology students. Psychology students, were, on 
the other hand, more likely to favour retribution and incapacitation as a goal for penal 
sanctions and favoured social-norms-related causes, such as loss of civic sense and moral 
values, to explain crime, compared to law students. They were also more likely than law 
students to support the idea that facts should affect judges’ decision-making. Psychology 
students were probably more favourable to explaining crime by the breakdown of social 
norms and more likely to consider that the facts surrounding the case should influence 
judicial decision-making, because their studies condition them, more than law studies do, 
to take into account external and social factors and their possible influence on a person’s 
behaviour.  
 These observations mirror Carvajal Sanchez’s (2010) recent findings concerning the 
ideological influence of the academic background on law and psychology student’s 
representations of restorative justice and punitive justice. On the whole, when confronted 
with evaluations, which are directly related to domains of knowledge specific to the legal 
field (salient legal cues in the scenario or assessment of the criminal justice system and 
its processes, favouring restorative justice aims), law students will respond in line with 
their training. Let us not forget, in this explanation, that we made sure that all law 
students who participated in this study had already gone through classes concerning 
specifically the different forms of legal culpability (negligence, intent) and the difference 
between legal responsibility and irresponsibility. In essence, in line with Clémence & 
Doise’s (1995) interpretation, law students, given their training, were more likely to use a 
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rational logic of reasoning and an informative process of thought. Psychology students, 
who are probably more representative of “ordinary perceivers’ reasoning”, were more 
likely to resort to a more spontaneous and natural logic of reasoning, which is underlain 
by representative thought. Such ordinary reasoning, as observed in this research, is more 
susceptible to moral, normative and emotional evaluations than to rational and analytical 
processes of reasoning. Yet, one should consider the possibility that studying psychology 
may have also made it more likely for psychology students to show such moral and 
evaluative tendencies. As Guimond’s (1998), in a study of the influence of socialization, 
suggests, “students in social sciences are regularly exposed to theories, concepts or 
proposals which highlight the importance of social conditions and which underline the 
limits imposed on human behaviour by the social, economic or political environment”. 
 Thus, respondents could have been more likely to assess responsibility in these 
different studies in correspondence with their academic socialization, in line with 
previous findings about the influence of socialization on different social evaluations 
(Collard-Bovy & Galand, 2003; Guimond, 1992; Guimond, Begin & Palmer, 1989). 
However, let us caution that the role of socialization in this study must be relativized with 
regard to the fact that respondents were in their first year of studies. Indeed, socialization 
effects are likely to increase with the length of time spent studying in a given field 
(Guimond et al., 1989). We can thus presume that, if this research had been carried out 
with psychology and law students in their 4th year of study, differences in responsibility 
evaluations would have been even more pronounced when comparing responses. More 
specifically, in this hypothesis, psychology students’ responses, because of their 
academic background, would have been more marked, in terms of their tendency to take 
into account the influence of social and environmental factors, when evaluating the 
responsibility of the agent. In that sense, because of their robust psychological lens, 4th 
year psychology students’ would have probably been less representative of ordinary 
thought about responsibility, in the sense of the everyday lay perceptions made by the 
ordinary man. Yet, this is also why we chose 1st year psychology and law students in this 
study. We wanted their exposure to their field of study to be minimal, in order to 
demonstrate that even when respondents’ conditioning is relatively weak, differences can 
be found and are related to a certain degree to socialization. Let us add that the effects 
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found in this study may also be somehow explained by self-selection effects (Haley & 
Sidanius, 2005), whereby people may be more likely to join an academic orientation 
which corresponds to their socio-political views. In this perspective, psychology and law 
students chose their respective fields of studies, according to their values and the manner 
in which they view the world around them. But, in view of previous findings 
investigating this hypothesis (Guimond et al., 1989), we find such an explanation rather 
unconvincing.  
 
1.3.4. Ordinary reasoning and legal reasoning: an illustration of social 
thought and cognitive polyphasia 
 
 Let us add that when legal cues are not salient, respondents who are sensitized to the 
logics of legal reasoning, may reason, in terms of responsibility, more like ordinary 
perceivers, because the context in which they are responding calls for normative 
judgments and does not stimulate as much a rational analysis from their part. In that 
sense, normative influences on ordinary representations of responsibility, such as those 
described here, are typical illustrations of social thought (Guimelli, 1999). People may 
reason differently about a given social object depending on the characteristics of the 
social context and the issues at stake for each respondent as an individual. Thus, when 
legal cues or references to the legal system are salient, law students may feel more 
involved in the evaluation and may thus be more likely to refer to a rational logic of 
reasoning, than when more normative factors are emphasized. By the same token, 
psychology students, when confronted to legal cues, use the process of reasoning which 
is the most familiar to them and resort, thus, to more moral and emotional evaluations, 
instead of responding in terms of rational dimensions. Hence, following Guimelli’s 
(1999) reasoning, psychology students do not make “wrong inferences, but different 
inferences that are characterized by their own social validity”. Moreover, all respondents 
spontaneously favour a more moral and normative reasoning, at the level of mean ratings, 
when there are no legal cues to constrain those participants who are legally-trained to a 
rational process of reasoning.  
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 Overall, this interpretation supports Moscovici’s (1961) contention that commonsense 
understandings of social objects should not be considered as a lesser form of knowledge 
that should be corrected by those who possess the right knowledge of such objects. 
Different ways of thinking about a given social object coincide in people’s minds, have 
different functions and may be triggered depending on the context and the needs attached 
to their social life. This is what Moscovici called cognitive polyphasia. Moscovici 
defined this concept quite clearly in a dialogue with Anna Markova (Moscovici & 
Markova, 2000, p. 241):  
 
“People are able in fact to use different modes of thinking and different representations according to the 
particular group they belong to, the context in which they are at the moment, etc. No further investigation is 
necessary in order to perceive that even professional scientists are not entirely engrossed in scientific 
thought. Many of them have a religious creed, some are racist, others consult their “stars”, have a fetish, 
damn their experimental apparatus when it refuses to work, which is not necessarily quite rational”.  
 
He (Moscovici & Markova, 2000, p.242) also adds that cognitive polyphasia helps to 
“understand how it is possible, that, not only in different societies, but also within the 
same individuals, there coexist incompatible ways of thinking and representations”. 
 Thus, cognitive polyphasia can explain why respondents, who are trained to process 
rational cues and analyse their legal implications, when judging the responsibility of an 
agent, will be more likely to turn to moral and emotional attributions of blame when 
rational cues are replaced by normative ones. In conformity with Durkheim’s (1925) 
distinction between the moral of good and the moral of duty, respondents may be 
thinking of responsibility in terms of a person’s duty of obedience to a legal authority 
(legal dimension), as well as in terms of a person’s role in society and in inter-individual 
relationships (moral dimension).  
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2. Moral and legal dimensions of responsibility: different 
processes of reasoning but overlapping evaluations  
 
 Overall, the three studies carried out in this research suggest that blame and legal 
responsibility are not based on the same processes, but may be in some manner connected 
depending on the event that is evaluated. These finding provide a significant contribution 
to the long-lasting debate about whether blame and responsibility are interchangeable 
constructs or distinct concepts (Alicke, 2000; Harvey & Rule, 1978; Shaver, 1996a).  
 This research demonstrates quite clearly that ordinary reasoning entails both 
dimensions of responsibility, but that ordinary people are more likely to reason 
spontaneously with a moral evaluation than in a legally-oriented manner. As 
demonstrated with psychology students’ patterns of responses for the car-crash event, 
ordinary reasoning is more likely to follow an evaluative process of reasoning reflecting 
moral outrage and be less attuned to a rational and analytical processing.  
 Moreover, across all studies carried out in this research, strong links between the 
moral dimension of responsibility and evaluations related to negative emotions, 
controllability, public denunciation, punitiveness and justifications were found, whereas 
this was much less the case for legal responsibility, which was more related to rational 
and legal concepts. When respondents attributed blame to a person’s behaviour, they 
referred to the extent to which they think the agent had control over his behaviour and 
relied on their negative feelings, disagreed with eventual justifications for this behaviour, 
favoured punitive responses and took into account attitudes favouring punitive aims 
underlain by a retributive rationale. Legal responsibility attributions were more related to 
respondents’ understanding of elements that are important in legal reasoning, such as the 
link between awareness of probability of risks and intentionality or the extent of 
necessary precautions taken to avoid harmful outcomes. The legal evaluation of 
responsibility was also affected by the legal level of negligence or culpability 
manipulation, but not by the manipulation of normative criteria. Legal responsibility 
dimensions were never found to be related to punitive attitudes or responses, negative 
emotions, as well as justifications for having taken risks.  
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2.1. Moral responsibility evaluations as spontaneous responses which are 
not always consistent with legal responsibility  
 
 Another noteworthy observation to make in this context is that several findings reveal 
that respondents, especially psychology students, did not always match their moral 
responsibility and legal responsibility judgments to the legal realities of the situation they 
were judging.  
 Psychology students were more likely to adopt a moral outrage pattern of response 
and to relate legal responsibility to legal qualifications in an indiscriminate and non-
legally consistent manner. More generally, respondents in study 3 were more likely to 
attribute more moral responsibility and show generally a more punitive stance when 
judging an irresponsible and harmful behaviour motivated by hedonistic reasons, 
compared to the duty-driven fatal outcome. However, their legal responsibility judgments 
were generally influenced by such normative factors.  
 In that line of reasoning, one should also mention that when comparing mean ratings 
for all moral and legal responsibility measures, all blame-related measures were generally 
more favoured by respondents, compared to measures of rational criteria for legal 
responsibility, across the three studies. Thus, most respondents agreed to attribute blame 
to the offender without considering that his actions were intentional or strongly agreeing 
that he was aware of the likelihood that his actions could lead to harmful outcomes. Let 
us add that t-test analyses confirmed that this assertion is valid for both psychology and 
law students across all three studies. Mean ratings for all moral and legal responsibility 
measures across the three studies, for both psychology and law students, are shown in 
Table 4.1 and 4.2. For study 1, we compared blameworthiness (since it was used to 
reflect the most moral responsibility in this study) to the legal responsibility mean rating 
for both types of study and significant differences were observed for both student groups 
(tpsy (96) = 15.19, p <.001; tlaw (116) = 16.59, p <.001). Blameworthiness (mpsy=4.32; 
mlaw=4.23) was always rated higher than legal responsibility (mpsy=2.63; mlaw=2.52) for 
all respondents. In study 2, significant differences were also found between moral and 
legal responsibility mean ratings for both student groups (tpsy (81) = 20.47, p <.001; tlaw 
(94) = 14.46, p <.001). Moral responsibility (mpsy=4.26; mlaw=4.52) was again more 
likely to be ascribed than legal responsibility (mpsy=2.24; mlaw=3.04) by respondents. 
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Such significant differences were also highlighted across both student groups in study 3 
(tpsy (107) = -15.21, p <.001; tlaw (123) = -16.77, p <.001). Again all respondents rated the 
agent’s moral responsibility (mpsy=4.10; mlaw=4.22) higher than his legal responsibility 
(mpsy=2.84; mlaw=2.94).  
 
 
Table 4.1.: Mean ratings for all moral and legal responsibility items for psychology students 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2.: Mean ratings for all moral and legal responsibility items for law students 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Moreover, blame ratings and moral responsibility were consistently found to be 
related to punitive retributive responses and condemnatory evaluations favouring the 
public denunciation of the agent’s acts, whereas legal responsibility ratings were never 
found to be related to such punitive and condemnatory responses. Thus, moral 
responsibility ratings could lead to punitive responses, but consideration for the extent of 
intentionality and consciousness of the agent’s actions may be less likely to be associated 
to a heightened punitive stance.   
 
Measures Study 1 
 
Study 2 
 
Study 3 
 
 Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* 
Legal 
responsibility 
Consciousness  2.89 1.41 3.07 1.26 3.64 1.17 
Voluntariness 3.62 1.28 4.45 0.86 3.57 1.22 
Intentionality 
 
 
1.39 
 
 
0.74 
 
 
1.40 
 
 
0.66 
 
 
1.31 
 
 
0.78 
 
 
Moral 
responsibility 
Responsibility for the death of the victim 3.90 0.95 4.06 0.88 4.02 0.97 
Accountability before justice 4.32 0.82 4.24 0.84 4.19 0.93 
Blameworthiness 4.32 0.84 4.48 0.79 4.10 1.01 
 
Measures Study 1 
 
Study 2 
 
Study 3 
 
 Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* 
Legal 
responsibility 
Consciousness  2.85 1.32 3.76 1.19 3.53 1.09 
Voluntariness 3.45 1.48 4.69 0.62 3.60 1.17 
Intentionality 
 
 
1.26 
 
 
1.40 
 
 
2.31 
 
 
1.29 
 
 
1.68 
 
 
1.04 
 
 
Moral 
responsibility 
Responsibility for the death of the victim 3.71 1.02 4.29 0.71 4.02 0.77 
Accountability before justice 4.29 0.84 4.65 0.63 4.19 0.59 
Blameworthiness 4.23 0.97 4.61 0.67 4.10 0.99 
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 These different observations taken together lead us to argue that people may not 
always morally evaluate a situation in tune with its legal liability implications. Ordinary 
citizens often do not understand why a person who has caused considerable harm to 
others is considered legally irresponsible and will, as a result, not be considered guilty 
and consequently, not liable for punishment (Hans, 1986; Hans & Slater, 1984). This is, 
for example, the case when a person who presents a serious mental deficiency kills 
another individual and is not judged responsible for his actions. He is not considered 
legally liable, because he did not have the mental capacity to be aware of his actions and 
its consequences. Such cases create often a public uproar, because members of the public 
cannot fathom the idea that a person who caused such harm will not be recognized legally 
responsible and will, thus, not be found guilty of such a crime. They need to blame the 
person who caused a given accident and their desire to attribute moral responsibility will 
not be mitigated by the fact that agent does not possess capacity responsibility (Finkel & 
Handel, 1989). Citizens will judge the agent blameworthy, responsible for the death of 
the victim and think that he should be accountable before justice (moral responsibility), 
even though they may be less susceptible to attribute intent, consciousness and 
voluntariness to the agent (legal responsibility). Hence, when moral and legal evaluations 
of an act are made, the moral culpability of the agent could override rational elements of 
responsibility in respondents’ minds. People most often reason less in terms of 
consciousness and intentionality, but more in terms of “could have done otherwise” or 
“ought to have known the risks incurred”. Consideration for rational criteria could be less 
intuitive than moral considerations about the perceived control over one’s actions.  
 
2.2. Moral responsibility as an antecedent evaluation of legal 
responsibility? 
 
 If we contend that moral responsibility is a more spontaneous reaction for ordinary 
perceivers to have when evaluating a harmful event, this could also mean that moral 
responsibility evaluations are probably necessary for legal attributions to be also made in 
ordinary reasoning. Moral responsibility ascriptions could be paving the way for legal 
responsibility attributions to be made when relevant legal cues are salient in the event that 
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is evaluated. This hypothesis is speculative but is suggested by the finding that moral 
responsibility was found to be related to legal responsibility in studies 2 and 3 and that 
this relationship was often more likely when controllability was also rated highly. Since 
controllability is related to moral responsibility without legal responsibility affecting this 
linkage, whereas the relationship between legal responsibility and controllability is 
strongly affected by moral responsibility, moral responsibility evaluations could precede 
legal responsibility judgments in respondents’ minds, especially if they are psychology 
students. In other words, moral responsibility may be an antecedent response to legal 
responsibility judgments.  
 Such a hypothesis can be related to the argument, made in previous discussions 
(Knobe, 2006; Leslie et al., 2006; Nadelhofer, 2006), that finding someone morally 
responsible for a given action may motivate the perceiver to consider his actions to be 
intentional. Let us add that this phenomenon may be explained by Alicke’s (2000) blame 
validation hypothesis which contends that when people are motivated to blame someone, 
their judgments of controllability and intentionality may be distorted accordingly in the 
process in order to confirm their moral disapproval stance.  
 In that sense, we could assimilate the legal dimension of responsibility to the concept 
of moral reasoning, which according to Haidt (2001), follows moral judgments and 
serves to justify such intuitive and spontaneous expression of moral reprobation. In other 
words and to cite Haidt’s suggestion, “people often behave more like a lawyer defending 
a client than a judge or a scientist seeking truth”. 
 More generally, the hypothesis that moral responsibility could be an antecedent 
evaluation of legal responsibility is supported by Hart & Honore’s (1985) analysis that 
moral blame often precedes legal responsibility, but does not always presuppose it. This 
perspective is clearly perceptible in their suggestion that “causing harm of a legally 
recognized sort or being connected with such harm in any of the ways that justify moral 
blame (…) is not and should not be either always necessary or always sufficient for legal 
responsibility” (Hart & Honore, 1985, pp. 67).  
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3. Controllability as an essential determinant of moral 
responsibility judgments 
 
 
 As we discussed previously, people may spontaneously be more likely to reason more 
in terms of “could have done otherwise” or “ought to have known the risks incurred” and 
less in terms of consciousness and intentionality. Consideration for moral evaluations 
about the perceived control over one’s actions could be more intuitive for ordinary 
perceivers. This brings us to the role of controllability with regard to moral and legal 
responsibility attributions. The assessment of the extent of control attributed to the agent 
over his actions refers to the extent to which the agent could have prevented the harmful 
outcome from occurring, could have acted otherwise or could have acted with more care, 
and has often been strongly related to moral blame (Mantler et al., 2003; Shaver, 1985; 
Weiner, 1995).  
 Findings in studies 2 and 3 confirm that moral responsibility and controllability are 
strongly associated elements in ordinary judgments of responsibility. Controllability was 
also more likely to be related to negative emotions, when moral responsibility was also 
strongly ascribed. These findings also suggest that controllability could be less of a 
determining factor for legal responsibility ascriptions, compared to moral responsibility 
evaluations. Indeed, the linkage between moral responsibility and controllability was 
never found to be in any way affected by legal responsibility, whereas moral 
responsibility was consistently found to influence the relationship between controllability 
and legal responsibility.  
 Moreover, findings in studies 2 and 3 also suggest that the linkage between moral and 
legal responsibility could depend to a certain extent on controllability ratings, especially 
when evaluating a situation of negligent conduct. Such an influence of controllability on 
the relationship between moral and legal ascriptions of responsibility was found in study 
2, for all respondents in the negligence condition, and in study 3, only for law students. 
This could mean that controllability is a central element that contributes to the 
relationship between moral and legal dimensions of responsibility when evaluating a 
situation in which the agent’s culpability level is rather low. Moreover, controllability, 
especially for law students in study 3, may have been a necessary element for higher 
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moral responsibility ratings to be accompanied by higher legal responsibility ascriptions 
for an event that could be evaluated at the most as constituting legal negligence. This 
finding adds an important contribution to the understanding of the role of controllability 
with regard to responsibility attribution in the context of harmful events produced by 
negligent conduct that can be liable to legal responsibility. This is all the more 
noteworthy since controllability has mainly been related to responsibility in judgments 
concerning everyday blame attributions where no legal liability could be determined 
(Mantler et al., 2003) or without taking into account explicitly the role of rational criteria 
for responsibility as well (Alicke, 2000).  
 
 Given all these findings, three conclusions are warranted. First, controllability seems 
overall to reflect more a morally tainted evaluation which is related to emotions, 
justifications and blame and which is more sensitive to normative cues than legal cues. 
Controllability could be, as suggested by Mantler et al’s (2003) study, an antecedent 
evaluation to moral responsibility ratings and subsequent emotional responses.  
 Second, controllability may be generally a more determining element in moral 
responsibility evaluations and their related evaluations, compared to legal evaluations. 
This interpretation may be explained by Weiner’s (2001) suggestion that moral 
responsibility judgments depend more on controllability than on intentionality judgments, 
since an uncontrollable action cannot yield a judgment of responsibility, whereas an 
unintended outcome can lead to such attributions. As Weiner puts it (2001, pp. 335), 
“controllability is a super-ordinate concept and outcome intention is a subordinate 
concept, with respect to responsibility” (in the sense of moral responsibility).  
 Third, controllability may also be an important element to be present for a person 
who is considered morally responsible for his actions to be also considered legally 
culpable, when the actions evaluated amount, at the most, to legal negligence. This 
assumption is supported by the findings that moral responsibility evaluations are more 
likely to affect legal attributions of responsibility (maybe especially for law students), if 
controllability is perceived as important for an act of negligence. Thus, these observations 
are in tune with Alexander & Ferzan’s (2009, pp. 79) argument that “one is culpable only 
for acts over which one has control”.  
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4. A closer look at respondents’ punitive attitudes  
 
4.1. A minority of strong retributivists? 
 
 Across all studies, respondents’ retributive attitudes and responses were only found to 
be related to moral responsibility evaluations and negative emotions and were never 
associated with legal responsibility. Utilitarian punishment goals were, on the other hand, 
never found to be related to blame evaluations or negative emotions. Moreover, 
retributive attitudes were found to be related to punitive responses, such as favouring the 
imprisonment of the agent or imposing a concrete sentence, whereas such associations 
with punitive responses were not found for utilitarian goals. Thus, utilitarian motives did 
not determine the manner in which respondents reasoned about penal sanctions and were 
not related to moral blame ascriptions. Retributive perspectives were more likely to 
determine respondents’ punitive responses and to be accompanied by moral blame, 
especially for psychology students. These findings bring further support to the Carlsmith 
& Darley’s contention that people are intuitive retributivists who react to harmful events 
with patterns of responses reflecting moral outrage.  
 
 Yet, concerning punitive attitudes in particular, certain findings indicate that 
retribution was not backed by the majority of respondents. Indeed, less than ¼ of 
respondents favoured highly this punitive rationale in study 1 (see chapter II, section 
3.10.1), and ⅓ of respondents showed the same agreement in study 3 (see chapter IV, 
section 3.8.). Moreover, in terms of mean ratings, in studies 1 and 3, retribution reached 
generally less agreement than rehabilitation or deterrence objectives for all respondents. 
In addition, as demonstrated in study 1, the minority of respondents who favoured 
retribution showed also specific demographic characteristics, since they were globally 
more likely to support the political right and to have a religious affiliation. These results 
are consistent with the hypothesis, put forward by previous research, assuming that 
support for retribution is more likely to be found in people who show conservative 
political and religious values and who are more likely to adhere to the principle of 
individual responsibility (Caroll et al., 1987; Languin et al., 2006; Tetlock et al., 2007). 
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These findings should also be related to the finding, in study 3, that respondents, who 
held right-oriented political values and religious beliefs, were also more likely to express 
satisfaction concerning the criminal justice system and its procedural fairness.  
 These findings altogether can be interpreted through the lens of Altmeyer’s (1981) 
authoritarianism theory (RWA), since political conservatism and religiousness are often 
associated with authoritarianism in that they contribute to a perception that the social 
order is legitimate (Leak & Randall, 1995; Wilson & Patterson, 1968). As a matter of 
fact, the RWA scale, which was developed to measure right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA), entails items related to authoritarian submission (tendency to abide by 
authorities), conventionalism (tendency to endorse normative rules and laws) and 
authoritarian aggression (tendency to show a harsh stance when rules, norms and laws 
are infringed). One can easily understand that agreement with such items may be more 
likely if one holds conservative political values and religious beliefs.  
 Findings from this research concerning respondents’ punitive attitudes provided 
support to the idea that ordinary reasoning makes a distinction between retributive and 
utilitarian philosophies and that blame and negative emotions may play a considerable 
role in this distinction, since they are only related to retributive attitudes. But since 
retribution was generally less favoured than deterrence or rehabilitation, this may indicate 
that only a minority of respondents supported such a punishment goal. Moreover, in 
support for such an interpretation, let us add that most respondents did not endorse the 
idea that imprisoning the offender could attenuate the harm done across the three studies 
(mode=2 in all three studies) and imposed a suspended prison sentence to the offender 
(more than 50% of the respondents agreed at the most with the imposition of a suspended 
prison sentence). The observation that, only a minority of people hold strong retributive 
attitudes is also consistent with previous research findings carried out in the Swiss 
context (Kuhn, 2001; Widmer, Languin, Pattaroni, Kellerhals & Robert, 2004).  
 
 The general observation across the three studies that respondents were more likely to 
endorse specific and general deterrence beliefs, as well as incapacitation aims, than to 
identify to restorative or retributive goals, when asked about their general punitive 
attitudes needs also be commented further.  
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 These findings contradict previous observations, since research generally 
demonstrates that retribution is the response that often dominates when people are asked 
to inflict punishment on an offender. The finding that only retributive aims were related 
to punitive responses in both studies 1 and 3 points, for that matter, towards such an 
understanding. The generally stronger endorsement of utilitarian goals, compared to other 
goals, that was found in this research may be explained by the type of situation 
respondents had to evaluate. Even though these goals were general and did not pertain 
specifically to the scenario that respondents had to evaluate, the punitive attitude measure 
followed the scenario and respondents may have thought more specifically of this case 
when responding to this general measure. They may then have favoured utilitarian goals, 
because they are more relevant to sanction the actions of an agent involved in a fatal 
road-traffic offense, compared to retributive goals. Keeping the offender off the road and 
reminding members of the society that dangerous driving is an offense and will be 
punished may indeed be a more intuitive and commonsense response to fatal road traffic-
offenses, than making the offender pay, suffer or giving him the punishment he deserves 
in proportion of the harm he caused in respondents’ minds. These results may be more an 
indication of a general concern to prevent further road-traffic offenses from being 
committed, than expressing a moral and public disapproval of the harm done. This 
observation is in line with Payne et al.’s (2004) findings that deterrence beliefs are also 
often endorsed by respondents and may be even favoured more than retributive beliefs 
depending on the type of offense evaluated. 
 
 Let us also mention a noteworthy result concerning respondents’ attitudes towards 
restorative responses, compared to punitive ones. When responses are explicitly related to 
the victim’s family’s needs, respondents were clearly more in favour of restorative 
responses, such as apologies and acknowledging one’s mistakes, than punitive responses 
(prison, fine, money). Mean ratings for all responses related to the ways to attenuate the 
harm done to the victim for studies 1, 2, and 3 are displayed in Table 4.3. In the interest 
of brevity, we did not separate mean ratings for both types of students for each study, as  
respondents in studies 1 and 2 rated these different measures similarly, whatever their 
type of study. Let us note, however, that differences between the two groups of students 
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were observed in study 3. Indeed, as discussed previously, in study 3, law students were 
found to be more likely, than psychology students, to support apologies and explanations, 
as well as money as a moral redress, as a manner to attenuate the harm done to the 
victim’s family. These differences in mean ratings between psychology and law students 
can be found in the results section of study 3 (section 3.4.).  
 
 
Table 4.3.: Mean ratings for all measures related to the ways to attenuate the harm done to the victim’s family for all 3 
studies 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 However, when asked to consider general punitive aims, all respondents, whether in 
study 1 or 3, showed little agreement with restorative options, such as repairing the 
trouble caused to social order or repairing the harm done to the victim, as demonstrated in 
Table 4.4. No significant differences were found between law and psychology students’ 
ratings.  
 
  Table 4.4.: Mean ratings for measures of punitive aims related to restoration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  * S.d. stands for standard deviation value 
 
 These mixed results may be due to the fact that respondents only clearly favoured 
restorative options, when they were directly linked to the situation and they concerned the 
victim. In the general measure of punitive aims, restorative responses were more abstract 
and did not only concern the victim, but also the society as a whole. 
 
Measures Study 1 
 
Study 2 
 
Study 3 
 
 Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* Mean S.d.* 
 
Acknowledging his mistakes 4.07 1.16 3.80 1.19 3.88 1.21 
Measures to 
attenuate the 
harm done 
Apologies and explanations 3.51 1.27 3.28 1.24 3.40 1.16 
Community service work 2.45 1.40 2.25 1.24 2.46 1.30 
Prison time 2.32 1.26 2.54 1.25 2.50 1.15 
Pay a fine 1.99 1.22 1.78 1.00 2.19 1.15 
Money as moral reparation 1.75 1.05 1.95 1.08 2.16 1.06 
Restorative-oriented 
punitive aims 
Study 1 Study 3 
Law students Psychology 
students Law students 
Psychology 
students 
 
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d 
Repair the trouble caused 
to society 2.87 1.20 2.87 1.29 2.51 1.08 2.25 1.02 
Repair the harm done to 
the victim 2.68 1.24 2.85 1.22 2.39 1.14 2.29 1.17 
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 Anyhow, the fact that respondents endorsed such restorative options is a noteworthy 
result, which supports the idea that people may be more inclined to accept restorative 
responses to criminal acts than what is generally thought (Roberts & Stalans, 2004). Our 
respondents may have endorsed such responses due to the non-violent nature of the 
offense they evaluated (the victim died because of a negligent or reckless conduct, but no 
act of violence per se was committed by the agent). Restorative justice may, indeed be 
better accepted by the public for offenses, which do not involve violence (Roberts & 
Stalans, 2004). 
 
4.2. Retributive responses as favoured spontaneous reactions to concrete 
events? 
 
 
 One should mention that other findings may add some nuance to the conclusion that 
retribution may not be an appealing philosophy for most participants. Public denunciation 
ratings, which were consistently associated to retributive punitive aims and which reveal 
a rather condemnatory tone, were found to be generally relatively accepted, since a 
majority of respondents showed moderate to fair agreement with this proposition across 
the three studies (study 1, m=3.27, mode and median=3; study 2, m=3.34, mode and 
median =4; study 3, m=3.09, mode and median=3).  
 These latter findings may indicate that many respondents may support the retributive 
rationale of re-establishing moral order through the public condemnation of harmful acts, 
when evaluating a concrete harmful action, such as the car-crash event. Retributive 
punitive aims and retributive responses favouring the imprisonment of the agent may 
have been generally weakly accepted because they were not directly related to the agent. 
Indeed, the measure used to rate respondents’ attitudes concerning punishment goals 
concerned general scales about the different objectives that the criminal justice system 
may hold when sanctioning a criminal behaviour. As for the measure concerning the 
imprisonment of the offender, it was formulated in terms of its capacity to attenuate the 
harm done to the victim’s family. Thus, it may have been understood more as a punitive 
measure with a reparative objective, than a punitive just deserts response per se. 
Respondents were more likely to endorse utilitarian punitive attitudes for a theoretical 
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and abstract issue, but were more likely, especially if they were psychology students, to 
also favour a moral outrage response, such as the public denunciation of the agent’s acts, 
for the concrete situation of the agent. One should add that public denunciation, moral 
responsibility and negative emotions were not found to be in any way related to utilitarian 
punitive attitudes.  
 
 Overall, the fact that many respondents seem to support the moral retributive-oriented 
public condemnation of a concrete harmful action they have to evaluated, but at the same 
are more likely to favour utilitarian goals of punishment could be related to the 
distinction between micro and macro justice highlighted by Carlsmith & Darley (2008). 
According to this perspective, when respondents are asked about general goals of 
punishment, an abstract evaluative process is engaged and utilitarian principles will be 
favoured (macro justice perspective), whereas when they are required to assign 
punishment to an individual described in a specific and concrete situation, a retributive 
responses is more likely to be triggered (micro justice orientation).  
 Moreover, previous research (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Greene et al., 2001) 
suggested that retributive punitive responses are more intuitive, automatic and 
emotionally driven, whereas utilitarian responses are the product of a more reasoned 
process and are not systematically considered. Our findings may also reflect such dual-
processing mechanisms, since persistent linkages between retributive responses and 
attitudes, public denunciation responses, negative emotions and moral responsibility were 
observed, whereas none of these factors was in any way associated to utilitarian 
responses.  
 Another argument to take into account is that the greater endorsement for deterrence-
related beliefs at the general level, compared to retributive aims, could also be simply due 
to the fact that deterrence is a punishment goal which is more frequently invoked by 
politicians to justify a harsher stance on the violation of legal rules and that respondents 
may have simply referred to the more salient information in their memory when they 
expressed agreement with such utilitarian-oriented items.  
 Finally, one should not forget the possibility that retributive and utilitarian concepts 
could be related to each other in that they each reflect a form of punitiveness (De Keijser, 
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van der Leeden & Jackson, 2002). Thus, respondents may have, at the general and 
abstract level, endorsed more utilitarian principles, whereas at the more concrete level, 
they endorsed more the idea of restoring the moral balance (public denunciation of the 
agent’s acts), which is related to a more retributive stance.  
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VI. General conclusions  
 
1. Moral responsibility: conceptual clarifications 
 
 These research findings also demonstrate quite clearly that moral-related 
responsibility measures can be equated to blameworthiness measures, in contradiction 
with Shaver’s (1985) claim that blame and responsibility were conceptually different 
dimensions. Shaver had based his argument on the fact that blame was strongly affected 
by justification and excuses, whereas responsibility was not. We suggest that Shaver may 
have been thinking more of the legal dimension of responsibility and its rational criteria 
when referring to “responsibility”. This statement is based on several arguments.  
 In this research and especially in study 3, all moral-related responsibility measures 
were found to be strongly affected by the justification condition, as well as strongly 
associated to the justification measure. Legal criteria of responsibility were, to the 
contrary, not affected by the justification condition (except for consciousness) and not at 
all related to the justification measure.  
 Moreover, previous research (Alicke, 2000; Mantler et al., 2003; Quigley & Tedeschi, 
1996) has always associated blame or moral responsibility to anger, which was also the 
case in this research, whereas legal responsibility criteria are not directly associated or 
predicted by such negative emotions.  
 Finally, factors demonstrating punitive tendencies, such as favouring prison, agreeing 
with the public denunciation of the agent’s acts or favourable attitudes towards punitive 
aims were always found to be related to moral responsibility, but were never associated 
to legal responsibility. This confirms the strong linkages existing between blame and 
punitive responses and attitudes (Caroll et al., 1987; Graham et al., 1997; Taylor & 
Kleinke, 1992; Weiner, 1995b, 1996).  
 Given these findings, and after examining what constituted “responsibility” in 
Shaver’s research, we suggest, thus, that Shaver may have been referring more to what 
we consider to underlie legal responsibility (consciousness, voluntariness and 
intentionality), when he analyses how people attribute what he calls “responsibility”, than 
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to dimensions such as accountability before justice, responsibility for the death or 
blameworthiness (what we refer to as moral responsibility criteria). Thus, these 
contradictions may be more based on a terminological level than on the conceptual level.  
 
2. Moral responsibility and its relationship to emotional and 
attitudinal correlates 
 
2.1. Negative emotions as strong motivational factors for moral 
responsibility evaluations  
 
 Negative emotions were consistently found to be associated to moral responsibility 
ratings and were even found, in study 3, to determine linkages between moral 
responsibility and correlates such as punitive responses and attitudes. As expected, 
negative emotions were not related to legal responsibility. The observation of the central 
role of negative emotions in blame attributions and its inexistent influence on legal 
responsibility ratings is a noteworthy result. Moreover, the fact that negative emotions, 
along with moral responsibility, were strongly affected by the normative manipulation in 
study 3 also provides support for the argument that emotional and normative influences 
are central to determining the level of blame attributed (Alicke, 2000). It confirms 
previous research findings (Feigenson & Park, 2006; Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996; Weiner, 
1996), but it also adds support to various theories concerning the role of emotions in 
moral and legal decision-making.  
 
 The influence of negative emotions is a consistent finding in any research dealing 
with negative behaviours that violate our moral sense and our societal norms (Reeder & 
Coovert, 1986; Trafimow & Schneider, 1994; Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999; Wojciszke, 
Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998). However, this moral judgment approach is recent, since 
moral psychology was, for a long time, dominated by rationalist approaches that 
emphasized the primary influence of reasoning and reflection in moral knowledge and 
evaluation processes (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1973; Turiel, 1983). Furthermore, the last 
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twenty years have seen the expansion of social intuitionist approaches to moral judgment 
which afford a central role to moral intuition, which includes moral emotions, in the 
generation of moral judgments (Haidt, 2003; Wilson, 1997). Moral judgments are, in this 
perspective, more the products of intuitive or spontaneous affective reactions, than of 
conscious reasoning processes (Alicke, 2000; Haidt, 2001, 2003). The primary role of 
such moral intuitions can also be more generally related to the rationale guiding dual-
process theories of cognition and social judgment (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). However, 
this does not mean that non-affective processes do not also have an important role in 
moral evaluations, since cognitive appraisals often colour and guide moral judgments 
(Pizzaro & Bloom, 2003).  
 This double influence of emotional and rational factors on moral evaluations was also 
found in this study. Not only were negative emotions and emotionally-tainted evaluations 
such as public denunciation, central factors in the blaming process, but rational 
dimensions of responsibility were also related to moral evaluations of blame. Moreover, 
as rational criteria for responsibility were sometimes found to be associated to blame 
ratings, they may have been, as a result, indirectly related to negative emotions (which 
are strong precursors of moral responsibility). Legal evaluations are most probably, in 
that sense, not immune to affective and normative influences. This observation adds more 
fuel to the contention that emotions are central to legal decision-making processes 
(Bandes, 1999) and cannot be avoided, despite many efforts to try to eradicate them in 
legal settings (Feigenson & Park, 2006; Gabriel, 2009).  
 
 However, as results in study 3 indicate, emotions could also bias a perceiver’s 
responsibility attributions.  
 Psychology students, in the pleasure-related justification for irresponsible conduct 
condition, were more likely to agree with retributive punitive aims such as making the 
person suffer and favouring punitive responses such as prison time, when they ascribed 
moral responsibility to the agent and also felt high negative emotions about the car-crash. 
Moreover, all respondents were more likely to feel high negative emotions, ascribe high 
moral responsibility and controllability, disagree with justification for taking risks and 
impose harsh sentences in the pleasure justification condition, compared to the duty-
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related condition. Moral responsibility, controllability and negative emotions were, thus, 
strongly influenced by the manipulation of the normative criteria of justification for 
irresponsible conduct, which lead to a higher tendency to consider this event as not 
justifiable and to impose harsh sentences on the agent. This demonstrates the blame 
validation power of extra-evidential factors (Alicke, 2000).  
 Let us add that the fact that moral and emotional responses were particularly affected 
by the pleasure justification condition, compared to the duty justification condition, could 
be also explained by the moral dumbfounding rationale described by Haidt (2001). Moral 
dumbfounding is suggested by Haidt to occur when people react strongly to an event that 
they consider as being wrong but cannot provide any valid and justified reasons for this 
“wrongness” judgment. This phenomenon was observed, for example, when people 
reacted negatively and disapprovingly to the story of two siblings who decided to engage 
in sexual intercourse after having both taken birth control measures (Haidt, Bjorklund & 
Murphy, 2000). In our situation, respondents expressed stronger disapproval, in terms of 
emotional, punitive, control and blame responses, when the agent was described as 
having partied all night, compared to when the agent had worked all night, although the 
fatal outcome was identical in both situations. But, as respondents did not consider one 
condition more justified than the other, in terms of the risks taken (no main effect of the 
condition on the justification measure), it may indicate that respondents may not be able 
to rationalize their higher emotional and moral disapproval of the party situation, 
compared to the duty situation. As respondents were not asked why they found the party 
justification less acceptable than the pleasure justification, one can only assume that they 
were not aware of the reasons why they found the agent’s behaviours more blameworthy 
when he partied all night, compared to when he worked all night. 
 In sum, respondents may have been motivated by strong intuitive and spontaneous 
negative feelings to consider the harmful outcomes of the agent’s actions as more 
controllable and more morally condemnable, when they were justified by hedonistic 
reasons, compared to when they were due to performing a duty. Respondents who felt 
negative emotions, such as anger, may have also felt more confident and certain about the 
responsibilities related to this event in the pleasure condition and thus, been more likely 
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to blame the agent in this condition, compared to the other, as suggested by previous 
findings (Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  
 We suggest that these findings may overall reflect a good illustration of the influence 
of affective and motivational factors on moral assessments (Ditto, Pizzaro & 
Tannenbaum, 2009). Affects, in that sense, may have a normative role in that they act as 
inherent moral compasses when we evaluate other people’s behaviours.  
 
2.2. Moral responsibility and retributive punitive responses and attitudes: a 
moral outrage response of ordinary perceivers 
 
 Strong associations between moral responsibility, negative emotions and retributive 
punitive aims or responses were also observed in all three studies. As these response 
patterns are more characteristic of psychology students’ perceptions, they could 
constitute a better reflection of ordinary evaluations of responsibility, than law students’ 
evaluations are. 
 
 Moral responsibility evaluations were consistently found to be related to public 
denunciation across all three studies, especially for psychology students. Linkages 
between moral responsibility and punitive attitudes and responses were also found across 
the three studies. Moral responsibility was related to favouring prison time in studies 1 
and 3, especially for psychology students. In study, 3, moral blame was also more likely 
to be related to a retributive rationale, such as wanting the offender to suffer until 
expiation, only by psychology students. Finally, still in study 3 and only for psychology 
students, moral responsibility ascriptions were more likely to be accompanied by harsh 
punitive reactions such as imposing high sentences to the agent and thinking that the 
criminal justice system is not harsh enough.  
 Overall, these findings are in line with the analysis that just deserts-related attitudes 
and responses could be considerably stimulated by moral outrage responses (Darley et al., 
2000; Carlsmith et al., 2002). The fact that condemnatory responses favouring the public 
denunciation of the agent’s behaviours were strongly related to moral responsibility and 
moral responsibility, in turn, was often associated to punitive responses, is consistent 
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with the hypothesis that ordinary perceivers may be more likely to follow a moral 
outrage-like pattern of responses when evaluating moral responsibility. Another 
observation supporting this contention is that public denunciation was also found to be 
strongly related to punitive responses such as imposing a concrete sentence (study 3) and 
favouring prison (study 2), especially for psychology students who also ascribed high 
moral responsibility to the agent. In other words, casting blame on the agent may 
accompany a need to denounce publicly the harmful behaviour, because it constitutes a 
violation to moral order, which may, in the end, make it more likely for the perceiver to 
want to sanction the agent with a concrete sentence and favour his imprisonment. 
These findings are, as a whole, in support with the idea that ordinary reasoning thinks of 
punishment in terms of retribution of an individual’s harmful actions and its moral 
deservingness (Feather, 1996). The just desert rational, in that sense, may be a strong 
underlying factor of our everyday moral thinking (Finkel, 1997; Goldberg et al., 1999).  
 
 Given that public denunciation ratings were more often related to moral responsibility 
and punitive responses by psychology students, than by law students, these response 
patterns may again be more representative of ordinary reasoning. Such patterns of 
response can be related to an analysis brought forward by Becker (1973). According to 
him, people do not always react automatically to a harmful or immoral conduct, even 
though it may violate clearly a relevant social norm. They need this behaviour to be 
pinpointed as deviant through a specific social reaction, in order for it to be sanctioned. 
The decision to identify an action as deviant is often made by individuals who have a 
personal interest in publicly denouncing such anti-normative behaviours; these persons 
are what Becker named moral entrepreneurs. Thus, in respondents’ minds, especially 
psychology students, when they decide to ascribe moral responsibility to a norm-violator, 
they may have wanted to bring this norm-violation to public attention and, through this 
public condemnation, sanction this castigated behaviour. Let us add also the hypothesis 
that by “public denunciation”, respondents may also be thinking of the mass-media’s 
power of bringing to light norm-violations and thereby influencing public policy agendas 
(Pritchard, 1992). The reasoning here being that when a harmful conduct is publicly 
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condemned through widespread media attention, it is more likely to be followed by 
punitive measures to prevent the occurrence of such behaviours in the future.  
 Moreover, let us not forget that in study 3, negative emotions were found on several 
occasions, to affect the linkages between moral responsibility and different punitive 
responses (making him suffer, favouring the agent’s imprisonment, imposing a harsh 
sentence on the agent and judging that the criminal justice system is not harsh enough). 
These linkages and the influence of negative emotions on these were only found for 
respondents studying psychology. The fact that negative emotions were strongly 
associated to the link between punitive responses and attitudes, public denunciation and 
moral responsibility supports globally the contention that negative emotions hold a 
central role in punitive responses (Lerner, Goldberg & Tetlock, 1998), but also on 
punitive attitudes (Graham et al., 1997; Weiner, Graham & Reyna, 1997).  
 
 Finally, as shown in study 3, perceptions that harmful actions are not dealt with 
harshly enough by the justice system and constitute a threat to social order were strongly 
related to retributive rationales, such as making the offender suffer, as well as to moral 
responsibility ascriptions. Such response patterns again were observed especially for 
psychology students. The perception that offenders are getting away with their actions 
too easily could be, in that sense, accompanied by punitive attitudes. In other words, 
feeling that social order should be re-established could make it more likely for the 
morally disapproving ordinary perceiver to want the offender to pay for his actions.   
 These results point consistently towards the idea that people may be even more 
motivated to hold retributive attitudes and to act on them, as well as to cast blame on 
individuals who violate moral order, if they have reasons to believe that norm violations 
are not dealt with harshly enough by the criminal justice system (Goldberg et al., 1999; 
Rucker et al., 2004).  
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2.3. Moral responsibility and its links with internality-related tendencies 
 
 Regression analyses carried out in studies 1 and 2 suggest that moral responsibility 
was generally related to the preference for internal explanations and perceived internal 
control in this research. This result was highlighted as much with measures that were 
developed for the purpose of study 1 concerning the different explanations that could be 
given to give a meaning to the harmful outcome, as with measures taken from a 
commonly used internality scale, such as the Levenson IPC scale, in study 2.   
 In study 1, moral responsibility was, as expected, related to agreeing with measures 
favouring internal explanations and disagreeing with measures pertaining to external 
explanations. In study 2, where items coming from the Levenson IPC scale were used to 
measure the tendency for internality, this tendency was also found to predict moral 
responsibility. However, since favouring internal explanations in study 1 and the 
tendency for internality in study 2 were also predictors of legal responsibility, this could 
indicate that such attitudinal constructs may be both related to moral and legal 
dimensions of responsibility.  
 
 It is worth mentioning here that the internality-externality scale did not yield reliable 
results across the two studies in which it was used. In study 2, it was a predictor of moral 
and legal responsibility, but, in study 3, no such linkages were found. The confrontation 
of these findings to the fact that internal and external mean ratings yielded in study 3 had 
low alpha ratings131, compared to those found in study 2132, suggests that the internality-
externality scale used in this research may not be very reliable. This is all the more 
possible, since the internality and externality factors produced in studies 2 and 3 with a 
factor analysis only explained a minimal variance (29.8% in study 2 and 37.8% in study 
3). This weak reliability explains also why further analyses were not carried out 
concerning the linkages between internality and moral and legal dimensions of 
responsibility. However, one should mention here that the internality-externality scale 
used in studies 2 and 3 was constituted of the subscales I and C of the Levenson IPC 
                                                 
131
 See note 123 in chapter IV (on study 3) section 3.5, p. 224.  
132
 See chapter III (on study 2) section 2.2 p. 155-156.  
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scale. Measures related to the P subscale, concerning the influence of powerful others, 
were not considered, because this element was not considered to be particularly relevant 
in this research. The fact of having left out this subscale could also explain why this 
internality-externality scale was not reliable.  
 
 Another important clarification to make here is that the scale used in study 1, 
concerning attitudes favouring internal explanations of events, does not measure the same 
psychological concept as the measures from the Levenson IPC scale, used in study 2 and 
3, do. The measures related to internal explanations of events, used in study 1, did not 
concern personal control per se, but the different reasons related to the individual’s lack 
of education or values that could explain the occurrence of the car-crash. They concerned 
directly the car-crash event, which could explain why they were associated to 
respondents’ punitive moral outrage response process. To the contrary, in study 2 and 3, 
the tendency for internality was measured at the beginning of the questionnaire, before 
respondents rated the car-crash event, because it was believed to act as an anchoring 
variable that would influence moral responsibility. 
 
 Overall, these results suggest that favouring explanatory factors related to the 
individual may be an important variable to take into account when analysing the manner 
in which people attribute responsibility. However, the lack of reliable and consistent 
results yielded by measures coming from the Levenson IPC scale casts doubts on whether 
such a measure may be appropriate to relate moral and legal responsibility evaluations to 
the tendency to favour personal control. In fact, the observation of a lack of clear and 
consistent results showing a link between internality tendencies and evaluations such as 
responsibility has already been made in previous researches (Dubois, 1994; Devos-
Comby & Devos, 2000). Let us add that, given the rather high alpha ratings produced for 
the measures related to external explanations and explanations related to the individual in 
study 1, such evaluations may be more relevant to moral and legal responsibility 
evaluations, than internality tendencies would be. The measure including different 
explanations of events (including internal and external reasons) that was created for study 
1 showed indeed interesting associations to blameworthiness and legal responsibility, 
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especially concerning disagreement with esoteric and external explanatory factors. 
Further research should be carried out to examine whether such a measure could be 
reliable when evaluating responsibility for different situations in which a person is 
involved in an event leading to fatal outcomes.  
 
3. Limitations and further research openings  
 
 
 Although these research findings are promising, limitations concerning the methods 
used must be briefly mentioned.  
 First, the use of scenario vignettes has its drawbacks, even though it is a frequently 
used methodology in social psychological research. One can wonder if, written 
descriptions of a given situation, adapted from real-life events, are as powerful in 
producing authentic evaluations and feelings, as vivid real-world events that would be 
observed by someone who has to judge them “live” are. This creates the risk that the 
results produced by vignette studies may be artificial, which makes their application to 
real life only limited. However, we argue that the weak ecological validity of our results 
does not affect this research’s value in honing our understanding of the processes 
involved in moral and legal responsibility and punishment-related decision making. We 
are well aware that such scenarios can only trigger responses that reflect a tendency or an 
intention to act, but do not indicate an actual behaviour (Bieneck, 2009). However, this 
research aimed more at highlighting the processes underlying respondents’ perceptions 
and interpretations of the car-crash event, than evaluating their actual behaviours and 
attitudes. Let us add that such behavioural intentions are more likely to be highlighted 
accurately, if vignettes are plausible and are realistic (Finch, 1987), which was the case in 
this research, since these criteria were well rated by respondents. Moreover, each 
scenario used in this research was assessed in a pilot study in terms of its clarity, 
consistency and uncomplicated formulation, before being used.  
 Secondly, another comment, which is in line with the first one, concerns the fact that 
results that were observed in this research were based on participants’ evaluations of a 
unique scenario. Indeed, a second scenario, concerning a fatal dog attack was constructed 
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for the use of this research and was used in studies 1 and 2. However, the results, 
concerning the fatal dog attack were unclear and incomparable to those pertaining to 
responses about the car-crash scenario in both these studies. Moreover, the link between 
the agent’s actions and the event that lead to the death of the victim was not comparable 
between the two scenarios (the agent causes the fatal collision, whereas it is the dog 
which fatally attacks the victim) in terms of responsibility. The processes underlying 
moral and legal responsibility evaluations highlighted in this research cannot thus be 
generalized across different situations involving a negligent or a reckless conduct. Future 
research could verify whether such processes apply to other everyday life harmful events 
that are increasingly being the object of legal and, sometimes even, penal consequences, 
such as home and leisure accidents.  
 Third, this research has enabled us to demonstrate that moral and legal responsibility 
dimensions are more or less likely to be activated depending on the nature of the cues that 
are salient in the harmful event that is evaluated. Legal responsibility is more likely to be 
ascribed when rational and legal cues pertaining to levels of culpability are included, 
whereas moral responsibility is more likely to be favoured when normative cues related 
to more or less irresponsible behaviour are salient. However, these findings were 
observed across the three studies carried out in this research, but were not highlighted all 
together for the same participants and in the same study. A future research should, thus, 
be conducted to manipulate rational and normative cues at the same time in order to 
compare their relative influence on legal and moral responsibility. This would enable us 
to assess whether moral responsibility is still favoured over legal responsibility when 
normative and rational cues are simultaneously salient or whether legal responsibility 
gets the upper hand.  
 Fourth, as all response scales as well as contextual cues designed to implement the 
manipulation of independent variables in the scenarios were of linguistic nature, concerns 
can be raised as to their power to activate accurate and valid responses. We consider this 
issue particularly relevant for the first part of the questionnaire relating to the measure of 
respondents’ perception of rational criteria of legal responsibility, in studies 1 and 2. The 
different measures designed to evaluate respondents’ perceptions of rational criteria, such 
as voluntariness, consciousness and intentionality, were rather abstract and formulated in 
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a very technical manner as to follow legal reasoning. Such formulation, although 
intentionally done to assess respondents’ understanding of these criteria in a manner 
which is similar to the one used to in legal reasoning, may have confused respondents. 
However, one finding does run current to this concern. Respondents, across studies 1 and 
2, differentiated accurately and in the same graded fashion between different levels of 
intentionality and consciousness in part 1 of the questionnaire.  
Fifth, another potential source of concern should be mentioned concerning the measures 
of rational criteria for responsibility used in studies 1 and 2 in the first part of the 
questionnaire. Respondents rated the measures concerning these criteria after having read 
a small scenario. Even though this scenario was used to contextualise these measures, it 
could have influenced respondents’ perceptions of these criteria in an unwanted manner. 
This possibly occurred in study 1, since the scenario used to trigger evaluations 
concerning these criteria was not “neutral” enough and biased respondents’ evaluations. 
The scenario used in study 2 was more neutral, but could have still had an unwanted 
effect on responses. Further studies concerning people’s understanding of criteria used in 
law should explore different methods for these assessments or refine the methods used in 
this research to guarantee more empirically valid findings. 
 Finally, the fact that the sample considered in this research was only composed of 
university students has also its shortcomings, even though this choice was related directly 
to some of the hypotheses guiding this investigation. The high level of education of this 
sample poses important limits on its demographic representativeness. It could explain, for 
example, why many respondents favoured utilitarian punitive aims over retributive 
objectives (Carlsmith et al., 2002). We recommend, thus, that future research should 
address these questions using a more diverse sample which is representative of the Swiss 
population. Such research should also be carried out with samples of individuals from 
other countries, as the issues of responsibility and punitivity are subject of much debate 
in the western world.    
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4. Implications for criminal policy and decision-making 
 
 
 Given the different findings concerning ordinary representations of responsibility 
across these three studies, several issues must be highlighted in terms of their 
implications for criminal policy and decision-making.  
 
4.1. Ordinary reasoning may not spontaneously interpret events in terms of 
rational criteria of responsibility and legal liability 
 
 Ordinary reasoning may perceive roughly different shades of consciousness and 
intentionality at the abstract level, but does not seem to use them necessarily to analyse a 
concrete situation in terms of legal liability. Psychology students, in studies 1 and 2, 
demonstrated that they made a distinction between consciousness and intentionality, on 
the one hand, and voluntariness, on the other, and roughly identified and distinguished 
different forms of such criteria at the abstract level. They seemed to understand that 
intentionality levels can vary depending on elements, such as desire to harm and 
consciousness of the probability that something bad will happen. Yet, law students were 
more likely than psychology students to detect the fine nuances between different forms 
of intentionality and to rate them in consistence with legal reasoning about intent levels. 
Moreover, even though psychology students roughly understood the differences between 
rational criteria for responsibility, when they had to evaluate such criteria with regard to a 
concrete situation, they were less sensitive to such legal cues than law students. In study 
1, although all respondents perceived that consciousness was more important in the 
conscious negligence situation, compared to the unconscious negligence condition, law 
students understood better, than psychology students did, that the latter condition was 
more likely to be considered as an act of negligence than the former condition. In study 2, 
when they had to evaluate these criteria for a given situation (first part of the 
questionnaire), where cues related to dispositional or motivational factors were rendered 
neutral and the situation concerned an apparently accidental event, law students were 
more likely to sense the potential legal implications of such a situation and rated each 
criteria higher, compared to psychology students. In study 2, law respondents were also 
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more likely to identify 1) the recklessness condition as reflecting more intentionality than 
the negligence condition and; 2) the negligence condition as amounting to more 
negligence and less intentionality. Psychology students rated all conditions as amounting 
to more negligence, compared to law students and were more likely to rate low 
intentionality for both conditions as well. Moreover, law students were also more likely 
to relate the recklessness condition to a different legal liability (intentional homicide) 
than the negligence condition, compared to psychology students. Law students also 
showed more sensitivity to legal implications in study 3 in which no salient legal cues 
were manipulated and the situation described was a car-crash due to fatigue, compared to 
psychology students. Finally, patterns of responses of law students’ concerning legal 
responsibility and its linkages to legal qualifications or legally relevant concepts 
demonstrated generally evaluations that were more consistent with the legal realities of 
the situation evaluated, compared to psychology students.  
 
 These findings bring us to the conclusion that ordinary reasoning, as illustrated by the 
responses psychology students’, when evaluating a concrete situation, may not always 
focus on rational factors and legal liability, if attention for such factors is not explicitly 
directed by salient cues. In that sense, ordinary reasoning may not spontaneously search 
for such rational factors when interpreting events. People may perceive offenses more in 
terms of prototypes, whereby one crime corresponds to a series of characteristics and 
attributes that are associated to certain facts, than in terms of the determination of 
necessary and sufficient conditions (Smith, 1991). Moreover, concrete information on 
actual objective and explicit behaviours, which is not only related to dispositions and 
psychological attributes (consciousness, desires, and beliefs), may be more relevant for 
ordinary reasoning to ascribe responsibility. Robinson & Darley’s (1995) research work 
on blame and liability shows indeed that small differences in terms of actions can make a 
considerable difference in terms of blame ratings and liability for punishment in ordinary 
intuitions of justice.  
 Another reason why ordinary reasoning may be less naturally attuned to rational 
criteria is that people consider various factors when reasoning about offenses and these 
factors may weigh differently on their blame judgments depending on the type of offense 
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or the particular circumstances surrounding its commission (Finkel, 2001; Robinson & 
Kurzban, 2007). Thus, extra-legal factors can easily sway moral evaluations in one 
direction or another depending on their nature and relevance for the perceiver (Alicke, 
2000; Schlenker et al., 1994).  
 
4.2. The element of consciousness of probability of risks is not a 
determining factor in ordinary reasoning.  
 
 Another important finding that could be significant for criminal policy-making related 
to road-traffic offenses concerns the absence of relationship found between the element 
of consciousness of probability of risks and respondents’ perceptions of blame, control 
and liability for punishment. Thus, in studies 1 and 2, the extent of consciousness of 
probability of risks and the corresponding intentionality level (none for negligence and 
some for recklessness) did not affect respondents’ ratings of blame, controllability, 
negative emotions and imprisonment of the agent and only affected their ratings of 
negligence and intentionality. This contrasts markedly with legal reasoning, since a road-
traffic offender involved in a fatal collision convicted for reckless conduct is liable to 
harsher punishment than if he is convicted for negligence. This reasoning was partly 
followed by law students in study 2, since they were more likely to qualify the situation 
of intentional homicide (which is liable to harsher punishment than negligent homicide) 
in the recklessness condition, compared to the negligence condition. Psychology students 
considered the situation to amount to an accident, whatever the condition. Moreover, law 
students, in study 1, were also more likely, than psychology students, to consider the 
element of consciousness of the probability of risks, as well as the presence of necessary 
precautions taken to avoid the event, when rating the extent to which the agent had acted 
out of negligence. Psychology students were, on the other hand, more likely to associate 
negligence to necessary precautions, as well as evaluative judgments such as carelessness 
or blameworthiness.  
 Thus, respondents who did not have an exposure to legal reasoning do not seem to 
have understood the legal underpinnings of reckless conduct and their more serious 
consequences compared to negligent conduct. The element of consciousness of 
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probability of risks does not seem to have been understood as a central factor in 
determining legal liability and consequent punishment for fatal road-traffic accidents by 
participants who did not study law.  
 
 These findings globally bring forward important questions as to road traffic 
offenders’ perceptions of their liability. This casts serious doubts on whether road traffic 
offenders would understand the difference between negligence and recklessness, whether 
in terms of the element of wilful disregard for risks that are known to be highly probable 
or in terms of the different sentencing levels these two qualifications correspond to. This 
question is all the more important since research has consistently shown that most 
reckless drivers are not aware of the risk related to their dangerous driving (Cunningham, 
2008). Often under the illusion of control (McKenna, 1993), they tend to overestimate 
their capacities and to feel immune to the possibility of an accident occurring, because 
they think they are more competent drivers than most drivers are.  
 
 Given all the above-mentioned findings, one wonders if heightened criminal 
responsibility and harsher sentences can prevent fatal road traffic offenses from being 
committed, if the risk of fatal consequences is not known or underestimated by the driver. 
The notions of reasonable precaution and awareness of the probability of risks, which are 
used in legal reasoning to determine the level of responsibility of an individual involved 
in a road-traffic offense, are based on a prototypical idea of what a reasonable person 
would do in a given situation with regard to the particular circumstances of the event. 
However, this prototypical representation of the reasonable and ordinary man may not fit 
the reality of people’s conceptions of what constitutes reasonable care in light of a 
probable risk (Green, 1968). This argument may be even more justified, given that people 
can often underestimate the probability of a risk occurring when they think they are in 
control (Dejoy, 1989; McKenna, 1993).  
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4.3. Respondents’ punitive responses and their implications for criminal 
justice policy 
 
 The manipulation of levels of legal culpability in studies 1 and 2 did not affect 
respondents’ punitive responses, contrary to the manipulation of normative factors in 
study 3. Whether respondents were psychology students or law students, in terms of 
mean ratings, they did not favour the imprisonment of the agent more when his legal 
liability was higher (conscious negligence in study 1 and recklessness in study 2), 
compared to when it was lower (unconscious negligence in study 1 and negligence in 
study 2). All respondents did, however, recommend higher sentences depending on the 
normative justification that was salient in study 3. Higher sentences were more likely to 
be recommended if the agent had caused an accident because of fatigue due to partying 
all night, than if it was the result of fatigue related to working all night. Thus, 
respondents’ punitive responses may not be based on the same principles as those 
practiced in legal settings. As discussed previously, punitive responses may be based 
more on negative emotions, moral responsibility and condemnatory responses favouring 
public denunciation and less on rational criteria and legal qualifications.  
 Moreover, since a majority of respondents were generally not in favour of 
imprisoning the agent and did not agree to impose a harsher sanction than a suspended 
prison sentence, this also indicates that most respondents do not follow the harsh stance 
taken recently by politicians and legislators in Switzerland concerning fatal road-traffic 
offenses committed by dangerous drivers.  
 
 The respondents in this research, coming from the academic world, cannot be 
considered as a representative sample of the Swiss population as a whole. We, thus, do 
not have the pretention to infer from our results whether or not citizens are likely to 
endorse the increased penalization of such acts. Some answers to this question will be 
probably provided when the period of time authorized to collect signatures for the Road-
Cross popular initiative “against dangerous drivers” ends. Time will tell if proponents of 
this initiative manage to collect the minimum amount of signatures necessary for a 
popular vote on the issue.  
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 Let us just conclude by stressing that if most people, like our respondents, do not 
support harsher sanctions for fatal road-traffic offenses, legal regulation processes and 
criminal policies may be developing counter current to the community’s sentiments and 
values about justice. We, then, run the risk of creating a rift between the citizen and the 
authorities in charge of legal regulation and implementation. For that matter, Darley, 
Tyler & Bilz (2003) express this argument by supporting our assumption that moral 
wrongfulness may be more instrumental in driving ordinary justice reasoning than the 
need to deter the offender from further offending that is often stated in political discourse. 
The fact that an agent whose irresponsible conduct is justified by mature and duty-related 
factors (working all night to pay for one’s studies or to take care of one’s children during 
the day) is evaluated less severely, compared to the agent who partied all night before 
causing the accident due to fatigue, is another perfect illustration of such a possible gap. 
It is indeed not expected that in such a situation judges would judge more severely an 
agent who caused an accident due to fatigue because he partied all night (if all the 
evidence is there to prove that we was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs), 
compared to a person who had to work all night. Keeping in tune with community 
intuitions about justice is central, since citizens are more likely to consider authorities as 
legitimate and are more likely to comply with societal rules, if they feel that the legal 
system functions, at least, most of the time in line with their moral intuitions (Darley et 
al., 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  
 
5. Towards a moralization of responsibility 
 
 
 As a final comment, we would like to stress the more global implications of this 
research for the meaning of responsibility in the everyday life of ordinary people. Our 
findings highlight the existence of two overlapping and interrelated conceptions of 
responsibility, which are based on different reasoning processes. A first dimension of 
responsibility is blame-related and is based on moral, punitive and emotional responses, 
which reflect condemnation and indignation. A second facet of responsibility is legally-
construed and is based on more rational analytical factors related to the legal implications 
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of the evaluated behaviour. Moral and legal dimensions of responsibility, as we have 
demonstrated in this research, are more or less activated depending on the nature of the 
information given in the situation that is evaluated. When legal and rational cues are 
salient and are manipulated, the legal responsibility dimension will be more activated 
then the moral responsibility dimension, whereas the manipulation of normative cues will 
have more impact on moral responsibility ascriptions than legal ones. The influence of 
normative cues on the moral responsibility dimension was observed for all respondents, 
irrespective of their exposure to legal training, and lead also to harsher sentences being 
imposed. Yet, such a normative effect on responsibility and sentencing evaluations could 
be a reflection of the hypothesis of the contemporary moralization of responsibility (Hier, 
2008; Hunt, 2003).  
 Ordinary conceptions of responsibility have undeniably evolved hand in hand with 
the contemporary increasing focus on risk avoidance and management, as well as the 
societal fascination, combined with anxiety, for crimes and victimhood. Individual 
liberties and autonomy are both cherished and apprehended. Demands for increased 
freedom of speech, movement or choice are accompanied paradoxically by expectations 
of protection from the State, which imply regulation processes that can restrict liberty. In 
this context, individualizing and totalizing discourses concerning responsibility can be 
observed simultaneously (Hunt, 2003). Individuals are encouraged to take personal 
responsibility and to take all necessary measures to avoid risk; while responsibility is 
ascribed to collective populations that are pinpointed as potential sources of risk one 
should protect oneself from (i.e. dangerous drivers, drug users, paedophiles, rapists).  
 This tendency to promote individual responsibility can be related to the norm of 
internality (Beauvois, 1984; Beauvois & Dubois, 1988). This norm was defined by 
Beauvois & Dubois (1988) as “giving a value to the explanations of psychological events 
(behaviours and outcomes) that accentuate the weight of the actor as causal factor”. This 
theory contends that internal explanations are particularly valued in Western liberal 
societies, because of their social utility. The value that is afforded to personal 
responsibility and self-sufficiency in our Western individualism-oriented society could, 
thus, be related to the social value attached to internal causal explanations (Dubois & 
Beauvois, 2005).  
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 However, with the proliferation of situations that are defined as potentially risky, the 
ensuing increased responsibilization of individuals is also accompanied by a tendency to 
transfer the responsibility to others (Hunt, 2003). This reaction of “deresponsibilisation” 
can lead to absurd judicial decisions, such as the one in which a woman who had spilt 
coffee on herself and burnt herself obtained financial reparation for damages from the 
company which sold her the cup of coffee. Another emblematic illustration of such 
deresponsibilisation is the tendency, for some victims, to claim victimhood as a perpetual 
status and to not want to take on the responsibility of recovering from such a state 
(Rauschenbach, 2010b). Let us add that the tendency to locate the cause of accidents in 
the individual can be considered as due to a certain extent to intellectual laziness and an 
oversimplification of the world. For example, people prefer casting the blame on human 
error when there is an accident, instead of investigating the possible external causes for 
such human failure. Plane crashes have often been explained by pilot error, but other 
more complex explanations as to why pilots fall asleep or are disoriented while piloting 
are now gradually put forward. Indeed, some of these cases could have been the result of 
external causes such as an exposure to toxic substances coming from the combustion of 
oil in the engine.  
 Collectivizing discourses designating “irresponsible” groups of people, which 
represent a threat that should be eradicated, are also part of this moralizing stance (Hier, 
2008). Stereotypical depictions of a given social group can, thus, be pinpointed by the 
mass-media and political actors as deviant “folk devils” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009). 
Isolated cases of youth violence can be exaggerated and distorted to symbolize a serious 
issue of concern for people’s everyday safety. As Goode & Ben-Yehuda (2009) suggest 
“once a category has been identified in the media as consisting of troublemakers, the 
supposed havoc-wreaking behaviour of its members reported to the public, and their 
supposed stereotypical features litanized, the process of creating a new folk devil is 
complete; from then on, all mention of representatives of the new category revolves 
around their central, and exclusively negative, features, rendering them demonstrably 
deviant and stigmatized”. The search for scapegoats aims at social purification through a 
cathartic transfer of public emotions and anxieties raised by the crime (Fauconnet, 1920). 
In the same vein, Ricoeur (1994) draws our attention to the contemporaneous move 
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towards an inflation of the moral concept of responsibility, whereby one is not only 
accountable for the effect of one’s actions, but one has also a responsibility towards 
others.  
 Such moralization of responsibility, even though it will probably never be as 
pronounced in Switzerland, as it is in a country guided by a strong neo-liberal philosophy 
like the United States, is increasingly creeping up in the Swiss political and media scene. 
The influence of normative factors on moral responsibility ascriptions that was 
highlighted in this research could be another indication of this phenomenon. The future 
will tell whether Swiss citizens will endorse the Road-cross initiative against dangerous 
drivers, thereby supporting a harsher stance for fatal road-traffic offenses.   
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Appendix 1a 
 
 
Anne, dans un accès de rage, lance un pot de fleur par  la fenêtre de sa cuisine située au 6e étage d’un 
immeuble.  Le pot de fleur atterrit sur la tête d’un passant et le blesse. 
 
 
1. A votre avis, dans quelle mesure le fait qu’Anne ait lancé ce pot de fleur par la fenêtre peut-il  être 
considéré comme un acte volontaire : 
 
a) si Anne a voulu lancer ce pot de fleur 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
b) si Anne a agi librement sans contrainte physique ou morale de la part d’une autre personne 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
c) si Anne était motivée à lancer ce pot de fleur 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
d) si Anne a agi de cette façon sans l’intervention d’aucune force extérieure  
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
 
2. A votre avis, dans quelle mesure, Anne peut-elle être considérée comme ayant conscience de son acte :  
 
a) si Anne a pensé à son acte et à ses conséquences avant de le commettre 
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
 
b) si Anne savait avant de lancer ce pot de fleurs que cet acte pouvait être considéré comme punissable par la 
loi 
  
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
 
c) si Anne a lancé le pot de fleurs, mais qu’après coup, lorsqu’elle repense à son acte, elle ne comprend pas ce 
qui s’est passé 
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
 
d) si Anne a pensé à son acte avant de le commettre et a lancé le pot de fleurs en sachant que cet acte pouvait 
blesser autrui 
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
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3. Selon vous, peut-on considérer qu’Anne a agi intentionnellement : 
 
  
a) si Anne voulait blesser un passant en lançant le pot de fleurs par la fenêtre 
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
 
b) si Anne avait l’intention de lancer ce pot de fleurs par la fenêtre et y a renoncé, mais a glissé et le pot est 
tombé de la fenêtre accidentellement.  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
 
c) si Anne savait qu’en lançant un pot de fleurs par la fenêtre elle avait de grandes chances de blesser 
quelqu’un.  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
 
d) si Anne avait pour seul et unique but de blesser autrui en lançant le pot de fleurs par la fenêtre 
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
 
e) si Anne savait que le pot de fleurs qu’elle a lancé pouvait tomber sur un passant 
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
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Appendix 1b (car-crash scenario) 
 
The paragraphs that differentiate these two conditions are marked in bold. 
 
Conscious negligence condition   
 
Florian prépare une fête pour célébrer l’obtention de sa maturité. A cette occasion, il a décidé de réaliser 
un enregistrement vidéo sur ses meilleurs souvenirs. Il demande à un ami, Julien, qui fait une école de 
cinéma et qui a une caméra vidéo, de filmer certaines séquences de ce film.  
Ils se rendent sur une route de campagne et Florian demande à Julien de descendre de la voiture et de le 
filmer depuis la route pendant qu’il conduit la voiture à grande vitesse au moment il emprunte un virage. 
Florian dépose donc Julien à la sortie du virage et fait demi-tour pour remonter le virage et le reprendre 
en direction de Julien. Avant de reprendre ce virage, Florian appelle Julien pour s’assurer que la 
voie est libre, qu’aucune voiture n’arrive en face et que Julien est prêt à filmer. Il sait que ce qu’il 
veut faire peut être dangereux, car il peut perdre la maîtrise de son véhicule et causer un accident.  
Florian démarre et s’engage dans le virage à vive allure. Au moment où il sort du virage, il entend un 
choc et réalise qu’il vient de percuter Julien sans toutefois l’avoir vu avant la collision. Florian arrête 
immédiatement son véhicule, se précipite vers son ami qui gît à terre inconscient et appelle police-
secours tout en tentant de réanimer Julien. Malheureusement, ce dernier décède quelques instants plus 
tard sur les lieux de l’accident avant que les secours n’aient pu arriver. 
 
 
Unconscious negligence condition   
 
Florian prépare une fête pour célébrer l’obtention de sa maturité. A cette occasion, il a décidé de réaliser 
un enregistrement vidéo sur ses meilleurs souvenirs. Il demande à un ami, Julien, qui fait une école de 
cinéma et qui a une caméra vidéo, de filmer certaines séquences de ce film.  
Ils se rendent sur une route de campagne et Florian demande à Julien de descendre de la voiture et de le 
filmer depuis la route pendant qu’il conduit la voiture à grande vitesse au moment il emprunte un virage. 
Florian dépose donc Julien à la sortie du virage et fait demi-tour pour remonter le virage et le reprendre 
en direction de Julien. Avant de reprendre ce virage, Florian appelle Julien pour s’assurer qu’il est 
prêt à filmer la scène et pour lui dire qu’il démarre, sans penser que ce qu’il s’apprête à faire peut 
être dangereux.  
Florian démarre et s’engage dans le virage à vive allure. Au moment où il sort du virage, il entend un 
choc et réalise qu’il vient de percuter Julien sans toutefois l’avoir vu avant la collision. Florian arrête 
immédiatement son véhicule, se précipite vers son ami qui gît à terre inconscient et appelle police-
secours tout en tentant de réanimer Julien. Malheureusement, ce dernier décède quelques instants plus 
tard sur les lieux de l’accident avant que les secours n’aient pu arriver. 
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Appendix 1c 
 
 
Concernant l’histoire que vous venez de lire, pouvez-vous répondre aux questions suivantes.  
  
 
 
1. En pensant à la mort de Julien, pourriez-vous éprouver : 
 
 
a) Un sentiment de révolte ?  
 
Faible          1           2          3          4           5         Intense 
 
  
b) Un sentiment d’injustice  ?  
 
Faible           1           2          3          4           5         Intense 
 
 
c) Un sentiment de colère ?  
 
Faible          1           2          3          4           5         Intense 
 
 
d) Un sentiment de pitié ?  
 
Faible          1           2          3          4           5         Intense 
 
 
e) Un sentiment de sympathie pour ses proches?  
 
Faible          1           2          3          4           5         Intense 
 
 
f) Un sentiment de compassion pour Julien ?  
 
Faible          1           2          3          4           5         Intense 
 
 
g) De l’indifférence ?  
 
Pas du tout          1           2          3          4           5         Tout à fait  
 
 
2. Dans quelle mesure cette histoire:  
 
 
a) est-elle  vraisemblable ? 
 
Pas du tout               1           2          3          4           5        Tout à fait  
vraisemblable  vraisemblable 
 
b) décrit-elle des situations qui arrivent… 
 
Très             1           2          3          4           5        Très  
 rarement fréquemment   
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3. A votre avis, pensez-vous que : 
 
a) Florian est responsable de la mort de Julien  
 
 Pas du tout           1           2          3          4           5        Totalement  
responsable  responsable 
 
 
b) Florian était conscient que le fait de conduire à vive allure dans un virage pouvait entraîner la mort de 
Julien  
 
 Pas du tout           1           2          3          4           5        Tout à fait  
conscient  conscient 
 
 
c) Florian a librement pris la décision de prendre le volant en sachant que cela pouvait avoir pour 
conséquence d’entraîner un accident  
 
 Pas du tout           1           2          3          4           5        Tout à fait  
 d’accord d’accord 
 
 
d) Florian a intentionnellement causé cet accident 
 
 Pas du tout           1           2          3          4           5        Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord   
 
 
 
4. Concernant l’histoire que vous venez de lire, êtes-vous d’accord avec les affirmations suivantes :  
 
 
   
a) L’acte de Florian doit être publiquement dénoncé  
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord    d’accord 
 
  
b) Florian aurait pu agir différemment 
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord   d’accord 
  
 
c) Florian a commis une faute grave 
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
  
 
d) Florian a agi avec beaucoup d’imprudence  
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
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e) Florian bénéficie de circonstances atténuantes  
 
 Pas du tout       1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
  
 
f) Florian doit répondre de ses actes devant la justice  
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
 
  
g) Florian n’a pas pris toutes les précautions nécessaires pour éviter ce qui s’est passé 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
h) Florian a agi avec négligence  
 
  Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
  d’accord   d’accord  
  
 
i) Le fait que Florian n’a pas voulu tuer ou blesser Julien est un facteur diminuant la responsabilité de 
 celui-ci  
 
  Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
  d’accord   d’accord 
  
 
 
 
5. Comment qualifieriez-vous cet événement ?  
 
a) C’est un accident 
 
  Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
  d’accord   d’accord 
  
b) C’est un homicide par négligence 
 
  Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
  d’accord   d’accord 
  
c) C’est un homicide volontaire 
 
  Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
  d’accord   d’accord 
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6. Selon vous, le mal causé aux proches de Julien peut-il être atténué si : 
 
 
a) Florian est condamné à une peine de prison 
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord   d’accord 
  
 
b) Florian s’excuse auprès d’eux et leur explique les circonstances de l’événement 
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord   d’accord  
 
 
c) Florian leur donne une certaine somme d’argent en guise de réparation morale 
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord   d’accord 
  
 
d) Florian effectue un travail d’intérêt général  
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord   d’accord 
  
 
e) Florian reconnaît ses erreurs  
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord   d’accord 
  
 
f) Florian paie une amende 
 
 Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord   d’accord 
 
  
7. Selon vous, dans quelle mesure est-ce que les acteurs sociaux suivants ont une part de responsabilité 
dans la mort de Julien ?  
 
 
a) Les parents de Florian  
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord 
  
 
b) Les autorités chargées de délivrer les permis de conduire 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord  
 
 
c) Julien  
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
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8. Selon vous, dans quelle mesure est-ce que les propositions suivantes peuvent-elles s’appliquer à la 
situation décrite ?  
 
 
a) C’est la fatalité  
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord 
  
 
b) Julien n’aurait pas du se trouver là 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord  
 
 
c) C’est le manque de valeurs des jeunes d’aujourd’hui 
 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
 
d) C’est la volonté de dieu 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord 
  
 
e) C’est le manque d’éducation des jeunes dû au laxisme des parents  
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord  
 
 
f) C’est bête 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord d’accord
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g) C’est la chance 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord 
  
 
h) Julien a pris des risques  
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord  
 
 
i) C’est le manque de normes inculquées dans la société d’aujourd’hui 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
 
j) C’était inévitable 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord 
  
 
k) C’est le hasard 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord  
 
 
l) Si Julien avait agi autrement, cela ne serait pas arrivé 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord d’accord 
 
m)  Ca aurait pu arriver à n’importe qui 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord d’accord  
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Appendix 1d  
 
III. Quelques questions générales concernant la justice vont vous être posées dans cette partie. Veuillez lire 
attentivement les énoncés et répondre. 
 
1. Veuillez lire attentivement les affirmations suivantes et y répondre à l’aide des échelles ci-dessous.  
 
Dans un procès, lorsqu’une personne ayant commis un crime est condamnée à une sanction pénale 
(une peine) donnée, cela permet de :  
 
a) aider cette personne à changer ses comportements et façons de percevoir le monde  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
b) mettre cette personne à l’écart de la société  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
c) venger la victime  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
d) dissuader la population de violer la loi  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
e) réparer le trouble causé à la société  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
f) soigner cette personne  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord   
 
 
g) réparer le dommage causé à la victime  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
h) faire honte à cette personne  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
i) faire payer cette personne pour les actes qu’elle a commis  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
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j) empêcher cette personne de nuire à la société  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
k) lui faire subir ce qu’elle mérite  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
l) faire réfléchir cette personne pour qu’elle s’améliore  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
m) réduire la probabilité que cette personne commette à nouveau un crime  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
n) rappeler à tous que les règles de la société doivent être respectées  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
o) faire souffrir la personne comme elle a fait souffrir sa victime pour qu’elle expie  
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord d’accord   
 
 
p) d’apprendre la discipline à cette personne 
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord d’accord   
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2.  Les prochaines questions concernent votre propre expérience de différents aspects de la vie.  Veuillez les lire 
attentivement et y répondre. 
 
 
 
a) A quelle fréquence discutez-vous des sujets suivants avec des personnes de votre entourage ?   
_________________________________________________________________________ 
  Tous les jours    Plusieurs fois   Plusieurs fois Plus  Jamais ou 
  ou presque par semaine par mois rarement presque 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
A) Les faits divers    
 de votre région 1 2 3 4      5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
B)  Les actualités des célébrités  1 2 3 4      5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
C) La politique suisse  ou  
la politique de votre pays 1 2 3 4      5  
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
D) Les problèmes de société 1 2 3 4      5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
E) Les actualités sportives 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F) Les nouvelles internationales 1 2 3 4      5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
G) La chronique judiciaire 1 2 3 4      5 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
b) A quelle fréquence regardez-vous les émissions suivantes à la télévision ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
  Tous les jours    Plusieurs fois   Plusieurs fois Plus         Jamais ou  
  ou presque par semaine par mois rarement presque 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
A) Le téléjournal   1 2 3 4      5       
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
B) Les séries policières 1 2 3 4      5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
C) Le sport   1 2 3 4      5 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
D) Les documentaires sur  
les problèmes de société 1 2 3 4      5  
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
C) Les émissions de téléréalité 1 2 3 4      5 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
E) Les émissions concernant 
la justice, les tribunaux 1 2 3 4      5 
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c) A quelle fréquence lisez-vous dans la presse des articles sur les sujets suivants ?  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
  Tous les jours    Plusieurs fois   Plusieurs fois Plus  Jamais ou 
  ou presque par semaine par mois rarement presque 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
A) Les faits divers    
 de votre région 1 2 3 4      5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
B)  Les actualités des célébrités  1 2 3 4      5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
C) La politique suisse  1 2 3 4      5  
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
D) Les problèmes de société 1 2 3 4      5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
E) Les actualités sportives 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F) Les nouvelles internationales 1 2 3 4      5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
G) La chronique judiciaire 1 2 3 4      5 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
d) Connaissez-vous personnellement des personnes ayant  été blessées ou tuées suite à un acte commis volontairement 
par autrui ?  
 
 Parmi vos proches (amis, connaissances, famille) Oui      Non   
 J’ai moi-même été victime d’un tel acte  Oui       Non     
   
e) Connaissez-vous personnellement des personnes ayant  été blessées ou tuées suite à un acte commis accidentellement 
par autrui ? 
 
  Parmi vos proches (amis, connaissances, famille) Oui      Non   
  J’ai moi-même été victime d’un tel acte   Oui      Non     
 
f) Connaissez-vous personnellement des personnes ayant volontairement commis un acte ayant entraîné une atteinte 
physique ou la mort d’autrui ?  
 
  Parmi vos proches (amis, connaissances, famille) Oui      Non     
 J’ai moi-même commis un tel acte Oui      Non   
 
g) Connaissez-vous personnellement des personnes ayant accidentellement commis un acte ayant entraîné une atteinte 
physique ou la mort d’autrui? 
 
  Parmi vos proches (amis, connaissances, famille) Oui      Non     
 J’ai moi-même commis un tel acte Oui      Non   
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IV. Pour terminer, nous vous prions de compléter des questions vous concernant (ces informations nous sont 
indispensables en vue de traitement statistique des résultats de l’enquête) :  
  
 
1. Vous êtes :      Femme       Homme 
 
 
2. Votre âge : …..ans 
 
 
3. Vous êtes :   célibataire   marié/e ou concubin/e   divorcé/e   veuf/e   
 
 
4. Langue maternelle :……………………………… 
 
 
5. Nationalité (veuillez indiquer toutes les nationalités si vous en avez plusieurs) : 
 
.................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
6. Veuillez indiquer votre année d’études et votre filière d’études  
 
……………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
7. Exercez-vous une profession à côté de vos études ?     Oui     Non 
 
Si oui, laquelle ? 
 
………………………………………………………………………… 
 
8. Quel est le niveau d’étude le plus élevé que votre père ait atteint ? (ne choisir qu’une réponse) 
 
 études secondaires 
 apprentissage 
 études au collège 
 études à l’université 
Autres…………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
9. Quel emploi exerce votre père actuellement ou le dernier emploi qu’il ait exercé ?  
………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
10. Quel est le niveau d’étude le plus élevé que votre mère ait atteint ?  
 
 Etudes secondaires  
 Apprentissage  
 Etudes au collège  
 Etudes à l’université  
Autres……………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 355 
 
11. Quel emploi exerce votre mère actuellement ou le dernier emploi qu’elle  
ait exercé ?  
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
12. Etes-vous actuellement, du point de vue religieux ?    
 
Croyant et pratiquant                       
Croyant mais non pratiquant  
Non croyant et non pratiquant  
 
 
13. Comment situez-vous vos préférences politiques sur une échelle Gauche-Droite ? 
 
Gauche   Gauche modérée   Centre    Droite modérée   Droite   
 
 
14. Etes-vous membre d’une ou plusieurs association(s) ?    Oui     Non 
 
Si oui, laquelle/lesquelles ? ………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Merci pour votre collaboration ! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Il est très important pour nous que vous ayez répondu à toutes les 
questions. Une rapide relecture de vos réponses vous permettra de 
vérifier que vous n’avez rien oublié.  
Si vous avez des questions ou des remarques au sujet de ce 
questionnaire, n’hésitez pas à me contacter à l’adresse email suivante : 
Mina.Rauschenbach@droit.unige.ch 
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Appendix 2a 
 
 
a) Le fait que je devienne ou non un leader dépend surtout de mes capacités. 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
b) Ma vie est en grande partie dirigée par des événements dus au hasard. 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
c) Le fait d’avoir ou non de ne pas avoir d’accident de voiture dépend surtout de mon habilité au volant. 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
d) Quand je fais des projets, je suis presque toujours sûr de les réussir. 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
e) Il n’est souvent pas possible de protéger mes intérêts contre des événements malchanceux. 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
f) Quand j’obtiens ce que je veux, c’est généralement par la chance. 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
g) Le nombre d’amis que j’ai dépend de mon degré de gentillesse personnelle.  
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
h) J’ai souvent constaté que ce qui doit arriver arrive.  
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
i) Le fait d’avoir ou de ne pas avoir d’accident de voiture est avant tout une question de hasard.  
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord 
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j) Pour moi, il n’est pas toujours sage de faire des projets trop longtemps à l’avance car de nombreuses 
choses s’avèrent être une question de bonne ou de mauvaise fortune.  
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
 
k) Parvenir ou non à être un leader dépend de la chance que j’aurai d’être à la bonne place au bon 
moment. 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord 
 
l) Je peux à peu près déterminer ce qui arrivera dans ma vie.  
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
m) En général, je suis capable de protéger mes intérêts personnels. 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord 
 
n) Quand j’obtiens ce que je veux, c’est en général parce que j’ai travaillé dur pour cela.  
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord d’accord 
 
o) Ce sont mes propres actions qui déterminent ma vie. 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord 
 
p) Que j’aie peu ou beaucoup d’amis, c’est avant tout une question de destinée. 
 
Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
d’accord  d’accord 
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4. Après avoir lu cette histoire d’Anne, est-ce que vous jugez :  
 
a) Que l’acte d’Anne était volontaire ? 
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
 
 
b) Que l’acte d’Anne était intentionnel ? 
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
 
 
c) Qu’Anne avait conscience du risque qu’elle prenait ? 
 
 Pas du tout     1           2          3          4           5      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord 
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The paragraphs that differentiate these two conditions are marked in bold. 
 
 
Recklessness condition  
 
Florian prépare une fête pour célébrer l’obtention de sa maturité. A cette occasion, il a décidé de 
réaliser un enregistrement vidéo sur ses meilleurs souvenirs. Il demande à un ami, Julien, qui fait 
une école de cinéma et qui a une caméra vidéo, de filmer certaines séquences de ce film.  
Ils se rendent sur une route de campagne et Florian demande à Julien de descendre de la voiture et 
de le filmer depuis la route pendant qu’il conduit la voiture à grande vitesse dans un virage. 
Florian dépose donc Julien à la sortie du virage et fait demi-tour pour remonter le virage et le 
reprendre en direction de Julien. Avant de reprendre ce virage, Florian appelle Julien pour 
s’assurer que la voie est libre, qu’aucune voiture n’arrive en face et que Julien est prêt à 
filmer. Il sait qu’il y a de fortes chances pour qu’il perde la maîtrise de son véhicule et cause 
un accident, mais il décide tout de même de démarrer, car il veut à tout prix faire ce film. 
Florian démarre et s’engage dans le virage à vive allure. Au moment où il sort du virage, il entend 
un choc et réalise qu’il vient de percuter Julien sans toutefois l’avoir vu avant la collision. Florian 
arrête immédiatement son véhicule, se précipite vers son ami qui gît à terre inconscient et appelle 
police-secours tout en tentant de réanimer Julien. Malheureusement, ce dernier décède quelques 
instants plus tard sur les lieux de l’accident avant que les secours n’aient pu arriver. 
 
Conscious  negligence condition  
 
Florian prépare une fête pour célébrer l’obtention de sa maturité. A cette occasion, il a 
décidé de réaliser un enregistrement vidéo sur ses meilleurs souvenirs. Il demande à un ami, 
Julien, qui fait une école de cinéma et qui a une caméra vidéo, de filmer certaines séquences 
de ce film.  
Ils se rendent sur une route de campagne et Florian demande à Julien de descendre de la 
voiture et de le filmer depuis la route pendant qu’il conduit la voiture à grande vitesse au 
moment il emprunte un virage. Florian dépose donc Julien à la sortie du virage et fait demi-
tour pour remonter le virage et le reprendre en direction de Julien. Avant de reprendre ce 
virage, Florian appelle Julien pour s’assurer que la voie est libre, qu’aucune voiture 
n’arrive en face et que Julien est prêt à filmer. Il sait que ce qu’il veut faire peut être 
dangereux, car il peut perdre la maîtrise de son véhicule et causer un accident.  
Florian démarre et s’engage dans le virage à vive allure. Au moment où il sort du virage, il 
entend un choc et réalise qu’il vient de percuter Julien sans toutefois l’avoir vu avant la 
collision. Florian arrête immédiatement son véhicule, se précipite vers son ami qui gît à 
terre inconscient et appelle police-secours tout en tentant de réanimer Julien. 
Malheureusement, ce dernier décède quelques instants plus tard sur les lieux de l’accident 
avant que les secours n’aient pu arriver. 
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The paragraphs that differentiate these two conditions are marked in bold. 
 
 
Young-work condition 
 
Florian est un jeune étudiant de 20 ans qui sort d’une longue nuit de travail dans une 
boîte de nuit. Il travaille la nuit pour pouvoir payer ses études et aller au cours 
pendant la journée.  
 
Il est fatigué, car le travail de nuit est éprouvant physiquement et il n’arrive pas à 
compenser, en dormant assez pendant le jour, le manque de sommeil accumulé par son 
travail nocturne. De plus, il a des cours la journée, dont il doit suivre la majorité s’il 
veut passer son année universitaire. Malgré la fatigue, il doit encore conduire une 
vingtaine de minutes pour arriver chez lui et pouvoir enfin dormir.  
 
Alors qu’il est dans un virage, sous le coup de la fatigue, il perd la maîtrise de son 
véhicule et vient heurter de face la voiture qui arrive sur la voie opposée. Le conducteur 
de la voiture heurtée par Florian décède quelques instants plus tard, avant que les secours 
n’aient pu arriver. Florian s’en sort avec quelques contusions et une jambe cassée. 
 
 
Young - party condition 
 
Florian est un jeune étudiant de 20 ans qui sort d’une longue nuit de fête dans une boîte 
de nuit. Il n’est pas tellement du genre à rester chez lui tout seul et adore faire la 
fête. 
 
Il est fatigué, car il sort souvent tard la nuit ces derniers temps et il n’arrive pas à 
compenser, en dormant assez pendant le jour, le manque de sommeil accumulé par ses 
sorties nocturnes. De plus, il a des cours la journée, dont il doit suivre la majorité s’il 
veut passer son année universitaire. Malgré la fatigue, il doit encore conduire une 
vingtaine de minutes pour arriver chez lui et pouvoir enfin dormir.  
 
Alors qu’il est dans un virage, sous le coup de la fatigue, il perd la maîtrise de son 
véhicule et vient heurter de face la voiture qui arrive sur la voie opposée. Le conducteur 
de la voiture heurtée par Florian décède quelques instants plus tard, avant que les secours 
n’aient pu arriver. Florian s’en sort avec quelques contusions et une jambe cassée.  
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Older-work condition 
 
Florian est un homme de 40 ans qui sort d’une longue nuit de travail dans une usine. Il 
travaille la nuit, car il est mieux payé et peut s’occuper de ses enfants le jour, 
pendant que sa femme travaille.  
 
Il est fatigué, car le travail de nuit est éprouvant physiquement et il n’arrive pas à 
compenser, en dormant assez pendant le jour, le manque de sommeil accumulé par son 
travail nocturne. De plus, il doit s’occuper de ses enfants la journée. Malgré la 
fatigue, il doit encore conduire une vingtaine de minutes pour arriver chez lui et pouvoir 
enfin dormir.  
 
Alors qu’il est dans un virage, sous le coup de la fatigue, il perd la maîtrise de son 
véhicule et vient heurter de face la voiture qui arrive sur la voie opposée. Le conducteur 
de la voiture heurtée par Florian décède quelques instants plus tard, avant que les secours 
n’aient pu arriver. Florian s’en sort avec quelques contusions et une jambe cassée.  
 
Older-party condition 
 
Florian est un homme de 40 ans qui sort d’une longue nuit de fête avec des collègues 
dans une boîte de nuit. Il aime bien sortir avec ses collègues, car cela lui permet 
d’entretenir de bonnes relations avec eux dans une atmosphère détendue.  
 
Il est fatigué, car, ces derniers temps, il accumule les sorties. Vu qu’il doit travailler 
pendant la journée, il n’arrive pas à compenser le manque de sommeil accumulé par ses 
sorties nocturnes. Malgré la fatigue, il doit encore conduire une vingtaine de minutes 
pour arriver chez lui et pouvoir enfin dormir.  
 
Alors qu’il est dans un virage, sous le coup de la fatigue, il perd la maîtrise de son 
véhicule et vient heurter de face la voiture qui arrive sur la voie opposée. Le conducteur 
de la voiture heurtée par Florian décède quelques instants plus tard, avant que les secours 
n’aient pu arriver. Florian s’en sort avec quelques contusions et une jambe cassée.  
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1. Si vous deviez sanctionner Florian, quelle est la peine qui vous paraîtrait la plus juste ?  
 
   
Aucune  Pas de peine  Peine de  1 à 6 mois 6 mois à 3 ans Plus de 3 ans 
peine de prison prison avec de prison  de prison ferme de prison ferme  
   sursis ferme 
 
 
 
0 1  2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
     
2. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d’accord avec l’affirmation suivante : 
 
Le fait que Florian veuille rentrer au plus vite chez lui pour aller se coucher justifie le fait qu’il prenne le 
volant alors qu’il est très fatigué. 
 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord d’accord 
 
 
 
3. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d’accord avec l’affirmation suivante : 
 
Florian aurait dû assumer le fait qu’il était fatigué et faire un petit somme avant de prendre la route, plutôt que de 
prendre le risque de créer un accident en roulant en étant fatigué. 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
 d’accord d’accord 
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III. Quelques questions générales concernant la justice et les sanctions vont vous être posées dans cette 
partie.  
 
  
Utiliser l’échelle d’évaluation suivante :  
 
-1  Si vous êtes opposé(e) à cette proposition 
 
0  Si vous êtes indifférent(e) à cette proposition 
 
1 Si vous êtes d’accord avec cette proposition 
 
2 Si vous êtes tout à fait d’accord avec cette proposition 
 
3 Réserver cette réponse si vous êtes d’accord sans réserves et quelles que soit les conditions.  
 
 
Veuillez lire attentivement les énoncés et y répondre à l’aide des échelles ci-dessous.  
 
 
Lorsque la justice sanctionne un acte criminel, cela permet de :  
 
 
a) aider cette personne à changer ses comportements et  
façons de percevoir le monde  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
 
  
b) mettre cette personne à l’écart de la société  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
 
  
c) venger la victime  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
d) dissuader la population de violer la loi  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
e) réparer le trouble causé à la société  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
 
  
Pour répondre aux questions vous devez vous demander : Avec quelles propositions êtes-vous le 
plus d‘accord et avec lesquelles vous êtes le plus en désaccord  
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f) soigner cette personne  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord   
 
g) réparer le dommage causé à la victime  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
h) faire honte à cette personne  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
i) faire payer cette personne pour les actes qu’elle a commis  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
j) empêcher cette personne de nuire à la société  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
k) lui faire subir ce qu’elle mérite  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
l) faire réfléchir cette personne pour qu’elle s’améliore  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
  
m) réduire la probabilité que cette personne commette à nouveau un crime  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
 
  
n) rappeler à tous que les règles de la société doivent être respectées  
 
 Pas du tout     -1           0          1          2           3      Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord  
 
  
o) faire souffrir la personne comme elle a fait souffrir sa victime pour qu’elle expie  
 
 Pas du tout     - 1           0          1          2           3       Tout à fait  
 d’accord d’accord   
 
 
p) d’apprendre la discipline à cette personne 
 
 Pas du tout      -1           0          1          2           3       Tout à fait  
 d’accord  d’accord   
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IV. Les prochaines questions concernent votre perception de la justice. Veuillez les lire attentivement 
et y répondre.  
 
1. Parmi les institutions suivantes, pouvez-vous me dire pour chacune d’elles si vous lui faites confiance 
ou pas : 
 
a) L‘école 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
confiance  confiance 
 
 
b) Les conseil fédéral 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
confiance  confiance 
 
 
c) La justice 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
confiance  confiance 
 
 
d) La presse 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
confiance  confiance 
 
 
e) La police 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
confiance  confiance 
 
 
f) Les institutions religieuses 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
  confiance      confiance  
 
 
2. Etes-vous d’accord avec les affirmations suivantes concernant la justice en général en Suisse : 
 
a) La justice en Suisse garantit généralement à tous un procès équitable.  
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
b) Les droits fondamentaux des citoyens sont bien protégés par la justice en Suisse.  
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
  
c) Lorsque quelqu’un a affaire à la justice en tant que partie, il bénéficie d’un procès équitable.  
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
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d) Les décisions pénales en Suisse sont presque toujours justes. 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
e) Le citoyen peut facilement introduire une action en justice.  
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
f) La justice donne suffisamment d’informations sur son travail.  
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
 
3. Etes-vous d’accord avec les affirmations suivantes sur les procédures au tribunal : 
 
  
a) Le langage juridique est suffisamment clair. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
b) Quelqu’un doit pouvoir être acquitté si on ne respecte pas la procédure, même s’il y a des éléments 
de preuve solides contre cette personne. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
c) Le traitement d’une affaire dure généralement trop longtemps 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
d) Les juges traitent tous les citoyens de façon égale. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
 
4. En général, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous satisfait du fonctionnement de la justice : 
 
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
satisfait   satisfait 
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5. Veuillez évaluer les affirmations suivantes sur les décisions du juge. Lors de ces décisions, le juge doit 
tenir compte…  
 
 
a) de la nature des faits 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
b) des condamnations antérieures du suspect 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
c) du dommage subi par la victime 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
d) de l’état mental du suspect 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
e) de la situation sociale du suspect 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
f) de l’opinion de la population 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
g) de l’âge du suspect 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
h) des motifs et intentions de son acte 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
i) des risques de récidive du suspect 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
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j) du repentir sincère du suspect 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
k) de la nationalité du suspect 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
l) des charges de famille du suspect 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
m) de l’effet probable de la peine sur le délinquant 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
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6. A votre avis, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d’accord que les causes suivantes peuvent expliquer la 
criminalité et la délinquance en Suisse aujourd’hui ? 
 
 
a) Il y a du chômage, des problèmes économiques. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
b) L’école ne remplit pas sa mission. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
c) Il y a une perte de valeurs morales dans la société. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
d) La police n’est pas assez efficace. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
e) Les jeunes ne sont pas assez entourés dans leur famille. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
f) Il y a une perte du sens civique. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
g) Certaines catégories de gens sont vraiment défavorisées. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
 
h) La justice n’est pas assez sévère. 
  
Pas du tout      1           2          3          4           5       Tout à fait  
d’accord   d’accord 
 
 
 
 
